
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ABRAHAM LINCOLN

A HISTORY

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY
AND JOHN HAY

VOLUME SEVEN

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ABRAHAM LINCOLN

CHAPTER I

THE ENROLLMENT AND THE DRAFT

THE successive steps by which the army of the United States, numbering some seventeen thousand men when Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated, grew to the vast aggregate of a million soldiers deserve a word of notice. We can do no more than to summarize briefly the process, referring those of our readers who may wish to study the matter more in detail to the admirable historical statement of General James B. Fry, appended to the report of the Secretary of War to the Thirty-ninth Congress. The first troops mustered into the service were the militia of the District of Columbia; thirty-eight companies were thus obtained. On the 15th of April was issued, under the law of 1795, the President's proclamation calling for 75,000 troops for ninety days. Their work was the protection of the capital; their service mainly ended with the first battle of Bull Run. On the 3d of May, the President issued a call for 42,000 volunteers to serve three years, unless sooner discharged; he increased at

1861.

CHAP. I.

the same time the regular army by eight regiments, and directed the enlistment of 18,000 seamen. This was done without authority from Congress, but the act was legalized when that body came together. The volunteers called for were immediately raised and many more were offered; but the recruits for the regular army came in slowly, and the new regiments were in fact never fully organized until the close of the war. After the disastrous battle of Bull Run the patriotism of Congress promptly rose to the emergency, and within a few days successive acts were passed giving the President authority to raise an army of a million men.

Acts of July 22, and July 25, 1861.

So enthusiastic was the response of the people in those early days that the chief embarrassment of the Government at first was to check and repress the offers of volunteers. Some regions were more liberal in their tenders of troops than others; individuals and companies rejected from one State whose quota was full, enlisted from another; pious frauds were practiced to get a place under the colors. Much confusion and annoyance afterwards resulted from these causes. Under authority of the acts of Congress referred to, a force of 637,126 men was in the service in the spring of 1862. This, it was thought, would be adequate for the work of suppressing the insurrection; the expenses of the military establishment had risen to appalling proportions, and the ill-advised resolution was taken of putting a stop to volunteer recruiting on the 3d of April. As the waste of the armies went on without corresponding successes, the error which had been committed was recognized, and recruiting was resumed in June; but before much progress

1862.

Report, Provost Marshal General, Part I., p. 9.

was made the ill-fortune of McClellan in the Peninsula, and its unfavorable effect on the public mind, chilled and discouraged recruitment. The necessity for more troops was as evident to the country as to the Government. CHAP. I.

While General McClellan was on his retreat to the James, the Governors of the loyal States signed a letter to the President requesting him to issue a call for additional troops, and it was in response to this that Mr. Lincoln issued his call, on the 2d of July, 1862, for 300,000 volunteers. The need of troops continuing and becoming more and more pressing, the call for 300,000 nine months militia was issued on the 4th of August, and in some of the States a draft from the militia was ordered, the results of which were not especially satisfactory. Only about 87,000 of the 300,000 required were reported as obtained in this way, and this number was greatly reduced by desertion before the men could be got out of their respective States. 1862.

In Pennsylvania a somewhat serious organization was formed in several counties for resisting the draft. Governor Curtin reported several thousand recusants in arms. They would not permit the drafted men who were willing to go to their duty to leave their homes, and even forced them to get out of the railway trains after they had embarked. By the prompt and energetic action of the State and National governments working in harmony, this disorder was soon suppressed. But there, as elsewhere, the enrollment was inefficient and the results entirely inadequate.

Early in the year 1863 it became evident that the armies necessary for an effective prosecution of the

CHAP. I. war could not be filled by volunteering, nor by State action alone, and a bill for enrolling and call-
1863. ing out the national forces was introduced in the Senate in the beginning of February, and at once gave rise in that body to a hot discussion. It was attacked by the Democratic Senators, who were mostly from the border States, with the greatest energy and feeling. They contended that it was in direct violation of the Constitution, and, if passed, would be subversive of the liberties of the country. They were joined by William A. Richard-
"Globe," Feb. 4, 1863, p. 709. son, who had succeeded Mr. Douglas as Senator from Illinois, and who warned his colleagues that they were plunging the country into civil war. The bill was principally defended by Henry Wilson of Massachusetts and Jacob Collamer of Vermont, the former laying most stress upon the necessities of the country, and the latter characteristically advocating the measure on legal and constitutional grounds.

The bill passed the Senate and came up in the
1863. House on the 23d of February. Abram B. Olin, who had charge of it, announced at the beginning, with a somewhat crude candor, that he proposed to permit discussion of the merits of the bill for a reasonable time and then to demand a vote upon it. He was not willing to hazard the loss of a bill he deemed so important by opening it to propositions for amendment. But in spite of this warning, perhaps by reason of it, an animated discussion at once sprang up and many amendments were offered, some in good faith, and some with the purpose of nullifying the bill. The measure was attacked with great violence. The object and purpose

of the President was proclaimed by Democratic members to be the establishment of an irresponsible despotism; and the destruction of constitutional liberty was prophesied as certain in case the bill should pass. There was a great difference of tone between the opponents and the supporters of the Administration; the latter, confident in their strength, were far more moderate in their expressions than the former, but there were reproaches and recriminations on both sides. Democrats, like Mr. Cox of Ohio, Mr. Biddle of Pennsylvania, and Messrs. Mallory and Wickliffe of Kentucky, claimed that the antislavery measures of the Administration were the sole cause of military failure, and that if the President would return to constitutional ways the armies would soon be filled by volunteering; to which the Republicans answered that the cessation of volunteering was due to the treasonable speech and conduct of the opposition.

Some unimportant amendments were attached to the bill, which was sent back to the Senate for concurrence, and after another debate, scarcely less passionate than the first, the amendments of the House were adopted and the measure became a law, by the approval of the President, on the 3d of March, 1863.

This was the first law enacted by Congress by which the Government of the United States without the intervention of the authorities of the several States appealed directly to the nation to create large armies. The act declared that, with certain exceptions especially set forth, all able-bodied male citizens and persons of foreign birth who had declared their intention to become citizens, between

CHAP. I. the ages of 20 and 45, should constitute the national forces, and empowered the President to call them forth by draft. All were to be called out if necessary; the first call was actually for one-fifth, but that was a measure of expediency. The act provided for the appointment or detail, by the President, of a provost marshal general, who was to be the head of a bureau in the War Department, and for dividing the States into districts coinciding with those for the election of Congressmen. The District of Columbia and the Territories formed additional districts. A provost marshal was authorized for each of these districts, with whom was associated a commissioner and a surgeon. The board thus formed was required to divide its district into as many sub-districts as might be found necessary, to appoint an enrolling officer for each, and to make an enrollment immediately.

Colonel James B. Fry, an assistant adjutant-general of the army, who had formerly been chief-of-staff to General Buell, and who was not only an accomplished soldier but an executive officer of extraordinary tact, ability, and industry, was made provost marshal general. Officers of the army, selected for their administrative capacity, were appointed provost marshals for the several States. The enrollment began the latter part of May, and was pushed forward with great energy, except in the border States, where there was some difficulty found in selecting the proper boards of enrollment. While there was more or less opposition, General Fry says: "It could not be said to be serious; some of the officers were maltreated, and one or two assassinated, but prompt action on the part of

the civil authorities, aided when necessary by military patrols, secured the arrest of guilty parties and checked these outrages."

Those who attempted to obstruct enrollment officers were promptly punished, and orders from the War Department gave a clear definition of what constituted impediments to the drafts. Not only the assaulting or obstructing of officers was cause for punishment, but even standing mute, and the giving of false names, subjected the offender to summary arrest.

In addition to the duties of enrolling all citizens capable of bearing arms, of drafting from these the numbers required for military service, and of arresting deserters and returning them to the army, the Provost Marshal General was also charged with the entire work of recruiting volunteers. This insured harmony and systematic action in the two methods of raising troops, and the work was carried on with constantly increasing efficiency and success. A comparatively small number of men was obtained strictly by the draft, but the draft powerfully stimulated enlistments, and the money obtained by commutation furnished an ample fund for all the expenses of the bureaus of recruitment. Improvements in the law and the modes of executing it were constantly made, until at the close of the war the system was probably as perfect as human ingenuity could make it under the peculiar conditions of American life. The result proved the vast military resources of the nation. In April, 1865, with a million soldiers in the field, the enrollment showed that the national forces, not called out, consisted of 2,245,000 more. We quote the

CHAP. I.

aggregates of the successive calls and their results from General Fry's final report. The quotas charged against the States, under all calls made by the President during the four years from the 15th of April, 1861, when his first proclamation echoed the guns at Sumter, to the 14th of April, 1865, when Lincoln was assassinated and recruiting ceased, amounted to 2,759,049; the terms of service varying from three months to three years. The aggregate number of men credited on the several calls, and put into service in the army, navy, and marine corps, was 2,690,401. This left a deficiency of sixty-eight thousand, which would have been readily filled if the war had not closed. In addition to these some seventy thousand "emergency men" were from first to last called into service.[1]

Report, Provost Marshal General p. 46.

During the progress of the work an infinite variety of questions arose as to the quotas and the credits of the several States, and the President was

[1] The following details of the several calls and their results are taken from a report made to Congress by the Secretary of War in the Session of 1865–66:

	Number of Men.	*Term of Service.*
Call of April 15, 1861, for 75,000 men produced	98,235	3 months
Calls of May 3, July 22 and 25, 1861, for 500,000 produced	2,715	6 months
	9,056	1 year
	30,952	2 years
	657,863	3 years
Call of July 2, 1862, for 500,000 men produced	419,627	3 years
Call of August 4, 1862, for 300,000 men produced	86,860	9 months
Proclamation of June 15, 1863, for militia (100,000)	16,361	6 months
Calls of October 15, 1863, and February 1, 1864, for 500,000 men	374,807	3 years
Call of March 14, 1864, for 200,000 men	284,021	3 years
Militia mustered in the spring of 1864	83,612	100 days
Call of July 18, 1864, for 500,000	149,356	1 & 2 yrs.
	234,798	3 years
	728	4 years
Call of December 19, 1864, for 300,000	151,105	1 year
	5,076	2 years
	48,065	3 years
	312	4 years

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1865, p. 31.

The aggregate shows a great many more soldiers than ever served, as a large number enlisted more than once. Veteran volunteers to the number of 150,000 reënlisted in 1863–64. Deserters and bounty-jumpers must also be deducted.

overwhelmed by complaints and reclamations from various Governors in the North. Even the most loyal supporters of the Administration exerted themselves to the utmost to have the demands upon them reduced and their credits for troops furnished raised to the highest possible figure; while in those States which were politically under the control of the opposition these natural importunities were aggravated by what seemed a deliberate intention to frustrate as far as possible the efforts of the Government to fill its depleted armies.[1] The most serious controversy that arose during the progress of the enrollment was that begun and carried on by Governor Seymour of New York.

So long as the administration of Governor E. D. Morgan lasted the Government received the most zealous and efficient support from the State of New York. It is true that at the close of Governor Morgan's term, the last day of 1862, the Adjutant-General reported the State deficient some 28,000 men in volunteers under the various calls of the Government, 18,000 of which deficiency belonged to the city of New York. But in spite of this

[1] Though the President knew that fairness and accuracy prevailed in the demands made upon the different localities for their proportion of troops, he was so much embarrassed by complaints that he found it necessary at last to constitute a board, consisting of Attorney-General Speed, General Delafield, Chief of Engineers, and Colonel Foster, Assistant Adjutant-General, to examine into the proper quotas and credits, and to report errors if they found any therein, and he announced in the order constituting the board that its determination should be final and conclusive. The board went carefully over the whole subject, explained the mode of proceeding adopted by the Provost Marshal General, and said: "The rule is in conformity to the requirements of the laws of Congress and is just and equitable; we have carefully examined and proved the work done under this rule by the Provost Marshal General, and find it has been done with fairness." This report was formally approved by the President.

CHAP. I. deficiency there had never been any lack of cordial coöperation on the part of the State government with that of the nation. In the autumn of that year, however, in the period of doubt and discouragement which existed more or less throughout the Union, General James S. Wadsworth, the Republican candidate for governor, had been defeated after a most acrimonious contest by Horatio Seymour, then, and until his death, the most honored and prominent Democratic politician of the State. He came into power upon a platform denouncing almost every measure which the Government had found it necessary to adopt for the suppression of the rebellion; and upon his inauguration, on the first day of 1863, he clearly intimated that his principal duty would be "to maintain and defend the sovereignty and jurisdiction of his State."

1862.

The President, anxious to work in harmony with the Governors of all the loyal States, and especially desirous on public grounds to secure the cordial coöperation in war matters of the State administration in New York, had written to Mr. Seymour soon after his inauguration as governor, inviting his confidence and friendship.

> You and I are substantially strangers, and I write this chiefly that we may become better acquainted. I, for the time being, am at the head of a nation which is in great peril; and you are at the head of the greatest State of that nation. As to maintaining the nation's life and integrity, I assume and believe there cannot be a difference of purpose between you and me. If we should differ as to the means it is important that such difference should be as small as possible; that it should not be enhanced by unjust suspicions on one side or the other. In the performance of my duty the coöper-

ation of your State, as that of others, is needed,—in fact, is indispensable. This alone is a sufficient reason why I should wish to be at a good understanding with you. Please write me at least as long a letter as this, of course saying in it just what you think fit.

Lincoln to Seymour, March 23, 1863. MS.

The Governor waited three weeks, and then made a cold and guarded reply, retaining in this private communication the attitude of reserve and distrust he had publicly assumed. He said:

I have delayed answering your letter for some days with a view of preparing a paper in which I wished to state clearly the aspect of public affairs from the standpoint I occupy. I do not claim any superior wisdom, but I am confident the opinions I hold are entertained by one-half of the population of the Northern States. I have been prevented from giving my views in the manner I intended by a pressure of official duties, which at the present stage of the legislative session of this State confines me to the executive chamber until each midnight.

After the adjournment, which will soon take place, I will give you without reserve my opinions and purposes with regard to the condition of our unhappy country. In the mean while I assure you that no political resentments, or no personal objects, will turn me aside from the pathway I have marked out for myself. I intend to show to those charged with the administration of public affairs a due deference and respect, and to yield them a just and generous support in all measures they may adopt within the scope of their constitutional powers. For the preservation of this Union I am ready to make any sacrifice of interest, passion, or prejudice.

Seymour to Lincoln, April 14, 1863. MS.

This closed the personal correspondence between them. The Governor never wrote the promised letter; he did not desire to commit himself to any friendly relations with the President. With the narrowness of a bitterly prejudiced mind he had given an interpretation to the President's cordial

CHAP. I.

overture as false as it was unfavorable. In an article, published with his sanction many years afterwards, he is represented as expressing his conviction that at the time of this correspondence there was a conspiracy of prominent Republicans to force Lincoln out of the White House; that the President was aware of it, and that this was "the cause of the anxiety which he displayed to be on intimate friendly terms with Mr. Seymour." There could be no intimate understanding between two such men. Mr. Lincoln could no more comprehend the partisan bitterness and suspicion which lay at the basis of Mr. Seymour's character than the latter could appreciate the motives which induced Lincoln to seek his cordial coöperation in public work for the general welfare. He gave the same base interpretation to a complimentary message which Stanton sent him in June, 1863, thanking him for the energy with which he had sent forward troops for the defense of Pennsylvania; and when, a year later, Stanton invited him to Washington for a consultation he refused either to go or to reply to the invitation.

"New-York Times," Aug. 18, 1879.

Ibid.

Thurlow Weed is quoted as saying in his later years that Mr. Lincoln, after Seymour's election and before his inauguration, authorized Mr. Weed to say to him that holding his position he could wheel the Democratic party into line and put down the rebellion; and that if he would render this great service to the country Mr. Lincoln would cheerfully make way for him as his successor. Mr. Weed says he made this suggestion to Seymour; but that the latter preferred to administer his office as an irreconcilable and conscientious partisan. It is probable

T. W. Barnes, "Memoir of Thurlow Weed." Vol. II., p. 428.

that Mr. Weed, as is customary with elderly men, exaggerated the definiteness of the proposition; but these letters show how anxious Lincoln was that Seymour should give a loyal support to the Government, and in how friendly and self-effacing a spirit he would have met him.

In what must be said in regard to the controversy in which Governor Seymour soon found himself engaged with the National Government, there is no question of his personal integrity or his patriotism. He doubtless considered that he was only doing his duty to his State and his party in opposing almost every specific act of the National Government. The key to all his actions in respect to the draft is to be found in his own words: "It is believed," he said, "by at least one-half of the people of the loyal States that the conscription act is in itself a violation of the supreme constitutional law."[1] This belief he heartily shared, and no moral blame attaches to him for trying to give it effect in his official action. His conduct led to disastrous

[1] The attacks upon the constitutionality of the enrollment act were mainly political. Several attempts were made to have it declared invalid by the courts, but these were generally unsuccessful. In the United States Circuit Courts of Pennsylvania and Illinois two important decisions were rendered, the one by Judge Cadwalader and the other by Judge Treat (Judge Davis concurring), affirming the constitutionality of the law. Only one important decision in the contrary sense was obtained, and that was in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Chief-Justice Lowrie and Justices Woodward and Thompson concurring in the decision that the law was unconstitutional; Justices Strong and Read dissenting. This decision was afterwards reversed. Chief-Justice Lowrie was a candidate for reëlection and Justice Woodward ran for governor the next year. The main issue in the canvass was this decision. They were both defeated by large majorities, A. G. Curtin being reëlected Governor, and Daniel Agnew taking the place of Lowrie on the bench. The court, thus reconstituted, reversed the former decision, Woodward and Thompson dissenting.

CHAP. I. results; his views of government were shown to be mistaken and unsound. The nation went on its triumphant way over all the obstacles interposed by him and those who believed with him, and during the quarter of a century which elapsed before his death his chief concern was to throw upon the Government the blame of his own factious proceedings.

He constantly accused the Administration of Mr. Lincoln of an unfair and partisan execution of the law, which he regarded in itself as unconstitutional. He assumed that because the enrollment of the arms-bearing population of New York City, which had given a majority for him, showed an excess over the enrollment in the rural districts, which had given a large majority for Wadsworth, that the city was to be punished for being Democratic and the country rewarded for being Republican; to which the most natural reply was that the volunteering had been far more active in the Republican districts than it had been in the Democratic. He attacked all the proceedings of the provost marshals. He accused them of neglect and contumacy towards himself. All these accusations were wholly unfounded. General Fry was a man as nearly without politics as a patriotic American can be. He came of a distinguished Democratic family, and during a life passed in the military service his only preoccupation had been the punctual fulfillment of every duty confided to him. The district provost marshals for the city of New York were selected with especial care from those recommended by citizens of the highest character in the place. Three provost marshal

generals were appointed for New York, and great pains were taken to choose "those who would be likely to secure the favor and coöperation of the authorities and the people of New York." They were Major Frederick Townsend, Colonel Robert Nugent, and Major A. S. Diven. Nugent was an Irishman, a war Democrat, and Diven "an intimate acquaintance and personal friend of Governor Seymour." Townsend was a well-known resident of Albany. They were specially charged to put themselves in communication with the Governor, to acquaint themselves with his views and wishes, and to give them due weight in determining the best interests of the Government; and to endeavor, by all means in their power, to secure for the execution of the enrollment act the aid and hearty coöperation of the Governor, State officers, and the people. A letter was at the same time written to the Governor by the Provost Marshal General commending these officers to him and asking for them his coöperation. A similar letter was sent to the Mayor of New York City.

General J. B. Fry, "New York and the Conscription," p. 14.

Ibid., p. 15.

The Government exhausted all its powers in endeavoring to commend the enrollment to the favorable consideration of the civil officers of the State. "But Governor Seymour," says General Fry, "gave no assistance; in fact, so far as the Government officers engaged in the enrollment could learn, he gave the subject no attention." Without the aid or countenance of the Governor, in face of his quiet hostility, the enrollment was carried forward as rapidly as possible. The work was impeded by numerous and important obstacles; the

Ibid., p. 18.

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large floating population of the city threw great difficulties in its way; opposition was encountered in almost every house the enrolling officers entered. Where artifice did not succeed violence was sometimes attempted. In some places organized bodies of men opposed the enrollment, in others secret societies waged a furtive warfare against the officers. But in spite of all these drawbacks the enrollment was made with remarkable fairness and substantial success. It was no more imperfect than was inevitable, and the draft which followed it was conducted in such a manner as to neutralize to a great extent the irregularities and hardships that might have resulted from the errors it contained.

Report, Provost Marshal General.

The enrollment having been completed, the orders for drafting in the State of New York were issued on the 1st of July. At that date the draft had been going on for some time in New England. Colonel Nugent was left at liberty, if thought expedient, to execute the draft in New York City by districts, and in one or more at a given time, rather than all at once, throughout the city. Governor Seymour was notified in almost daily letters, from the 1st to the 13th of July, of the drafts which had been ordered in the several districts. The Provost Marshal General begged him to do all in his power to enable the officers "to complete the drafts promptly, effectually, fairly, and successfully." He paid no attention to these requests further than to send his adjutant-general to Washington on the 11th of July for the purpose of urging the suspension of the draft. But while this officer was away upon his mission the evil passions excited in

1863.

General J. B. Fry, "New York and the Conscription," p. 23.



GENERAL JAMES B. FRY.

the breasts of the lowest class of Democrats in New York City, by the denunciations of the enrollment act and of the legally constituted authorities who were endeavoring to enforce it, broke out in the most terrible riot which this Western continent has ever witnessed.

The state of popular distrust and excitement which naturally arose from the discussion of the enrollment was greatly increased by the vehement utterances of the more violent Democratic politicians and newspapers. Governor Seymour, in a speech delivered on the 4th of July, which was filled with denunciations of the party in power, said: "The Democratic organization look upon this Administration as hostile to their rights and liberties; they look upon their opponents as men who would do them wrong in regard to their most sacred franchises."

The "Journal of Commerce" accused the Administration of prolonging the war for its own purposes, and added, "such men are neither more nor less than murderers." "The World," denouncing "the weak and reckless men who temporarily administer the Federal Government," attacked especially the enrollment bill as an illegal and despotic measure. The "Daily News," which reached a larger number of the masses of New York than any other journal, quoted Governor Seymour as saying that neither the President nor Congress, without the consent of the State authorities, had a right to force a single individual against his will "to take part in the ungodly conflict which is distracting the land." It condemned the manner in which the draft was being executed as "an outrage on all decency and

CHAP. I. fairness," the object of it being to "kill off Democrats and stuff the ballot-boxes with bogus soldier votes." Incendiary hand-bills in the same sense were distributed through the northern districts of the city, thickly populated by laboring men of foreign birth.

Although there had been for several days mutterings of discontent in the streets, and even threats uttered against the enrolling officers, these demonstrations had been mostly confined to the drinking saloons, and no apprehensions of popular tumult were entertained. Even on Saturday morning, the 1863. 11th of July, when the draft was to begin at the corner of 43d street and Third Avenue, there was no symptom of disturbance. The day passed pleasantly away, the draft was carried on regularly and good-humoredly, and at night the Superintendent of Police, as he left the office, said, "the Rubicon was passed and all would go well." But the next day, being Sunday, afforded leisure for the ferment of suspicion and anger. Every foreigner who was drafted became a center of sympathy and excitement. There were secret meetings in many places on Sunday night, and on the next morning parties of men went from shop to shop, compelling workmen to join them and swell the processions which were moving to the above-mentioned office of the Enrollment Board.

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1863, p. 811.

The Commissioner proceeded quietly with his work; the wheel was beginning to turn; a few names were called and recorded; when suddenly a large paving-stone came crashing through the window and landed upon the reporters' table, shivering the inkstands, and knocking over one or two

bystanders; and with hardly a moment's interval a volley of stones flew through the windows, putting a stop to the proceedings.

The crowd, kindled into fury by its own act, speedily became a howling mob; the rioters burst through the doors and windows, smashing the furniture of the office into splinters, sprinkled camphene upon the floor, and set the building on fire. When the Fire Department arrived they found the mob in possession of the hydrants, and the building was soon reduced to ashes. This furious outburst took the authorities completely by surprise.[1] The most trustworthy portion of the organized militia had been ordered to Pennsylvania to resist the invasion of General Lee. There was only a handful of troops in the harbor, and the mob having possession of the street railways prevented, for a time, the rapid concentration of these, while the police, who were admirable in organization and efficiency, being at the time under Republican control,[2] were, of course, inadequate to deal, during the

[1] General Fry, in his valuable treatise, "New York and the Conscription of 1863," p. 30, gives the following as reasons why no large military force was assembled to preserve the public peace in New York:

On the occasion of the first draft "these questions were carefully weighed by the President and the War Department. The conclusions were that no exception in the application of the law should be made in New York; that no presumption that the State or city authorities would fail to coöperate with the Government should be admitted; that a Federal military force ought not to be assembled in New York City on the mere assumption that a law of the United States would be violently and extensively resisted; and that if it were thought best to assemble such a force there was none to be had without losing campaigns then going on, or battles then impending."

[2] Several years afterwards Governor Seymour said: "The draft riots of 1863 were put down mainly by the energy, boldness, and skill of the Police Department. In saying this, I am certainly not influenced by prejudice, for the force was politically and in some degree personally unfriendly to myself."

CHAP. I. first hours of the outbreak, with an army of excited and ignorant men, recruited in an instant from hundreds of workshops and excited by drink and passionate declamation. The agitation and disorder spread so rapidly that the upper part of the city was in a few hours in full possession of the maddened crowd, the majority of them filled with that aimless thirst for destruction which rises so naturally in a mob when the restraints of order are withdrawn. They were led by wild zealots, excited by political hates and fears, or by common thieves who found in the tumult their opportunity for plunder. By three o'clock in the afternoon the body of rioters in the upper part of the city numbered several thousand. Their first fury was naturally directed against the enrolling offices. After the destruction of the building in the Ninth District they attacked the block of stores in which the enrolling office of the Eighth District stood.[1] The adjoining shops were filled with jewelry and other costly goods, and were speedily swept clean by the thievish hands of the rioters, and then set on fire; here, as before, the firemen were not permitted to play on the flames.

But the political animus of the mob was shown most clearly by the brutal and cowardly outrages inflicted upon negroes. They dashed with the merriment of fiends on every colored face they saw, taking special delight in the maiming and murdering of women and children. Late in the afternoon of the 13th the mob made a rush for the fine building of the Colored Orphan Asylum.[2] This estimable charity was founded and carried on

[1] Broadway, near 29th street. [2] Fifth Avenue and 44th street.

by a society of kind-hearted ladies; it gave not only shelter but instruction and Christian training to several hundred colored orphans. A force of policemen was hastily gathered together, but could only defend the asylum for a few minutes, giving time for the inmates to escape. The policemen were then disabled by the brutal mob, who rushed into the building, stealing everything which was portable, and then setting the house on fire. They burned the residences of several Government officers, and a large hotel which refused them liquor.

For three days these horrible scenes of unchained fury and hatred lasted. An attack upon the "New York Tribune" office was a further evidence of the political passion of the mob, headed at this point by a lame secessionist barber who had just before been heard to express the hope that he "might soon shave Jeff. Davis in New York," and who led on the rioters with loud cheers for General McClellan; but after dismantling the counting-room they were attacked and driven away by the police. Colonel H. T. O'Brien, having sprained his ankle while gallantly resisting the mob, stepped into a drug-store for assistance while his detachment passed on. The druggist, fearing the rioters, begged O'Brien to leave his shop, and the brave soldier went out among the howling crowd. In a moment they were upon him, and beat and trampled him into unconsciousness. For several hours the savages dragged the still breathing body of their own countryman up and down the streets, inflicting every indignity upon his helpless form, and then, shouting and yelling, conveyed him to his own

Trial of J. H. Whittier, Aug. 12, 1863.

CHAP. I. door. There a courageous priest sought to subdue their savagery by reading the last offices for the dying over the unfortunate colonel; the climax of horror was reached by the brutal ruffians jostling the priest aside and closing the ceremonies by dancing upon the corpse. From beginning to end they showed little courage; they were composed, for the greater part, of the most degraded class of foreigners, and as a rule they made no stand when attacked either by the police or the military in any number. The only exception to this rule was in the case of a squad of marines who foolishly fired into the air when confronting the rioters. A company of fifty regulars was able to work its will against thousands of them. The city government, the trusty and courageous police force, and the troops in the harbor at last came into harmonious action, and gradually established order throughout the city.

The State government was of little avail from beginning to end of the disturbance. Governor Seymour having done all he could to embarrass the Government and rouse the people against it, had
July, 1863. left the city on the 11th and gone to Long Branch in New Jersey. On the receipt of the frightful news of the 13th he returned to the city a prey to the most terrible agitation. He was hurried by his friends to the City Hall, where a great crowd soon gathered, and there, in sight of the besieged "Tribune" office, he made the memorable address, the discredit of which justly clung to him all his days. His terror and his sympathy with the mob, in conflict with his convictions of public duty, completely unmanned him. He addressed the

rioters in affectionate tones, as his "friends," and assured them that he had "come to show them a test of his friendship." He informed them that he had sent his adjutant to Washington to confer with the authorities there and to have the draft suspended. This assurance was received with the most vociferous cheers. He urged them to act as good citizens, leaving their interests to him. "Wait until my adjutant returns from Washington," he said, "and you shall be satisfied." The words in this extraordinary speech for which the Governor was most blamed were those in which he addressed the mob as his friends; but this was a venial fault, pardonable in view of his extreme agitation. The serious matter was his intimation that the draft justified the riot, and that if the rioters would cease from their violence the draft should be stopped.[1] CHAP. I.

He issued two proclamations on the 14th, one mildly condemning the riot and calling upon the persons engaged in it to retire to their homes and employments, and another, somewhat sterner in tone, declaring the city and county of New York to be in a state of insurrection, and warning all who might resist the State authorities of their liability to the penalties prescribed by law. It is questionable if the rioters ever heard of the proclamations, and, if they did, the effect of these July, 1863.

[1] "While the riot was going on he [Governor Seymour] had an interview with Colonel Nugent, the acting Provost Marshal General, New York City, and insisted on the colonel's announcing a suspension of the draft. The draft had already been stopped by violence. The announcement was urged by the Governor, no doubt, because he thought it would allay the excitement; but it was, under the circumstances, making a concession to the mob, and endangering the successful enforcement of the law of the land."—General James B. Fry, "New York and the Conscription of 1863," p. 33.

CHAP. I. official utterances was entirely nullified by the Governor's sympathetic speeches. The riots came to a bloody close on the night of Thursday, the fourth day. A small detachment of soldiers[1] met the principal body of rioters in Third Avenue and 21st street, killed thirteen and wounded eighteen more, taking some dozens of prisoners. The fire of passion had burned itself out by this time, and the tired mob, now thoroughly dominated, slunk away to its hiding places. During that night and the next day the militia were returning from Pennsylvania; several regiments of veterans arrived from the Army of the Potomac, and the peace of the city was once more secured. The rioters had kept the city in terror for four days and had destroyed two millions of property. For several days afterwards arrests went on, and many of the wounded law-breakers died in their retreats afraid to call for assistance.

There were disturbances more or less serious in other places, which were speedily put down by the local authorities, but, as Mr. Greeley says: "In no single instance was there a riot incited by drafting wherein Americans by birth bore any considerable part, nor in which the great body of the actors were not born Europeans, and generally of recent importation." The part taken by Archbishop Hughes in this occurrence gave rise to various commentaries. He placarded about the city on the
1863. 16th of July an address "to the men of New York, who are now called in many papers rioters," inviting them to come to his house and let him talk to them, assuring them of immunity from the police

[1] Of the Twelfth Regulars under Captain H. R. Putnam.

in going and coming. "You who are Catholics," the address concluded, "or as many of you as are, have a right to visit your bishop without molestation." On the 17th, at two o'clock, a crowd of four or five thousand persons assembled in front of the Archbishop's residence,[1] and the venerable prelate, clad in his purple robes and full canonical attire, appeared at the window and made a strange speech to the mob, half jocular and half earnest, alternately pleading, cajoling, and warning them. He told them that he "did not see a riotous face among them." He did not accuse them of having done anything wrong. He said that every man had a right to defend his house or his shanty at the risk of his life; that they had no cause to complain, "as Irishmen and Catholics," against the Government, and affectionately suggested whether it might not be better for them to retire to their homes and keep out of danger. He begged them to be quiet in the name of Ireland — "Ireland, that never committed a single act of cruelty until she was oppressed; Ireland, that has been the mother of heroes and poets, but never the mother of cowards." The crowd greeted his speech with uproarious applause and quietly dispersed.

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July, 1863.

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1863.

The number of those who lost their lives during the riots has never been ascertained. The mortality statistics for that week and the week succeeding show an increase of five or six hundred over the average. Governor Seymour estimated the number of killed and wounded at one thousand; others placed it much higher.

Naturally, in such days of terror and anger,

[1] Corner Madison Avenue and 36th street.

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there were not wanting those who asserted that the riots were the result and the manifestation of a widespread treasonable conspiracy involving leading Democrats at the North. The President received many letters to this effect, one relating the alleged confession of a well-known politician who, overcome with agitation and remorse, had in the presence of the editors of the "Tribune" divulged the complicity of Seymour and others in the preparation of the *émeute*. But he placed no reliance upon the story, and there was in fact no foundation for it. With all his desire to injure the Administration, Governor Seymour had not the material of an insurrectionist in his composition, and when the riot came his excitement and horror were the best proof that he had not expected it.

J. R. Gilmore to Lincoln, July 17, 1863. MS.

The scenes of violence in New York were not repeated anywhere else, if we except a disturbance at Boston which for a time threatened to become serious, but was put down by the prompt and united action of the civil and military authorities; but the ferment of opposition was so general as to give great disquietude to many friends of the Government throughout the country. Leading Unionists in Philadelphia, fearing a riot there, besought the President by mail and telegraph to stop the draft. In Chicago a similar appeal was made, and by recruitment and volunteering the necessity of a draft was avoided in Illinois until the next year.

No provision of the enrollment law excited such ardent opposition as that which was introduced for the purpose of mitigating its rigors—the provision exempting drafted men from service upon payment

of three hundred dollars. "The rich man's money against the poor man's blood" was a cry from which no demagogue could refrain, and it was this which contributed most powerfully to rouse the unthinking masses against the draft. The money paid for exemptions was used, under the direction of the Provost Marshal General, for the raising of recruits and the payment of the expenses of the draft. It amounted to a very large sum — to twenty-six millions of dollars. After all expenses were paid there was a remainder of nine millions left to the credit of that Bureau in the Treasury of the United States. The exemption fund was swelled by the action of county and municipal authorities, especially by those of New York, who, in the flurry succeeding the riots, passed in great haste an ordinance to pay the commutation for drafted men of the poorer class. A certain impetus was given to volunteering also, but the money came in faster than the men; and in June, 1864, the Provost Marshal General reported that out of some 14,000 drafted men, 7000 were exempted for various reasons and 5000 paid money commutation. This statement was sent to Congress by the President with the recommendation that the commutation clause be repealed. This was done after a hot discussion which exhibited a curious change of front on the question, Willard Saulsbury, William A. Richardson, and other Democrats energetically opposing the repeal and making it the occasion of as bitter attacks on the Administration as those which had been for a year directed against the law.

Act approved July 4, 1864.

"Globe," June 23, 1864.

It may not be without interest to look for a moment at the measures pursued by the Confederate

CHAP. I. authorities to raise and maintain their army. There is a striking contrast between methods and results on either side of the line. The methods of the Confederates were far more prompt and more rigorous than those of the National Government, while the results attained were so much less satisfactory that their failure in this respect brought about the final catastrophe of their enterprise. They began the war with forces greatly superior in numbers to those of the Union. Before the attack on Fort Sumter their Congress had authorized the raising of an army of 100,000 men, and Mr. Davis had called into service 36,900 men, more than twice the army of the United States; and immediately after beginning hostilities he called for 32,000 more. On the 8th of May the Confederate Congress gave Mr. Davis almost unlimited power to accept the services of volunteers without regard to place of enlistment, and a few days later he was relieved by statute of the delays and limitations of formal calls, and all power of appointment to commissions was placed in his hands. So that, while from the beginning to the end the most punctilious respect was paid by the National Executive and Legislature to the rights of the loyal States in the matter of recruitment, the States which had seceded on the pretext of preserving their autonomy speedily gave themselves into the hands of a military dictator.

In December, 1861, the term of enlistment was changed from one to three years, the pitiful bounty of fifty dollars being given as compensation. During all that winter recruiting languished, and several statutes, continually increasing in severity, were passed with little effect; and on the 16th of

April, 1862, the Confederate Congress passed a sweeping measure of universal conscription, authorizing the President to call and place in the military service for three years, unless the war should end sooner, "all white men who are residents of the Confederate States, between the ages of 18 and 35 years," not legally exempt from service; and arbitrarily lengthening to three years the terms of those already enlisted. A law so stringent was of course impossible of perfect execution. Under the clamor and panic of their constituencies the Confederate Congress passed, repealed, and modified various schemes of exemption intended to permit the ordinary routine of civil life to pursue its course, but great confusion and heart-burnings arose from every effort which was made to ease the workings of the inexorable machine. The question of overseers of plantations was one especially difficult to treat. The law of the 11th of October, 1862, exempted one man for every plantation of twenty negroes. This system was further extended from time to time, but owners of slaves were obliged to pay five hundred dollars a year for each exemption. By one statute it was provided that, on plantations where these exemptions were granted, the exempt should pay two hundred pounds of meat for every able-bodied slave on the plantation. Gradually all exemptions as of right were legislated away, and the whole subject was left to the discretion of the Executive, which vastly increased his power and his unpopularity. It finally rested upon him to say how many editors, ministers, railroad engineers and expressmen were absolutely required to keep up the current of life in the business of the country.

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The limit of age was constantly extended. In September, 1862, an act of the Confederate Congress authorized the President to call into service all white men resident in the Confederate States, between the ages of 18 and 45; and in February, 1864, another law included all between 17 and 50, which gave occasion to Grant for his celebrated *mot* — afterwards credited by him to General Butler — that the Confederates were "robbing both the cradle and the grave" to fill their armies.

"Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant," Vol. II. p. 426.

Severe and drastic as were these laws, and unrelenting as was the insurrectionary Government in their execution, they were not carried out with anything like the system and thoroughness which characterized the action of the National authorities. The Confederate generals were constantly complaining that they got no recruits, or not enough to supply the waste of campaigns. On the 30th of April, 1864, the chief of the bureau of conscription at Richmond made a report to the Secretary of War, painting in the darkest colors the difficulties encountered by him in getting soldiers into the ranks, though he had all the laws and regulations he needed and there were men enough in the country. He said,—and in these words confessed that the system had failed and that the defeat of the revolt was now but a question of time,— "The results indicate this grave consideration for the Government, that fresh material for the armies can no longer be estimated as an element of future calculation for their increase, and that necessity demands the invention of devices for keeping in the ranks the men now borne on the rolls. The stern revocation of all details, an appeal to the

Report of Col. John Preston printed in the final Report of the Provost Marshal General of the United States, p. 122.

patriotism of the States claiming large numbers of able-bodied men, and the accretions by age, are now almost the only unexhausted sources of supply. For conscription from the general population the functions of this bureau may cease with the termination of the year 1864."

CHAPTER II

THE LINCOLN-SEYMOUR CORRESPONDENCE

CHAP. II.

GOVERNOR SEYMOUR was too thorough a partisan to undergo any change of opinion in consequence of the riotous scenes which had so shaken his own nerves and so frightfully disturbed the peace of New York. On the contrary, he was only the more convinced of the illegality and impolicy of the draft, and at once dispatched Samuel J. Tilden and other prominent citizens to Washington to urge the President to suspend it. He supplemented these personal solicitations by repeated telegrams asking that the draft be suspended until the President should receive a letter which he was preparing. In this letter, which was dated the 3d of August, the Governor denounced the enrollment and draft as a "harsh" and "unfortunate" measure. He claimed that injustice was done in assigning the quotas; that they were not in proportion to the relative population of the several districts; and urged, with the greatest earnestness and persistence, that the draft should be suspended in the State of New York until measures should be taken by the courts to ascertain its constitutionality, a point which the Governor had already decided for himself. He said in this letter that "it is believed by

J. B. Fry, "New York and the Conscription," p. 34.

1863.

at least one-half of the people of the loyal States that the conscription act . . . is in itself a violation of the supreme constitutional law"; and in a tone of sullen menace he warned the President against persisting in the enforcement of the law. "I do not dwell," he said, "upon what I believe would be the consequence of a violent, harsh policy, before the constitutionality of the act is tested. You can scan the immediate future as well as I." He then demanded that the enrolling officers should submit their lists to the State authorities and that an opportunity should be given him, as Governor, to test the fairness of the proceedings. He left entirely out of view in this letter the fact that he had been repeatedly invited and urged to coöperate with the enrolling officers, and thereby insure the fairness of their action.

J. B. Fry, "New York and the Conscription," p. 34.

Ibid., p. 35.

The tone of this letter was not calculated to inspire the President with confidence in the goodwill or the candor of Governor Seymour. But although he recognized in the Governor's attitude that of a determined political opponent, he chose in replying to take his adversary's good faith for granted, and throughout the entire correspondence which ensued the courtesy as well as the fairness of the President is noticeable. After acknowledging the receipt of Seymour's letter, the President said, "I cannot consent to suspend the draft in New York as you request, because, among other reasons, time is too important." He accepted the figures of the Governor as proving the disparity of the quotas in relation to the population; "much of it, however," he said, "I suppose will be accounted for by the fact that so many more persons fit for soldiers

Lincoln to Seymour, Aug. 7, 1863. Autograph MS.

CHAP. II. are in the city than are in the country, who have too recently arrived from other parts of the United States and from Europe to be either included in the census of 1860 or to have voted in 1862." Still he did not insist upon this natural explanation of the disparity, but conceded the Governor's claim without further discussion, reducing the quota, where it seemed by the Governor's showing to be excessive, to the average of the districts not complained of. He then said he should direct the draft to proceed in all the districts, ordering a reënrollment in those whose quota had been reduced. He also promised that the Governor should be informed of the time fixed for commencing the draft in each district. He continued:

> I do not object to abide a decision of the United States Supreme Court, or of the judges thereof, on the constitutionality of the draft law; in fact, I should be willing to facilitate the obtaining of it, but I cannot consent to lose the time while it is being obtained. We are contending with an enemy who, as I understand, drives every able-bodied man he can reach into his ranks, very much as a butcher drives bullocks into a slaughter-pen. No time is wasted, no argument is used. This produces an army which will soon turn upon our now victorious soldiers, already in the field, if they shall not be sustained by recruits as they should be. It produces an army with a rapidity not to be matched on our side, if we first waste time to reëxperiment with the volunteer system, already deemed by Congress, and palpably, in fact, so far exhausted as to be inadequate, and then more time to obtain a court decision as to whether a law is constitutional which requires a part of those not now in the service to go to the aid of those who are already in it, and still more time to determine with absolute certainty that we get those who are to go in the precisely legal proportion to those who are not to go. My purpose is to be in

my action just and constitutional and yet practical, in performing the important duty with which I am charged, of maintaining the unity and the free principles of our common country.

Lincoln to Seymour, Aug. 7, 1863. Autograph MS.

But the Governor was not in a frame of mind to accept this fair and practical treatment of the subject. Even while the President was writing, the Governor was sending him notice of a still more elaborate and partisan statement which had been prepared by his judge-advocate general accusing the enrolling officers of "shameless frauds," which, he said, "will bring disgrace not only upon your Administration but upon the American name"; and on the following day, having received the President's letter of the 7th, Governor Seymour wrote again, regretting the President's decision, urging anew the advantages of the system of volunteering over the draft and calling attention to what he termed the "partisan character of the enrollment." He claimed that in nineteen Republican districts the quotas were too small, and that in nine Democratic districts they were too large. "You cannot and will not fail," he said, "to right these gross wrongs."

Fry, "New York and the Conscription," p. 37.

Ibid., p. 39.

Ibid.

In spite of these insulting charges the President did not lose his equanimity and good temper. He did not even suggest, as General Fry does, "that the war had then been going on about two years and its early demands had skimmed off the cream of the nation's loyalty, and very naturally most men would be found remaining in those districts which were most unfriendly to the war or the manner in which the Government conducted it." He answered with patient courtesy, on the 11th

Ibid.

CHAP. II.

of August, saying to the Governor that, in view of the length of his first statement and the time and care which had been taken in its preparation, he did not doubt that it contained the Governor's entire case as he desired to present it. He had answered it, therefore, supposing that he was meeting Governor Seymour's full demand, laying down the principle to which he proposed adhering, which was "to proceed with the draft, at the same time employing infallible means to avoid any great wrongs." He therefore arbitrarily reduced the quotas of several additional districts to the minimum heretofore adopted.

Lincoln to Seymour, Aug. 11, 1863.

Although his demands were thus substantially conceded, nothing could mitigate Governor Seymour's hostility to the execution of the law. General Dix, who had been appointed to the command of the Department of the East, with headquarters in New York City, had asked the Governor, as early as the 30th of July, whether the military power of the State might be relied on to enforce the execution of the law in the case of forcible resistance to it. He was anxious, he said, for perfect harmony of action between the Federal and State governments, and if he could feel assured that the Governor would see to the faithful enforcement of the law he would not ask the War Department to put United States troops at his disposal for that purpose. Four days later he received a reply from the Governor saying that he believed the President would take such action as to relieve both of them "from the painful questions growing out of an armed enforcement of the conscription law."

1863.

Morgan Dix, "Memoirs of John A. Dix," Vol. II., p. 77.

August 3.

Ibid., p. 78.

The general answered in a letter giving ex-

pression to his disappointment at the tone of the Governor's letter; and receiving no further communication from him, he applied to the Secretary of War on August 14th for a force adequate to maintain public peace. This call was promptly answered, and troops sufficient to preserve public order against any attack were sent him. After the call had been made the Governor informed him that, as there could be no violations of good order which were not infractions of the laws of the State, these laws would be enforced under all circumstances, and that he should take care that all the executive officers of the State should perform their duties vigorously and thoroughly, and that, if need be, the military power would be called into requisition; and on the 18th of August he issued a proclamation saying that while he believed it would have been a wise and humane policy to procure a judicial decision, with regard to the constitutionality of the Conscription Act, at an earlier day and by a summary process, that the failure to do this in no degree justified any violent opposition to the act of Congress. He warned all citizens of the State to abstain from riotous proceedings and to rely on the courts for redress of their wrongs.

CHAP. II. Aug. 8, 1863. Aug. 15. 1863.

It was probably due to the energetic action of the Government, the presence of ten thousand veteran troops from the Army of the Potomac, and the recollection left on the minds of the turbulent classes by the clubs of the policemen a month before, rather than to the half-hearted proclamation of the Governor, that when the draft was resumed on the 19th of August no resistance was offered.

CHAP. II. Governor Seymour, however, continued an active campaign by mail and telegraph against the proceeding, protesting at every stage that the apportionments were unfair; that the demands upon New York were excessive, and the credits allowed the State and city inadequate. The enormous bounties which had been paid by towns and counties proved an irresistible temptation to dishonest men. Almost every criminal out of the penitentiary betook himself to the comparatively safe and lucrative business of bounty-jumping. The anxiety for recruits was great, and it was almost impossible to counteract the ingenuity and duplicity of bounty-brokers in working rascals into the service. The discipline of the recruiting officers was lax; desertion speedily followed enlistment, and the same nimble rogue might figure, under different names, in the credits claimed from a dozen districts. This rascality especially flourished in the crowded wards of the city of New York. So fast as enlistments were reported, however informally, from any district, Governor Seymour wanted a corresponding reduction of the quotas, and he also demanded that every New Yorker enlisted in another State should be credited to his own. This last demand was so patently unreasonable that the President refused it, after consulting the Judge Advocate General of the army.

Report of the Adjutant General of New York, Dec. 31, 1862.

Opinion, Judge Advocate General Holt, Aug. 24, 1863.

With all reasonable demands for credits, he tried his best to comply. On the 16th of August he sent the following dispatch to Governor Seymour:

> Your dispatch of this morning is just received, and I fear I do not perfectly understand it. My view of the principle is that every soldier obtained voluntarily leaves

one less to be obtained by draft. The only difficulty is in applying the principle properly. Looking to time, as heretofore, I am unwilling to give up a drafted man now, even for the certainty, much less for the mere chance, of getting a volunteer hereafter. Again, after the draft in any district, would it not make trouble to take any drafted man out and put a volunteer in, for how shall it be determined which drafted man is to have the privilege of thus going out, to the exclusion of all the others? And even before the draft in any district the quota must be fixed; and the draft might be postponed indefinitely if every time a volunteer is offered the officers must stop and reconstruct the quota. At least I fear there might be this difficulty; but, at all events, let credits for volunteers be given up to the last moment which will not produce confusion or delay. That the principle of giving credits for volunteers shall be applied by districts seems fair and proper, though I do not know how far by present statistics it is practicable. When for any cause a fair credit is not given at one time, it should be given as soon thereafter as practicable. My purpose is to be just and fair, and yet to not lose time.

Lincoln to Seymour, Aug. 16, 1863. MS.

1863.

During the entire summer and autumn Governor Seymour and his friends made the proceedings of the Government, in relation to the enrollment law, the object of special and vehement attack. On the 17th of October the President made a call for 300,000 volunteers, and at the same time ordered that the draft should be made for all deficiencies which might exist on the 5th of January following, on the quotas assigned to districts by the War Department. Shortly after this the Democratic State Committee issued a circular making the military administration of the Government, and especially the law calling for troops, the object of violent attack, greatly exaggerating the demands of the Government, claiming that no credits would be

General Fry, "New York and the Conscription," p. 49.

CHAP. II. allowed for those who had paid commutation, and basing these charges upon a pretended proclamation of the 27th of October which had never been issued. The President, with the painstaking care which distinguished him, prepared with his own hand the following contradiction of this misleading circular:

> The Provost Marshal General has issued no proclamation at all. He has, in no form, announced anything recently in regard to troops in New York, except in his letter to Governor Seymour of October 21, which has been published in the newspapers of that State. It has not been announced nor decided in any form by the Provost Marshal General, or any one else in authority of the Government, that every citizen who has paid his three hundred dollars commutation is liable to be immediately drafted again, or that towns that have just raised the money to pay their quotas will have again to be subject to similar taxation or suffer the operations of the new conscription, nor is it probable that the like of them ever will be announced or decided.

Dated, Executive Mansion, Washington, Oct. 31, 1863. MS.

The circular we have referred to went on claiming that the State had been thoroughly canvassed, and that the victory of the Democratic ticket was assured. But the result showed that the Democratic leaders were as far wrong in their prophecy as in their history. The Republican State ticket was elected by a majority of thirty thousand over the Democratic, and the principal State of the Union decided the vehement controversy, which had raged all the year between Seymour and Lincoln, in favor of the President — a verdict which was repeated in the following year when Governor Seymour was himself a candidate for reëlection.

In the early part of December the President, anxious in every way to do justice and to satisfy,

if possible, the claims of Governor Seymour, consented to the appointment of a commission to inquire into the whole subject of the enrollment in New York. The principal member of the commission, chosen by Governor Seymour, was Wm. F. Allen of New York, his intimate friend and an ardent Democrat in politics; of the other members, General John Love of Indiana was also a Democrat; Chauncey Smith of Massachusetts was a lawyer, not prominently identified with either political party. Judge Allen clearly dominated the commission, and they agreed with him in condemning the principle on which the enrollment and draft were conducted. They reported that, instead of numbering the men of a given district capable of bearing arms and making that number the basis of the draft,— which was the course the enrolling officers, in direct obedience to the law of Congress, had pursued,— the quota should be adjusted upon the basis of proportion to the entire population. They did not indorse the injurious attacks made by the Governor upon the enrolling officers and agents, but distinctly stated that their fidelity and integrity was unimpeached. The essential point of their report was simply that the quota should be in proportion to the total population of the district, and not according to the number of valid men to be found in it. When the President required from the Provost Marshal General his opinion upon the report, General Fry made this reasonable criticism:

> The commission has evidently been absorbed by the conviction that the raising of men is, and will necessarily continue to be, equivalent to levying special taxes and

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raising money, and they would therefore require the same proceeds, under the enrollment act, from a district of rich women which they would from a district with the same number of men of equal means. I assume that we are looking for personal military service from those able to perform it, that we make no calls for volunteers in the sense in which the commission understands it, but that we assign to the districts under the enrollment act fair quotas of *the men* we have found them to contain.

Fry, "New York and the Conscription," p. 52.

The President entirely agreed with the Provost Marshal General that it was manifestly unjust to require from a district, whose young men had been depleted by the patriotic impulse which filled the army at the beginning of the war, as many drafted men as were justly called for from those who had contributed nothing to the field, a course which would have been the logical result of yielding to the demands of Governor Seymour and the recommendation of the commission. But, wishing to make all possible concessions to the State authorities, he resolved, once more, to reduce the quota of New York, and explained his action in a letter to the Secretary of War dated February 27, 1864:

1864.

In the correspondence between the Governor of New York and myself last summer, I understood him to complain that the enrollments in several of the districts of that State had been neither accurately nor honestly made; and in view of this, I, for the draft then immediately ensuing, ordered an arbitrary reduction of the quotas in several of the districts wherein they seemed too large, and said: "After this drawing, these four districts, and also the seventeenth and twenty-ninth, shall be carefully reënrolled, and, if you please, agents of yours may witness every step of the process." In a subsequent letter I believe some additional districts were put into the list of those to be reënrolled. My idea was to do the work over according to the law, in presence of the complaining

party, and thereby to correct anything which might be found amiss. The commission, whose work I am considering, seem to have proceeded upon a totally different idea. Not going forth to find men at all, they have proceeded altogether upon paper examinations and mental processes. One of their conclusions, as I understand, is that, as the law stands, and attempting to follow it, the enrolling officers could not have made the enrollments much more accurately than they did. The report, on this point, might be useful to Congress. The commission conclude that the quotas for the draft should be based upon entire population, and they proceed upon this basis to give a table for the State of New York, in which some districts are reduced and some increased. For the now ensuing draft, let the quotas stand, as made by the enrolling officers, in the districts wherein this table requires them to be increased; and let them be reduced according to the table in the others: this to be no precedent for subsequent action; but, as I think this report may, on full consideration, be shown to have much that is valuable in it, I suggest that such consideration be given it, and that it be especially considered whether its suggestions can be conformed to without an alteration of the law.

Lincoln to Stanton, in Fry, "New York and the Conscription," pp. 56, 57.

So long as Governor Seymour remained in office he continued his warfare upon the enrollment act and the officers charged with its execution.

On the 18th of July, 1864, the President made a third call for troops under the act, and the Governor promptly renewed his charges and complaints. At this time, however, both he and Mr. Lincoln were candidates before the people, the one for the Presidency and the other for the governorship of New York, and it was probably for this reason that Mr. Seymour's correspondence was carried on, at this time, with the Secretary of War instead of Mr. Lincoln. But it afforded no new features; there were the same complaints of exces-

CHAP. II. 1864.

sive quotas, of unfair, unequal, and oppressive action, as before. He said again that there had been no opportunity given to correct the enrollment, upon which the Provost Marshal General reported that the Governor had been duly informed of the opportunities to make corrections, and that an order had been issued from his own headquarters in reference to the matter. No efforts were spared by the Government to insure a rigid revision of the lists. The Governor spoke with great vehemence of the disparity between the demands made upon New York and Boston, saying that in one of the cities 26 per cent. of the population was enrolled, and in the other only 12½ per cent.

Fry, "New York and the Conscription," p. 59.

General Fry replied to this that the proportion of enrollment to population in Boston was not 12½ but 16.92 per cent.; that less than 17 per cent. in New York and Brooklyn were enrolled, and that, in fine, the enrollment was "a mere question of fact"; it was the ascertainment of a number of men of a certain description in defined areas; that the enrollments were continuously open to revision, and that any name erroneously on them would be stricken off as soon as the error was pointed out to the Board of Enrollment by anybody. He then showed that the quotas throughout New York were in fact smaller than in many other States where the proportion of men was large, and closed his report by saying that he saw "no reason why the law should not be applied to New York as well as to the other States." This report Mr. Stanton transmitted to the Governor, expressing the somewhat sanguine trust that it would satisfy him that his objections against the quotas assigned to New York

Ibid., p. 60. Aug. 11, 1864.

were not well founded. He recalled the fact that a commission was appointed the previous year with a view to ascertain whether any mistake or errors had been made by the enrolling officers, but that the commissioners bore their testimony to the fidelity with which the work was done; that with a view to harmony the President had directed a reduction in some districts, but without the increase of others recommended by the commissioners; and that a basis for the assignment being now absolutely fixed by act of Congress, the War Department had no power to change it. In reply to Governor Seymour's demand for the appointment of another commission, the Secretary declined it on these grounds:

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1864.

First. Because there is "no fault found" by you with the enrolling officers, nor any mistake, fraud, or neglect on their part alleged by you, requiring investigation by a commission. *Second.* The errors of the enrollment, if there be any, can readily be corrected by the Board of Enrollment established by law for the correction of the enrollment. *Third.* The commission would not have, nor has the Secretary of War, or the President, power to change the basis of the draft prescribed by the act of Congress. *Fourth.* The commission would operate to postpone the draft, and perhaps fatally delay strengthening the armies now in the field, thus aiding the enemy and endangering the National Government.

Fry, "New York and the Conscription," p. 61.

The voters of New York in the autumn election decided to retire Governor Seymour to private life, and his successor, Governor Reuben E. Fenton, gave to the Government, during the rest of the war, a hearty and loyal support.

Nov., 1864.

The Provost Marshal General, in his final report of March 17, 1866, presents some important consid-

CHAP. II. erations concerning the conscription. They are substantially as follows: The conscription was not presented as a popular measure, but as one of absolute necessity; it was difficult to convince the drafted man, whose family depended on him for support, that a law was wise which forced him to enter the military service, or that the Board of Enrollment had not done injustice in refusing to exempt him. The opponents of the measure were prompt to render pretended sympathy and encourage opposition by misrepresenting facts, magnifying real cases of hardship, or creating imaginary grievances where real ones were wanting. The action of civil courts was invoked, and the officers enforcing the law were subjected to harassing litigation, and in many instances fines were imposed upon them for acts done in their official capacity pursuant to the orders of superior and competent authority. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the duty was satisfactorily discharged. When the bureau was organized the strength of the army was deemed insufficient for offensive operations. The inadequacy of the system of recruiting previously pursued had been demonstrated. A new system was therefore inaugurated by the General Government, assuming the business which had previously been transacted mainly by the State governments. The functionaries provided by the enrollment law were made United States recruiting officers. Springing directly from the people, and at the same time exercising the authority and representing the necessities and wishes of the Government, they reached the masses, and were able, without abating the requirements of the conscription, to promote volun-

teering, and to forward recruits as fast as they could be obtained. The quotas of districts were made known; each locality was advised of the number it was required to furnish, and that in event of failure the draft would follow. The result was that 1,120,621 men were raised, at an average cost (on account of recruitment exclusive of bounties) of $9.84 per man, while the cost of recruiting the 1,356,593 raised prior to the organization of the bureau was $34.01 per man. In addition to the duties of recruitment, the law required the Provost Marshal to arrest deserters wherever they might be found, and 76,526 were arrested and returned to the ranks.

The Provost Marshal General compared, for the purpose of great wars, the system of recruitment by volunteer enlistments stimulated by bounties, with the system of compulsory service through enrollment of the national forces by the direct action of the General Government and their draft if volunteering failed. He said that a plan of recruitment based upon the bounty system will necessarily be more expensive than any other, and, as a rule, produce soldiers of an inferior class; and, although bounty is unquestionably calculated to stimulate recruiting, it does not always accomplish that object at the proper time. For when it is visible, as it was during the late war, that in the anxiety to obtain recruits the bounties offered constantly increased, the men who intend to enlist at one time or another are induced to hold back with the hope at a later day of receiving higher compensation and having to serve for a shorter period. In time of peace, enough recruits to meet the requirements of

CHAP. II. the service can usually be procured without the aid of bounty, and in time of war the country can least afford the cost, besides needing the service of better men than those who enter the army simply from mercenary motives. The Provost Marshal General regarded the enrollment act of 1863 and its amendments, with some slight improvements which he suggested, as establishing a military system adequate to any emergency which the country is ever likely to encounter. Under the wise and patient guidance of President Lincoln the delicate duties of this bureau, novel to our country, and possessed of almost unlimited powers, were successfully performed, the rights of citizens duly considered, and personal liberty always respected. The careful attention which the President himself gave to the complicated and vexatious business of enrollment and draft is indicated by the report of a committee appointed by the Legislature of Rhode Island to confer with him concerning the quota of that State. The committee said:

> The President at this point interrupted the committee to say that complaints from several States had already been made to the same effect, and in one instance the subject had been so earnestly pressed upon his attention that he had personally taken the pains to examine for himself the formula which the Provost Marshal General had adopted for the calculation and distribution of the quota for the different States, and had arrived at the conclusion that it was impossible for any candid mind to doubt or question its entire fairness. The President further stated that the plan that had been adopted by the Provost Marshal General for the assignment of the respective quotas met his entire approval, and appeared to him to be the only one by which exact justice could be secured.

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMUEL F. DU PONT.

While the controversy between the Government and its opponents in regard to the enrollment and the draft was going on, the President, disappointed and grieved at the persistent misrepresentations of his views and his intentions by those of whom he thought better things were to be expected, feeling that he was unable, by the power of logic or persuasion, to induce the leaders of the Democratic party to do him justice, or to coöperate with him in the measures which he was convinced were for the public good, thought for a time of appealing directly to the people of the United States in defense of the conduct of the Government. He prepared a long and elaborate address, which he intended most especially for the consideration of the honest and patriotic Democrats of the North, setting forth, with his inimitable clearness of statement, the necessity of the draft, the substantial fairness of its provisions, and the honesty and the equity with which, as he claimed, the Government had attempted to carry it out. But, after he had finished it, doubts arose in his mind as to the propriety or expediency of addressing the public directly in that manner, and it was never published. It is for the first time printed in this work, and from Mr. Lincoln's own manuscript; and it is a question whether the reader will more admire the lucidity and the fairness with which the President sets forth his views, or the reserve and abnegation with which, after writing it, he resolved to suppress so admirable a paper:

"It is at all times proper that misunderstanding between the public and the public servant should

CHAP. II. be avoided; and this is far more important now than in times of peace and tranquillity. I therefore address you without searching for a precedent upon which to do so. Some of you are sincerely devoted to the republican institutions and territorial integrity of our country, and yet are opposed to what is called the draft, or conscription.

"At the beginning of the war, and ever since, a variety of motives, pressing, some in one direction and some in the other, would be presented to the mind of each man physically fit for a soldier, upon the combined effect of which motives he would, or would not, voluntarily enter the service. Among these motives would be patriotism, political bias, ambition, personal courage, love of adventure, want of employment, and convenience, or the opposite of some of these. We already have, and have had in the service, as appears, substantially all that can be obtained upon this voluntary weighing of motives. And yet we must somehow obtain more, or relinquish the original object of the contest, together with all the blood and treasure already expended in the effort to secure it. To meet this necessity the law for the draft has been enacted. You who do not wish to be soldiers do not like this law. This is natural; nor does it imply want of patriotism. Nothing can be so just and necessary as to make us like it if it is disagreeable to us. We are prone, too, to find false arguments with which to excuse ourselves for opposing such disagreeable things. In this case, those who desire the rebellion to succeed, and others who seek reward in a different way, are very active in accommodating us with this class of arguments.

They tell us the law is unconstitutional. It is the first instance, I believe, in which the power of Congress to do a thing has ever been questioned in a case when the power is given by the Constitution in express terms. Whether a power can be implied when it is not expressed has often been the subject of controversy; but this is the first case in which the degree of effrontery has been ventured upon, of denying a power which is plainly and distinctly written down in the Constitution. The Constitution declares that 'The Congress shall have power . . . to raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.' The whole scope of the conscription act is 'to raise and support armies.' There is nothing else in it. It makes no appropriation of money, and hence the money clause just quoted is not touched by it.

"The case simply is, the Constitution provides that the Congress shall have power to raise and support armies; and by this act the Congress has exercised the power to raise and support armies. This is the whole of it. It is a law made in literal pursuance of this part of the United States Constitution; and another part of the same Constitution declares that 'this Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, . . . shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.' Do you admit that the power is given to raise and support armies, and yet insist that by this act Congress has not exercised the power in a constitutional mode? — has not done

CHAP. II. the thing in the right way? Who is to judge of this? The Constitution gives Congress the power, but it does not prescribe the mode, or expressly declare who shall prescribe it. In such case Congress must prescribe the mode, or relinquish the power. There is no alternative. Congress could not exercise the power to do the thing if it had not the power of providing a way to do it, when no way is provided by the Constitution for doing it. In fact, Congress would not have the power to raise and support armies, if even by the Constitution it were left to the option of any other, or others, to give or withhold the only mode of doing it. If the Constitution had prescribed a mode, Congress could and must follow that mode; but, as it is, the mode necessarily goes to Congress, with the power expressly given. The power is given fully, completely, unconditionally. It is not a power to raise armies if State authorities consent; nor if the men to compose the armies are entirely willing; but it is a power to raise and support armies given to Congress by the Constitution, without an if.

"It is clear that a constitutional law may not be expedient or proper. Such would be a law to raise armies when no armies were needed. But this is not such. The republican institutions and territorial integrity of our country cannot be maintained without the further raising and supporting of armies. There can be no army without men. Men can be had only voluntarily or involuntarily. We have ceased to obtain them voluntarily, and to obtain them involuntarily is the draft — the conscription. If you dispute the fact, and declare

that men can still be had voluntarily in sufficient numbers, prove the assertion by yourselves volunteering in such numbers, and I shall gladly give up the draft. Or if not a sufficient number, but any one of you will volunteer, he for his single self will escape all the horrors of the draft, and will thereby do only what each one of at least a million of his manly brethren have already done. Their toil and blood have been given as much for you as for themselves. Shall it all be lost rather than that you, too, will bear your part?

"I do not say that all who would avoid serving in the war are unpatriotic; but I do think every patriot should willingly take his chance under a law, made with great care, in order to secure entire fairness. This law was considered, discussed, modified, and amended by Congress at great length, and with much labor; and was finally passed, by both branches, with a near approach to unanimity. At last, it may not be exactly such as any one man out of Congress, or even in Congress, would have made it. It has been said, and I believe truly, that the Constitution itself is not altogether such as any one of its framers would have preferred. It was the joint work of all, and certainly the better that it was so.

"Much complaint is made of that provision of the conscription law which allows a drafted man to substitute three hundred dollars for himself; while, as I believe, none is made of that provision which allows him to substitute another man for himself. Nor is the three hundred dollar provision objected to for unconstitutionality; but for inequality, for favoring the rich against the poor. The substitu-

CHAP. II. tion of men is the provision, if any, which favors the rich to the exclusion of the poor. But this being a provision in accordance with an old and well-known practice, in the raising of armies, is not objected to. There would have been great objection if that provision had been omitted. And yet being in, the money provision really modifies the inequality which the other introduces. It allows men to escape the service who are too poor to escape but for it. Without the money provision, competition among the more wealthy might, and probably would, raise the price of substitutes above three hundred dollars, thus leaving the man who could raise only three hundred dollars no escape from personal service. True, by the law as it is, the man who cannot raise so much as three hundred dollars, nor obtain a personal substitute for less, cannot escape; but he can come quite as near escaping as he could if the money provision were not in the law. To put it another way: is an unobjectionable law which allows only the man to escape who can pay a thousand dollars made objectionable by adding a provision that any one may escape who can pay the smaller sum of three hundred dollars? This is the exact difference at this point between the present law and all former draft laws. It is true that by this law a somewhat larger number will escape than could under a law allowing personal substitutes only; but each additional man thus escaping will be a poorer man than could have escaped by the law in the other form. The money provision enlarges the class of exempts from actual service simply by admitting poorer men into it. How then can the money

provision be a wrong to the poor man? The inequality complained of pertains in greater degree to the substitution of men, and is really modified and lessened by the money provision. The inequality could only be perfectly cured by sweeping both provisions away. This, being a great innovation, would probably leave the law more distasteful than it now is. CHAP. II.

"The principle of the draft, which simply is involuntary or enforced service, is not new. It has been practiced in all ages of the world. It was well known to the framers of our Constitution as one of the modes of raising armies, at the time they placed in that instrument the provision that 'the Congress shall have power to raise and support armies.' It had been used just before, in establishing our independence, and it was also used under the Constitution in 1812. Wherein is the peculiar hardship now? Shall we shrink from the necessary means to maintain our free government, which our grandfathers employed to establish it and our own fathers have already employed once to maintain it? Are we degenerate? Has the manhood of our race run out?

"Again, a law may be both constitutional and expedient, and yet may be administered in an unjust and unfair way. This law belongs to a class, which class is composed of those laws whose object is to distribute burthens or benefits on the principle of equality. No one of these laws can ever be practically administered with that exactness which can be conceived of in the mind. A tax law, the principle of which is that each owner shall pay in proportion to the value of his property, will be a

CHAP. II. dead letter, if no one can be compelled to pay until it can be shown that every other one will pay in precisely the same proportion, according to value; nay, even it will be a dead letter, if no one can be compelled to pay until it is certain that every other one will pay at all — even in unequal proportion. Again, the United States House of Representatives is constituted on the principle that each member is sent by the same number of people that each other one is sent by; and yet, in practice, no two of the whole number, much less the whole number, are ever sent by precisely the same number of constituents. The districts cannot be made precisely equal in population at first, and if they could, they would become unequal in a single day, and much more so in the ten years which the districts, once made, are to continue. They cannot be remodeled every day; nor, without too much expense and labor, even every year.

"This sort of difficulty applies in full force to the practical administration of the draft law. In fact, the difficulty is greater in the case of the draft law. First, it starts with all the inequality of the Congressional districts; but these are based on entire population, while the draft is based upon those only who are fit for soldiers, and such may not bear the same proportion to the whole in one district that they do in another. Again, the facts must be ascertained, and credit given, for the unequal numbers of soldiers which have already gone from the several districts. In all these points errors will occur in spite of the utmost fidelity. The Government is bound to administer the law with such an approach to exactness as is usual in analogous cases, and as

entire good faith and fidelity will reach. If so great departures as to be inconsistent with such good faith and fidelity, or great departures occurring in any way, be pointed out they shall be corrected; and any agent shown to have caused such departures intentionally shall be dismissed.

"With these views, and on these principles, I feel bound to tell you it is my purpose to see the draft law faithfully executed."

Lincoln, Opinion on the Draft. Autograph MS.

CHAPTER III

DU PONT BEFORE CHARLESTON

CHAP. III.

THE blockade of the Atlantic coast was maintained with energy and efficiency; many captures were made, and its execution was at all times so strict that no vessel could enter the Confederate harbors without imminent risk of capture or destruction — a condition of things which is generally accepted as the standard of efficiency in a blockade. Fast-sailing steamers, however, did often succeed in entering blockaded ports, and in going out with cargoes of cotton, and the profits upon each trip were so enormous that the traffic continued throughout the war; the gains of success forming a sufficient insurance against probable losses. The Confederate Government stoutly protested to foreign governments against the recognition of the blockade, continually asserting that it was inefficient, and putting forth extraordinary efforts to break it.

Jan. 31, 1863.

The most remarkable of these efforts was made by two Confederate ironclads in the harbor of Charleston, and was supplemented later in the same day by a proclamation of the Confederate commanders in that city; and it is hard to say which demonstration was the more audacious. The

weather was most favorable to the sortie; a thick haze covered the glassy sea and added to the obscurity of the wintry morning. Two of the strongest of the blockading vessels were absent, for the moment, taking in coal at Port Royal. Only one vessel of any strength, the *Housatonic*, remained off the harbor, with the *Ottawa* and *Unadilla*, and seven other purchased vessels which were no better fitted than North River steamboats to cope with ironclads. At four o'clock in the morning the Confederate ram *Palmetto State* (followed by the *Chicora*) all at once loomed through the haze, almost touching the *Mercedita*, which was instantly disabled by the first shot from the ram, and an officer was too promptly sent on board the Confederate, who gave an irregular parole and returned to his vessel. The *Keystone State* was attacked by the *Chicora*, and received considerable injury; finding his ship helpless, her commander lowered his colors, but the *Chicora* still continuing to fire, he thought better of it, hoisted them again, and, with the assistance of the *Memphis*, resumed the fight. By this time the *Housatonic* had got under way, and, steering in as near as soundings would permit, opened fire on the rams and soon drove them back to the protection of the forts. The *Mercedita* patched up her injuries and steamed, without assistance, for Port Royal, whither the *Keystone State* was also sent for repairs; so that before ten o'clock in the morning the incident was closed and the blockade was reëstablished.

The rams had made a bold and, on the whole, not unsuccessful raid. But the performance of General Beauregard and Commodore Ingraham, command-

CHAP. III. 1863.

ing respectively the military and naval forces in South Carolina, was still more daring, and their raid upon paper left entirely out of sight that of the *Palmetto State* and the *Chicora* on the still waters of the harbor. These enthusiastic officers trumpeted to the world the following proclamation: "At about five o'clock this morning the Confederate States naval force on this station attacked the United States blockading fleet off the harbor of the city of Charleston, and sunk, dispersed, or drove off and out of sight, for the time, the entire hostile fleet. Therefore, we, the undersigned commanders, respectively, of the Confederate States naval and land forces in this quarter, do hereby formally declare the blockade by the United States of the said city of Charleston, South Carolina, to be raised by a superior force of the Confederate States from and after this 31st day of January, A. D. 1863." This swelling manifesto was based, not upon any possible facts, but upon diligent reading of works of international law. General Beauregard knew that a blockade did not become ineffective through the momentary and accidental dispersion of the blockading fleet, but only through the action of a superior hostile force, and he made his proclamation to fit the law rather than the facts. The Charleston papers stated, in addition to this official utterance, that the French and Spanish consuls, at the invitation of General Beauregard, had gone out in a Confederate steamer, and that the British consul, with the commander of the British war-steamer *Petrel*, had sailed five miles beyond the usual anchorage of the blockaders, and that no signs of the Federal force were visible; that the foreign

Beauregard and Ingraham, Proclamation. W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 205.

consuls had held a meeting, and were unanimously of the opinion that the blockade was legally raised. CHAP. III. 1863.

There was a good deal of loose and exaggerated statement on both sides during the war; but it may be questioned if anything else so false or so reckless as this proceeded from any source, from the beginning to the end of hostilities. No vessels were sunk, none were set on fire seriously; only the *Mercedita* and the *Keystone State* were injured, and their injuries were soon repaired. The engagement was so soon at an end that many of the vessels of the fleet knew nothing of it until all was over. The *Housatonic* was never beyond the usual line of blockade. No attempt was made to run the blockade that day. Five officers of the highest character commanding vessels nearest to the action testified that no vessels came out from Charleston to make the pretended inspection set forth in the Confederate accounts; and yet this statement, founded only upon the fact that the rams went out and had a skirmish and were driven back, was heralded to the world and accepted by every one who sympathized with the Confederates, and for a time cast a serious doubt upon the efficiency of the blockade.

By way of testing the ironclads of the *Monitor* type, Admiral Du Pont, in the latter part of January, had sent the *Montauk* to attack the Confederate works at Genesis Point, about fifteen miles south of Savannah, afterwards known as Fort McAllister, and the scene of several serious engagements, and, if possible, to capture or destroy the *Nashville*, a swift blockade-runner, which failing to escape with a cargo of cotton had been withdrawn, 1863

MAP OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA COAST.

her cargo removed, and the vessel fitted out as a privateer. Under the protection of Fort McAllister, she had lain in the Ogeechee River for several months waiting for an opportunity to emerge. Worden, whose gallantry and intelligence had already been shown in the combat with the *Merrimac*, attacked the fort on the 27th of January, and again on the 1st of February, but inflicted no damage upon it which could not be readily repaired. The fort poured volley after volley upon the *Montauk* with very little effect. Had the fort been the only enemy in sight the *Montauk* would have at once proceeded up the river; but the stream was heavily obstructed and planted with a line of torpedoes. CHAP. III. 1863.

On the 27th of February Worden observed the *Nashville* with steam up, and apparently in trouble, and after a bold yet careful reconnaissance he discovered that she was aground about 1200 yards above the obstructions. With a true sailor's intuition he saw that his prey was within his reach. She had grounded at high water and could not get off before morning. He therefore resolved at the earliest light to push into the area swept by McAllister's fire and destroy the privateer at his leisure. This daring but sagacious plan was carried out at daylight the next morning. Deliberately placing himself under the guns of McAllister he opened fire upon the *Nashville* across a low projection of swampy land at the point of which lay the line of obstructions. The upper works of the privateer alone were in sight across the low land, but Worden, undisturbed by the tempest of shot and shell which rained on him from the fort, speedily got the range of the *Nashville* and dropped his 11 and 1863.

CHAP. III. 15 inch shells with terrible precision upon the Confederate vessel, and in a few moments saw the flames rising from her above the swamp. Through the thick fog which now settled down over both combatants, hiding them from each other's view, Worden continued his deadly fire, his mathematics taking the place of eyesight. All his available men stood by to repel boarders who were expected every moment through the fog; but none came, and when the mist disappeared in the morning sun the *Nashville* was seen to be on fire from stem to stern. Her pivot gun burst; a few minutes later her smoke-stack went by the board, and at last, with a loud detonation, the magazine exploded, scattering the blackened timbers over the river and swamp. The furious and inaccurate fire of McAllister had done little or no damage to the *Montauk*. One of the most brilliant and scientific exploits of the navy during the war had been gained almost without cost.

March 3, 1863. Three days later Admiral Du Pont, as a matter of experiment and practice, ordered the *Passaic*, *Patapsco*, and the *Nahant* to make a new attack upon Fort McAllister, which was energetically done. The engagement was interesting as a matter of target practice, but without substantial results on either side. On account of the obstructions and the depth of water, vessels could not approach nearer than 1200 yards, and although this had not been too great a distance for the *Montauk* to destroy the *Nashville* it was entirely too far for anything afloat to destroy an earthwork like McAllister. Two of the guns of the fort were disabled, the parapet and traverses were badly knocked

about, but no damage was done which could not be repaired in a few hours. The vessels returned substantially unhurt to Port Royal harbor.[1]

A formidable force of ironclads had been collected, under the command of Rear-Admiral Du Pont, by the beginning of April, 1863. The officers and crews had become sufficiently acquainted with their construction and disciplined in their workings. They had been tested by the incidents we have described, and by a large number of reconnaissances in the various rivers, bays, and inlets which formed the network of the Sea Islands. The admiral now prepared, under orders from Washington, to assault with his entire iron-clad fleet Fort Sumter and the other defenses of Charleston, and high hopes were entertained, both in the fleet and at Washington, of the capture of the City of Charleston. Although the officers of the navy had already conceived a prejudice against the monitor class of vessels, which afterwards developed into vehement hostility, and although life below the surface of the waves was almost intolerable in these iron chests, it was with a feeling of hope and elation that this extensive attack was planned and begun.[2] When at noon, on the 7th of April, the

[1] Major D. B. Harris, Confederate chief engineer of the department, took encouragement from this affair. "The result of this engagement," he said, "ought to make us feel quite comfortable. When the grand affair with which the abolitionists have been so long threatening us shall come off (if it ever does) I am sure our sand batteries will give a good account of themselves."—W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 219.

[2] Rear-Admiral Daniel Ammen says in his historical work, "The Atlantic Coast," p. 102: "The opinion before the attack was general, and was fully shared in by the writer, that whatever might be the loss in men and vessels, blown up by torpedoes or otherwise destroyed (and such losses were supposed probable), at all events Fort Sumter would be reduced to a pile of ruins before the sun went down."

CHAP. III. great flotilla moved in the order of battle, which sailors call "line ahead," under the lead of Captain John Rodgers, in the *Weehawken*, there was little doubt in the minds of the accomplished officers commanding the ironclads that they could silence the batteries on either side and pound Fort Sumter into brick-dust before the sun should set.

There was great excitement also in the Confederate camp. For the past two months General Beauregard had been in constant expectation of a serious attack. On the 8th of February he telegraphed the Governor of South Carolina, saying that an attack would soon be made by an overwhelming force, and that not much assistance could be expected from the Confederate Government.

Feb. 5, 1863. General Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis in the same sense, saying also that he expected an advance on the part of General Hooker; but adding, "the troops of this army are ready to move at a moment's warning and all I require is notice where they are wanted," and twelve days later Beauregard issued a stirring proclamation couched in the grandiloquent terms characteristic of him, urging non-combatants to retire at once from Charleston and Savannah, and ending with this clamorous appeal: "Carolinians and Georgians! the hour is at hand to prove your devotion to your country's cause. Let all able-bodied men from the sea-board to the mountains rush to arms. Be not exacting in the choice of weapons; pikes and scythes will do for exterminating your enemies; spades and shovels for protecting your friends." The Governor the next day called out the militia, saying: "The Abolitionists are threatening to invade our soil with a

W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 766.

Ibid., p. 782.



REAR-ADMIRAL JOHN RODGERS.

formidable army, and . . . the most effective method of defending our firesides, our wives, and our children is to meet the ruthless invader at the threshold." CHAP. III. W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 784.

General Beauregard remained in this nervous state during the two months that intervened before the attack. He was continually writing to Richmond in regard to the overwhelming land forces of the enemy; striving, like some of the Federal generals, to put the Government in the wrong in case of a defeat and to secure for himself all the credit in case of victory. He claimed that Hunter's force was 40,000, while his own was only 25,000. Writing to Mr. Memminger on the 28th of March, he said that 1863. he needed three more brigades of troops, but he hoped "if we are not successful, while the country may deplore, it will have no just cause to blush for our defeat." His apprehensions reached their climax Ibid., p. 849. when the ironclads appeared off Charleston harbor, and he then issued orders to Captain Francis D. Lee to make all necessary arrangements for the destruction of the torpedo ram under his charge at a moment's warning. He understated his own force Ibid., p. 885. and greatly overestimated that of his enemy. His returns for the 7th of April showed an effective total of 32,217 men; his aggregate present and Ibid., p. 889. absent being 43,449; not counting 3000 negroes at work on the fortifications; while Hunter's returns show about 20,000 present for duty, with an aggregate, present and absent, of 27,060. Ibid., p. 434.

The nine floating forts composing the flotilla[1]

[1] The flotilla consisted of the *Weehawken*, Captain John Rodgers; the *Passaic*, Captain Percival Drayton; the *Montauk*, Captain John L. Worden; the *Patapsco*, Commander Daniel Ammen; the *New Ironsides*, Admiral Du Pont's flagship, com-

CHARLESTON HARBOR AND VICINITY.

embodied the best results of labor, invention, and discipline of which the navy was capable. It was Admiral Du Pont's intention, keeping the batteries on Sullivan's Island to his right, to move up the channel between Fort Moultrie and Fort Sumter and establish himself to the northwest of the latter work, to reduce it by the fire of the monitors, and thence to gather the fruits of victory at the wharves of Charleston. But the result was one of the most complete failures of the war. In spite of the lavish expense, the long preparation, and the gallantry and obstinacy with which the attack was made, the monitors met with a severe repulse, and, although few lives were lost, the victory of the Confederates was, to them, one of the most valuable and inspiriting which they ever gained. The attack, that was to have begun at noon on the 7th of April, was, as usual, delayed by trivial accidents for over an hour, and after the vessels got under way their imperfect steering qualities caused the line of battle to be continually disarranged, and it was nearly three o'clock when the *Weehawken* received the first furious volleys from Moultrie and Sumter, and all the subsidiary batteries within range. Rodgers replied with his usual energy and spirit. In spite of the rain of iron from the forts, he worked his guns as rapidly as possible, firing 26 heavy shells from the *Weehawken* which, in turn, was struck 53 times in 40 minutes, receiving considerable injuries but not becoming disabled. He approached very near the obstructions which extended from Fort Sumter

1863.

manded by Commodore Thomas Turner; the *Catskill*, Commander George W. Rodgers; the *Nantucket*, Commander Donald M. Fairfax; the *Nahant*, Captain John Downes, and the unfortunate *Keokuk*, Commander Alexander C. Rhind.

CHAP. III. to Fort Moultrie, and found the casks by which they were buoyed and marked so thickly dotting the waters, and with an appearance so formidable, that
April 7, 1863. he thought best not to push his vessel further upon such certain perils and probable disaster. As the *Weehawken* turned a torpedo exploded under her, but did no harm.[1] The other vessels, as they came within range of the Confederate batteries, had much the same experience. The *Passaic* was struck 35 times; the *Montauk* received 14 shots without especial injury; the *Catskill*, approaching within 600 yards of Sumter, met a heavy cross-fire, receiving 20 missiles; the *Nantucket* was struck 51 times, and the *Nahant* 36 times; the *Keokuk*, finding itself in danger of running foul of the *Nahant* in the narrow channel and the rushing tide, took a position a little in advance of the line and between the fire of Moultrie and Sumter; she was struck 90 times, 19 shots piercing her about the water-line. After more than an hour of this frightful punishment she was withdrawn and anchored out of range of the enemy's fire and kept afloat during the night, but at seven o'clock the next morning she rapidly filled and sank; her crew and wounded having been removed just in time to save their lives.

[1] Beauregard says the obstructions had nothing to do with the failure of the attack. He contends that the monitors had only "reached the gorge of the harbor—never within it—and were baffled and driven back before reaching our lines of torpedoes and obstructions which had been constructed as an ultimate defensive resort as far as they could be provided. . . Therefore it may be accepted, as shown, that these vaunted monitor batteries, though formidable engines of war, after all, are not invulnerable nor invincible, and may be destroyed or defeated by heavy ordnance properly placed and skillfully handled. In reality they have not materially altered the military relations of forts and ships."—W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 242.

Admiral Du Pont was unable to bring his own flagship, the *New Ironsides*, into the thick of the fight, as he desired and endeavored to do. The vessel was almost unmanageable in the narrow channel and the swift current, and had to be anchored twice to prevent grounding. She came no nearer to Fort Sumter at any time than one thousand yards. In the course of her movements she floated for an hour over a cylinder torpedo of the enemy containing two thousand pounds of powder, at first to the delight, but finally to the exasperation, of the Confederate engineer who tried in vain to explode it. Near five o'clock the admiral, finding that it was too late to fight the battle before dark, gave signal for his vessels to withdraw, expecting to renew the attack the next morning.

April 7, 1863.

C. R. P. Rodgers, "Battles and Leaders." Vol. IV., p. 73.

But as the commanders of the ironclads reported, one by one, on board the flagship, with their stories of injury to their vessels, stories in which there was perhaps something of unintentional exaggeration, natural to men who had been confined during the afternoon in such abnormal conditions under water, exposed every instant to the danger of death by drowning, by cannon-shot, by flying splinters and broken plates and bolts, the admiral became convinced of the uselessness of any further attempt to force the passage of the forts, and concluded to renounce his intention of renewing the attack. He briefly announced this conclusion to the Department, and, in a later and more detailed report, of April 15, he described the fire to which his vessels were subjected and the injury resulting from it, and gave it as his opinion that any attempt to pass through the obstructions would have entangled the

Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1863, pp. 199–202.

CHAP. III.

vessels and held them under the most severe fire of heavy ordnance that had ever been delivered. "I had hoped," he said, "that the endurance of the ironclads would have enabled them to have borne any weight of fire to which they might have been exposed; but when I found that so large a portion of them were wholly or one-half disabled by less than an hour's engagement, before attempting to remove (overcome) the obstructions, or testing the power of the torpedoes, I was convinced that persistence in the attack would only result in the loss of the greater portion of the ironclad fleet, and in leaving many of them inside the harbor to fall into the hands of the enemy." The latter contingency would have been a serious disaster, and might have resulted in the breaking of the blockade.

Report, Secretary of the Navy, 1863, p. 201.

On the same evening Admiral Du Pont received a confidential letter from the Secretary of the Navy, dated April 2, saying: "The exigencies of the public service are so pressing in the Gulf that the Department directs you to send all the ironclads that are in a fit condition to move, after your present attack upon Charleston, directly to New Orleans, reserving to yourself only two." This order was accompanied by an unofficial letter from Mr. Fox, saying that matters were at a standstill on the Mississippi River and that the President had been, with difficulty, restrained from sending off Hunter and all the ironclads directly to New Orleans, the opening of the Mississippi being now the principal object of the Government. He says: "We must abandon all other operations on the coast, where ironclads are necessary, to a future time. We

Welles to Du Pont, April 2, 1863. W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 436.

cannot clear the Mississippi River without the ironclads, and as all the supplies come down the Red River, that stretch of the river must be in our possession. This plan has been agreed upon after mature consideration, and seems to be imperative." While the mind of the admiral was under the influence of the failure of the attack and of these dispatches, General Hunter, commanding the land forces, made a proposition that the army and navy should join in an attack on the works on Morris Island, which proposition the admiral declined. Answering a letter full of compliment and sympathy from General Hunter, the admiral said: "I feel very comfortable, general, for the reason that a merciful Providence permitted me to have a failure instead of a disaster, and if I had ever entertained for a moment any misgiving as to my course, the dispatches just handed me would remove it." The day before, April 8, finding the ships more damaged than he had suspected, he had written to General Hunter: "I am now satisfied that the place cannot be taken by a purely naval attack, and I am admonished by the condition of the ironclads that a persistence in our efforts would end in disaster, and might cause us to leave some of our ironclads in the hands of the enemy, which would render it difficult for us to hold those parts of the coast which are now in our possession. I have therefore determined to withdraw my vessels."[1]

Fox to Du Pont, April 2, 1863. W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 436.

Du Pont to Hunter April 9, 1863. Ibid., p. 438.

W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 442.

[1] In another note Du Pont had said (April 8): "My Dear General: I attempted to take the bull by the horns, but he was too much for us. These monitors are miserable failures where forts are concerned; the longest was one hour and the others forty-five minutes under fire, and five of the eight were wholly or partially disabled."— W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 437.

CHAP. III. 1863.

The failure of the naval attack on Charleston caused a disappointment in the North in proportion to the high hopes which had been entertained of a brilliant success. On the 11th of April, before the news had reached Washington, the Secretary of the Navy wrote to Du Pont that the President had suggested that in view of operations elsewhere, and especially by the Army of the Potomac, it would be best for the admiral to retain a strong force off Charleston even if he should find it impossible to carry the place. He therefore ordered him to continue to menace the rebels, keeping them in apprehension of a renewed attack, in order that they might be occupied, and not come North or go West to the aid of those with whom our forces were expecting to be immediately engaged. "Should you be successful," added the Secretary, "as we trust and believe you will be, it is expected that General Hunter will continue to keep the rebels employed and in constant apprehension, so that they shall not leave the vicinity of Charleston. This detention of ironclads, should it be necessary in consequence of a repulse, can be but for a few days. I trust your success will be such that the ironclads can be, or will have been, dispatched to the Gulf when this reaches you." This dispatch, which counted so confidently upon his success, was bitter reading to the admiral after his failure. A day or two later he received a dispatch directly from the President, dated the 13th of April: "Hold your position inside the bar near Charleston, or, if you shall have left it, return to it, and hold it till further orders. Do not allow the enemy to erect new batteries or defenses on

Ammen, "The Atlantic Coast," p. 106.

Morris Island. If he has begun it, drive him out. I do not herein order you to renew the general attack. That is to depend on your own discretion or a further order." And the next day, conscious of a certain inconsistency between this order and that of April 2, the President issued a joint instruction to General Hunter and Admiral Du Pont, directing him who received it first to communicate it instantly to the other:

Lincoln to Du Pont, April 13, 1863. W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 440.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 14, 1863.

This is intended to clear up an apparent inconsistency between the recent order to continue operations before Charleston, and the former one to remove to another point in a certain contingency. No censure upon you, or either of you, is intended. We still hope that by cordial and judicious coöperation you can take the batteries on Morris Island and Sullivan's Island and Fort Sumter. But whether you can or not, we wish the demonstration kept up for a time, for a collateral and very important object; we wish the attempt to be a real one (though not a desperate one) if it affords any considerable chance of success. But if prosecuted as a demonstration only, this must not become public, or the whole effect will be lost. Once again before Charleston, do not leave till further orders from here. Of course this is not intended to force you to leave unduly exposed Hilton Head or other near points in your charge. Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN. Ibid., p. 441.

On receipt of these dispatches the mortification and resentment of Admiral Du Pont were greatly increased. He fancied, entirely without reason, that the President's orders were couched in a tone of censure and criticism, and wrote on the 16th to the Secretary of the Navy, requesting that the Department would relieve him by appointing an officer "who, in its opinion, is more able to execute that service in which I have had the misfortune to

April, 1863.

Ammen, "The Atlantic Coast," p. 108.

CHAP. III.

fail—the capture of Charleston." He announced his intention to obey all orders with the utmost fidelity, even when his judgment was entirely at variance with them, such as the order to reoccupy the unsafe anchorage for the ironclads off Morris Island, and an intimation that a renewal of the attack on Charleston might be ordered, "which," he added, "in my judgment would be attended with disastrous results, involving the loss of this coast." In the same tone of resentful subordination he said, "I shall spare no exertions in repairing, as soon as possible, the serious injuries sustained by the monitors in the late attack, and shall get them inside Charleston bar with all dispatch in accordance with the order of the President. I think it my duty, however, to state to the Department that this will be attended with great risk to these vessels from the gales which prevail at this season, and from the continuous fire of the enemy's batteries, which they can neither silence nor prevent the erection of new ones." In this opinion the admiral was supported by the leading officers of his fleet. It was the general belief in the blockading squadron that the monitors could not ride securely at anchor within the bar; the opinion, however, was erroneous, as was afterwards frankly admitted by the same officers. The bar was found to furnish a sufficient protection from the heavy seas to the vessels inside; and the monitors rode safely at anchor off Charleston, inside the bar, for nearly two years. They were made safe by heavy moorings with buoys attached; and the dragging, so confidently predicted by Du Pont, never took place.

Ammen, "The Atlantic Coast," p. 108.

Ibid., p. 115.

The monitor vessels did most important service at a critical time, and their short history will render still more illustrious the name of their accomplished inventor. But there existed against them among the higher officers of the navy an unconquerable repugnance. This arose partly from the disagreeable conditions of existence in the monitors in the Southern seas. The temperature below decks, when the hatches were closed, became almost intolerable in the course of a few hours; and the perils of battle were doubled by those of asphyxia to officers and men, laboring in intense activity and excitement in the vitiated air. The dangers which a trained soldier or sailor accustoms himself to accept with coolness in the wonted conditions of field or siege, or on the open deck, became much more exasperating to the nerves, when, to a man shut up in an iron room, every inch of the wall was charged with possible death. The officers in the turrets were constantly exposed to destruction from the flying of nuts within, answering to the impact of projectiles without.[1] Many a tired officer, leaning for a moment's rest against the wall of his protecting dungeon, was disabled by the shock of a shell outside that never touched him. The slow movement of the vessels in action, a fault which was rapidly and constantly aggravated by the extraordinary growth of seaweed and shellfish on their bottoms in the warm Southern waters; their in-

[1] "The plates of the turret and of the pilot-house were held together by numerous bolts, with the heads on the outside and a nut within. The blow of a very heavy projectile would make the nuts fly with great force within the turret, and the rebound of the plates would then, at times, withdraw the bolts entirely, but more frequently they would stand out like the 'quills upon the fretful porcupine.'"— Ammen, "The Atlantic Coast," p. 112.

CHAP. III. curable habit of sheering from one side to the other when not under way — all induced the officers, whose education and training had been obtained in swift-sailing clippers on the deep seas, to regard the monitors with feelings of disgust, which rendered them, perhaps, unjust to their great and incontestable merits. Five of the officers of highest rank near Charleston, a month after the failure of the attack on Sumter, submitted an opinion to the Navy Department which condemned the monitors in the strongest language; they regarded them as incapable of keeping the seas and of making long voyages; though in a secure harbor, and able to choose their time of exit, it was admitted they could greatly damage and harass a blockading force. The long time required to load, point, and fire the heavy guns, which they placed at seven minutes, was another objection. The Navy Department, however, did not accept this report as conclusive against the monitors, and they continued to render good service until the close of the war. Perhaps no more striking proof of the excellent qualities of the monitors, and of their serious structural defects, was ever given than in the splendid achieve-
1863. ment of the *Weehawken* on the 17th of June, and her inglorious end the following winter.

All through the early part of the month of June rumors were continually reaching Admiral Du Pont that the Confederate ironclads at Savannah were about to leave by way of the Wilmington River for the purpose of raising the blockade of Warsaw Sound and the neighboring inlets. The principal ironclad at that place, and one of the most formidable war vessels ever constructed by the Confeder-

acy, was the ram *Atlanta*. This was originally an English iron steamer called the *Fingal*, which, after a successful career as a blockade runner, had been taken by the Confederate Government, rechristened the *Atlanta*, and altered into a man-of-war. Her deck had been cut down to within about two feet of the water; this was surmounted by a casemate with inclined sides and flat roof, inclosing a powerful battery of four Brooke rifles of six and seven inch caliber, two of which could be fired either laterally or fore and aft. Her armor was four inches thick, of double 2-inch plates of English railroad iron. The edges of the deck projected six feet from the side of the vessel; the overhang being filled in and strengthened with a heavy mass of wood and iron. CHAP. III.

These details were, of course, unknown to Admiral Du Pont; but knowledge of the great strength of the vessel and of the high hopes entertained of her in the South had come to him, and he therefore dispatched to Warsaw Sound, to guard against her, two of his best monitors, the *Weehawken* and the *Nahant*, under the command, respectively, of two of the most trustworthy and accomplished officers in the fleet, Captain John Rodgers and Commander John Downes. As soon as the monitors appeared, the officers of the *Atlanta* joyfully accepted the gage of battle thus held out to them, and early on the morning of the 17th of June, she came down the river accompanied by several steamers, decorated with holiday flags, and loaded with spectators, who had thronged from the city to witness the easy defeat and probable destruction or capture of the Yankee flotilla. There may have been more of confidence and of ardor on board the *Atlanta* than within the 1863.

CHAP. III. black turrets of the Federal ironclads; but there never were seen, afloat or ashore, more of coolness, courage, and trained scientific presence of mind than Captain Rodgers brought to the important work before him. At the first sight of his enemy he beat to quarters and cleared his ship for action; then, slipping their cables, the *Weehawken* and the *Nahant* steamed outward for the northeast end of Warsaw Island. The movement was interpreted on board the *Atlanta* as one of retreat. The Federal commanders, having finished their preparations, turned and stood up the sound to meet their confident adversary. The *Atlanta* fired first, at a distance of a mile and a half; the shot, which went over the stern of the *Weehawken*, struck the water near the *Nahant*. For twenty minutes the monitors advanced slowly and steadily and in perfect silence, until Rodgers, who was in the lead, and whose plan had been thoroughly arranged in advance, attained the point he had selected for beginning his attack three hundred yards from the Confederate ram. As coolly and deliberately as if he were engaged at target practice he opened fire with his 15-inch gun.

June 17, 1863.

The result of his first shot on the *Atlanta* was simply stupefying. Although it was fired at an angle of fifty degrees with the keel, striking the sloping side of the vessel in the line of her ports, it penetrated her armor, ripped out the wooden backing, covering the deck with splinters of iron and Georgia pine, and prostrated "about forty men." The second shot struck the edge of her projection, starting some plates; the third took off the roof of the pilot-house, injuring both pilots, and knocking senseless the man at the wheel. One more shot came, thun-

REAR-ADMIRAL JOHN A. DAHLGREN.

dering ruin and doom, breaking a port shutter and driving the crumbled fragments in through the port. This was all the work of a few minutes. The *Atlanta* fired only one shell, at long range, before the *Weehawken* opened. The consternation of these appalling blows, following in such rapid succession, far more than the real injury received, had rendered the officers and crew incapable of further fighting.[1] She hauled down her colors, hoisting the white flag in token of surrender. The *Weehawken* had captured the greatest naval prize of the war with four shots, in fifteen minutes, and the gallant Downes, in the *Nahant*, had had no need or opportunity to assist. The *Atlanta* was found to be so little hurt that in a few hours she steamed without assistance to Port Royal. There were only sixteen Confederates wounded; not a man was touched on board the *Weehawken*.

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Yet this famous vessel, which made such easy work of any enemy opposed to her, perished, at last, by the faults of her own construction. She lay at anchor on the 6th of December, 1863, within Charleston bar, fast to one of the mooring buoys. She had been heavily loaded with shells, and the weight caused her to lie deeper than usual in the water. The sea was rather heavy, and a considerable amount of water slopped into the windlass room, unnoticed, through her hawse-holes. As the sea became heavier, the waves began washing over the bow and came over the high coaming[2] of the

[1] Rodgers, in his report, says: "The first shot took away their disposition to fight, and the third their ability to get away."

[2] This coaming had been adopted for the purpose of making the monitors habitable, and the air in them respirable in hot weather. "Without this arrangement," says Ammen, "it would have been absolutely impossible to exist on board of them, as the water was usually swashing over the decks."

Ammen, "The Atlantic Coast," p. 116.

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hatchway. To keep the water out of the cabin the iron door between it and the windlass room was closed; and as the seas increased, while closing down the battle-plate of the hatchway, several seas went over, almost filling the room. The pumps were put to work, and at first the executive officer had no apprehension of the loss of the vessel. Shortly after noon, it was found that the *Weehawken* was sinking. The signal was made that "assistance was required," but it was too late. Five minutes afterwards the vessel heeled to starboard; the bow settled; and, suddenly righting herself, she went down, the top of her smoke-stack alone remaining visible. Four officers and twenty men were drowned.

Ammen, "The Atlantic Coast," p. 143.

Ibid., pp. 144, 145.

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For some time after the 7th of April General Beauregard was unable to realize the full extent of the repulse he had inflicted upon the national forces. He remained in constant expectation of a renewal of the attack, and busied himself in plans for offensive returns which never were carried out. On the 11th of April he issued orders for a general boarding assault from the boats in Charleston harbor upon the Federal fleet. In his instructions to the officer charged with the work he says: "I feel convinced that with nerve and proper precaution on the part of your boats' crews, and with the protection of a kind Providence, not one of the enemy's monsters, so much boasted of by them, would live to see the next morning's sun." He was so sure of great results from this plan that he indiscreetly boasted of them in advance, by telegraph, to the South Carolina Senators at Richmond. "I have advised," he says, "a secret expedition

Beauregard to Well, April 11, 1863. W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 895.

which will shake Abolitiondom to its foundation if successful. My hopes are strong." But nothing came of it; and, in view of the continued inactivity of the national forces on the coast, the Confederate Government, feeling the absolute necessity of giving every possible support to Lee in the East and Pemberton in the West, withdrew from Beauregard, early in May, a part of his force. This extorted from him loud outcry and clamor, in which the representatives of South Carolina at Richmond joined. Mr. Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War, upon whom devolved the hard task of fighting, at the same time, the Federal armies and the Confederate jealousies, tried his best to satisfy the South Carolinians of the unreasonableness of their remonstrances. "The enemy cannot have," he said, "more than 10,000 or 15,000 troops at the utmost. . . After all deductions . . . for the troops sent back to North Carolina and ordered to Mississippi, there will be left for the defense of Charleston and Savannah more than 15,000 of all arms. . . Surely with this force you can be in no serious danger, considering the superiority of spirit and valor in your soldiers and the advantages of intrenchments, from a force, probably not equal, certainly not superior, of the Yankee enemy." This statement, reserving the natural Southern boast, was as accurate as it was reasonable. Hunter had 15,745 effectives, as shown by his May returns; while Beauregard's effective force, after the withdrawal of the troops mentioned, still amounted to 20,045. Mr. Seddon went on to say: "I could be scarcely justified in stating the causes that preclude succor from General Lee's army and other points to General Pem-

Beauregard to Orr and Barnwell, April 12, 1863. W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 898.

May 13, 1863.

Seddon to Miles and others, May 13, 1863. W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 940.

Ibid., p. 461.

Ibid., p. 953.

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berton, but you may rely upon it that only on the fullest consideration and under the gravest necessity is the draft made on Charleston and persisted in, despite the earnest remonstrance of gentlemen so highly esteemed as yourselves." The campaign of Gettysburg was at that moment in preparation in Richmond, and the capture of Philadelphia and Washington was the dream which occupied the minds of the Confederate Government on one hand, while on the other the resistless march of Grant's legions across Mississippi was straining their utmost energies. But no considerations of reason or policy had any effect to quiet the petulant complaints of General Beauregard. While demanding the impossible from his Government he writes, with singular self-deception, to the South Carolina Senators: "All I ask is not to be cramped, decried, or unnecessarily driven into opposition to the Government, where a united front and the concentrated efforts of all are absolutely required to withstand the gigantic storm which threatens to engulf us at any moment. I am well aware that like others I have my faults and my deficiencies, but, thank God, selfishness and ambition form no part of my nature."

May 13, 1863. W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 940.

Apl. 24, 1863. W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 911.

It was not the fault of General Hunter that Beauregard was left so completely at leisure from April to June. On the very afternoon of the ironclad attack on Fort Sumter he had massed his troops on Folly Island ready to cross Light House Inlet and attack the Confederate positions on Morris Island. The boats were ready, the men under arms for crossing, when they were recalled by the announcement of Admiral Du Pont that he had

Hunter to the President, May 22, 1863. W. R. Vol. XIV., pp. 455, 456.

resolved to retire. On the 29th of April Hunter proposed to the admiral a general demonstration on the Savannah River which Du Pont declined, saying that nothing but a feint could be made and that that would be regarded as a repulse by the rebels as well as in the North. Hunter at last being satisfied that the rebels had already sent away from Charleston and Savannah all the troops not absolutely needed to garrison the defenses, therefore begged to be relieved from his orders to coöperate with the navy, in which case he promised to place "a column of 10,000 of the best-drilled soldiers in the country" at once in the heart of Georgia. "Nothing is truer," he says, "than that this rebellion has left the Southern States a mere hollow shell." He promised with this column "to penetrate into Georgia, produce a practical dissolution of the slave system there, destroy all railroad communication along the Eastern portion of the State, and lay waste all stores which can possibly be used for the sustenance of the rebellion." But even while the ardent veteran was thus begging for a dissolution of the partnership which bound him to the admiral, the removal both of himself and Du Pont from command had already been determined upon at Washington. Admiral Foote had been designated to relieve Du Pont. He dying on the 26th of June, Admiral Dahlgren was appointed in his place; while General Q. A. Gillmore, a brilliant and energetic young officer of engineers, was, on the 3d of June, appointed to relieve General Hunter in the command of the Department of the South. The President, on the 30th of June, wrote to General Hunter: "I assure you, and you

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April 29, and May 4, 1863. W. R. Vol. XIV., pp. 454, 455.

Ibid., p. 456.

Hunter to Lincoln, May 22, 1863. Ibid., pp. 456, 457.

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may feel authorized in stating, that the recent change of commanders in the Department of the South was made for no reasons which convey any imputation upon your known energy, efficiency, and patriotism; but for causes which seemed sufficient, while they were in no degree incompatible with the respect and esteem in which I have always held you as a man and an officer." The Secretary of the Navy, at the same time, sent an equally cordial and complimentary letter to Admiral Du Pont, commending the ceaseless vigilance which had ended in the destruction of the *Nashville* and the timely measures to which were due the capture of the *Atlanta*. "You may well regard this," he says, "and we may with pleasure look upon it, as a brilliant termination of a command gallantly commenced and conducted for nearly two years with industry, energy, and ability."

Lincoln to Hunter, June 30, 1863. W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 470.

Report, Secretary of the Navy, Dec. 7, 1863.

CHAPTER IV

CHANCELLORSVILLE

THE President did not leave General Hooker in ignorance of any of his sentiments towards him. On the day that he appointed him Commander of the Army of the Potomac he wrote him the following letter, which is equally remarkable for its frankness and its magnanimity: "I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not an indispensable, quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying

Jan. 26, 1863.

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that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit, which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticizing their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories."

Lincoln to Hooker, Jan. 26, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXV., Part II., p. 4.

A friend, to whom Hooker showed this letter immediately upon its reception, says it made a deep impression upon the general. While he was somewhat chagrined by its severe chiding he was touched by its tone of mingled authority and kindness. "He talks to me like a father," the general said. "I shall not answer this letter until I have won him a great victory."

He immediately went about his work in the most faithful and efficient manner. The spirit of gloom and demoralization which other observers had noticed in the Army of the Potomac became more evident to him, now that he had command of the whole army, than it had been while he commanded one of the Grand Divisions. "Desertions," he says, "were at the rate of about two hundred a day." A

Hooker, Testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Part I., p. 112.

large number of the officers were openly hostile to the policy of the Government; there was a spirit of dormant revolt which began to show itself after the Proclamation of Emancipation. General Hooker felt that the first thing to be done was to check desertion and to renew, as far as possible, the morale of the army. He found absent from their commands some 3000 officers, and 80,000 privates. By a judicious system of punishment and of furloughs he corrected this evil to a great extent. He reorganized his staff departments. To occupy the troops who were rusting in idleness, he greatly increased the amount of drill and field exercise. He consolidated the cavalry and improved its efficiency; by frequent small expeditions and skirmishes he brought up the spirit and discipline of this arm to a higher point than it had before reached. In the early part of April he was able to say that he had under his command "a living army, and one well worthy of the republic." On one occasion he called it "the finest army on the planet."

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Hooker, Testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Part I., p. 113.

This necessary and valuable work occupied him during three months of the late winter and early spring. About the middle of April he felt that an active movement was required. The troops were ready for it and public opinion demanded it. He had an army of about 130,000 men effective for service; that of General Lee on the opposite side of the river had been reduced by Longstreet's departure for the South to not less than 60,000.

1863.

"Battles and Leaders." Vol. III., p. 237.

Ibid., p. 238.

Hooker was confident of success — perhaps too confident. He wrote to the President on the 11th announcing his intended movement, and saying: "I am apprehensive that he [the enemy] will retire

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from before me the moment I should succeed in crossing the river, and over the shortest line to Richmond, and thus escape being seriously crippled." He hoped, however, to delay and check him with cavalry, and thus get a fight out of him. The President, on the same day, made the following memorandum showing his clear perception of the immediate work in hand:

W. R. Vol. XXV., Part II., p. 199.

Apl. 11, 1863.

"My opinion is that, just now, with the enemy directly ahead of us, there is *no* eligible route for us into Richmond; and consequently a question of preference between the Rappahannock route and the James River route is a contest about nothing. Hence our prime object is the enemy's army in front of us, and is not with or about Richmond at all, unless it be incidental to the main object.

"What then? The two armies are face to face with a narrow river between them. Our communications are shorter and safer than are those of the enemy. For this reason we can, with equal powers, fret him more than he can us. I do not think that by raids towards Washington he can derange the Army of the Potomac at all. He has no distant operations which can call any of the Army of the Potomac away; we have such operations which may call him away, at least in part. While he remains intact, I do not think we should take the disadvantage of attacking him in his intrenchments; but we should continually harass and menace him, so that he shall have no leisure nor safety in sending away detachments. If he weakens himself, then pitch into him."

Lincoln, Memorandum. MS.

The plan of campaign which Hooker adopted was simple, bold, and perfectly practicable. The fail-

ure of Burnside had eliminated several elements from the problem. There were no practicable fords below Fredericksburg and none above Fredericksburg as far as the mouth of the Rapidan. Hooker, writing to a friend about this time, said: "You must be patient with me. . . Remember that my army is at the bottom of a well and the enemy holds the top." There were many points where crossing of the river was possible, but it was almost hopeless to think of gaining a footing on the hills beyond, exposed as the troops would be for a long distance to a concentrated artillery fire. The first place above the city where favorable conditions of approach were to be found was Banks's Ford, about six miles by the road. This was heavily fortified; two of the enemy's lines were so close to each other that both could bring their fire at once upon troops crossing the river. About seven miles further there was another practicable approach to the stream, the United States Mine Ford, also strongly fortified with long lines of infantry parapets. The enemy had not thought it worth while to expend much labor on the Rappahannock above the mouth of the Rapidan; an attack involving so great a detour and the crossing of two difficult rivers seemed to him so improbable that he took no measures to prevent it. It was this route, therefore, that Hooker wisely chose. He resolved to threaten the enemy's right wing by a heavy demonstration under General John Sedgwick, with three corps, a few miles below Fredericksburg, while he threw a strong force across the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford and essayed, by a rapid march down the Rappahannock, to "knock away" the enemy's force

Hooker, Testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Part I., p. 116.

CHAP. IV. holding the United States and Banks's Fords by attacking them in rear, and as soon as these fords were re-opened to reënforce the marching columns sufficiently for them to attack and rout the rebel army wherever they should meet it outside of its works.

He had intended to anticipate this movement of his infantry by a great cavalry raid through Virginia. He gave orders to General Stoneman on the 1863. 12th of April to take his entire cavalry force to turn the enemy's position on his left, to throw a force between him and Richmond, cutting off his supplies, intercepting his retreat, and injuring him in every way possible; and enjoined upon him the utmost vigilance and energy. "Let your watchword be fight, and let all your orders be fight, fight, fight." In pursuance of these orders the cavalry left their camps the next day; but on the second day out a great rain-storm came on. The river became impassable and every ravine turned to a foaming torrent. The expedition was therefore compelled to wait. A start was made on the 28th, and on the 29th the cavalry corps crossed the Rappahannock.

April 12, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXV., Part I., p. 1066.

April, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXV., Part I., p. 1058.

The infantry movement was executed with astonishing celerity and success. The general had kept secret from his corps commanders the details of his plan. Three corps were put in motion on the 27th of April; by a rapid march on the 28th they crossed the Rappahannock on a canvas pontoon bridge, finding nothing but a small picket to oppose them. They crossed the Rapidan on the morning of the 30th. Lee, whose attention had been diverted by the noisy demonstration which

Sedgwick was making below the river, knew nothing of the more formidable enemy approaching on his left. The army coming down the right bank of the Rappahannock uncovered the United States Ford, as Hooker had anticipated, and the engineers rapidly bridged the Rappahannock at that point. So far the march of Hooker had been one of the most successful made in the war. The rebel general was completely deceived. When he heard of the turning column on the Rappahannock, he imagined it was on the way to Gordonsville, and he sent his cavalry upon that track and therefore lost the use of it for twenty-four hours. If Hooker had continued his march with the same success and swiftness with which it was begun, it is hard to see how Lee could have escaped a crushing defeat. On the evening of the 30th Hooker had four corps at Chancellorsville; three roads run from there to Fredericksburg; on the right a plank road, on the left a road skirting the river, and between them a road called the old turnpike. Here he wasted the greater part of an afternoon and a morning — hours of inestimable importance.

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April, 1863.

It was eleven o'clock on the 1st of May when General Hooker began his direct movement upon the enemy's rear. Slocum's corps, followed by that of Howard, had the extreme right, Sykes and Hancock took the turnpike, Griffin and Humphreys of Meade's corps went by the river road, each column preceded by a detachment of Pleasonton's cavalry. Sickles's corps, which had just arrived, was held in reserve. Any criticism of the operations of armies in this country would be unjust if we did not keep constantly in mind the nature of the



CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN.
I.



CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN.
II.

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ground. Except for rare clearings, the whole country in which Hooker now found himself was a dense and tangled forest, in every part of which the axman had to be employed before the artillerist could be made available; cavalry were for the most part of no use; the troops could not be seen by their officers; a regiment deployed as skirmishers disappeared from the sight of their colonel as if the earth had swallowed them. After half an hour's march through the thicket the best equipped troops would reappear in rags and tatters. General Doubleday says, "It was worse than fighting in a dense fog." The frightful reverberation of battle among the trees was enough to appal the stoutest heart, yet a few hundred yards away nothing would be heard. The generals on either side, shut out from sight or from hearing, had to trust to the unyielding bravery of their men till couriers brought word which way the conflict was tending, before they could send the needed support.

Doubleday, "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," p. 12.

General G. K. Warren, Report. W. R. Vol. XXV., Part I., p. 193.

It was through such a wilderness as this that Hooker advanced his army on the 1st of May. The enemy had of course to contend with the same difficulties, with this advantage on their side that they knew the by-roads of the whole region. But having advanced there could be no question that Hooker should have continued as far as possible. Instead of doing this, he acted with unusual prudence and with something like hesitation. Sykes in the center met with some opposition from McLaws. Slocum was not abreast of him on his right, while Meade was too far away on the river road to connect with him; he therefore fell back upon Hancock, who pushed forward and checked

1863.



GENERAL THOMAS J. ("STONEWALL") JACKSON.

the enemy. Now, if ever, was the need and justification for a great effort. Hooker was almost through the worst of the woods; Meade was nearly in sight of the important position of Banks's ford which was feebly defended; by pushing his forces resolutely forward on all three roads, General Hooker could have gained an advantageous position on open ground beyond. "The troops were in fine spirits," says Humphreys, "and we wanted to fight." "We ought to have held our advanced positions," says Hancock, "and still kept pushing on." General Warren, Chief of Engineers, was of the same opinion; he urged Couch not to abandon his position without further orders. Couch asked for permission to remain, which was flatly refused, and the army fell back to the position near Chancellorsville which they had left in the morning.[1] This movement did not improve the spirits of the troops, and when Humphreys came back from the river road with his division, his keen, soldierly eye recognized clearly the fault of the position. The army was drawn in too closely in every direction; it had not the look of an army ready for battle; "they were in no confusion," he says, "but they seemed to be unoccupied."

Humphreys, Testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Part I., p. 63. Hancock, Testimony. Ibid., p. 66. Couch, "Battles and Leaders." Vol. III., p. 159.

Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Part I., p. 64.

[1] General Hooker claimed that he retired because on those narrow roads he could get but few troops into position, and nearer Chancellorsville his position was much stronger.— Hooker, Testimony, Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Part I., pp. 125–142.

General Lee in his report confirms this; he says, "Here [at Chancellorsville] the enemy had assumed a position of great natural strength, surrounded on all sides by a dense forest, filled with a tangled undergrowth, in the midst of which breastworks of logs had been constructed, with trees felled in front so as to form an almost impenetrable abatis. His artillery swept the few narrow roads by which his position could be approached from the front and commanded the adjacent woods." — General Lee, Report. W. R. Vol. XXV., Part I., p. 797.

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The 1st of May thus passed without any progress having been made; the brilliant beginning of Hooker's campaign had not borne the fruit that was fairly to have been expected. Still the position was a strong one, and with a few hours of work, where it was most needed, the Army of the Potomac would have been safe from any attack the enemy was able to make. But unfortunately the work was not done; the extreme right, under General Howard, commanding the Eleventh Corps, was absolutely unprotected. All his defensive works were in his immediate front; his right wing was in the air. This point of weakness in the Union line was discovered by General Stuart and made known to General Lee on the evening of the 1st. A flank attack upon the Federal right wing had always been his favorite manœuvre, and the true and tried weapon with which he had so often succeeded was ready to his hand. He proposed to Stonewall Jackson that he should take his entire corps round to the right and rear of Hooker's army. Jackson entered into the plan with the greatest enthusiasm, and at early dawn on the morning of the 2d he started upon this bold and perilous enterprise with 26,000 troops. He moved by a zig-zag route, southwest, and then northwest across the Federal front, which in general faced south, leaving General Lee with a mere curtain of soldiers to occupy during his absence the attention of Hooker and his army.

Jackson's movement, though hazardous, was not so desperate as it has been sometimes represented. Lee had been convinced the night before that it was impossible for him to carry Hooker's line by a direct attack in front; he had therefore resolved

upon this flanking attempt as the only resource left him. In case of the repulse of Jackson, Lee considered that he still had his chance of retreat by the Richmond Railroad, and Jackson could with little difficulty have made his way back to Gordonsville, and with their rapid movements they could have reunited their columns by the Central Railroad. The flanking movement did not pass undetected. Jackson's column was seen in the early morning passing a hill in front of General Birney of Sickles's corps, who had been detached to fill the gap between Howard and Slocum. He immediately reported his discovery to General Hooker, who was unable at the moment to make up his mind whether it indicated an attack upon his right flank or a movement in retreat of the enemy.[1] In fact, every act of his during those three days indicated a singular indecision entirely at variance with what was previously known of his character. Yet he does not deserve all the blame for the disaster of the 2d of May, for, immediately on receiving Birney's report, he sent an urgent order to Slocum and to Howard to examine their ground carefully and to take all possible measures against an attack in flank.[2] He told them that the right of their line did not appear to be strong enough; no artificial defenses worth naming had been thrown up; they

CHAP. IV.

Dabney, p. 674.

1863.

[1] At four o'clock, the hour when Stonewall Jackson was forming his lines across the turnpike for his rush upon our right, Hooker wrote to Sedgwick, "We know the enemy is flying, trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles's divisions are among them."— Sedgwick, Testimony. Report, Committee on Conduct of War, 1865. Part I., p. 95.

[2] General Howard says this order never reached him. General Schurz, on the contrary, says that it arrived at Howard's headquarters about noon or a little after, and that he read it to Howard. For the statements of Howard, Hooker, and Schurz see "Battles and Leaders," Vol. III., pp. 196, 219, 220.

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had not troops enough on their flank; and he thought they were not so favorably posted as might be. He had good reason to suppose that the enemy was moving to our right, and he concluded with an order to "advance your pickets for purposes of observation, as far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their approach."

May 2, 1863.

W. R. Vol. XXV., Part II., p. 361.

With these urgent orders in his hands, supplemented by his own observation of the movement of a column of Confederate infantry westward, which he reported to Hooker about eleven o'clock, General Howard did little to guard against the coming danger. In view of the warnings he had received, he faced, it is true, two regiments to the west, but this amounted to the same as doing nothing; his pickets consisted of only two companies and he had no grand guards to support them. Generals Devens and Schurz thought our right flank too much in the air, but Howard appeared to have a fixed idea that the attack of the enemy, if made at all, would be in his front, and he was confident of his ability to repulse any force that could come against him from that quarter. He waited, therefore, in perfect security, until about six o'clock. At this hour his command, thinking the day was to go by without their participating in the battle, the noise of which they had heard fitfully rising and falling in the distance on their left, were quite at their ease: the soldiers were cooking their suppers; most of the regiments had stacked their arms; many were scattered under the trees playing cards; when all at once they were startled by a strange invasion—deer, rabbits, and birds came leaping and flying in a panic through the thick brush towards

"Battles and Leaders." Vol. III., p. 219.

them, and behind these came their scanty pickets and outposts, with Stonewall Jackson's army corps, three lines deep, at their heels.

As soon as Birney had discovered the march of Jackson across his front, Sickles took Whipple's division to reënforce his left, and proceeded, cutting and slashing his way through the hilly wilderness, to attack the flank of the force he saw moving before him; but by the time he reached Jackson's line of march, the greater part of his corps had passed on. There was some sharp and successful skirmishing with the rear-guard; Jackson's trains were driven off to the road further south, and a considerable number of prisoners were taken by Sickles. He continually reported progress, and finding himself in such a favorable position to operate on either hand, he begged for orders to strike McLaws and Anderson on his left flank, or to proceed with reënforcements against Jackson's rear on his right; but as Lee had begun at this time a noisy demonstration upon Hooker's left to aid the attack of Jackson on the right, Hooker suffered, for the second time that day, from an attack of indecision, which had deplorable results. Before he had clearly made up his mind what to do, the Eleventh Corps was flying in panic in upon his center. The victorious troops of Jackson, inspired by a great success, which had instantly cured all fatigue of the forced march of fifteen miles, had taken in reverse the entire right flank of the army, and twilight was coming down on a scene of confusion and ruin.

Then, as often before and since, in the history of our war, it became the duty of subordinates, with-

CHAP. IV. out orders, to rectify the errors of their superiors and to save the army from destruction. In the midst of the wreck and havoc created by Jackson's charge, several of the generals on the right, including General Howard, did their best to stay the incoming flood of the enemy; and the prominent officers who held the center of the field also kept their senses about them, and with admirable coolness and conduct executed what orders they were able to get. General Alfred Pleasonton, of the cavalry, had been sent to operate with Sickles in front, but when he reached him, finding the woods in that part of the field absolutely impassable, he started back, and at Hazel Grove a part of the Eleventh Corps passed him in full retreat. He had only two regiments of cavalry with him, but these and twenty-two guns of different batteries were very efficient. A gallant charge by the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, under command of Major Pennock Huey, in which Major Peter Keenan and other officers were killed, checked for several minutes the advance of Jackson's corps; the twenty-two guns at Hazel Grove were brought into position, and held their place with wonderful steadiness amid the confused rush of fugitives from the right; and as the right of Jackson's advancing lines emerged from the woods, they were received with a fire so intense and so well sustained that they made no further progress until nightfall.[1] Sickles had been

[1] See General Pleasonton's testimony before the Committee on Conduct of the War, Report, 1865, Part I., p. 26 *et seq.*; a volume by Brevet Brigadier-General Pennock Huey: "The Charge of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry at Chancellorsville"; and also the statements of the two officers above, and several others in "Battles and Leaders," Vol. III., pp. 172–188.

left in a critical position, far in front of the rest of the Union line, with Jackson's corps on his right and rear; guided only by the sound and the flash of Pleasonton's guns, he made his way back through the wilderness, and afterwards by a gallant bayonet attack cleared the space to the turnpike. CHAP. IV.

In this twilight fighting the Confederates met with a personal loss equal to that of an army corps. In the impetuosity with which Jackson's corps attacked, their first line, commanded by Rodes, became mixed and mingled with their second, commanded by Colston. The nature of the ground, broken up by dense thickets, still further disordered the line, and Jackson's own fury and ardor perhaps contributed to the confusion. He kept right up with his own advance, mingling his frequent cries of "press forward" with short prayers of praise and thanksgiving, which he uttered with hand and face uplifted to the starlit sky. At last, perceiving that his lines were for the moment in hopeless disorder, he directed General A. P. Hill to divide his command, filing to the right and left of the highway to replace those of Rodes and Colston, who were to be withdrawn to the second line. While this was being done he rode forward, in his unrestrainable impatience, one hundred yards beyond his line of battle. All at once he found himself under the fire of the Union guns. Turning to regain his lines he was shot by his own men and mortally wounded. He died a few days later at Guiney's Station. May 2, 1863. Dabney, p. 282. May 10, 1863.

General Hooker, somewhat shaken by the untoward course of things for the last twenty-four hours, and not appreciating fully the value of the position held by his troops at Hazel Grove, the

CHAP. IV. center and key of the field, on the evening of the 2d, had ordered his entire line to be withdrawn to a position nearer Chancellorsville.

The damage incurred in the rout of the Eleventh Corps, great as it was, had been almost repaired
May, 1863. before the morning of the 3d by the readiness and energy of Pleasonton, Sickles, and Hiram G. Berry who was killed in the afternoon of that day. The lines which they formed during the night, if held, would have insured the safety of the army during the next day, especially as J. E. B. Stuart, who succeeded Jackson in command of his corps, abandoned Jackson's plan of turning the Federal right and occupying the fords, and devoted himself to desperate assaults directly in his front against the Union lines near the Chancellor House, and to establishing communication of his right with the left of Lee's army. All the morning of the 3d the officers in command suffered from great embarrassment, on account of an unfortunate accident to General Hooker. As he was standing by his headquarters at Chancellor's house, a column of the portico was struck by a cannon-shot and thrown violently against him; he fell senseless, and for some time was thought to have been fatally injured; he did not become conscious for half an hour, and for more than an hour longer he was incapable of giving any intelligent direction to the battle. General Couch was second in command, but, under the circumstances, naturally assumed as little responsibility as possible; and in the course of an hour or so General Hooker again resumed control; but valuable time had been lost, and he did not during the day fully recover from the effects of

the shock he had received. The battle therefore lacked unity and energy from beginning to end, and although his troops fought well, with steady and dogged courage, they could do nothing more, under the circumstances, than punish the enemy severely whenever they were attacked, and then fall back in pursuance of orders. By their last withdrawal they gave up their valuable position commanding the three roads to Fredericksburg, simply retaining an intrenched front towards the enemy with both wings resting upon the river and covering their fords.[1]

General Hooker always severely blamed General Sedgwick for his part in the failure at Chancellorsville, and the Committee on the Conduct of the War adopted his opinion, visiting General Sedgwick in their report with severe and undeserved censure. At nine o'clock at night, on the 2d of May, Hooker sent a peremptory order to Sedgwick, directing him to march with the greatest expedition upon Chancellorsville, and to attack and destroy any force he might fall in with upon the road; another order of the same purport was sent to him from General Butterfield, Chief of Staff, dated at midnight. It seems altogether unreasonable that Hooker should have expected Sedgwick to attack and defeat the force left at

1863.

1 "We immediately commenced to fortify that position by throwing up rifle-pits, and held it until we recrossed the river. In the mean time we had given up all those great roads connecting with Fredericksburg. The enemy took possession of the belt of woods between us and those roads, and held us in the open space, and commenced using the roads we had abandoned, and marched down and attacked Sedgwick as it proved afterwards. And after accomplishing all they could with him, which was to drive him across the river, they came back to attack us."—Hancock, Testimony, Report Committee on Conduct of the War.

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Fredericksburg, and then to march eleven miles and attack Lee's rear, and to do all this between midnight and daybreak; yet this he claims to have expected, and this the committee of Congress censured Sedgwick for not having done. It is true they induced several witnesses to say that if Sedgwick had accomplished this feat the result would have been the destruction of Lee's army, a proposition which need not be discussed. But it is difficult to see how Sedgwick could have proceeded with more expedition than he really used. Getting his orders at midnight, he began operations against Fredericksburg as early as he could. He moved by the flank, fighting all the way. The head of his column, at daylight, forced its way into the town and to the front of the intrenchments at the heights beyond; he assaulted with four regiments, which were repulsed from the enemy's rifle-pits. He attempted to turn the right of the enemy's position with a force under General Howe; he sent Gibbon's division to try to turn the enemy's left, and these efforts failing, he organized a strong storming party, which at last carried the enemy's center at the formidable point of Marye's Heights, which had proved so fatal to the army under Burnside. He did this at eleven o'clock in the morning; he seems to have delayed as little time as was possible to bring his troops into order again after the confusion of their assault and their victory. He then immediately put them in motion for Chancellorsville, meeting with some opposition all the way, until at Salem Church, little more than a third of the way to Hooker, the Confederates made a strong stand against him, having been heavily reënforced

Sedgwick, Testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. I., p. 96.

from Lee's main army. It is hard to see what more he could have done. He had taken Fredericksburg, had marched to Salem Church, fighting almost constantly, from daylight until dark. If all the generals of the army had done their duty equally well on that and the previous day, we should have no further disaster to chronicle. He had also nearly all the fighting on the next day, the 4th of May. He gave and received about equal injury. The enemy had, of course, reoccupied Fredericksburg, and came upon him from the East, West, and South. He applied to General Hooker for leave to cross the river, and received it. This permission was afterwards countermanded, but these later orders were only received by him after his command had gained the north bank of the Rappahannock.[1]

CHAP. IV. 1863.

Little was done by Hooker's army on the 4th. The disappointments of the three preceding days had greatly depressed him, and the physical injury which he had received on the 3d left him still faint and feeble. So vacillating and purposeless was his action on the 4th that the usual calumnious report obtained credence that he was under the influence of liquor that day.[2] Had he been in possession of

May, 1863.

[1] "The losses of the Sixth Corps in these operations were 4925 killed, wounded, and missing [revised tables 4590]. We captured from the enemy, according to the best information we could obtain, five battle-flags, fifteen pieces of artillery, — nine of which were brought off, the others falling into the hands of the enemy upon the subsequent reoccupation of Fredericksburg by his forces, — and 1400 prisoners, including many officers of rank. No material of any kind belonging to the Corps fell into the hands of the enemy except several wagons and a forge that were passing through Fredericksburg at the time of its reoccupation by his forces." — Sedgwick, Report. Vol. XXV., Part I., p. 561.

[2] The Rev. Henry Ward Beecher has the credit of having given currency to this story. On being asked by the Committee on the

CHAP. IV. all his faculties he never could have left, as he did, 37,000 fresh troops out of the battle, who were waiting and willing to take part in it. The First and most of the Fifth Corps stood idle on Hooker's right, forbidden to go in. So anxious was General Reynolds to bear his part that, in spite of his orders, he sent forward a brigade to make a reconnaissance, hoping that in this way an engagement might be brought on; but to his disappointment the officers detailed to that service came back with only an excellent report and a lot of prisoners. Lee's army was left perfectly free to hammer Sedgwick at its will.

May, 1863. On the night of the 4th a council of war was called. Hooker, stating his views of the situation to his generals, retired and left them free to deliberate among themselves. Reynolds threw him-

Conduct of the War to give his authority for it, he declined to mention the name of his informant. — Report Committee on Conduct of the War.

The story is positively contradicted by all the officers who were with Hooker during the battle. The following is from General Pleasonton's testimony:

"He was under a fly [tent]— we were under fire — the shells were bursting over us, and I believe some of the staff were injured during the day. General Hooker was lying on the ground and usually in a doze, except when I woke him up to attend to some important dispatch that required his decision. When I did so his efforts appeared to me to be those of a person who was overcoming great physical pain by mental efforts, and I regretted that we had not at that time some one who was physically capable of taking the command of the army.

. . . . . .

"*Question.* It has been loosely reported that General Hooker was under the influence of liquor at that time. Please state how that was.

"*Answer.* It is my opinion, from what I saw of General Hooker at that time, that that impression is entirely erroneous. General Hooker did not drink anything while I was with him. His whole manner was that of a sick person and nothing else. His eyes were perfectly clear, but his whole appearance was that of a man who was suffering great pain."— See also General Couch's opinion, "Battles and Leaders." Vol. III., p. 170.

self on a bed and went to sleep, saying he would vote with Meade. Meade, thinking the crossing would be too hazardous, voted to remain; so did Howard, who wished to give his corps a chance to redeem their reputation. Couch voted in favor of crossing the river. Sickles voted in the same sense. He afterwards gave as his justification for this vote, that their rations had given out, that the rain-storm of Tuesday had turned the Rappahannock into a rapid and swollen torrent, and had carried away one of the bridges and threatened the rest; besides they had only supplies enough for one day more of fighting, and defeat would entail a great disaster. These were the views of General Hooker himself, and, notwithstanding the majority of his corps commanders wished to stay and fight it out on the south side, he resolved to recross the river, and the movement was executed without further incident.

His confusion and bewilderment lasted long after the battle. He said himself to the committee of Congress, "When I returned from Chancellorsville I felt that I had fought no battle; in fact, I had more men than I could use, and I fought no general battle for the reason that I could not get my men in position to do so; probably not more than three or three and a half corps on the right were engaged in that fight."

Hooker, Testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Part I., p. 142.

We need not recapitulate the fatal errors to which we have alluded to show that Hooker's reputation as a great commander could not possibly survive his defeat at Chancellorsville. Stonewall Jackson's bold and successful stroke on the Union right would not have prevented a great

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victory if a man of even ordinary capacity in great emergencies had been at the head of the army. He threw away his chances one by one. On the night of the 30th, and on the morning of the 1st, a swift movement forward would have brought him clear of the forest with his left on Banks's Ford, and given him an enormous tactical advantage in the attack which Lee was forced to deliver. And even on the morning of the 3d, by simply holding the position which Pleasonton, Sickles, and Berry had gained, with the help of the fresh First and Fifth Corps on the right, and the indomitable Hancock on the left, the enemy could, probably, have been repulsed. The successive withdrawals of Hooker's lines were a bitter mortification to his own troops and the subject of wonder and amazement to the enemy.

April and May, 1863.

The attempt to throw the blame of his failure upon Sedgwick was as futile as Burnside's effort to saddle his upon Franklin. The distrust and criticisms which had darkened the latter days of General Burnside's command of the army now gathered about his luckless successor. He had been the most outspoken and the most merciless of Burnside's critics, and the words of the President's severe admonition must have often come back to him when he felt himself exposed to the same measure which he had meted out to Burnside. The opinion which General Warren expressed to the committee of Congress was that of most of the officers of high rank of the Army of the Potomac: "A great many of the generals lost confidence in him. . . I must confess that notwithstanding the friendly terms I was on with General Hooker,

Warren, Testimony, Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Part I., p. 50.

I somewhat lost confidence in him from that battle." CHAP. IV.

Stoneman's expedition, although he started with the largest and most perfectly equipped cavalry corps which had ever been brought together upon the continent, accomplished very little. Instead of marching directly in a solid body upon Lee's line of communications, he divided his force into several parties of raiders, which spread wide alarm throughout the State, but did little serious and permanent damage.

The losses at Chancellorsville were large on both sides. The Union loss was 1606 killed, 9762 wounded, and 5919 missing, a total of 17,287. The rebel losses were 1649 killed, 9106 wounded, and 1708 captured: in all 12,463. The proportion of loss to the troops engaged was thus about the same on the Confederate and on the Union side.

CHAPTER V

PRELUDES TO THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGNS

CHAP. V. July 23, 1862.

THE promotion of General Halleck to the chief command of the armies of the United States, and his removal to Washington, placed General Grant at the head of the armies of the West. He was not at first able to follow his natural disposition, and to attack the enemy opposed to him, on account of the large subtractions which were made from his forces to enable Buell to hold his positions in Tennessee. He had a long line to hold, from Memphis to Corinth, and had all he could do to guard it against the attacks of an active and vigilant enemy. He massed his troops, as well as he could, in a triangle of which the points were Jackson, Bolivar, and Corinth. He remained about two months in this enforced inactivity, which was only broken, at last, by an attack of the enemy. The Confederate generals Price and Van Dorn were in front of him, the former on the left and the latter on the right; and towards the middle of September they made a movement, the object of which was to effect a junction and either attack and disperse the forces of Grant, or, together passing his flank, to reënforce Bragg in his campaign



GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER.

against Buell. In pursuance of this object Price seized the village of Iuka, twenty-one miles southeast of Corinth, Colonel Robert C. Murphy, who commanded the place, giving way without resistance and displaying a pusillanimity which, when repeated on a subsequent occasion, caused great damage to the Union arms.

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. I., p. 434.

As soon as Grant heard of the movement he prepared, with his usual energy, to prevent the two Confederate generals from effecting their junction. He ordered General Rosecrans, whose troops were at the moment south of Corinth, to attack Iuka on the southwest, and General E. O. C. Ord to march on the north of the Memphis and Charleston railroad and attack that side of the town at the same moment. The two generals had about 17,000 men, almost equally divided. This plan met with the usual ill-success which attended such concerted movements during the early part of the war. Rosecrans was himself attacked by the Confederates two miles south of Iuka, and the head of his column was roughly handled. The engagement lasted several hours, but as a strong wind was blowing from the north, Ord, who was only a few miles away, and who was waiting for the signal of Rosecrans's attack, heard not a shot nor a sound. He got the news, however, during the night, and pushed on to Iuka in the morning, only to find that the town was deserted and that the enemy, after holding Rosecrans in check during the afternoon on the Jacinto road, had escaped during the night by the Fulton road, a few miles further east. Price passed in this way round the right flank and rear of Rosecrans, and joined Van Dorn at Ripley. Both

Sept. 19, 1862.



CAMPAIGNS IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY.
I.



CAMPAIGNS IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY.
II.

CHAP. V. sides claimed the advantage in this affair. Rosecrans's loss was 790 and Price's was 535.[1]

1862. Price and Van Dorn came together in the latter part of September, and before the 1st of October Grant ascertained that another movement was in progress against him. This time Corinth was the point of attack. Rosecrans occupied that place with some 23,000 men, Ord at Bolivar had 12,000, and there was a small reserve at Jackson, where Grant had established his headquarters. Van Dorn, being the ranking officer, took command of the Confederate forces, amounting to some 22,000. He reached Pocahontas, a point about twenty miles northwest of Corinth, on the 1st of October, and pushed for that place with great force and celerity. His object, as set forth by himself in his report, was to attack the forces there, drive them back on the Tennessee and cut them off, then turn upon Bolivar and Jackson, overrun West Tennessee, and effect a communication with General Bragg through Middle Tennessee. The campaign was well planned, and if it could have been successfully carried out would have been of very great advantage to the Confederates.

Oct. 3, 1863. The attack upon Corinth began under the most favorable auspices. Rosecrans's forces were attacked near the outlying works at some distance

[1] "General Grant was much offended with General Rosecrans because of this affair, but in my experience these concerted movements generally fail, unless with the very best kind of troops, and then in a country on whose roads some reliance can be placed, which is not the case in Northern Mississippi."—"Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman." Vol. I., p. 261.

"I was disappointed at the result of the battle of Iuka — but I had so high an opinion of General Rosecrans that I found no fault at the time."—Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. I., p. 413.

from the town, and forced back into the inner intrenchments with considerable loss. The Confederates bivouacked for the night within a few hundred yards of the Union forces, and expected an easy day's work on the morrow. Van Dorn ordered General Louis Hébert to attack vigorously on the left at daylight, swinging his left wing along the Ohio Railroad against the north side of the town. Dabney H. Maury, commanding the center, was to move directly from the west, and Mansfield Lovell was to second the attack from the southwest. But the whole plan miscarried. Hébert, instead of attacking at daybreak, came to headquarters at seven o'clock, and said he was too sick to fight. It was two hours later before his command, under the next in rank, General Martin E. Green, attacked, and Maury having already become engaged, the assault lacked the unity and vehemence required. The Confederates, nevertheless, fought with great bravery and determination, and were opposed with equal gallantry by the national troops in the town. They succeeded in breaking the Union line and entering the streets of Corinth, but the attacking party, being subjected to a terrible crossfire of artillery, were driven out again with heavy loss. The battle lasted only a short while, and before Lovell had begun to bring his forces seriously into action from the southwest the other divisions had been repulsed, and he could do nothing more than cover the retreat. The Confederate loss was very severe. Rosecrans reported their killed at 1423, and he captured 2268 prisoners; their total loss, as indicated by the records, was 4838. As the Union soldiers fought behind breast-

Rosecrans, Report. W. R. Vol. XVII., Part I., p. 170.

CHAP. V. works they suffered much less, their loss being only 2520.

The troops rested from noon of the 4th to the morn-
Oct., 1862. ing of the 5th, and then started after the retreating enemy; General Rosecrans took the wrong road, and lost eight miles by his mistake. Van Dorn, in his retreat, fell in with Ord's detachment, by whom he was sharply attacked and driven away from Davis's Bridge and compelled to cross further south. Ord being seriously wounded in this fight, the pursuit from his column ceased. Rosecrans came up with Van Dorn too late to prevent his crossing the Hatchie; and on reporting this to General Grant, he concluded that the chase was no longer of any use, and ordered Rosecrans to return. Although in neither of these engagements had General Rosecrans, in the opinion of General Grant, gained all the advantages he should have done from the defeat of the enemy, they were not without their importance in defeating the junction of Van Dorn's army with Bragg, and for some time afterwards West Tennessee was safe from any incursions from the south. General Rosecrans himself received ungrudging praise from the country and from the Government. He was promoted to the grade of major-general, and given command of the Army of the Cumberland; and although General Grant did not suggest, and would not have approved, this promotion, he took a certain grim satisfaction in it, as it relieved him from the command of a subordinate who had not fulfilled his expectations.[1] Van

[1] Grant says ("Memoirs," Vol. I., p. 420), "As a subordinate I found that I could not make him do as I wished, and had determined to relieve him from duty that very day."— Vide Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 120.

Dorn, who had planned his campaign with good judgment, made his attack with energy, and when it failed effected his retreat with great skill and success, was blamed severely for his failure, though a court of inquiry exonerated him from all censure. Jefferson Davis, although Van Dorn had lost nothing in his estimation by the untoward result of the attack on Corinth, still felt that it would not be advisable to continue him in chief command of the troops in that region, and therefore made J. C. Pemberton a lieutenant-general and ordered him to Mississippi. He assumed command at Jackson on the 14th of October, 1862. CHAP. V.

Towards the end of that month General Grant, in view of the repulse of the enemy in his front and the good condition of the troops under his command, reënforced by the new levies of the summer, began to turn his thoughts in the direction of an advance through the State of Mississippi in rear of Vicksburg. He suggested in a letter to General Halleck, on the 26th of October, the destruction of all the railroads about Corinth and an advance southward from Grand Junction along the east bank of the Yazoo River; and in pursuance of that idea he gathered in, from Bolivar and Corinth, a force of about thirty thousand men, who arrived in the neighborhood of Grand Junction on the 4th of November. General Halleck, on being informed of this movement, telegraphed his approval of it, and added also that he had ordered the troops at Helena, in Arkansas, to cross the river and threaten Grenada on the Mississippi Central Railroad, half way between Grand Junction and Vicksburg. It was therefore under the best possible auspices that Grant began his Oct., 1862.

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movement southward. He had an excellent army, well composed and well officered, inured to camp life, and with the habit of victory. He was heartily and generously supported and seconded at Washington.[1] He enjoyed the confidence of the President, and the enthusiastic support of the country. The prize before him was also of a nature to excite to the highest point of activity the ambition and the energies of any general. The possession of the Mississippi River was indispensable to the success of the National cause. So long as this vast highway was closed, at any point, to the fleets of the Union, the National power was, to a great extent, paralyzed in the West. The triumphant campaign of Donelson and Henry and its resulting operations had freed the river from its source to the city of Vicksburg. The gallantry of Farragut and his fleet in the memorable passage of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and the subsequent capture of New Orleans, had given to the Union the control of the mouths of the great river; but from Vicksburg to Port Hudson, a distance by the river of some two hundred miles, the enemy held almost unbroken possession, and, by means of this great belt of territory, they kept up undisturbed communication with the country west of the river. They held Louisiana as a field of manœuvre and supply; the vast empire of Texas, the most important beef-producing region of the

[1] There are expressions in the writings of General Grant, and those of his family and staff, which may seem contradictory of this statement, but the records do not confirm them. There had been some ill-feeling between Halleck and Grant before the former went to Washington, and their personal relations never were especially cordial. But Grant in all his campaigns was loyally and heartily supported by Halleck — in spite of occasional differences of opinion — from Corinth to Appomattox.

continent, was subject to their orders; in short, the Louisiana Purchase was virtually their own; and their only communication by land with the outside world was through their southwestern frontier.

The post of Vicksburg owed its importance primarily to its topographical situation. The Mississippi River runs from Memphis to Vicksburg (a stretch of two hundred miles as the crow flies, and twice that distance if we follow the sinuosities of the stream), through a flat and rich alluvial country of a dreary monotony and dullness. On the eastern side of the river, between the two points we have mentioned, stretches a vast low valley sixty miles in width at its broadest part, bounded by the river on the west, and on the east by a long range of hills which in former ages was the eastern limit of the bed of a prodigious water-course. Along the foot of these hills runs the Yazoo River, and the whole country is intersected in every direction by swamps, bayous, and sluggish streams creeping through vast forests of cypress. The bluffs we have mentioned leave the Mississippi River at Memphis, and, curving to the east, do not join the river again until they reach Vicksburg; from there to Port Hudson they follow the eastern bank of the river, and turn sharply to the east between that point and New Orleans.

We have detailed in another place the unsuccessful attempts of Farragut and Williams to capture Vicksburg in April and June of 1862. These failures so raised the spirits of the rebel officers there that General Van Dorn, who was in command of the Confederate troops, after General Williams had retired to Baton Rouge, determined to take the

CHAP. V. 1862. offensive and to attack him there. He sent General Breckinridge with two divisions against that position the last of July. A severe action took place in which the Confederates were repulsed with great loss; their ram *Arkansas* was set on fire, after having run aground. On the Union side the loss was comparatively slight, although it included the brave and accomplished General Williams. But though the Confederate attack had failed of its immediate object, the capture of Baton Rouge, General Breckinridge, notwithstanding his defeat, acted with admirable judgment in seizing the commanding point of Port Hudson, immediately above Baton Rouge, and strongly fortifying it. The Union troops, not being reënforced, soon afterwards returned to New Orleans, and for nearly a year more the rebel garrisons at Port Hudson and Vicksburg dominated a stretch of two hundred miles of the Mississippi River.

Just as General Grant was proposing to start on his expedition southward, he received a dispatch from Halleck promising him large reënforcements in a short time. The prospect of this addition to his force induced him to delay his principal movement for a few days; but he sent a large reconnoitering party, under the command of General James B. McPherson, towards Holly Springs, from which he learned that there was a considerable force of the enemy in that neighborhood; and, having been informed by Halleck that Memphis would be made a depot of a general military and naval expedition to Vicksburg, he grew impatient at the prospect of continued delay, and telegraphed to Halleck asking whether he was to wait at Grand Junction until the Memphis expedition was fitted out, or whether he

was to push south as far as possible. He also asked whether W. T. Sherman was to move subject to his orders, or whether he was to be reserved for some special service; to which Halleck answered, "You have command of all troops sent to your Department, and have permission to fight the enemy where you please." Grant next asked for an addition to the railroad rolling stock then accumulated at Memphis, to which Halleck answered that it was not advisable to undertake the repair of railroads south; that Grant's operations in Mississippi should be limited to rapid marches upon any collected force of the enemy; and he suggested a rapid turning movement down the river as soon as necessary forces could be collected. On the 15th of November Grant, having determined to move forward, sent for Sherman, and concerted with him a plan of operations. Grant was to move in person with the troops from Grand Junction, Sherman was to come out with an auxiliary force from Memphis and join Grant on the Tallahatchie, and Curtis was to send a force over the river from Arkansas to demonstrate upon the rear of the enemy at Grenada. As the expedition was on the point of moving Grant received a dispatch from Halleck, asking how many men could be spared for a movement down the river, reserving merely enough to hold Corinth and West Tennessee. Grant replied that he could let 16,000 go from Memphis, to be taken mainly from the new levies there; but that he required the rest of his force to move against Pemberton. Halleck immediately answered, approving the proposed movement but cautioning Grant not to go too far.

Halleck to Grant, Nov. 11, 1862. W. R. Vol. XVII., Part I., p. 469.

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The expedition started, as arranged, on the 26th of November, 1862. Grant's cavalry crossed the Tallahatchie on the 1st of December, his infantry and Sherman's forces following close after. The troops from Helena crossed, as agreed, under General Alvin P. Hovey. His cavalry came to within seven miles of Grenada, and inflicted considerable damage on the railroads. The Confederate force fell back as Grant advanced; the Union columns meeting only slight skirmishing parties of the enemy. The pursuit continued as far as Oxford, and even there it was not the stand of the Confederates but trouble in his logistics that brought Grant's advance to a halt. The embarrassment of feeding a large force by a single line of railway, and that generally out of repair, was far greater than he had counted upon. The country was free along the line of the Mississippi Central as far as Grenada on the 3d of December, but the difficulties of supply had already become so great that on the next day he asked Halleck, in a telegram sent from Abbeville, "how far south would you like me to go? . . . With my present force it would not be safe to go beyond Grenada and attempt to hold present lines of communication."

Grant to Halleck, Dec. 4, 1862. W. R. Vol. XVII., Part I., p. 472.

The day after, when his cavalry had arrived at Coffeeville, only eighteen miles from Grenada, the obstacles to his advance had become so great that he proposed to Halleck to send Sherman with the Helena and Memphis troops south of the mouth of the Yazoo River, and thus secure Vicksburg and the State of Mississippi. Halleck at once directed him not to attempt to hold the country south of the Tallahatchie, but to collect 25,000 troops at Mem-

phis by the 20th of the month for the Vicksburg enterprise. Grant had asked, "Do you want me to command the expedition on Vicksburg, or shall I send Sherman?" He took Halleck's dispatch of the preceding day—"You will move your troops as you may deem best to accomplish the great object in view"— as a sufficient answer to his question, and immediately wrote, "General Sherman will command the expedition down the Mississippi. He will have a force of about 40,000 men. Will land above Vicksburg, up the Yazoo, if practicable, and cut the Mississippi Central Railroad and the railroad running east from Vicksburg where they cross the Black River. I will coöperate from here, my movements depending on those of the enemy." Full and elaborate orders were issued to Sherman, in the sense of the above dispatch, on the 8th of December, and he hurried to Memphis to organize and take charge of this important expedition, which Grant, with his usual unselfishness, had put in the hands of his most trusted subordinate. He had no hesitation in thus giving to another the opportunity for this brilliant and conspicuous exploit, while he reserved for himself the more modest task of holding the enemy's forces in check on the Yallabusha. It was understood between the two generals, in conversation, that in case Pemberton retreated, Grant would follow him up to the Mississippi between the Yazoo and the Big Black rivers.

Dec. 8, 1862.

Badeau, Vol. I., p. 135.

Grant to Halleck, Dec. 8, 1862. W. R. Vol. XVII., Part I., p. 474.

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 136.

Having once resolved upon the expedition, Grant urged Sherman to use all possible dispatch in getting away, and such energy and zeal was put into the work that a week after Sherman reached

CHAP. V. Memphis, on his return from Oxford, sixty-seven boats had arrived at Memphis, and the embarkation began on the morning of the 19th. One reason for this haste on the part of Grant and Sherman was that they had heard rumors of the intention of the President to assign General J. A. McClernand of Illinois to take command of the expedition against Vicksburg, and they wished to forestall any such action.[1] But no notice of such assignment had been as yet sent to Grant, and he had, in fact, the authority of Halleck, communicated in a dispatch of the 9th, to appoint Sherman to the command; but, on the 18th of the month, while the transports were arriving to convey Sherman and his troops down the river, a dispatch came from Washington saying, "It is the wish of the President that General McClernand's corps shall constitute a part of the river expedition, and that he shall have the immediate command, under your direction." This was a bitter order for General Grant, who thoroughly disliked and distrusted McClernand, but he did his best to obey it. He immediately telegraphed to McClernand, who was at Springfield, Illinois, that he was to command one of the four corps into which the troops of the department had been divided, and that his corps was to form part of the expedition to Vicksburg. He also repeated the unwelcome news by telegraph to Sherman at Memphis; but neither of these dispatches reached its destination, on account of an

Halleck to Grant, Dec. 18, 1862. W. R. Vol. XVII., Part II., p. 425.

[1] "Grant was still anxious lest McClernand should obtain the command of the river expedition, and therefore had hurried Sherman to Memphis on the very day that he received the authority, so that, if possible, the latter might start before McClernand could arrive."—Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 136.

event which took place at this time and entirely changed the face of the campaign. CHAP. V.

The fears which General Grant entertained within a few days after the beginning of the expedition, that his line of communication was too long to be safely held, received a remarkable confirmation. A large force of the enemy's cavalry under General Forrest, in the middle of December, 1862. struck Grant's lines of communication with the North, and with the greater part of his own command; and a simultaneous movement, of much greater importance, was made by General Van Dorn, with 3500 cavalry, who passed by the left flank of Grant and attacked his base of supplies at Holly Springs, capturing the garrison on the 20th, and destroying a great quantity of valuable stores. Colonel Murphy, the same incapable officer who had abandoned Iuka to Price in so discreditable a manner, had been carelessly left in command of this important point. He had been warned of the coming danger, but paid no attention to it, and gave up the post without striking a blow.[1]

On hearing of this disaster to his line of supply Grant did not hesitate a moment in regard to the course to be pursued. He at once fell back north of the Tallahatchie and telegraphed to Halleck for permission to join the Mississippi expedition. This was promptly accorded, and he hurried with his troops, as rapidly as possible, to Memphis. Had this misadventure happened to Grant at a later period of his career he would have paid no attention to it, but gathering his troops compactly

[1] He was dismissed the service for his conduct on this occasion.—W. R. Vol. XVII., Part I., p. 516.

CHAP. V. together, would have at once advanced upon the enemy in front of him, and in all probability would have beaten Pemberton's army and taken Vicksburg six months earlier than it was actually done. But the experiment of living upon the enemy's country had not yet been tried; the roads were bad; the rainy season was beginning, and he concluded the more prudent course was to return. He learned something on the way back in regard to the problem of subsisting upon the enemy's country. For some ten days he had no communication with the North, and for a fortnight no supplies. But the diligent system of foraging by which his army was fed on the route from Coffeeville to Grand Junction served as a lesson to him which was afterwards put to splendid use by Sherman and himself. General Grant arrived at Holly Springs on the 23d of December, where he remained a fortnight, leaving a part of McPherson's command on the Tallahatchie, while most of his troops were engaged in reopening and guarding the railroad from Memphis to Corinth.

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 140.

1862.

The dispatch of General Grant, ordering McClernand to take charge of the expedition from Memphis, as we have said, miscarried, the wires having been cut by Forrest's troopers, but the letter containing the same orders reached McClernand at Springfield, and he immediately started for his post. Sherman, in the mean time, not knowing that he had been superseded in command, started down the river on the 20th of December, ignorant also of the cavalry raids of Forrest and Van Dorn, which had put an end to Grant's advance upon the interior of Mississippi. He started with 30,000

Ibid., p. 143.



GENERAL EARL VAN DORN.

men, and taking on 12,000 more at Helena, he steamed down the river and reached Milliken's Bend, twenty miles above Vicksburg, on the morning of the 25th. Here he landed A. J. Smith's division to break up the Shreveport Railroad, which supplied Vicksburg with provisions from the West. The other three divisions went on to the mouth of the Yazoo River, and moving up that stream some twelve miles, they disembarked on the swampy bottoms at the foot of Walnut Hills, where they were joined by Smith's division a day later.

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Both Grant and Sherman had counted upon a surprise in this movement, but, in the nature of the case, no surprise was possible. The events of the autumn had attracted to this region the most anxious attention of the Confederate Government. After Van Dorn's defeat at Corinth, Jefferson Davis had sent General Pemberton, an officer to whom he was personally much attached, to take command of that department; and, not satisfied with this, on the 24th of November, he assigned General J. E. Johnston, who was as yet only imperfectly recovered from the wounds which had disabled him at the battle of Fair Oaks, to the supreme command of the armies commanded by Pemberton in Mississippi, by E. Kirby Smith in Louisiana, and by Bragg in Tennessee. Pemberton had a force outside of the garrisons at Vicksburg and Port Hudson of 23,000 on the Tallahatchie. In Arkansas, Lieutenant General Holmes had a large army amounting, according to General Johnston, to 55,000 men. The new commander of the Western armies immediately recommended that he be allowed to unite these forces for the purpose of attack-

J. E. Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," pp. 147, 148.

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ing and overwhelming Grant. This suggestion was not adopted. On arriving at Chattanooga on the 4th of December he was informed of the danger with which Pemberton was threatened by Grant's advance; that Holmes had been ordered to reënforce him; but fearing that Holmes might be too late, Mr. Davis urged upon Johnston the importance of sending to Pemberton a large reënforcement from Bragg's command. He did not think it judicious to weaken Bragg's army by this detachment, but both generals set to work at once to organize the cavalry raids which were afterwards so effective.

Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 150.

Mr. Davis's anxiety on account of affairs in Mississippi, the State of his residence, was so great that he went to Chattanooga in person to look into the situation of affairs in the threatened region. He did not agree with General Johnston in regard to the detachment of troops from Bragg, and ordered him to transfer nine thousand infantry and artillery from Tennessee to Pemberton. He then set off for Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, accompanied by General Johnston. Governor John J. Pettus had convened the Legislature for the purpose of bringing the entire arms-bearing population of the State into the service to add to the inadequate force by which Pemberton was endeavoring to defend the Mississippi River. On the 20th, at the moment when Sherman was steaming away from Memphis with his army, the Confederate President was inspecting and criticizing, with that confidence in his own opinion which he regarded as justified by his West Point education, the extensive fortifications of Vicksburg. From that point Johnston and Jeffer-

son Davis went to the Confederate camp near Grenada, where Pemberton was preparing to contest Grant's expected passage of the Yallabusha. Here the three Confederate dignitaries had a conference in regard to the campaign, which, General Johnston says, revealed a wide divergence of views in regard to the mode of warfare best adapted to the circumstances — a divergence which ultimately caused serious damage. On the 27th the retirement of Grant towards the North and the destruction of the supplies at Holly Springs became known to Pemberton, and immediately afterwards the approach of the expedition against Vicksburg was also announced to him. The troops detached from Bragg were sent to the defense of Vicksburg. Mr. Davis, after a fervent address to the Legislature, in which he urged the citizens of Mississippi to "go at once to Vicksburg and assist in preserving the Mississippi River, that great artery of the country, and thus conduce, more than in any other way, to the perpetuation of the Confederacy and the success of the cause," returned to Richmond.

Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 153.

Dec., 1862.

When, therefore, General Sherman landed his force upon the east bank of the Yazoo the task which he had assigned himself had become already well-nigh impossible. The bluffs in his front, which he must cross a difficult bayou to reach, were crowned by formidable earthworks and defended by an ample force, for in the position which the Confederates held one man for defense was as good as ten for attack. Impassable swamps on the left and the Mississippi River on the right restricted the field of operations to a very narrow space, and even that was of such a character that a description



NOTE: The "Route of General Steele," as indicated on the map, applies to his reconnaissance of December 27th, 28th. In the attack of the 29th, General Blair (who the day before had operated on General Morgan's right) crossed to General Morgan's left and assaulted the Confederate right.

of it in the reports of the generals engaged, at this lapse of time, strikes the reader with amazement. General Frank P. Blair, Jr., who led the principal attack on the enemy's works, thus describes the ground he was compelled to traverse: "The enemy had improved their naturally strong position with consummate skill. The bed of the bayou was perhaps one hundred yards in width, covered with water for a distance of fifteen feet. On the side of the bayou held by my troops (after emerging from the heavy timber and descending a bank of eight or ten feet in height) there was a growth of young cottonwoods, thickly set, which had been cut down by the enemy at the height of three or four feet and the tops of these saplings thrown down among these stumps so as to form a perfect net to entangle the feet of the assaulting party. Passing through this and coming to that part of the bayou containing water, it was deep and miry, and when this was crossed we encountered a steep bank on the side of the enemy, at least ten feet high, covered with a strong abatis and crowned with rifle-pits from end to end. Above them was still another range of rifle-pits, and still above a circle of batteries of heavy guns which afforded a direct and enfilading fire upon every part of the plateau, which rose gently from the first range of rifle-pits to the base of the embankment which formed the batteries." Yet it was not in the nature of a soldier like Sherman, even in the face of obstacles such as these, to recoil without a battle, and, after two days of reconnaissances which would have discouraged any but the most daring fighter, he ordered an assault over the ground we have seen described.

Blair, Report, Dec. 30, 1862. W. R. Vol. XVII., Part I., p. 655.

Dec. 29, 1863.

CHAP. V.

Blair's brigade of Frederick Steele's division went in on the left and John F. DeCourcy's brigade of G. W. Morgan's division on the right. Over that tangled abatis, through the clinging quicksands and the icy bayou, up the perpendicular banks and over the plateau filled with death-dealing missiles, Blair, "leaving his horse floundering in the quicksands of the bayou," led his brigade with desperate heroism, piercing two successive lines of the Confederate rifle-pits and pausing only at the very foot of the enemy's earthworks. There, turning for the first time to look round, he found that DeCourcy's brigade, after handsomely crossing the bayou at a more favorable point, had not been able to withstand the withering fire, and that no support was forthcoming from any quarter. The assault was over, and Blair had only to bring back what was left of his gallant brigade, who retired in good order. An attack had been made at the same time by the Sixth Missouri Infantry, who, with heavy loss, had crossed the bayou lower down, but could not ascend the steep bank; they scooped out with their hands caves in the perpendicular wall of sand to shelter them from the muskets of the enemy, fired vertically over the parapet. They were not extricated from this critical position till after nightfall, and then one at a time. Blair's brigade, out of about 1800 men who marched into action, had lost 603 in killed and wounded and missing; DeCourcy's brigade even more (724); the total casualties of Sherman's force being 1776. "Our loss," says General Sherman, "had been pretty heavy, and we had accomplished nothing and had inflicted little loss on our enemy." His first intention was to

Steele, Report. W. R. Vol. XVII., Part I., p. 652.

Sherman, "Memoirs." Vol. I., p. 292.

Ibid.

renew the assault higher up the river on the next day. A dense fog prevented the movement of the transports and the coöperation of the gunboats. Rain began to fall also, and Sherman observing the water marks upon the trees ten feet above ground concluded to abandon the attempt. Reënforcements to the enemy were constantly arriving; he could hear the frequent whistle of the trains at Vicksburg, and could see battalions of men marching up towards Haines's Bluff. It was evident that no coöperation from Grant in the interior was probable, and he had had no communication with him since parting three weeks before. He embarked his forces on the transports and, steaming down the Yazoo, tied up again at Milliken's Bend, where General McClernand had already arrived to supersede him. McClernand took command of the Army of the Mississippi, as he called it, the next day, dividing the forces into corps, commanded respectively by Morgan and Sherman.

General McClernand was for several years before the war a Democratic Congressman from the State of Illinois. He went early into the service, and contributed a considerable personal and political influence to the support of the Government at the outbreak of the rebellion. It has been the habit of General Grant's biographers to represent McClernand as an intimate friend of President Lincoln and as owing his original appointment and subsequent promotions to personal favoritism. This impression, however obtained, is entirely incorrect. It is true that General McClernand was an acquaintance and fellow-townsman of Mr. Lincoln, but they were never intimate friends; their

CHAP. V. relations were those of lifelong political opponents. But, after the death of Senator Douglas, there was probably no Democrat in the State of Illinois, except John A. Logan, who could bring such a decided and valuable support to the Union cause as McClernand, and there was none who entered into the war with more of zeal and loyalty.

He and Logan were both men of great courage, ambition, and capacity; both successful lawyers and politicians; the great difference between them, which was developed later, was that in addition to the ability, influence, and energy which they both possessed in something like an equal degree, Logan exhibited every day a constantly increasing aptitude for military command and the highest soldierly qualities, not only of courage and intelligence, but of strict obedience and subordination, which latter McClernand did not possess and seemed incapable of acquiring.

But these deficiencies of character had not become apparent in the autumn of 1862, and when, in the month of October, he came to Washington and laid before the President a plan he had conceived of extensive recruiting service in Illinois and other Western States, with the view of a campaign which was to liberate the Mississippi Valley, the President and the Secretary of War readily gave their consent, with an understanding that he was to have such a command of the troops which were to be raised in great part by his own personal exertions, as should be suitable to his services and rank. The general plan was to give him command of a corps of troops taken from these proposed levies and an opportunity to take part in the coming campaign

for the opening of the Mississippi River.[1] In pursuance of this understanding General Grant was ordered on the 18th of December to put General McClernand in command of a corps. Grant promptly obeyed the order and, as we have seen, his telegram to McClernand was delayed by Forrest's raid. Sherman got away from Memphis not knowing of his supersession, had attacked at Chickasaw Bluffs and been repulsed before the new commander arrived.

While lying at Milliken's Bend the question at once arose what was to be done with the troops. Sherman was anxious to do something to redeem the ill-success that had thus far attended the expedition, and McClernand was naturally burning to illustrate his new command by some striking feat of arms. They had both had their attention directed to the post of the enemy on the Arkansas River some forty miles above its mouth, called by the Confederates Fort Hindman and by the Union troops Arkansas Post. General Sherman

[1] The following is the text of the order given to General McClernand dated October 20, 1862, and the indorsement of the President upon it: "Ordered, that Major-General McClernand be, and he is, directed to proceed to the States of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, to organize the troops remaining in those States and to be raised by volunteering or draft, and forward them with all dispatch to Memphis, Cairo, or such other points as may hereafter be designated by the General-in-Chief, to the end that when a sufficient force, not required by the operations of General Grant's command, shall be raised, an expedition may be organized under General McClernand's command against Vicksburg, and to clear the Mississippi River and open navigation to New Orleans."

[Indorsement]: "This order, though marked confidential, may be shown by General McClernand to governors, and even others, when in his discretion he believes so doing to be indispensable to the progress of the expedition. I add that I feel deep interest in the success of the expedition, and desire it to be pushed forward with all possible dispatch consistently with the other parts of the military service.

"A. LINCOLN."

W. R. Vol. XVII., Part II., p. 502. Compare p. 282.


BATTLE OF
ARKANSAS POST
Jan'y 11, 1863.
ARKANSAS RIVER
TRANSPORTS
SWAMP
SWAMP
Farm
STEELES
NEW ROUTE
OLD ROUTE
MORGAN'S CORPS
SMITH
OSTERHAUS
SHERMANS CORPS
BLAIR
STEELE
TUTTLE
HOVEY
GARRARD
LOG HUTS
NEW ERA
BLACKHAWK
LINDSEY
POST
HINDMAN
BURBRIDGE
LANDRAM
C. WELLS

says in his memoirs that on the very day McClernand assumed command he asked of him "leave to go up the Arkansas and clear out the post." McClernand suggested a consultation with Admiral Porter, which ended, somewhat to General Sherman's surprise, in McClernand's taking personal charge of the expedition instead of sending him, and in Porter's leading his flotilla in person instead of sending a subordinate.[1]

Sherman, "Memoirs," Vol. I., p. 296.

The expedition once resolved upon was carried through with the greatest dispatch. The army and the fleet, under their respective energetic commanders, made short work of the matter. They reached the mouth of White River on the 8th of January, and after prompt reconnaissances assaulted Fort Hindman by land and by water on the 11th of January. The works consisted of a

1863.

[1] General McClernand, in his report of the reduction of Arkansas Post, dated January 20, 1863, claims for himself the credit of beginning the expedition, "the importance of which," he says, "I had suggested to General Gorman at Helena, December 30, on my way down the river." But General Sherman, in a letter to General Halleck, dated, "on board *Forest Queen*, January 5, 1863," gives the following account of the conception of the undertaking: "I reached Vicksburg at the time appointed, landed, assaulted, and failed. Reëmbarked my command unopposed, and turned it over to my successor, General McClernand. At first I proposed to remain near Vicksburg to await the approach of General Grant, or General Banks to coöperate, but as General McClernand had brought intelligence, the first that had reached me, that General Grant had fallen back of the Tallahatchie, and as we could hear not a word of General Banks below, instead of remaining idle I proposed we should move our entire force in concert with the gunboats to the Arkansas, which is now in boating condition, and reduce the Post of Arkansas where seven thousand of the enemy are intrenched and threaten this river. One boat, the *Blue Wing*, towing coal barges for the navy and carrying dispatches, had been captured by the enemy, and with that enemy on our rear and flank our communications would at all times be endangered. General McClernand agreed, and Admiral Porter also cheerfully assented, and we are at this moment *en route* for the Post of Arkansas fifty miles up the Arkansas River."

W. R. Vol. XVII., Part I., p. 701.

Ibid., p. 613.

CHAP. V. four-bastioned fort commanding a bend of the river, and a long line of intrenchments running from the river to an impassable bayou. It was defended by about five thousand men. Sherman commanded the right and Morgan the left of the Union army, while Porter in person directed the vigorous and effective attack of the fleet. After a sharp skirmish, during which Sherman got within a few hundred yards of the intrenchments, the white flag was displayed, and Sherman and Morgan at the two ends of the line rode into the enemy's works. An instant of confusion ensued, which might have led to awkward consequences, as General Thomas J. Churchill, commanding the place, asserted that he had not authorized the display of the white flag, and one of his subordinates on the left of the rebel lines refused at first to surrender; but, seeing the hopelessness of further resistance, Churchill ordered his troops to stack their arms, and the easy and valuable victory was complete. The Union loss was slight compared with the magnitude of the result accomplished.

The expedition remained three days to complete the destruction of the rebel works, and then, under Grant's orders, returned to Napoleon at the mouth
Jan., 1863. of the Arkansas River on the 17th. McClernand had for a moment the intention to push his conquest further into Arkansas, but while planning this movement, his justifiable complacency over his victory was rudely dashed by a dispatch from Grant, written upon receiving the first announcement of the expedition, and in ignorance of its triumphant result, in which he peremptorily ordered McClernand to return to the Mississippi, at

the same time telegraphing Halleck that McClernand had "gone on a wild goose chase to the Post of Arkansas," to which dispatch Halleck replied with that unfailing confidence and support with which the Government favored every movement and every request of Grant, "You are hereby authorized to relieve General McClernand from command of the expedition against Vicksburg, giving it to the next in rank, or taking it yourself." Even after Grant received the news of McClernand's complete success, his dislike and distrust of that general made it impossible for him to regard his conduct with approval or satisfaction. General Badeau says, "Lacking any confidence in McClernand's military judgment, and supposing that the plan emanated solely from that officer, he did not give it the same consideration it would have received had he known that Sherman first suggested the idea." The relations between the two generals were such that it was only a question of time when one of them must leave the service. McClernand answered Grant's dispatch in an angry letter contrasting his own success with Grant's failure in Mississippi, and the correspondence between them which opened in this inauspicious way continued in the same tone until six months later McClernand was relieved of his command.

Halleck to Grant, Jan. 12, 1863. W. R. Vol. XVII., Part II., p. 555.

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 149.

Although it cannot be denied that it is not, as a rule, judicious to assign to a general in the field a subordinate who is distasteful to him, we cannot but think that too much has been made of this want of harmony between McClernand and Grant, so far as results are concerned. The order appointing McClernand to the command of the Vicksburg expedi-

CHAP. V. tion was not carried into effect until after Sherman had made his attack and failed; and during the few days when McClernand exercised his independent command it was attended with the most brilliant possible success. It is useless to discuss the point whether he or his more famous subordinate deserved the credit of the victory of Arkansas Post. The practical fact is that McClernand at least did not prevent it. It was within the undoubted prerogative of the President and the Secretary of War to give command of an army corps to a general who largely by his own personal exertions had raised it and placed it in the field, and there has been more than enough talk among professional military writers about civilian interference in appointments to high command. This interference is not only authorized but commanded by the Constitution of the United States, which places these appointments in the hands of the civil government, and in a war carried on by thirty millions of free people the President who would entirely disregard popular, or, as some prefer to call it, political influences, would by that fact show himself incapable of understanding or properly executing the duties of his office. McClernand was not the only soldier in the Western army who owed his appointment to such considerations. Grant and Sherman themselves were constantly favored and protected by some of the most powerful statesmen in Congress. McClernand's fault was, not that he had been a politician, but that he did not become a good soldier; while Blair and Logan, who in civil life were more popular and more distinguished politicians than McClernand, as soon as they put on army

uniform surpassed him equally in their thorough obedience and subordination as generals. General Grant himself bore willing witness to the worth of Logan and Blair as soldiers.

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. I., pp. 497, 573, 574.

If McClernand had been supported at Washington in his attitude of insubordination to his general, the results would, of course, have been as disastrous as such a course would have been ill-advised. But there never was the slightest disposition on the part of the President or the Secretary of War to encourage him in such a course. Grant was made, from beginning to end, the absolute arbiter in all matters affecting the administration of his army. In the order of the 18th of December, assigning McClernand to command, it was expressly stated that he was to be "under the direction" of Grant, and afterwards, at the first intimation of Grant's dissatisfaction with his subordinate, who had as yet, it must be said, done nothing to deserve it, the Government authorized him to relieve McClernand from command, leaving it optional with Grant to give it to Sherman or to take it himself, and this attitude the Government maintained until the last. At the beginning of the final campaign against Vicksburg the Secretary of War telegraphed: "General Grant has full and absolute authority to enforce his own commands, and to remove any person who, by ignorance, inaction, or any cause, interferes with or delays his operations. He has the full confidence of the Government; is expected to enforce his authority, and will be firmly and heartily supported; but he will be responsible for any failure to exert his powers. You may communicate this to him."

1862.

Stanton to Dana, May 5, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 84.

CHAPTER VI

THE CAMPAIGN OF THE BAYOUS

THE most important result of the lack of harmony between Grant and McClernand was that the former, not wishing to use the authority given him to relieve McClernand of the command of the expedition against Vicksburg in favor of Sherman, his junior, determined to take personal charge of it himself; a determination to which we owe one of the most brilliant and instructive chapters in all our annals. In accordance with orders from the War Department the army was divided into four corps numbered and commanded as follows: the Thirteenth by McClernand; the Fifteenth by Sherman; the Sixteenth by Hurlbut, and the Seventeenth by McPherson. General Grant lost no time in thoroughly completing this organization of his forces; but, in striking contrast to the conduct of some of our generals in the East, he did not spend an hour in mere drill and discipline, rightly believing that, with an army composed like that of the Tennessee, the active work of a campaign was the best possible school. Hurlbut's corps was left in charge of the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and McPherson's was, as rapidly as possible, brought down the river to join



GENERAL JOHN A. McCLERNAND.

those of McClernand and Sherman already at Milliken's Bend. CHAP. VI.

General Grant now found himself at the head of an army which, upon any ordinary field, would have been irresistible to any force the enemy were able to bring against him, and the fact that for three months he was unable to make a single inch of progress only shows what powerful auxiliaries the army of Pemberton possessed in the forces of nature and the singular topography of the country in which this extraordinary campaign was carried on. Vicksburg, planted upon a plateau two hundred feet high, surrounded by formidable outlying works and batteries, defended from approach on the south by fortifications as far as Warrenton, and two hundred miles further down the river by the fortress of Port Hudson, impregnable, thus far, to any force that could be brought against it from New Orleans, was still more strongly defended on the north by that vast network of bayou and marsh which filled the entire space from Vicksburg to Memphis, north and south, and from the Yazoo to the Mississippi, east and west. The sanguinary experiment of the Chickasaw Bluffs was enough to convince General Grant of the impossibility of success by direct attack on the enemy's works anywhere between Haines's Bluff and Warrenton. There was no soldier in the army upon whose judgment he relied so thoroughly as upon Sherman's, and certainly no subordinate commander could have rushed upon the enemy's works with more valor than that shown by Frank Blair on the 29th of December. He therefore had no disposition 1862.
to repeat that experiment. He says in his report,

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Grant, Report. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 44.

"From the moment of taking command in person I became satisfied that Vicksburg could only be turned from the south side"; and, for the purpose of accomplishing a movement in that direction, his first plan was to take up and carry out with the utmost industry and energy the excavation of the canal which had been begun by General Williams across the tongue of land on the Louisiana side, lying in a loop of the river commanded by Vicksburg. The highest hopes were built upon this work, shared not only by the successive generals who undertook it, and by Admiral Porter as well, but, upon their report, by President Lincoln and the authorities at Washington. After setting McClernand's and Sherman's troops at work upon the canal, Grant went to Memphis, where he spent a week making his final preparations for the campaign, and then returned to Vicksburg, and, on the 30th of January, assumed personal command of the army. General McClernand, who had looked forward to great usefulness and great fame in this capacity, made a vociferous protest against the action of Grant, but the latter, secure in his position, simply forwarded the protest to Washington, where it received no further notice.

McClernand to Grant, Jan. 30, 1863. Ibid., Part III., p. 19.

As soon as Grant began a thorough inspection of his troops and of the canal upon which they were engaged, he lost much of the faith with which he and others had hitherto regarded the enterprise. The current of the river was almost at right angles to the trench and its lower end was easily commanded by the bluffs on the Mississippi side. Nevertheless, he was not inclined to drop the work without giving it a thorough trial, and the exhausting and

unwholesome toil of the soldiers lasted for nearly two months longer. But on the 8th of March, when the excavation was almost completed, a sudden rise of the river broke down the northern dyke which guarded the canal, and flooded not only the enormous ditch but the entire peninsula as well, destroying to a great extent the lateral dyke which protected it and driving the troops to the levee to save their lives. When this flood subsided the canal was found to be a ditch full of stagnant water and nothing more. The current refused to seek the channel provided for it with so much labor and pains. A fortnight more of severe work with dredging machines was wasted upon it, when the batteries from the Warrenton Bluffs got the range of the working parties and the work was at last abandoned, a confessed failure. But while it was going on, Grant, having a large surplus of men who could not find standing room on the narrow peninsula of Young's Point, devoted great labor and care to three other enterprises of a similar nature by which he hoped to derive some advantage from the singular natural features of the country, which had hitherto been only profitable to his adversary.

Grant, Report. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 44.

On the west side of the Mississippi the network of lakes and bayous, which on the east were compressed within the limits of the Yazoo bluffs and the Mississippi River, stretched out into almost illimitable extent, westward over the greater part of the State of Louisiana and southward to the Gulf of Mexico. General Grant hoped, by availing himself of one of the more important of the bayous on this side, called Lake Providence, to

CHAP. VI. open a passage through the Tensas and the Washita to the mouth of the Red River, nearly two hundred miles below, and in that way to effect a communication with the army under General Banks and the navy under Farragut. The greater part of the way such a route was entirely practicable, but from Lake Providence to Bayou Macon, about six miles' distance, the only thoroughfare was Bayou Baxter, which was partly stream and partly cypress swamp. To open this route it was necessary to secure a channel through the swamp, dig up the stumps of trees with which it was filled, and pierce a hole in the Mississippi River levee opposite Lake Providence. This work was assigned to McPherson's corps and prosecuted with
1863. vigor until the middle of March. It proved, as usual, to be far more difficult than the most accomplished engineers had imagined. The men worked
McPherson to Grant, March 18, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part III., p. 120. a great part of the time up to their shoulders in water, and the task of clearing the channel of the cypress stumps was exasperatingly slow. The levee was pierced on the 17th of March, and shortly afterwards McPherson reported that, with a few days more work cutting stumps and dredging the shallows, the canal might be made practicable for light-draft boats. By this time, however, General Grant had formed a new plan, and all the labor expended on the Lake Providence route went for naught.

Another scheme was to open communication from the Mississippi to the Coldwater by means of a Bayou called the Yazoo Pass, which, in former years, was the ordinary means of transit from Memphis to Yazoo City. But, as the lands in this

region are lower than the surface of the river at high water, an unusually heavy levee had been built directly across the Pass for the purpose of reclaiming the rich bottoms. It was resolved, at the end of January, to cut this levee and try to reëstablish communication by water between the Mississippi, the Coldwater, the Tallahatchie, and Yazoo rivers. By this route General Grant only expected, at first, to enter the Yazoo and destroy the enemy's transports in that stream and some gunboats which it was thought were building there. The levee was cut on the 3d of February by Colonel J. H. Wilson of the Engineers, and in a few hours the opening was forty yards wide, and "the water pouring through," says Colonel Wilson, "like nothing else I ever saw except Niagara Falls. Logs, trees, and great masses of earth were torn away with the greatest ease." As soon as the rush of water settled, several boats steamed into the Pass and the navigation was found so much better than had been expected that General Grant indulged, for a time, the hope of making this the route for obtaining a foothold on high land above Haines's Bluff. A considerable expedition was therefore sent through the Pass, which succeeded in reaching the Coldwater on the 2d of March after much difficulty and the partial disabling of most of the boats; but from that point to Fort Pemberton (a Confederate fortification extending from the Tallahatchie to the Yazoo, near their junction at Greenwood) the expedition found no special obstacles to navigation nor any considerable interruption from the enemy; but the land around the fort being low and mostly overflowed, it was impossible to effect

1863.

Wilson to Rawlins, Feb. 4, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 373.

Grant, Report. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 45.

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a landing, and the works were too strong for the gunboats. The expedition was therefore given up and the troops withdrawn in the latter part of March.

Grant, Report. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., pp. 45, 46.

Equally futile with the rest, so far as results were concerned, but the most interesting of all in its personal incidents, was the attempt to turn the works at Haines's Bluff (a point on the Yazoo about fifteen miles above Vicksburg) by the way of Steele's Bayou. While the expedition just mentioned was still in front of the enemy at Fort Pemberton, Admiral Porter made a reconnaissance up Steele's Bayou towards Deer Creek, and gave so favorable a report of the navigability of those streams that Grant imagined it might be possible to get through by that route to the Sunflower River, and thence to the Yazoo, which would bring a Union force on the rear of Fort Pemberton, and not only insure its capture but also give an invaluable advantage of position in the campaign against Vicksburg. He accompanied the admiral on a second trip through Steele's Bayou and, seeing no serious obstacles to navigation except overhanging trees, he pushed back to Young's Point and dispatched Sherman with a division to join Porter on this promising mission. Sherman, going ahead of his troops, found the admiral in aggressive spirits and confident of reaching the Sunflower; but, as he was returning to bring up his forces, he received a message from Porter saying that he had unexpectedly come upon a force of the enemy who were giving him great annoyance, and asking him to come immediately to his assistance.

Mar. 15, 1863.

Ibid., pp. 21, 46.

Sherman took a canoe and paddled down the bayou till he met a navy tug and the transport *Silver Wave* loaded with troops. With these he started back at the utmost speed, "crashing through the trees, carrying away pilot-house, smoke-stacks, and everything above deck"; it was pitch-dark, and, after making two miles and a half, they were brought to a stop. They then disembarked and marched through the cane-brake, carrying lighted candles in their hands, till they came to some open fields where they lay down for a nap. They were up and off again at daylight; the soldiers could not complain of the forced march when they saw General Sherman trotting on foot, at the double-quick, at their head; they made twenty-one miles by noon. Their speed, says General Sherman, "was accelerated by the sounds of the navy guns, which became more and more distinct" as the relieving force pushed on to the rescue, through brake and bayou, sometimes in water waist-deep. At last they struck a small body of Confederates who were felling trees across the stream in Porter's rear, and drove them away. Here Sherman mounted a barebacked horse and, once more a cavalier, rode to the front and across a cotton-field, to where the beleaguered admiral lay in the miry bayou. He was on the deck of one of his ironclads, standing full armored, inside of a section of a smoke-stack which served as a shield against the rebel sharpshooters. The rebels had obstructed the channel of Deer Creek so that no further progress in that direction was possible, and the opportune arrival of Sherman had prevented their doing the same thing in the rear, and had thus saved the fleet from cap-

CHAP. VI.

Sherman, "Memoirs," Vol. I., p. 308.

Ibid., p. 309.

Ibid.

CHAP. VI. ture or destruction.[1] It took three days for the boats to back out of the creek, which was too narrow to admit of their turning, but the expedition
March, 1863. at last, on the 27th, arrived at Young's Point without loss.

As soon as General Grant heard that the Deer Creek expedition had failed and that Admiral Porter had started on his return, he ordered the recall of the Yazoo Pass expedition from Fort Greenwood, and immediately, after his resolute fashion, put both enterprises, in mercantile phrase, to the account of profit and loss. The work was not entirely without its value. "It carried our troops," said General Grant, "into the heart of the granary from which the Vicksburg forces are now being fed, it caused great alarm among the enemy, and led them to move a number of their guns from batteries on the river." Much cotton was burnt, and some was brought away; a great quantity of beef, bacon, poultry, and corn was consumed or destroyed, and a large number of cattle seized, and several hundred negroes returned with the troops. But after all, it must be said that the most important result of the expedition was that it finished the series of groping and tentative enterprises which during three months had occupied the Western army. All avenues of approach towards Vicksburg had, one by one, been tested, and the successive failure of all of them drove General Grant, in a

Grant to Kelton, Apr. 12, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 28.

[1] "I learn that when Admiral Porter was entrapped by the rebels at Deer Creek, week before last, his situation was so desperate that when Sherman's forces arrived to relieve him they found he had already smeared his gunboats with turpentine preparatory to abandoning them and setting them afire."—C. A. Dana to Stanton, April 8, 1863.—W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 72.

manner which he calls "providential," to the line of operations in which an immense success awaited him. He now determined to move his army partly by land, and partly by water, to a point below Vicksburg on the Mississippi, to join hands with General Banks, and effect the reduction of Port Hudson, and then, with the united armies and fleets, to move upon Vicksburg and Pemberton's army. The same cause which had operated at last to destroy the efficiency of his canals had begun to make the roads practicable. The rainy season was ending; the floods of the early spring were subsiding; and, although the roads would still have been counted execrable by those accustomed to the turnpikes of civilization, they had become as good as they generally are in that land of perpetual mud. CHAP. VI.

This was the dark hour of General Grant's fortunes. The battle of Shiloh had not increased the fame which he won at Donelson; the credit of the partial successes at Iuka and at Corinth had gone exclusively to Rosecrans; the unsuccessful march upon Grenada and the disastrous assault at Chickasaw Bluffs had each contributed its part to cloud his reputation, and the apparently futile gropings about the canals and bayous had done nothing to satisfy the intense and eager expectations with which the public mind had for months been directed towards his army; and now, just upon the eve of his greatest exploits, distrust and suspicion became general throughout the country, and found a voice even in quarters nearest the President. On the 4th of April the Secretary of the Treasury sent to Mr. Lincoln a letter from one of the ablest and 1863.

CHAP. VI. most loyal of the Western journalists, attacking General Grant in the bitterest language, accusing him not only of utter incapacity, but of flagrant misconduct, and demanding in the name of the Western people and the Western troops that his command should be taken from him and given to Rosecrans. Mr. Chase added to this letter his own strong indorsement, saying, "Reports concerning General Grant similar to the statement made by Mr. —— are too common to be safely or even prudently disregarded"; and three weeks later the Secretary, being in Philadelphia, felt compelled by his disbelief in General Grant to write suggesting his supersession; "unless something decisive," he says, "is to be done on the Mississippi shore, is it not clear that Grant's army should be made to coöperate otherwise with Rosecrans? How I wish that Sherman was at the head of that army instead of Grant. He is certainly an abler and better and more reliable commander." Yet in spite of this and many similar attempts to destroy his confidence in the quiet Western general, the President stood stoutly by him, saying he should have his chance, and answering the over-zealous people who accused Grant of intemperance, by the famous *mot*, "If I knew what brand of whisky he drinks I would send a barrel or so to some other generals."[1]

There were but three courses open to General Grant at this juncture. One was to assault the enemy's works in front — from which his reason and conscience both revolted; another, to return

[1] We think this jest is none the less authentic for being a variant of the well-known reply of King George II., when somebody in his presence accused General James Wolfe of being mad,—"I wish he would bite some of my other generals."

up the Mississippi to Memphis and from Grand Junction to move southward on the line of the Mississippi Central, renewing the unsuccessful campaign of December with the added strength and experience which he and his troops had gained in the mean time. There was much to be said in favor of this plan, and it was the one urged upon him by one of the ablest generals in the army. On the 8th of April General Sherman, after discussing the matter verbally with General Grant, wrote him a letter advising the seizure and fortification of the Yazoo Pass, the Coldwater, and Tallahatchie rivers; the securing and reopening of the road back to Memphis and, as soon as the water should subside, an attack upon Grenada; then to attack the line of the Yallabusha as a base from which to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central and the Vicksburg and Jackson railroads cross the Big Black. He thought that this would insure the capture of Vicksburg.[1] It is the opinion of many intelligent soldiers that this plan offered better chances of success than the one which was actually adopted, and it is known that General Grant himself was of the opinion that, by cutting loose from his base at the time of the

[1] General Badeau describes the manner in which Grant received this letter: "Colonel Rawlins handed the paper to Grant without saying a word; Grant read it carefully, but in silence, and after the perusal was finished made no comment. The orders were not revoked, the council of war was not called, and the letter has never since been mentioned between the two commanders. Its existence was not disclosed by Grant, until Sherman himself publicly related the incident, after the investment of Vicksburg, when several prominent men were attributing to him the conception of the campaign which resulted in opening the Mississippi River." —Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 184. See also Sherman, "Memoirs." Vol. I., pp. 315–317.

CHAP. VI. Forrest and Van Dorn raids, he might have brought his army successfully in the rear of Vicksburg.[1]

But neither the persuasion of his nearest friend and favorite general, nor the evident difficulties and dangers of the plan he had chosen, were sufficient to change the mind of General Grant when once determined upon the movement to the south. He was never in the habit of discussing his campaigns or giving many reasons for his actions, but it is altogether probable that what are contemptuously called by military writers political considerations, which Grant was too wise a man to disregard, had much to do with this final choice. To leave Vicksburg and transport his army to Memphis would have presented to both sides the appearance of a retreat, which could not have been explained without also informing the enemy of General Grant's intention and purpose; and in that time of gloom and stagnation, in the period between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, a retrograde movement, on so great a scale, on the part of the Western army, would have had a most unfavorable effect on the public mind of the North, and

[1] General Sherman says: "He has told me since the war, that had we possessed in December 1862 the experience of marching and maintaining armies without a regular base which we afterwards acquired, he would have gone on from Oxford as first contemplated, and would not have turned back because of the destruction of his depot at Holly Springs by Van Dorn. The distance from Oxford to the rear of Vicksburg is little greater than by the circuitous route we afterwards followed, from Bruinsburg to Jackson and Vicksburg, during which we had neither depot nor train of supplies. I have never criticized General Grant's strategy on this or any other occasion, but I thought then that he had lost an opportunity, which cost him and us six months' extra hard work, for we might have captured Vicksburg from the direction of Oxford in January, quite as easily as was afterward done in July, 1863."—"Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman." Vol. I., p. 317.

would have been regarded as a reason for profound encouragement and congratulation on the part of the chiefs of the rebellion and their anxious sympathizers in Europe. CHAP. VI.

Grant selected as the first point below Vicksburg which could be reached by land, at the stage of water then existing, the village of New Carthage, and directed the Thirteenth Corps, under General McClernand, to start for that point on the 29th of March; the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps were to follow. The movement was slow and laborious on account of the wretched condition of the roads, and when McClernand arrived in the vicinity of New Carthage, it was found that the levee of Bayou Vidal was broken in several places, and New Carthage was surrounded by water. A change of route was thus made necessary. They marched round Bayou Vidal to Perkins's Plantation, which made a journey of thirty-five miles from Milliken's Bend to water communication. While this march was going on the attention of the enemy was distracted by sending Steele's division up the river to Greenville, one hundred and fifty miles, where it landed and raided the country in the neighborhood of the Rolling Fork, and created the impression on Pemberton's mind that another attack was imminent from that direction. 1863.

Meantime Admiral Porter was preparing for the long contemplated and perilous enterprise of running past the batteries of Vicksburg and Warrenton. There was, strictly speaking, no novelty in this attempt, for during the previous two months the practicability of the enterprise had been demonstrated more than once. The ram *Queen of the*

CHAP. VI. *West*, under the gallant Colonel Charles R. Ellet, had run by the batteries in open day on the morn-
1863. ing of the 2d of February, and had then dashed up the mouth of the Red River and captured several Confederate transports; ten days afterwards the gunboat *Indianola* had run the same gauntlet by night, though both boats were afterwards attacked and captured by the Confederates. On the 14th of March, Farragut, with his flag-ship, the *Hartford*, and the *Albatross*, had passed the batteries at Port Hudson, the rest of his fleet failing to get by. As these two vessels were not strong enough to maintain the blockade of the Red River, General A. W. Ellet, of the same family of amphibious fighters as the officer above mentioned, sent down two rams to join Farragut, the *Lancaster* and the *Switzerland*. The former was destroyed, and the latter much disabled, but, to a sailor of Porter's temperament, these partly successful ventures simply proved that the thing could be done, and he assured General Grant, without hesitation, that he could take his fleet past the batteries at any moment it was required, with the understanding that they would probably not be able to repass them; and on the 16th of April, when Grant announced his readiness for the movement, Porter was equally prepared for his part of the dangerous enterprise.

1863. At ten o'clock on the night of the 16th of April Admiral Porter, with seven ironclads, three river steamers, and ten barges, swung into the stream and floated down the river. There was no moon; the fires were banked; no lights were displayed, and in the silence and darkness the fleet glided through the shadows, and was not discovered until

fairly abreast of the town. All at once, at the first shots from one of the batteries, a terrific cannonade burst from the terraced heights of Vicksburg, lighting up the river with continuous flashings, and awakening thunderous echoes over many miles of river, bluff, and bayou. Heaps of combustibles, prepared for the purpose, were fired, and the torch was applied to houses along the river bank, which shed a light, almost as bright as day, upon a scene of terrible beauty. Porter's fleet responded instantly to the attack of the forts, and his gunboats poured, one by one, their broadsides into the town as they passed. He steamed boldly in under the blazing bluffs, while the transports, gliding as near as they could to the Louisiana shore, sought to escape under cover of the smoke and tumult into the darkness beyond the town. The transports passed the public place opposite the court-house a little after midnight, and were here exposed to a most furious fire; the batteries, guided by a light like that of a lurid midday, converged their fire upon the passing vessels, and the roar of artillery from the bluffs was answered by the clear ring of the navy guns from the river. The barges were cut loose, and floated down the stream to their destination at New Carthage, while the naval vessels lingered behind to cover the rear of the flotilla.

In spite of the heavy fire to which they were subjected, there was comparatively little damage done; though every transport was struck, only one was destroyed. The *Henry Clay* was set on fire by the explosion of a shell, and the flames from her upper works, darting aloft into the clear darkness of the night, added to the strange im-

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pressiveness of the scene. She cast loose the barge which she was towing, but this also was soon discovered to be on fire; and General Sherman, who was watching the bombardment in a small boat, picked up the pilot as he floated from the wreck. The crew scrambled ashore and hid behind the levee till the firing was over, and then made their way, through the flooded bottoms, to their camps. The whole population of Vicksburg had been drawn from their beds by the light and the noise, and watched with a deep interest, from the wide circle of hills, the blaze and tumult of this extraordinary battle. It lasted two hours and a half, but at last the barges had floated southward into the sheltering darkness; the blazing wreck had burned down to the water's edge; the gunboats, sending their useless Parthian shots defiantly backward, had steamed out of range; the *Tuscumbia* herded the last stragglers, bringing up the rear; and the silence, only deeper for this midnight disturbance of fire and fury, again enveloped Vicksburg and its girdle of forts. When the barges first came floating down the stream, and the burning wreck of the *Henry Clay* was seen, the rebels on the plantations below imagined that the Yankee fleet had been destroyed; and even at McClernand's headquarters the officers were not without fear of such a disaster; but one by one the transports, the barges, and at last the exultant naval vessels gathered in, and it was found that the peril of the passage had been more apparent than real. No one was killed on the gunboats, eight only were wounded, and all of Admiral Porter's vessels were ready for service within half an hour after passing

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant," Vol. I., pp. 192, 193.

W. T. Sherman

the batteries. The success was so perfect that a few days later Grant sent another fleet of six vessels past the batteries with the loss of only one. Their crews, with two exceptions, declined the dangerous service, but a call for volunteers produced from the hardy soldiers of Illinois and Missouri men enough to have manned a hundred vessels.[1] CHAP. VI.

Grant, having thus accumulated a sufficient number of transports to effect his crossing of the river, rapidly transferred McClernand's force from Perkins's Plantation to a village called Hard Times, a short distance above the gulf-like bend of the river upon which the Confederate fort at Grand Gulf was situated. Two divisions of McPherson's corps, headed by General Logan, marched close behind them, and on the 29th of April everything was ready for the movement upon Grand Gulf. Sherman was left behind at Milliken's Bend. There were so few roads, and they were in such bad condition, that it was a slow business for one corps to wait till the one in advance had cleared the route. Sherman, while waiting for his orders to march, received a letter from General Grant announcing his purpose to cross over and attack Grand Gulf, and suggesting that he could usefully employ this time of waiting by making a demonstration upon Haines's Bluff. It was a suggestion Grant made with reluctance, as he feared the feint might be taken for a genuine attack and repulse, and sub- 1863.

[1] Commenting upon this, General Grant says in his report: "It is a striking feature, so far as my observation goes, of the present volunteer army of the United States, that there is nothing which men are called upon to do, mechanical or professional, that accomplished adepts cannot be found for the duty required in almost every regiment."—W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 47.

CHAP. VI. ject General Sherman to misconstruction and criticism in the North. It is true that General Sherman was not more fond of calumnious attack than others, but where he saw an opportunity of making himself useful he was ready to take the chances of criticism as well as of bullets; so without a moment's hesitation he replied that he would make the feint required, and set about it in a bustling and boisterous manner, with a great movement of camps, and a blowing of whistles, and the moving up and down of all the transports he could get afloat. He took, however, only ten of the smallest regiments he could find, to make a show of force.

April 29, 1863. In this way he proceeded, with as much noise and ostentation as was possible, in the direction of Haines's Bluff. The demonstration was perfectly successful, as it distracted the attention of Pemberton and drew away a considerable portion of his troops at a most critical time.

A still more serious distraction and damage was that spread through the whole interior of the State of Mississippi, from Grand Junction to Baton Rouge, by the cavalry of General B. H. Grierson. This expedition, one of the most important of the kind during the war, was organized at La Grange in the

1863. middle of April by General Hurlbut in pursuance of General Grant's orders. Its mission was to ride through the State of Mississippi to some safe point on the river below Vicksburg; to destroy the railroads on its course; to cut off supplies, and in short to do all the damage possible to the Confederate cause and as little as possible to peaceable people. General Grant hoped that this expedition might test the idea he entertained that the pressure of war

had forced to the border all the available forces of the Confederacy, and that the interior would be found to be a hollow shell. The expedition of Grierson went far to confirm this impression. He started, on the 17th of April, with seventeen hundred men, but soon detached one regiment, under Colonel Edward Hatch, to destroy the railroad between Columbus and Macon and return north; he was not wholly successful but made an efficient diversion of some of the enemy's force. Grierson rode rapidly down to the Vicksburg and Meridian Railroad, tearing up several miles of the track near Meridian; moving then to the southwest, he broke up the railroad between Jackson and New Orleans; still riding southward, he beat a detachment of cavalry sent out to intercept him from Grand Gulf, and leaving Port Hudson on his right he rode into the Union camp at Baton Rouge on the 2d of May. He had traversed the State of Mississippi, 600 miles in sixteen days; he had captured 500 prisoners; he had destroyed over fifty miles of railroad and telegraph, and a vast amount of military stores; had burned several factories producing supplies for the Confederate army; broken up several locomotives and unnumbered bridges; he had spread terror and dismay through a vast extent of country; and, from one end to the other of the State, he had thrown confusion and disorder into the Confederate councils, at the very moment of all others when concentration against their formidable enemy on the Mississippi was a vital necessity to the Confederacy in the West.

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., pp. 188, 189.

Grierson, Report, May 5, 1863.

W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., pp. 528, 529.

Scarcely less remarkable than the gallantry and swiftness of his march was the generosity and

CHAP. VI. kindness with which Grierson treated the people of the district through which he rode. On approaching a town he would send a battalion in advance to establish pickets, protect property, maintain order, and quiet the fears of the inhabitants. At some points, where he found the citizens in arms for the defense of their homes, even after they had fired upon his troops and had been captured, he would kindly represent to them the folly of their acts and release them. This magnanimity had the happiest effect. In some cases the citizens, grateful for this unexpected kindness, volunteered valuable information and even offered to serve as guides.

Grant was now ready, after all these months of experiment and preparation, to throw his forces in a compact mass against the enemy. His action at this point has been fancifully compared to that of the wild bee in the Western woods, who, rising to the clear air, flies for a moment in a circle, and then darts with the speed of a rifle-bullet to his destination. If Pemberton had been ready to meet him with the same energy and order, the issue of the contest might have been very different, for there was no great disparity of forces between
1863. them. Pemberton's report of the 31st of March showed an aggregate of 82,318, of whom 61,495
W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part III., p. 702. were present, and 48,829 fit for duty. They were all within reasonable distance of each other, so that they might have been readily concentrated. General C. L. Stevenson had 22,000 effectives holding the Vicksburg line from Haines's Bluff to Grand Gulf; General Franklin Gardner had over 16,000 at Port Hudson; while W. W. Loring, in the neighborhood of Grenada and Fort Pemberton,

had an army of 7000. There were from 5000 to 10,000 others scattered in small garrisons about the State; the greater portion of them watching Hurlbut in the North. They had the great advantage over Grant of high and dry roads and ready communication by rail and telegraph. CHAP. VI.

But they did not make use of their advantage. It is true that Grand Gulf, the point immediately threatened by Grant, had been garrisoned early in March by a brigade under General John S. Bowen, who had detached three of his regiments to the right bank of the river to watch McClernand's advance. But the mind of General Pemberton had been so long fixed upon the idea of an attack upon his right flank that he was slow to credit the rumors of an advance in force upon his left. Many things conspired to trouble and mislead him on this point. The successive demonstrations into Deer Creek and Sunflower, the bewildering raid of Grierson, and finally, the most important of all, the sailing of Ellet's marine brigade up the river, under orders to the Tennessee, were circumstances that, altogether, afforded some justification for his unfortunate incredulity, in which it must be said the commander-in-chief of the district, General J. E. Johnston, shared. Under the impression that Grant was preparing for another move southward from the direction of Memphis, a considerable portion of Pemberton's command was ordered to the Tennessee line, and it was only after the passage of the fleet that Pemberton and Johnston began to realize the magnitude of the demonstration upon their left. The troops on their way to Tennessee were ordered back, and Bowen's detachment to the west of the

CHAP. VI. river was hastily recalled just in time to escape capture. Even then Pemberton's doubts had not deepened into certainty, though, on the 23d of 1863. April, from his headquarters at Jackson, he warned General Stevenson at Vicksburg that Warrenton or Grand Gulf was threatened and that he must hold all his troops ready to be directed upon either W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part III., p. 780. of these points. But a week after this Sherman made his imposing feint at Haines's Bluff, and again threw doubt and perplexity into the mind of the Confederate commander.[1] At this same moment he heard from General Bowen of the arrival of a heavy force at Hard Times, and he hurriedly ordered a brigade from Port Hudson and directed Stevenson to hold 5000 more troops in readiness to move to Bowen's help, whose force, increased by that of General M. E. Green, amounted by this time to about 5000. But owing to the state of uncertainty existing in Pemberton's mind as to which of his flanks was actually attacked, this force from Stevenson was not sent. After all the delays and all the warnings, Grant arrived at Grand Gulf before he was expected, and before adequate preparations had been made to receive him.

This quiet river hamlet was the terminus of a little railway running to Port Gibson. It was strongly fortified and had a certain importance as commanding the mouth of the Big Black River.

[1] Mr. Jefferson Davis, who is always anxious to defend Pemberton, referring to this demonstration of Sherman's, says: "Finding due preparation made to resist an attack there, this demonstration was merely a feint, but had Pemberton withdrawn his troops that feint could have been converted into a real attack, and the effort so often foiled to gain the heights above Vicksburg would have become a success."—Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government." Vol. II., p. 400.

Porter attacked the works with his usual energy on the morning of the 29th of April, and continued a furious bombardment until afternoon, under the eye of Grant, who watched the engagement from a tug in the stream. He had loaded all the transports and barges in his reach with three divisions of McClernand's corps, intending to assault the enemy's works at the moment that Porter should have silenced or materially disabled the Confederate batteries. But after five hours of a furious cannonade it became evident to both the admiral and the general that no impression could be made by the gunboats upon works so strong and so well defended, and at such an elevation as those of Grand Gulf. It was characteristic of Grant that he did not at this juncture waste an hour in doubt or in new preparations. After having become convinced that he could not take the batteries, he immediately landed his troops at Hard Times, and marched them across the narrow peninsula opposite Grand Gulf, reaching dry ground on the Mississippi three miles below, at a plantation called De Schroon's. When night fell Porter renewed his fire upon the forts, and in the midst of the racket the transports and gunboats came down and joined the army almost without damage. Here, after what would have seemed to some commanders a day of failure, Grant, whose quiet courage and steadfast faith had taken the repulse at Grand Gulf as a mere incident of the day's work having no bearing on the ultimate success of his expedition, absolutely sure after all his misadventures that he was now upon the right track, sent this remarkable dispatch to Washington: "The gun-

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boats engaged Grand Gulf batteries from 8 A. M. until 1 P. M., and from dusk until 10 P. M. The army and transports are now below Grand Gulf. A landing will be effected upon the east bank of the river to-morrow. I feel that the battle is now more than half won."

Grant to Halleck, April 29, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 32.

CHAPTER VII

GRANT'S MAY BATTLES IN MISSISSIPPI

GENERAL GRANT passed the night of the 29th of April, 1863, in giving minute and elaborate orders for the movement of the morrow. He provided for the safety of his camp against sudden attack; for the bringing forward of a full supply of rations; he ordered the chief commissary of the Thirteenth Corps to provide that command with three days' rations for their subsistence for five days, writing all these orders with his own hand. Early on the morning of the 30th McClernand's corps passed down the river closely followed by McPherson, and landed at Bruinsburg, six miles below De Schroon's, on the east bank. It was Grant's intention to go to Rodney, ten miles further, from which point he knew there was a good road to Port Gibson, but he ascertained from an intelligent negro that a road ran directly from Bruinsburg over the hills to that place. He therefore hurried McClernand's force over the river with the greatest dispatch, and, as soon as they could be supplied with rations for three days in their haversacks, they set out for the hills, two miles and a half inland, which they found, to their great relief, entirely unoccupied. They had still an hour

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., pp. 204, 205.

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of daylight before them and Port Gibson was only ten miles away. They marched through the late afternoon and far into the night, meeting no obstacle until, about an hour after midnight, McClernand's skirmishers came up with the enemy, posted four miles to the west of Port Gibson. This was a village deriving its sole importance from the junction of a number of radiating roads, one of which commanded the route of retreat from Grand Gulf by way of Willow Springs, ten miles to the east. It was the first place at which the advance of Grant could be disputed, and its occupation would render Grand Gulf untenable. Both sides rested on their arms until morning when, with the earliest light, the battle of Port Gibson began.

Grant, Report, July 6, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 48.

May 1, 1863.

The Confederate forces consisted of a portion of the garrison of Grand Gulf, which had been hastily detached as soon as General Bowen became aware of the flanking movement of the day before. Pemberton had also taken the alarm, and had ordered Stevenson to send the five thousand men already directed to be held in readiness. The road from Bruinsburg divides some four miles west of Port Gibson, to meet again before entering the town, and it was there that McClernand's advance had found the Confederates posted: Green's brigade on the south branch of the road and E. D. Tracy's on the north. The Confederates made a brave stand, and were greatly assisted by the character of the ground, which was rough and broken and almost impassable by cause of steep ravines and undergrowth. But the Union force was too heavy for them. Peter J. Osterhaus's division was placed on the left and attacked Tracy's brigade on the northern road. The

divisions of E. A. Carr, Hovey, and Andrew J. Smith attacked Green, an hour later, on the southern road; he was soon dislodged by the Union right, and driven slowly along the road; but Tracy held Osterhaus in check until later in the day, when Logan's division of McPherson's corps came on the field, and McPherson brought one brigade of it into the fight under his own eye. The enemy soon gave way in front of McPherson and Logan; and although reënforced from Vicksburg during the fight, his whole line speedily followed, retreating through Port Gibson and taking refuge for the night beyond the forks of Bayou Pierre. General Bowen with his 8000 men (including his reënforcements) had made a gallant fight, but it was useless for him to attempt to stand against 19,000.[1] The losses on each side were nearly equal, the Union loss being 875 and the rebel loss 832.

General Pemberton, who was by this time convinced that an attack in force was in progress on his left flank and that Grant's army was pouring through Bruinsburg like a flood through a crevasse, had left Jackson and hurried to Vicksburg, calling in his scattered detachments from every side to oppose the invasion. He made what hasty dispositions were in his power to defend the line of the Big Black River. General Loring was ordered from Meridian to Rocky Springs, and sending Lloyd Tilghman to Grindstone ford, on the north bank of Bayou Pierre to delay, if possible, the crossing of

[1] Badeau, in his history of Grant, Vol. I., p. 207, gives Bowen's number at eleven thousand as the careful estimate of General Grant himself and of General Rawlins, his chief of staff; but a comparison of all the available reports on both sides brings us to the conclusion that Bowen's force was less than that.

CHAP. VII. the National forces at that point, he rode over to Grand Gulf; and, after consultation with Bowen, who had retreated there after the battle of Port Gibson, the place was hurriedly evacuated and at once occupied by Admiral Porter.

May, 1863. As soon as day dawned on the 2d McClernand's corps dashed into the town and beyond, until their progress was arrested by the south fork of Bayou Pierre where the Confederates in retreating had burnt the bridges. The Union troops set to work with the utmost zeal to build them anew, floundering in the water, swarming like bees over the blackened timbers, and tearing down all the houses within reach for planking. Two of Logan's brigades, not waiting for the completion of the bridges, forded the bayou and pushed on to the left. Reenforcements to Grant were constantly arriving from the west side of the river, and McPherson's corps having been strengthened by the addition of M. M. Crocker's division, Grant ordered him to push forward and attack the enemy in the direction of Willow Springs. He reached the North fork at Bayou Pierre and found the Grindstone bridge over it on fire. He repaired it during the night and crossed his troops at daylight. Meeting with little resistance on the northern bank he drove the enemy through Willow Springs, thus cutting off what garrison there might be at Grand Gulf from communication with their friends on the east.

Logan and Crocker kept up the pursuit with occasional skirmishing and capture of prisoners all day, till the enemy were driven to Hankinson's Ferry over the Big Black, fifteen miles northeast of Port Gibson. McPherson at this point was so

close upon the heels of the rebels that he seized the bridge before they had time to fire it and established himself firmly there. Grant, with a cavalry escort of twenty men, meanwhile rode straight for Grand Gulf, which he found evacuated and the navy in possession; Porter was absent, having started that morning to lend Farragut a hand at the mouth of the Red River. Grant's blows in the last few days had fallen so hard and so fast that the enemy had not had leisure to save his heavy guns, and as the victorious general inspected the formidable arms and the system of works which, seen from the rear, were far more extensive than they appeared from the river, he had reason to congratulate himself on the wisdom of the march to Bruinsburg, which had avoided the danger and the bloodshed involved in a direct attack upon the fortifications of Grand Gulf. It was now three days since he had been in bed or undressed, so he begged a change of linen on board one of the gunboats, and, thus refreshed, spent the greater part of the night in writing dispatches. CHAP. VII.

It is astonishing to see the amount of work, the thought, care, and minuteness of detailed instruction, which he crowded into those few hours. He wrote to General Halleck, giving a full account of his expedition up to date; to Sherman, ordering him to effect a junction with the main body as soon as possible, full of details as minute as the following: "I wish you to collect a train of one hundred and twenty wagons at Milliken's Bend, and Perkins's Plantation. Send them to Grand Gulf, and there load them with rations as follows: one hundred thousand pounds of bacon, the balance, coffee,

Grant to Sherman, May 3, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part III., p. 268.

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sugar, salt, and hard bread," etc. With equal detail he gave orders for the construction of a road for land transportation from Young's Point to a landing below Warrenton. All his faculties seemed sharpened by the emergency. There was nothing too large for him to grasp; nothing small enough for him to overlook. He had heard that day of Grierson's raid, and its thorough success had contributed to the steady elation which is visible in all his utterances of that day. He says to General Halleck his army is in the finest health and spirits, "composed of well-disciplined and hardy men who know no defeat and are not willing to learn what it is." "The country," he further says, "will supply all the forage required for anything like an active campaign, and the necessary fresh beef; other supplies will have to be drawn from Milliken's Bend; this is a long and precarious route, but I have every confidence in succeeding in doing it. I shall not bring my troops into this place, but immediately follow the enemy, and if all promises as favorably hereafter as it does now, not stop until Vicksburg is in our possession."

Grant to Halleck, May 3, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 33.

In this last phrase we find the only intimation which he gave to the Government, at that time, of the campaign upon which he was resolved; a resolution which was the turning-point of his career, for in that day's resolve was the germ of the victories of Vicksburg and Chattanooga, of Appomattox and the Presidency. It had been his intention, as he said in his dispatch from Vicksburg three weeks later, to "detach an army corps or the necessary force to coöperate with General Banks to secure the reduction of Port Hudson and the union of the two

Grant to Halleck, May 24, 1863. Ibid., p. 38.

armies"; but, having received a letter from Banks, stating that he could not be at Baton Rouge before the 10th of May, and that after the reduction of Port Hudson he could add only 12,000 to the force in the field, Grant instantly concluded that he would make his campaign without reference to Banks. He felt, rather than knew, the dispositions of the enemy opposed to him. By keeping his army well in hand he could interpose it between the force of Pemberton, now collected on the line of the Big Black on his left, and the force which Johnston would naturally collect about him at Jackson. He knew he was stronger than either of these bodies and, in striking contrast with those generals in the East who constantly multiplied in their imagination the force of the enemy, it was the habit of Grant to make the opposite error and to minimize a hostile force which he could not see. He estimated at this time Pemberton's force at about three-fifths of its actual strength.[1] The exigencies of his first day's battle, and the pursuit of the retreating enemy, had brought him fifteen miles in the direction of the Confederate army. He felt it would be wasting too much time, at that stage of the campaign, to countermarch that distance to join General Banks. It will be no disparagement to Grant if we admit the possibility of another consideration which may have influenced him at this moment. Banks, as Badeau says, was his senior, and on the junction of their forces must have assumed command, and it will not be accusing

Grant, Report, July 6, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 49.

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 186.

1 "Pemberton was in Vicksburg and along the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad with, as afterwards proved, 52,000 men, but as Grant then supposed, with 30,000." — Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant," page 219.

CHAP. VII. Grant of any taint of vanity, presumption, or ambition to say that he probably felt that for the work in hand he was a better man than Banks.

Having taken this momentous resolution, upon the result of which depended either the greatest military service ever rendered the republic and an immortal fame, or, in the other event, irremediable failure and disgrace; and then having sat down without a tremor of the pulse, to give directions to generals, sea-captains, quartermasters, and commissaries, for every incident of the opening campaign, Grant mounted his horse again and rode to his troops at Hankinson's Ferry, where he found his own horses and personal luggage had arrived. Since leaving Hard Times his sole worldly gear had been a tooth-brush. He had taken from day to day the first horse he could lay his hands on, and had shared the luncheon of any general near whom he happened to halt.[1]

His forces remained for three days at Hankinson's Ferry waiting for supplies and reënforcements from across the river which were constantly arriving. Though the army was on short rations of bread they had in this fertile and populous district a great plenty of other things, and after the long months of levee, swamp, and bayou, they heartily enjoyed those first days of high and dry land, of fresh beef, and poultry. The men were not entirely idle; General Grant employed the

[1] E. B. Washburne wrote to Lincoln on the 1st of May, 1863, "I am afraid Grant will have to be reproved for want of style. On this whole march for five days he has had neither a horse nor an orderly or servant, a blanket or overcoat or clean shirt, or even a sword — that being carried by his boy 13 years old. His entire baggage consists of a tooth-brush." MS.





time in demonstrations on both sides of the Big Black, for the purpose of inducing the enemy to think that his intentions pointed in that direction. But on the morning of the 7th the army in high health and spirits broke camp and started on their march towards the center of the enemy's line between Vicksburg and Jackson. "It was my intention here," says General Grant, "to hug the Big Black River as closely as possible with McClernand's and Sherman's corps, and get them to the railroad at some place between Edwards's Station and Bolton." He intended McPherson, commanding the right wing,[1] to move by way of the village of Utica to Raymond and thence to make a rapid dash upon Jackson, the capital of the State, to do what damage might be swiftly wrought upon the railroad and public stores, and then to rejoin the main army. A close watch was to be kept on the ferries of the Big Black to prevent the sudden descent of a body of the enemy upon his line of communication. In this order, therefore, the army moved north a march of five days, McPherson holding the right, McClernand the left, Sherman following McClernand and gradually coming to the center abreast of him.

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May, 1863.

Grant, Report. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 50.

On the morning of the 12th McPherson struck a brigade of the enemy commanded by General John Gregg, supported later by another under General W. H. T. Walker at Raymond. Logan's division

May, 1863.

[1] General McClernand, properly speaking, had command of the right at the beginning, but General Grant, who preferred General McPherson for the service required, worked his corps over to the right to make the movement on Jackson, while he allowed McClernand to think he held the post of greatest honor and responsibility, being nearest the principal force of the enemy. — Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 231.

CHAP. VII. first attacked and gradually pushed the enemy before him for two or three hours until, on the arrival of Crocker's division, the Confederates broke and retreated towards Jackson, Logan following in pursuit until night. General Grant during the battle was with Sherman, seven miles west of Raymond, and about the center of the army.

Grant, Report, July 6, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., 50.

This sharp action, and additional reports which Grant had received of the arrival of considerable reënforcements under Johnston at the State capital, determined him to countermand the orders under which the left wing and center were now marching to the railroad, and he directed both Sherman's and McClernand's corps to concentrate upon the right while McPherson pushed forward towards Jackson. Grant was determined, as he says, to make sure and leave no enemy in his rear. The army was certainly fortunate in the possession of a general who could change his plans at a moment's notice to suit the exigencies of the hour and of officers and troops who could march as fast and as far as it suited their general to command them. McPherson pushed to the north from Raymond, occupying the town of Clinton on the railroad between Jackson and Vicksburg, thus interposing his corps between Johnston and Pemberton; and Sherman, with equal celerity, marched on the direct route between Raymond and Jackson, arriving south of the town just as McPherson arrived, in a pouring rain, on the north side.

1863. On the 9th of May the Confederate Government, seriously alarmed at Grant's march into the interior, had ordered General Johnston to proceed at once to Mississippi with three thousand good

troops and take command of the forces there. The fatal divergence of views, between Johnston on the one side and the Confederate Government on the other, had continually widened since the conference at Grenada some months before. Pemberton was constantly importuning Johnston for reënforcements which the latter could not send him, and in the latter part of March he made an urgent request that Van Dorn's cavalry might be returned to him from the Army of the Tennessee. Johnston replied that that force was much more needed in Tennessee than it could be in Mississippi, and that it could not be sent back so long as that state of things existed. There is some reason in Pemberton's claim that but for his poverty in mounted troops Grierson's raid would have been impossible, and Grant never could have advanced so easily as he did from the river into the heart of the State. But on the 12th of May, when Pemberton announced his purpose to meet the heavy force of the enemy advancing on the railroad, and asked for an immediate reënforcement of three thousand cavalry, as a positive necessity, he might as well have asked for the moon. Van Dorn had just been killed in a private quarrel; it was not possible to gather up three thousand cavalry from any quarter, and Grant's solid legions were bringing intelligence of themselves with a rapidity that no dragoons could have surpassed.

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1863.

May 8, 1863.

It was on a train between Tullahoma and Jackson that General Johnston received, on the 13th of May, his first intimation of the critical state of affairs from General Pemberton; and the first report he heard on arriving at the capi-



CHAMPION'S HILL AND BLACK RIVER BRIDGE.

CHAP. VII. tal was General Gregg's narrative to him, in person, of his defeat at Raymond. On the receipt of this news General Johnston, who was always extremely careful to perfect his written record in case of controversy arising between himself and his Government, sent to Richmond this truthful but most unpalatable dispatch: "I arrived this evening, finding the enemy's force between this place and General Pemberton, cutting off the communication. I am too late." Whether it be that his wounds and long illness had depressed his energies, or whether, in the circumstances of the case, it was possible for him and General Pemberton to with-

Johnston to Seddon, May 13, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 215.



RAYMOND AND JACKSON.

stand the splendid army and the swift movements of Grant, it is not to be denied that his management of the present campaign is the least creditable portion of his career. At the same time, having provided against the worst contingency by announcing to the Confederate Government that he had arrived too late, he telegraphed to General Pemberton that he had learned Sherman was between them with four divisions at Clinton, saying that it was important to reëstablish communications, that Pemberton might be reënforced, and directing him to come up in Sherman's rear at once. "To beat such a detachment," he said. "would be of immense value"; CHAP. VII.

CHAP. VII.

W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part III., p. 870.

—an unnecessary truism;—"the troops here could coöperate. . . Time is all-important." The whole telegram is little more than a waste of words. Pemberton, from Bovina, replied on the next day, telling what detachments he had left at Big Black and Baldwin's ferry, two divisions to hold Vicksburg, leaving an available force of sixteen thousand

Ibid., p. 877.

with which he had moved at once. He was not to blame in hesitating to attack, with this insufficient force,—for although understated it was still insufficient,—the army of Grant, with three corps in supporting distance, any one of which would have been all that Pemberton could handle.[1]

May, 1863.

On the morning of the 14th Sherman and McPherson moved on parallel roads towards Jackson. In spite of a furious rain-storm, which had flooded the roads all night and continued until noon, the troops of both corps marched in excellent order, without straggling, and in the best of spirits. McPherson, on the northern road, had the bulk of the battle to his share. After a severe fight of two or three hours the Confederates were beaten and fled by the Canton road leading due north from

Grant, Report, July 6, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 50.

[1] Pemberton's force effective for action on this date, according to his own account, was 27,000 men, and is greatly underestimated. The simplest statement of the case will show this. He surrendered to Grant in Vicksburg some 32,000 men; the prisoners Grant took during the campaign in the field were 7000. Pemberton's losses in the different battles were not much less than 10,000, and Loring's force, which wandered away from him at Champion's Hill and never rejoined him, was not less than 4000; and finally, 3000 would be a fair estimate of the stragglers. "Pemberton stated in his official report that his effective strength at the beginning of the siege was 18,500 men; and (May 14) that his whole available force, at the time of the battle of Champion's Hill, was 16,000 in the field, while 7800 were left to hold Vicksburg. He lost at least 15,000 men after this, and had 32,000 to surrender two months later."—Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 399. Note.

the town, upon which Johnston had already carried away his most valuable supplies. Sherman was opposed, on the Raymond road, by several field batteries, of which he captured three and some hundreds of prisoners. General Grant was with Sherman, and the two met McPherson in the center of the town, from which the rebels had retreated, who laid before them some intercepted dispatches between Pemberton and Johnston which put the Confederate plan, if it could be called by such a name, in their hands. Grant instantly ordered McPherson to march back on the Clinton road and join McClernand, while Sherman remained behind for a day to break up railroads, to destroy the arsenal, and various manufacturing establishments, and then to follow McPherson.

Sherman, "Memoirs." Vol. I., p. 321.

The conduct of the Confederate commanders at this juncture has been the source of endless discussion between the principal parties concerned. General Johnston severely censures the Confederate Government for not properly supporting him, and Pemberton for not obeying his orders, while Pemberton endeavors, in his reports, to throw the blame upon General Johnston; and President Davis voluminously attacks Johnston and attempts the defense of his luckless subordinate.[1] But looking

[1] There has probably never been a campaign in which all the prominent parties stood in such an attitude of contumacy. The Confederate Government, in the person of Mr. Davis, accuses General Johnston of not obeying his instructions, and General Johnston, in his turn, impartially attacks his superiors for not having sustained him, and his subordinates for not having obeyed him. On the other side General Grant accuses McClernand, in every report, of insubordination as well as incapacity, and, to complete the whimsical circle, Grant himself was guilty of an innocent and unconscious disobedience of orders, for while, on the 11th of May, a telegram was on its way to him from Wash-

CHAP. VII. 1863.

dispassionately at the situation of the two armies on the morning of the 15th of May, it is hard to see how, with the utmost harmony and good-will on the part of the Confederates, Grant could have been defeated. His campaign was already almost a secured success; his tremendous energy in marching had made the fighting of battles a matter of secondary importance; his army, as round and solid as a cannon-ball, had been interposed between the two Confederate wings, each division within supporting distance of the rest, and although the National army and that of the Confederates were almost exactly equal in numbers, the rebels were so scattered, in every direction, that it was in the power of Grant to fall with overwhelming force upon any detachment he chose to attack.

At the same time it must be admitted that both the Confederate commanders assisted his wisdom and energy by all the mistakes which it was possible for them to make. Johnston, after having been driven out of Jackson, imagined that Grant intended permanently to occupy that place,[1] and immediately bestirred himself from his refuge on the Canton road to take ways and means to starve

ington directing him to join forces with Banks somewhere between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, he was sending a dispatch from the Jackson road, saying that he was marching in the opposite direction at the utmost speed of his troops, and that he should communicate with Grand Gulf no more.

[1] Johnston says: "From the events of the 14th I supposed that General Grant intended to occupy Jackson and hold it to prevent the troops then there and those coming from the east from joining Lieutenant-General Pemberton's army." He wrote a letter to Pemberton on that date expressing the hope that the troops of Generals Gist and Maxey would be able to prevent General Grant's forces in Jackson from obtaining supplies from the east, and that troops on the Canton road might keep those of the country to the north from the Union troops.—Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 178.

out Grant by cutting off his supplies, with that intention detaching a considerable force under General S. R. Gist to the east of the town; at the same time he sent orders to Pemberton to move his army east and attack the Union rear, without any adequate comprehension of the force or the position of Grant's army; and he ever afterwards blamed Pemberton with great severity for not having carried out these orders. But when Pemberton, before the capture of Jackson, received on the morning of the 14th the first orders of this tenor, although he disapproved them and thought the result would be disastrous, he immediately prepared to obey them. He ordered his troops forward from Edwards's Station; but later in the day his doubts became intolerable to himself; he called together his principal generals in council of war, and asked for their opinions. The larger number of them were in favor of strictly obeying Johnston's orders and marching east upon the rear of the army which Johnston supposed to be between Clinton and Jackson; the two senior generals, however, Loring and Stevenson, favored a movement against Grant's line of communications, hoping in this way to cut off his supplies and compel him to retreat. This divergence of views only increased Pemberton's embarrassment, who, for his part, thought the wisest course was to wait for the battle, which he felt must soon come, in a place chosen by himself; but, being forced to a decision, he made what was probably the worst one possible under the circumstances. He resolved to move to the southeast upon Grant's line of communication and supply, which he hoped to strike at the village of Dillon, a

CHAP. VII. few miles to the east of Raymond; and even this movement was not executed promptly. The severe rain-storm, which had not been enough to keep McPherson and Sherman out of Jackson, had so swollen the creeks in Pemberton's line of march that he was forced to make a detour to find a bridge on the Clinton road. In this way the greater part
1863. of the 15th of May was wasted, and night found him only a short distance on the Raymond road near the village of Elliston.

If General Grant had himself directed the movement of the Confederate forces he could not have disposed them more to his own advantage than Johnston and Pemberton, in their confusion, had done. With a part of Johnston's forces ordered forty or fifty miles east of Jackson for the purpose of starving out Grant from a place he had no intention of holding; with another force to the north in search of a point of junction with Pemberton, and the latter wheeling the right wing to the south to strike the communications of an army which was living off the country, and living well, the two Confederate generals continually increased their own embarrassment by their mutual distrust and vacillation. With a force like Grant's held compactly between them and making the most of every hour, they were still further confusing and weakening each other by dispatches which it required days to deliver and which, when received, had been invalidated by the swift progress of events. At Elliston on the Raymond road, where Pemberton had rested for the night and was preparing to march in the
MAY, 1863. morning of the 16th, he received an order from Johnston to join him at Clinton, a place which at

the moment was equally inaccessible to both of them.[1] Although this order was a day old, Pemberton had, by this time, grown apprehensive of the consequences of his disobedience, and resolved to obey the command which had become obsolete, at a moment when its execution was impossible to him; for even while he issued the order to reverse his column towards Edwards's Station, intending to seek Johnston at Brownsville, the skirmishers of McClernand's corps were already engaged with his cavalry advance.

The moment Grant learned at Jackson of the intention of the enemy to join their forces and attack his rear, he determined to be beforehand with them, and ordered all his troops, except Sherman, to face to the west and rendezvous in the neighborhood of Bolton's Station, a point on the railroad almost exactly in the center of a quadrilateral composed by Brownsville and Raymond on the north and south, and Clinton and Edwards's Station on the east and west. By moving promptly to this point he felt sure of preventing Johnston's junction with Pemberton and overwhelming the latter before assistance could reach him from any quarter. This movement necessarily placed McClernand's corps once more in the lead. Hovey's division, which had relieved McPherson at Clinton when he moved on Jackson, marched straight from Clinton to Bolton, while Osterhaus and Carr, moving on what

1 The order from General Johnston was in these words: "May 15, 1863, 8.30 A. M. . . . Our being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plan impracticable. The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton, informing me, that we may move to that point with about six thousand."—W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part III., p. 882.

CHAP. VII. is called the middle road from Raymond to Edwards's Station, and Smith and Blair (the latter having just arrived from Grand Gulf with a train of two hundred wagons bearing the only supplies which Grant had received since swinging loose from the river) followed a road a few miles south of that last mentioned, all three, however, converging upon Edwards's Station and within supporting distance of each other.

May, 1863. Grant passed the night of the 15th at Clinton, and at daylight he was aroused from sleep to listen to the report of two men employed on the railroad, who had passed through Pemberton's camp the day before, and who told him that Pemberton, with eighty regiments, was moving to attack his rear. The battle which was to decide the fate of Vicksburg was thus upon him. He sent a swift courier to Sherman to bring on his force with the utmost speed to Bolton; McPherson was ordered to push through Bolton in support of Hovey. Orders had been sent to McClernand the night before to move cautiously forward on the road leading from Raymond to Edwards's Station, taking care to keep in communication with Blair, who was temporarily placed under his orders, though belonging to Sherman's division. Grant's aversion to McClernand were shown in these orders. He did not feel inclined to leave to him that freedom of action which he was always glad to give to Sherman and McPherson, and his directions were therefore unnecessarily stringent, commanding him to proceed with great caution and to take care not to bring on a general engagement. This order resulted badly the next day.

When Pemberton attempted, on the morning of the 16th, to reverse his column, for the purpose of joining Johnston north of the railroad, the power of marching away from the field he had so imprudently chosen had passed out of his hands. Just as the reverse movement was beginning, McClernand's advance drove in the Confederate cavalry pickets and opened with artillery, at long range, on the head, which had become the rear of their column, on the Raymond road; but General Pemberton, not being sure whether this was a reconnaissance or a serious attack, did not at once countermand his orders, but took measures for securing the safety of his trains. While his wagons were moving to the rear he became convinced that something more serious than a reconnaissance was on hand, and he formed his troops in line of battle on the cross-road from the Clinton to the Raymond road. Loring held the right, Bowen the center, and Stevenson the left. His right thus barred the road along which McClernand's corps was advancing, and his left held a strong position, called Champion's Hill, just south of the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad at a point where the Clinton road, running west, suddenly turns almost at a right angle to the southward running along the base of the hill to what we have called the middle road which runs, after crossing a bridge over Baker's Creek, to Edwards's Station.

Pemberton, Report, W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 263.

Ibid.

He had hardly completed this formation when the battle began. Grant, riding forward from Clinton in the early morning,[1] had ordered the

1 "At six and a half o'clock McPherson dispatched to Grant, 'I think it advisable for you to come forward to the front as soon as you can.' . . McPherson saw that a battle was imminent, and

CHAP. VII. trains moved out of the road as he hurried on, and directed McPherson to push his troops westward at the top of their speed. About ten o'clock he came up with Hovey, whose skirmishers were already in contact with the enemy; and, after holding this division in check for some time waiting for the advance of McClernand on the left, General Grant was probably reminded of his stringent orders of the night before by the receipt of a dispatch from McClernand about noon, already two hours old, asking if he should bring on an engagement.[1] He immediately sent orders for McClernand to attack at once, but they were not received until after two o'clock, three hours after the battle had opened on the right.

McPherson came on the field about eleven o'clock, Logan in the lead, and Crocker following closely. Hovey's division immediately advanced along the left of the Clinton road, and moved up the eastern slope of Champion's Hill under a severe fire from the enemy posted there. Logan, who had formed on the right of the road, attacked the enemy's extreme left and worked energetically round the northern slope of the hill making sure and rapid progress.

McClernand was the ranking officer at the front. McPherson was unwilling to risk his troops under that general, unless it became unavoidable, and therefore sent the dispatch given above." McPherson explained this to Grant after the battle was won. —Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 261.

[1] Even so late as fifteen minutes past ten Grant, in his written orders to McClernand, said: "From all information gathered from citizens and prisoners the mass of the enemy are south of Hovey's division. McPherson is now up with Hovey and can support him at any point. Close up all your forces as expeditiously as possible but cautiously. The enemy must not be allowed to get to our rear."— W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part III., p. 317. It was not until half-past twelve that Grant could bring himself to give McClernand positive orders to attack.— Ibid., p. 318.

Hovey's division met with such heavy resistance, Pemberton continually drawing reënforcements from his right to sustain his endangered left wing, that about two o'clock Hovey's troops were forced back from the Hill. They had captured in their advance eleven guns, and in this retreat they lost nine of them; but being reënforced by Crocker's division, which had opportunely arrived, both divisions now rushed forward again with irresistible energy and drove the enemy over the Hill and down to the Raymond road, where they retreated in a complete rout towards Baker's Creek. Barton's Confederate brigade, which had been opposing Logan, broke about the same time, retreating across Baker's Creek by a bridge on the Clinton road. CHAP. VII.

Loring on the Confederate left, whom the cautious attack of McClernand had left very much at leisure during the battle, was now called upon to cover the retreat of Bowen's and Stevenson's divisions, which were completely routed. He formed his men between the two roads and was there attacked by Osterhaus's division and driven from his place; falling back to the Raymond road he found Tilghman's brigade of his division had been attacked and severely handled by Smith's division, and Tilghman killed. With what was left of his force Loring hastened along the Raymond road to the ford over Baker's Creek, which he had been informed would be held by Stevenson and Bowen until he could arrive; but, in saying this, they promised too much, for, late in the afternoon, General Carr, who had crossed at the bridge, moved down the west bank and Stevenson and Bowen had

CHAP. VII. to use all their activity to escape capture, so that, when Loring arrived at the ford, he found it occupied by a heavy force of Union troops, and after a comfortless night of wandering from one road and ford to another he discovered that he was cut off from the rest of the army and fled for the Southeast, joining Johnston several days later.

W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part II., p. 167. Ibid., Part I., p. 320. May, 1863.

This, Grant said, was the hardest fought battle of the campaign. The loss of the Union army was 2441 men, of whom 2254 were killed and wounded. The Confederates lost 3624, of whom 2195 were prisoners. They left on the field twenty-four pieces of artillery. On the 17th the pursuit was renewed, McClernand's corps leading, and the enemy was overtaken at the bridge over the Big Black River. A sharp action took place here. The enemy were posted in the river bottom on the east bank within a long line of rifle-pits, which were defended by a bayou. They presented a somewhat formidable front as the Union army approached, but as Grant's line was extended it was found that the rifle-pits could be flanked, under the cover of the river bank, and a brilliant assault, by Carr's division, so demoralized the enemy that little resistance was made, and a race for the bridge ensued, by which the fleet Confederates saved themselves, with heavy loss, however, in prisoners and guns.

Sherman, "Memoirs." Vol. I., p. 324.

In the mean time Sherman had reached Bridgeport, several miles higher up the river, which he crossed in the night by means of a pontoon bridge. Grant was with him, and the two generals sat on a log looking at the passage of the troops over the bridge, which was illuminated by brilliant fires of pitch-pine. McClernand and McPherson passed



J. E. Johnston

the night in building floating bridges, and crossed their commands early in the morning of the 18th. This unavoidable delay enabled Pemberton to bring his beaten army back to Vicksburg, a hot journey of twelve miles over dusty roads, with all the fatigue and discouragement which a week of defeat inflicts upon the bravest soldiers; but, once inside the works of Vicksburg, their fortitude returned, and when the Union army, flushed with its victories, came surging up against the rebel works it found them firmly held and stoutly defended. CHAP. VII. May, 1863.

In the mean while General Johnston, with a faith which would seem to have had insufficient nourishment under the circumstances, had been expecting to meet Pemberton's army somewhere on the road from Livingston to Edwards's Station. It must be admitted however that, if he were marching in view of such a junction, he moved with singular deliberation, for, during the whole day of the 16th, while Pemberton was fighting the most furious battle of the campaign at Champion's Hill, Johnston, on the report of his brigadiers that their troops were tired, rested the whole day. But the next day, having resumed his leisurely march along the road indicated to him in a dispatch which Pemberton wrote him just before he was attacked, he was met by a courier dispatched by Pemberton on his retreat, with a full account of the disaster of Champion's Hill and a clear intimation of the defeat at the Big Black, "where," Pemberton said, "heavy cannonading is now going on. There are so many points," he continued, "by which I can be flanked, that I fear I shall be compelled to withdraw; if so, the position at Snyder's

Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 185.

May, 1863.

Johnston, Report. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 240.

CHAP. VII.

Mill [Haines's Bluff] will also be untenable." Although this was appalling news to Johnston he did not lose his clearness of judgment, and immediately dispatched to Pemberton the only orders compatible with common-sense in the disastrous condition of affairs. "If Haines's Bluff is untenable, Vicksburg is of no value and cannot be held; if, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both troops and place, we must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march to the northeast." Of course it will be asked why Johnston did not instantly get into the saddle and, riding to Pemberton's camp, execute his own orders; the reason he gives is, that his health was too infirm for him to attempt such a ride.

Johnston to Pemberton, May 17, 1863. Vol. XXIV., Part III., p. 888.

May 18, 1863.

On the next day he received another dispatch from Pemberton announcing that he had submitted to a council of war the orders for the evacuation of Vicksburg, and it was their unanimous decision not to obey them; and this decision was accompanied by a reason more humiliating still, upon which it was founded, "that it was impossible to withdraw the army from this position with such morale and material as to be of further service to the Confederacy." "I have decided," Pemberton continued, "to hold Vicksburg as long as possible, with the firm hope that the Government may yet be able to assist me in keeping this obstruction to the enemy's free navigation of the Mississippi River. I still conceive it to be the most important point in the Confederacy." Although

W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part III., p. 890.

General Johnston considered this reasoning unfounded in view of the investment of the city and the practical nullification of the obstruction referred to by the passage of the gunboats, the situation was too distressing to him for further recriminations, and he simply replied, "I am trying to gather a force which may attempt to relieve you. Hold out." It may be said that the trap was already sprung before Pemberton communicated to Johnston the decision of his council of war, which had broken up to the booming of Grant's cannons only a few hundred yards away.

Johnston to Pemberton, May 19, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part III., p. 892.

The army had moved forward during the 18th with the same celerity and the same solidity of column with which they had marched through the State. As they arrived in the neighborhood of the Confederate works McClernand's force was sent to the left and McPherson's to the center; while Sherman took his corps, which had marched by the upper road, and moved to the right until he rested upon the bluffs of the Mississippi, in full communication with the North. Haines's Bluff fell without a blow, a few cavalrymen riding into the works which had so long baffled the great army; and Grant and Sherman, who had come together during the last stage of the march, rode, side by side, up to the farthest heights of the Walnut Hills, commanding a view of the Yazoo River and the beetling bluffs where Sherman, six months before, had made so brave an attack and met with so disastrous a repulse, and the two friends realized at last that the triumphant campaign was ending and that a victory, more complete and splendid than Sherman had deemed possible, or than even Grant

May, 1863.

CHAP. VII.

had anticipated, had crowned with immortal honor the Army of the Tennessee. Sherman, turning to Grant, said: "This is a success, if we never take the town."[1]

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 281.

[1] Mr. Jefferson Davis, writing eighteen years after the fact, could still not reconcile himself to the success of this campaign. He enumerates the wise and prudent measures he took to oppose Grant. He says he wrote "to the Governor, Pettus, — a man worthy of all confidence, as well for his patriotism as his manhood,— requesting him to use all practicable means to get every man and boy, capable of aiding their country in its need, to turn out, mounted or on foot, with whatever weapons they had, to aid the soldiers in driving the invader from our soil. The facilities the enemy possessed in river transportation, and the aid which their iron-clad gunboats gave to all operations where land and naval forces could be combined, were lost to Grant in this interior march which he was making. Success gives credit to military enterprises; had this failed, as I think it should, it surely would have been pronounced an egregious blunder."— Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government." Vol. II., p. 400.

CHAPTER VIII

THE INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA

AS soon as Hooker found himself once more on the north bank of the Rappahannock, he began to think of crossing again; as he gradually recovered the use of his benumbed faculties he saw that in spite of the three days' slaughter into which he had led and from which he had brought back his army, he had as yet fought no battle. On the 6th of May he telegraphed to the President that he had seen no way of giving the enemy general battle with a desirable prospect of success; that he had only engaged a comparatively small proportion of his troops, and that he saw a better place near at hand for the whole to join. The President, appreciating more clearly than General Hooker the deplorable effect of Chancellorsville upon the public mind, wrote to him on the 7th the following letter: "The recent movement of your army is ended without effecting its object, except, perhaps, some important breakings of the enemy's communications. What next? If possible, I would be very glad of another movement early enough to give us some benefit from the fact of the enemy's communication being broken; but neither for this reason nor any other do I wish anything done in despera-

Hooker to Lincoln, May 6, 1863, 4:30 P. M. W. R. Vol. XXV., Part II., p. 435.

CH. VIII.

tion or rashness. An early movement would also help to supersede the bad moral effect of the recent one, which is said to be considerably injurious. Have you already in your mind a plan wholly or partially formed? If you have, prosecute it without interference from me. If you have not, please inform me, so that I, incompetent as I may be, can try and assist in the formation of some plan for the army."

Lincoln to Hooker. W. R. Vol. XXV., Part II., p. 438.

The general answered on the same day, saying that he did not deem it expedient to suspend operations on that line; that the want of success in the first attempt to extricate the army from its present position was through causes which could not be foreseen; as to the time for renewing his advance he could only decide after he had learned more of the feeling of the troops; he said he had decided in his own mind the plan to be adopted in his next effort if the President wished to have one made. He gave no intimation of what his plan was, except that it would be one in which the operations of all the corps, unless it should be a part of the cavalry, would be within his personal supervision. In his evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War he intimated that the plan he had at that time in his mind for an engagement was "at Franklin's Crossing, where I had elbow-room."

Hooker to Lincoln. W. R. Vol. XXV., Part II., p. 438.

Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. I., p. 134.

May, 1863.

On the 13th he wrote to the President, explaining his reasons for delay. His army had been considerably reduced by the withdrawal of the two years and nine months regiments,[1] by which his march-

[1] He reports his losses from these sources as follows: Two years men, 16,480; nine months men, 6421.—W.R. Vol. XXV., Part II., p. 243.

ing force of infantry was cut down to about eighty thousand. He says that he is impatient to move, but his impatience must not be indulged at the expense of the country's interests. Longstreet is in Richmond, and can readily join Lee if attacked. The enemy's camps appear to be increasing in numbers. He now believes the enemy is numerically superior to him; he would like to have a reserve of 25,000 infantry placed at his disposal, if possible, and ends with an expression not quite in keeping with the rest of his letter, that he "hopes to be able to commence his movement to-morrow." This hope was not fulfilled; it is doubtful if much importance was attached to it on the other side of the correspondence, for the President answered him the next day, telling him clearly that he did not then think it probable that anything could be gained by an early renewal of the attempt to cross the Rappahannock; the enemy having reëstablished his communications, regained his position, and received reënforcements. "I therefore shall not complain," said Mr. Lincoln, "if you do no more for a time than to keep the enemy at bay and out of other mischief, by menaces and occasional cavalry raids, if practicable, and to put your own army into good condition again. Still, if in your own clear judgment you can renew the attack successfully, I do not mean to restrain you." At the close of the President's letter occurs a passage which bears an unhappy resemblance to the communications made to Burnside near the close of his brief command: "I must tell you," he says, "that I have some painful intimations that some of your corps and division commanders are not giving you

CH. VIII.

Hooker to Lincoln, May 13, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXV., Part II., p. 473.

CH. VIII.

Lincoln to Hooker, May 14, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXV., Part II., p. 479.

their entire confidence. This would be ruinous if true, and you should, therefore, first of all ascertain the real facts, beyond all possibility of doubt." There was to General Hooker, in these words, an ominous reminiscence of the fate of his predecessor and of his own conduct towards him, and he immediately called upon the President to ascertain what special significance they contained. The President promptly told him that he had derived his information from two prominent citizens of Pennsylvania, Governor Curtin and Mr. Barclay, from which General Hooker at once inferred that the center of disaffection towards him was with General Meade and General Stoneman.

Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. I., p. 151.

The great and easily earned victories which had fallen to the lot of General Lee on the banks of the Rappahannock had raised to the highest point they ever reached the spirits and the confidence of the Confederate Government. The defeat of General Burnside in December, followed by the unfortunate campaign of Hooker in May, had excited in the Southern army and in the Richmond Cabinet a feeling of invincibility. A corresponding depression and grief had invaded the North, which gave occasion to the manifestation of a sinister opposition to the Government, from which the most serious results were hoped on the one side and feared on the other. The Richmond papers copied with the greatest elation the factious utterances of prominent Democrats of the North and attributed to them an undue influence. A pamphlet attacking the Administration is referred to by one Southern historian as the echo of the "thunder of Lee's guns of Chancellorsville." From the rebel emissaries in Europe, also, there

J. E. Cooke, "Life of General Lee," pp. 269, 270.

came letters full of hope and encouragement, saying that one or two more such victories would secure the recognition of the Confederacy by all the great powers. With more vigor and unanimity than inspired the cry of "on to Richmond," two years before, was General Lee now beset on every hand with the cry "on to Washington." We are given to understand from many sources that this plan of invasion was not originally his own, and Jefferson Davis himself claims the responsibility for it; but General Lee accepted it not unwillingly. He would have been more than human if he had not been greatly elated by his victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville; and the army which he saw under his orders at the end of May was by far the finest that ever gathered under the Confederate banner. It was about equal in numbers to the great army with which he raised the siege of Richmond against McClellan, and far superior to it by virtue of a year of constant success and rigid discipline. Longstreet had brought back his army from Suffolk, and the enthusiasm born of recent successes had filled the depleted regiments with the flower of the Southern youth. It was divided into three corps of three divisions each, under Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, and numbered nearly 80,000 men.

Speech of Mr. Davis in Richmond after General Lee's death. J. E. Cooke, "Life of General Lee," p. 540.

General Lee in his report of the 31st of July, 1863, gives a clear and simple statement of the motives which induced him to begin his enterprise of invasion. "The position," he says, "occupied by the enemy opposite Fredericksburg being one in which he could not be attacked to advantage, it was determined to draw

CH. VIII. him from it. The execution of this purpose embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley, . . . and if practicable the transfer of the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac." He thought that the execution of this purpose would give him a fair opportunity to strike a blow at General Hooker's army in the course of the movement into which that army would be drawn; that in any event it would be compelled to leave Virginia and draw other troops to its support from a distance; finally "it was hoped that other valuable results might be obtained by military success." In this last brief phrase are buried the most audacious and ambitious hopes ever entertained by the Confederate Government.

Lee to Cooper, July 31, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part II., p. 305.

They expected no less than to conquer a triumphant peace in this campaign of General Lee. They looked upon their army as a machine so perfect in composition and in discipline that it could go anywhere and do anything. If the Army of the Potomac stood in its way, they expected to beat it as they had done before. It was to their minds within the range of reasonable probability that they should take Harrisburg and Philadelphia; Baltimore would be theirs without resistance, for it always pleased them to regard Maryland and its chief city as lying in unwilling bondage at the feet of Lincoln. The capture of Washington was an incident of this campaign of great expectations. It is reported that when it was suggested to General Lee that Hooker might take advantage of his absence to advance upon Richmond, he smiled and said, "Very well, in that case we shall swap queens." The question of supplies gave him no trouble. The greater distance he marched from the plundered

and wasted fields of Virginia the better. The rich lands of the Lower Shenandoah, of Maryland, and Pennsylvania, were among the greatest of the temptations of this bold enterprise. There is a story, not very well authenticated, that, when General Lee made a requisition for a large amount of rations upon the Richmond Government, the Confederate Commissary-General indorsed upon the paper, "If General Lee wishes rations let him seek them in Pennsylvania."

J. E. Cooke, "Life of General Lee," p. 272.

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Before the end of May Hooker began to suspect that the army across the river was on the eve of a forward movement. Spies from Richmond reported that the principal topics of conversation in that city were the funeral of Stonewall Jackson and the invasion of Maryland. Hooker, with that keenness of insight which generally characterized him, telegraphed to the Secretary of War, on the 28th of May, that, while he was in doubt as to the direction Lee would take, he thought it would be "the one of last year, however desperate it may appear." To ascertain more definitely if there were any actual movement in progress, he bridged the river in his front, and threw the Sixth Corps over at Franklin's Crossing on the 6th of June. He saw from Falmouth Heights that the movement created a good deal of excitement in the camps opposite, and that the enemy gathered from all quarters in great force in front of Sedgwick; he therefore concluded that no movement was under way at that moment.

Hooker to Stanton, May 28, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXV., Part II., p. 543.

Order, June 6, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part III., p. 12.

As so often happened with General Hooker, his intuition was nearer correct than his inferences derived from actual contact with the enemy. Be-

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cause Hill's force had gathered with great alacrity to dispute Sedgwick's advance, he concluded that the enemy was not yet in motion. On the day before he had sent a long dispatch to the President, announcing with great clearness and accuracy his views of Lee's movement, which turned out in the end to be absolutely correct. He thought Lee had it in mind to cross the Upper Potomac and move upon Washington; that the head of his column would be directed towards the Potomac by way of Gordonsville or Culpeper, while the rear would rest on Fredericksburg; he therefore desired the views of the Government concerning the Army of the Potomac in such a contingency; he gave it decidedly as his opinion that it was his duty to attack Lee's rear as soon as the movement was fully developed.

Hooker to Lincoln, June 5, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 30.

Mr. Lincoln replied to this dispatch with only an hour's delay, saying that so much of professional military skill was requisite to answer it that he had turned the task over to General Halleck; but the President himself decidedly disapproved of Hooker's suggestion to attack the enemy in Fredericksburg. The recollection of Burnside's disaster was too fresh in the minds of both the President and General Halleck to allow them to look with favor upon the project of attacking an army in position on a scene which had been already so fatal to our troops. The enemy would fight, said the President, "in intrenchments, and have you at disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river like an ox

jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other." With this graphic metaphor the President turned the military question involved over to the two generals. Halleck repeated the same idea in less vivid language; he thought it would be much better to attack the flank of Lee's movable column, rather than to cross the Rappahannock and fight the intrenched rear-guard at Fredericksburg.

Lincoln to Hooker, June 5, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 31.

Halleck to Hooker. Ibid.

While this correspondence was going on, the movement which Hooker suspected was in full progress. It had begun on the 3d of June; McLaws's division of Longstreet's corps was the first body of troops to move from Fredericksburg to Culpeper Court House, and Hood's troops, from the Rapidan, had marched to the same place; on the 4th and 5th Ewell's corps left Fredericksburg; so that when Sedgwick crossed below the city the only force that confronted him was that of A. P. Hill. Although Hooker was not aware of the heavy force of Confederate infantry that had already arrived at Culpeper Court House he knew there was a great concentration of cavalry near that place, and resolved to attack it. He sent a large force in that direction under Pleasonton and David McM. Gregg. The whole command was to rendezvous at Brandy Station and attack the enemy together; unfortunately, as it resulted, they found the enemy at that point instead of at Culpeper, and not coming together at the same instant, they suffered the disadvantage almost inseparable from such a concentric movement, and were forced to fight in detail an enemy in position, in superior numbers. It was one

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CH. VIII. of the most important cavalry fights in the war; in fact, it is rare anywhere that a duel of 10,000 horsemen on a side is ever seen. Both armies fought with equal courage and nearly equal damage, and both sides, as a matter of course, congratulated themselves on a signal victory. The results which General Pleasonton claims to have accomplished were: the breaking up of the enemy's plans, gaining valuable information, and so crippling the Confederate cavalry that they were unable to follow out their purpose to so protect the right wing of Lee's army as to screen his march along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge; thus compelling him to take the less desirable route by the Shenandoah Valley. Pleasonton even thought on the night of the battle that he had broken up the entire expedition, an illusion which Hooker did not share.

Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. I., p. 157.

General Hooker, having been convinced by the affair of Brandy Station that the bulk of the enemy's cavalry and a strong body of infantry were at Culpeper, and that the tendency of the rest of his infantry was to drift in that direction, conceived a bold and startling plan which he at once communicated to the President. It was nothing less than to march directly upon Richmond, brushing away the force left at Fredericksburg and leaving Lee's army on his right flank. He did not go so far as McClellan had done in adopting Lee's idea of "swapping queens"; on the contrary, he thought that after taking Richmond, which he imagined would be a mere matter of capturing the provost guard, he could send from there all the disposable part of his army to any threatened point



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north of the Potomac; he thought there would be no difficulty in holding in check any force which might be thrown against Washington until his return.

Hooker to Lincoln, June 10, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., pp. 34, 35.

There is something in this proposition which stirs the blood of any soldier who reflects upon the exciting possibilities which it contains. If it had been attempted, and had succeeded, a world of blood and treasure would have been saved, Hooker would have gained one of the greatest

CH. VIII.

names of modern times, and Lee's career would have ended in disaster, not unmingled with ridicule. But the suggestion was too extravagant and hazardous to commend itself to the calm judgment of the President. He answered without a moment's delay, "If left to me, I would not go south of Rappahannock upon Lee's moving north of it. If you had Richmond invested to-day, you would not be able to take it in twenty days. . . I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your sure objective point. If he comes towards the Upper Potomac, follow on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens his; fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him." He wrote this dispatch before consulting Halleck, but the general-in-chief gave it his full approval; and there seems to be no question that the President's decision was the wisest which could have been taken.

Lincoln to Hooker, June 10, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 35.

Lee sent his advance into the Valley of the Shenandoah, and General Ewell invested the garrison of Winchester on the 13th. This post was held by General Milroy, a man of stubborn courage, who, when ordered to evacuate the place, instead of obeying,[1] protested that he was able to hold it

June, 1863.

[1] "Winchester and Martinsburg were at this time occupied by us simply as outposts. Neither place was susceptible of a good defense. Directions were therefore given on June 11th to withdraw these garrisons to Harper's Ferry, but these orders were not obeyed, and on the 13th Winchester was attacked and its armament and part of its garrison captured."— General Halleck's Report of Operations in 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 15.

General Halleck always divided the blame of the mischance at Winchester equally between Milroy and Schenck. In fact, each of the three is equally impartial towards the other two.

We give the following letter from the President to Milroy as a remarkable specimen of his dealings with his discontented generals. It would be impossible



GENERAL RICHARD S. EWELL.

against any force the enemy might bring. His orders were not repeated with sufficient promptness and firmness, and he was therefore caught by Ewell's army, and, though fighting obstinately, CH. VIII.

to be more kindly or more authoritative. Yet he took time to write this letter in the most critical hour of the Gettysburg campaign.

"(*Private.*) EXECUTIVE MANSION,
"WASHINGTON, June 29, 1863.
"MAJOR-GENERAL MILROY.

"MY DEAR SIR: Your letters to Mr. Blair and to myself are handed to me by him. I have never doubted your courage and devotion to the cause. But you have just lost a division, and, *prima facie*, the fault is upon you; and while that remains unchanged, for me to put you in command again is to justly subject me to the charge of having put you there on purpose to have you lose another. If I knew facts sufficient to satisfy me that you were not in fault, or error, the case would be different; but the facts I do know, while they are not at all conclusive, and I hope they may never prove so, tend the other way.

"First, I have scarcely seen anything from you at any time that did not contain imputations against your superiors, and a chafing against acting the part they had assigned you. You have constantly urged the idea that you were persecuted because you did not come from West Point, and you repeat it in these letters. This, my dear general, is, I fear, the rock on which you have split.

"In the Winchester case you were under General Schenck, and he under General Halleck. I know by General Halleck's order-book, that he, on the 11th of June, advised General Schenck to call you in from Winchester to Harper's Ferry; and I have been told, but do not know, that General Schenck gave you the order accordingly, on the same day — and I have been told, but do not know, that on receiving it, instead of obeying it, you sent by mail a written protest against obeying it, which did not reach him until you were actually beleaguered at Winchester. 1863.

"I say I do not know this. You hate West Point generally and General Halleck particularly; but I do know that it is not his fault that you were at Winchester on the 13th, 14th, and morning of the 15th, the days of your disaster. If General Schenck gave the order on the 11th, as General Halleck advised, it was an easy matter for you to have been off at least on the 12th. The case is inevitably between General Schenck and you. June, 1863.

"Neither General Halleck nor any one else, so far as I know, required you to stay and fight 60,000 with 6,000, as you insinuate.

"I know General Halleck through General Schenck required you to get away, and that in abundant time for you to have done it.

"General Schenck is not a West Pointer, and has no prejudice against you on that score.

"Yours very truly,
"A. LINCOLN." Lincoln to Milroy, June 29, 1863. MS.

CH. VIII. only escaped with the loss of a large proportion of his forces. On the very night when Ewell struck Winchester, Hill began his march up the Rappahannock; and Hooker also left the Aquia line, moving in accordance with the President's directions, pursuing the road indicated towards the Upper Potomac. Before the President had heard of Milroy's disaster he telegraphed to Hooker asking if he could afford any succor at Winchester. Drawing, in one of his vivid phrases, a picture of the condition of the rebel army, he said, "If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him?" It was not until the night of the 15th of June that the President was able to telegraph to General Hooker a definite account of the loss of Winchester and Martinsburg, and to say that the enemy was crossing the Potomac at Williamsport. This left no doubt on Hooker's mind of the settled purpose of the enemy, though he thought that Lee would be more inclined to go north and west than to turn to the east. "He can have no design," said Hooker, in a dispatch to the President, "to look after his rear. It is an act of desperation on his part, no matter in what force he moves."

June 14, 1863. 5:50 P. M.

W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 39.

Ibid., p. 43.

Ibid.

In all Hooker's dispatches of this period there is a tone of sullen reticence arising from his strained relations with General Halleck, which boded no good to the interests of the army. For instance, in this dispatch, written at a moment which called for the utmost exercise of all his energy and vigor, he says, "I do not know that my opinion as to the

duty of this army, in the case, is wanted; if it should be you know that I will be happy to give it." General Halleck on the same day had telegraphed him, "Your army is entirely free to operate as you desire against Lee's army, so long as you keep his main army from Washington." On the next day, the 16th of June, Hooker sent another dispatch to the President still more marked in its spirit of insubordination, "You have long been aware, Mr. President, that I have not enjoyed the confidence of the major-general commanding the army, and I can assure you, so long as this continues, we may look in vain for success, especially as future operations will require our relations to be more dependent upon each other than heretofore"; he continued to ask for instructions, complaining of the lack of information of the movements of the enemy, saying that he could not "divine his intentions, so long as he fills the country with a cloud of cavalry." The President, seeing that only disaster could follow the exhibition of such a spirit on the part of the general in command of a great army in the most momentous crisis of the war, responded in a tone of unusual sternness: "To remove all misunderstanding, I now place you in the strict military relation to General Halleck of a commander of one of the armies to the general-in-chief of all the armies. I have not intended differently, but it seems to be differently understood. I shall direct him to give you orders, and you to obey them." But at the same time he sent Hooker by the hand of his young friend Captain Ulric Dahlgren a letter in which, laying aside his tone of authority, he pleaded with the gentlest persuasion

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W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 42.

W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 45.

Ibid., p. 47.

CH. VIII. for a better understanding between the two generals. He said:

(*Private.*) EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, June 16, 1863.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I send you this by the hand of Capt. Dahlgren. Your dispatch of 11:30 A. M. to-day is just received. When you say I have long been aware that you do not enjoy the confidence of the major-general commanding you state the case much too strongly.

You do not lack his confidence in any degree to do you any harm. On seeing him, after telegraphing you this morning, I found him more nearly agreeing with you than I was myself. Surely you do not mean to understand that I am withholding my confidence from you, when I happen to express an opinion (certainly never discourteously) differing from one of your own.

I believe Halleck is dissatisfied with you, to this extent only, that he knows that you write and telegraph (report as he calls it) to me. I think he is wrong to find fault with this; but I do not think he withholds any support from you on account of it. If you and he would use the same frankness to one another, and to me, that I use to both of you, there would be no difficulty. I need and must have the professional skill of both, and yet these suspicions tend to deprive me of both.

I believe you are aware that since you took command of the army, I have not believed you had any chance to effect anything till now. As it looks to me, Lee's now returning towards Harper's Ferry gives you back the chance that I thought McClellan lost last fall. Quite possibly I was wrong both then and now; but, in the great responsibility resting upon me, I cannot be entirely silent. Now, all I ask is that you will be in such mood that we can get into our action the best cordial judgment of yourself and General Halleck, with my poor mite added, if indeed he and you shall think it entitled to any consideration at all. Yours as ever,

A. LINCOLN.

Lincoln to Hooker, June 16, 1863. MS.

In short the relations between General Halleck and General Hooker were rapidly becoming unen-

durable. An instinctive dislike between them, which dated from earlier days in California, had grown to a positive and active antipathy. The President had placed Hooker in command of the Army of the Potomac against the judgment and wishes of General Halleck. Hooker was made aware of this through the indiscretion of a member of the Cabinet, and his trenchant comments upon the general-in-chief were promptly reported at headquarters. Every act of each was misinterpreted by the other. "It was sufficient for me," said Hooker on one occasion, "to make a request to have it refused." Halleck, on the other hand, was annoyed at the frequent and friendly communication between the President and Hooker. He affected to believe that he had no authority over the general. In a letter to the Secretary of War, dated May 23, he pretended to have no information in regard to the Army of the Potomac since General Hooker assumed command, except that which he had received from the President, "to whom," he says, "General Hooker reports directly." It is hard to determine whether in this case, as in that of Burnside, he refrained from assuming responsibility more from punctilio than from indolence.

Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. I., p. 175.

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W. R. Vol. XXV., Part II., pp. 506, 516.

It cannot be said that the coolness existing between the two generals had as yet affected injuriously the interests of the campaign in progress. General Hooker was moving his force from the line of Aquia to the Potomac with wonderful efficiency and skill. Although the President saw with some regret that no movement was made against the long-stretched flank of Lee's army, it is undeniable

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

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that Hooker was pursuing the wisest course in swinging his army around on the inside of a parallel arc to that occupied by Lee, and in doing this he was only following out the President's clear and judi-

June, 1863. cious orders of the 10th. The march of his army to the Potomac was scarcely less able and successful than his famous movement across the Rappahannock and Rapidan; and on General Halleck's part it does not appear that General Hooker's complaints of malevolent interference were valid.

Generals Heintzelman and Wool were ordered to report to him constantly. He was given full command of their troops, except those specially set apart for the defense of Washington; and all that part of the Middle department east of Cumberland which was commanded by General Schenck was placed under Hooker's direct orders. CH. VIII.

General Hooker's action was never more intelligent and energetic than at this time. He made no mistakes, and he omitted nothing that could properly be done; although he complained of Lee's "cloud of cavalry," which prevented him from obtaining information of his movements, he managed his own cavalry with such vigor and efficiency that the enemy was kept equally in the dark. The superiority of the Confederate cavalry had disappeared with the McClellan regime; from the time Hooker assumed command, and more especially from the hour in which Pleasonton took the mounted force in hand, the Union cavalry began to meet their opponents upon equal terms, and at every encounter where the forces were not disproportionate they gained the advantage. It had been the hope and expectation of Lee to hold the passes of the Bull Run mountains with his cavalry, and behind that living screen to use the east and the west slopes of the Blue Ridge for the march of his army northward; but the energy and skill with which the Union cavalry was managed rendered this plan abortive. At Aldie, at Middleburg, at Thoroughfare Gap, and at every point where the Confederate cavalry appeared, they were attacked by Pleasonton and his subordinates, Gregg, Buford, and Judson Kilpatrick, and driven backward in every fight, June, 1863.

CH. VIII. until at last Stuart retired to Ashby's Gap under the protection of Longstreet's infantry.[1]

But these successes of his cavalry did not tempt Hooker to any imprudent advance upon the flank of the enemy. General Lee says in his report that Longstreet's advance upon the east side of the Blue Ridge, and his occupation of the passes, were for the purpose of drawing Hooker farther from his base; but even the advance of Ewell across the river, and the news of the panic and terror his cruel exactions were exciting among the peaceful farmers of Maryland and Pennsylvania, did not have the desired effect of drawing Hooker away from his well-considered plan. Seeing himself out-manœuvred in this respect, General Lee withdrew Longstreet from the passes and sent him down the valley after Ewell, where Hill had already preceded him.[2] Stuart was left alone to guard the passes of the mountains and to watch the movements of Hooker; the duty assigned him, besides keeping Lee informed of every movement of the Union army, was to worry and harass it as much as possible, and try to delay, or even prevent, its crossing the Potomac. This was a task, as it proved,

1 "The success of the Union cavalry was complete; the moral advantage was as great as the material result; it had attacked the cavalry of the enemy wherever it had met it, and had always in the end had the advantage. The highest proof of the new qualities which it had just revealed is found in the reports of its opponents, who constantly believed they were dealing with forces double their own, while in reality the number of the combatants was about equal on each side."— "History of the Civil War," by the Comte de Paris. Vol. VI., p. 174.

2 "As these demonstrations did not have the effect of causing the Federal army to leave Virginia, and as it did not seem disposed to advance upon the position held by Longstreet, the latter was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, General Hill having already reached the valley."— Lee, Report. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part II., p. 306.

far beyond his powers. He had all he could do to defend himself from harassment and annoyance. Every time he approached the Federal force he was beaten off, and at last, relinquishing all hope of effecting anything against Hooker's moving host, he struck to the eastward and performed his favorite feat of riding around the Union army. He crossed the Potomac at Seneca Creek, captured a train at Rockville, made a long and fatiguing detour at a great distance from the right flank of the National forces, lost his way between York and Carlisle, and after six days of desperate marching and frequent unsuccessful engagements, during which he accomplished little except to weary and cripple a great portion of his command, he joined the main body of Lee on the evening of the 2d of July, too late to be of any real service in the invasion of Pennsylvania.

"By the 24th" (of June), General Lee says, "the progress of Ewell rendered it necessary that the rest of the army should be within supporting distance";[1] he therefore put the columns of Longstreet and Hill at once in movement, and they both crossed the

1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part II., pp. 306, 307.

[1] On the point of crossing the Potomac, General Lee seems to have had for the moment a feeling that his forces might prove insufficient for the daring adventure upon which he was embarked. He wrote on the 23d a letter to Mr. Davis, in which he begged him to send him every man who could be placed at his disposition, and to concentrate at Culpeper all the rest of the forces in Virginia under the command of Beauregard, in the hope that a show of force at that point might have its effect upon the Government at Washington and result in a diversion useful to the Confederate invasion. Mr. Davis wrote in reply that it was impossible to satisfy this demand; that all his generals were making the same requests, and there was no force anywhere to meet them. This letter was captured by Captain Ulric Dahlgren, and, falling into the hands of General Meade, was an encouraging proof of the straits to which the Confederate Government were put in sustaining their invading army. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 76.

Ibid., Part III., p. 925.

CH. VIII. Potomac without opposition, the one at Williamsport, the other at Shepherdstown; and coming together at Hagerstown, they crossed Mason and Dixon's line and encamped for the first time on free
1863. soil near Chambersburg on the 27th of June. On account of the failure of his cavalry, Lee was acting in entire ignorance of Hooker's movements; but with that contempt of his enemy which was one source of strength to him, and a source of weakness as well, he pushed forward, trusting to meet every emergency as it arose. His only fear seems to have been that Hooker might push his forces west of South Mountain, and thus cut off his communications with Virginia. To prevent this he caused Early's division to be sent as far east as possible, hoping by this demonstration to frighten his antagonist away from his own line.

W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part II., p 307.

June, 1863. The march of Ewell had spread the wildest terror and consternation among the rural population on his route. The farmers, who were harvesting their crops, saw the fruits of their year's labor snatched from them in a moment, their horses and cattle driven away, and in the Lower Shenandoah and in Maryland their negro neighbors seized to be sold into slavery in the South. There was a great show of justice and fairness in the orders and proclamations of General Lee; everything seized was to be paid for; but as payment was made in Confederate scrip,[1]

[1] "The people are exceedingly ignorant. . . They think our Confederate money is worth no more than brown paper, and one man sold one hundred and fifty dollars of it for a twenty shilling gold piece. Most refuse to take it, and prefer that you take what you wish without compensation in this form."— Letter in the Richmond "Sentinel," Moore, "Rebellion Record." Vol. VII., Documents, p. 324. They have "lots of Confederate money: carry it in flour barrels."— Meade to Halleck, June 28, 1863.

W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 65.

which was absolutely worthless outside of the rebel lines, it may be thought that General Lee has received more credit than is due to him for this pretense of scrupulosity. His army, as a matter of course, gave a liberal interpretation to his orders. Letters printed in Southern papers from correspondents in the army, treated them as a dead letter, and ridiculed the idea that the starving soldiers of the South should not enjoy the fatness of the enemy's country. All the plunder which was not needed for immediate use was sent down the Cumberland Valley and across the river. The panic-stricken farmers fled in every direction, but principally to the North; the roads were encumbered with melancholy caravans of fugitives bearing their families and their household goods away from the scene of danger, the whites trying to rescue as much of their stores as they could hastily gather together, and the unhappy negroes to save themselves and their families from capture, sale, and lifelong separation. Among the rich cities of central Pennsylvania, and even as far as Philadelphia in the east and Pittsburg in the west, there was great excitement and concern. General Lee was bearing directly upon Harrisburg, a great center of trade and railway transportation, the capture and destruction of which would have inflicted a staggering blow upon the prosperity of the State.[1]

[1] The Richmond "Whig" of the 2d of July, encouraged by a false report of the occupation of Harrisburg by Lee, announced that his first aim would be to cut all the railroad connections, and thus put a stop to the transportation of fuel. His next would be to destroy the costly and not easily replaced machinery of the pits; he might then set fire to the coal mines, withdraw the forces sent out on special duty, and leave the heart of Pennsylvania on fire, never to be quenched until a river should be turned into its pits or

CH. VIII. 1863.

As early as the 15th of June the President, foreseeing this invasion, had called into the service of the United States 100,000 militia from the States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maryland, and West Virginia to serve for six months, unless sooner discharged. The Governors of all these States had promptly responded to this proclamation, and summoned the militia to stated places of rendezvous. The Governors of New York and New Jersey had also called upon their citizens to go to the assistance of their neighbors. These calls were responded to with promptness, and a large number of militia and unorganized bodies of citizens thronged the railroads to the banks of the Susquehanna. It is probable that they would not have offered much resistance to the disciplined army of Lee, but the show of force which they made was doubtless of service in checking his advance.

None of his forces crossed the river. Ewell's corps took possession of the city of Carlisle, and a division under Early was sent to York, which it occupied on the 28th of June; he laid that place under heavy contribution, demanding one hundred thousand dollars in cash and a large amount of provisions and clothing, in consideration of which he kindly refrained from destroying the town.[1] The bridge over the Susquehanna at Co-

1863.

Early, Report, Aug. 22, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part II., pp. 466, 467.

the vast supply of coal was reduced into ashes. The anthracite coal was found in large quantities in no other part of the world but Pennsylvania, enormous quantities were used in the United States navy, the countless workshops and manufactories of the North, in the river boats, and even upon locomotives. All that was needed was to seize the anthracite fields, destroy the roads and the machinery of the pits, set fire to the mines, and leave them. Northern industry would thus be paralyzed at a single blow.

[1] General Early, on leaving the town, issued a magniloquent address to the citizens, calling upon them to recognize his

lumbia was destroyed just before the Confederate cavalry reached it. A system of fortifications was hastily thrown up south of the Susquehanna at Harrisburg. But the force of militia under General Couch — though it was not called into actual battle — was probably more effective than these works in preventing an attack upon that city. This state of excitement and terror in the peaceful towns and villages of Pennsylvania found its *contre-coup* in the city of Richmond. The demonstration made by the Union forces under General Dix threw the Confederate capital into great panic; the entire male population was called to the defense of the works, and it was even proposed to call boys from twelve to eighteen into the service. The forces under Colonel Spears destroyed the bridge over the South Anna, and among other captures brought in General W. F. Lee and a less valuable prize of $15,000 in Confederate bonds, taken from an agent of the Richmond Government.

Richmond "Sentinel," June 20.

The operations of Pleasonton having brushed the enemy entirely out of Loudon County and given General Hooker control of the Potomac below Harper's Ferry, he was able to choose at perfect leisure his time and place for crossing the

lenity in not burning their town. "Had I applied the torch," he said, "without regard to the consequences, I would have pursued a course that would have been fully vindicated as an act of just retaliation for the unparalleled acts of brutality perpetrated by your own army on our soil. But we do not war upon women and children, and I trust the treatment you have met with at the hands of my soldiers will open your eyes to the odious tyranny under which, it is apparent to all, you are groaning." Some hundreds of Southern cities were, at the moment this preposterous document was issued, resting in peace and security under the flag of the United States.

Moore, "Rebellion Record." Vol. VII., Documents, p. 328.



POSITIONS JUNE 28, 1863.

river. He waited until Lee's whole army was on the north side, and then crossed at Edwards's Ferry. He directed General Reynolds to seize the passes of the South Mountain so as not only to anticipate the enemy in their possession, but also to confine him to a single line of invasion west of those hills. He then directed Reynolds with the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps to take position at Middle-

town. He determined at once to strike the point where General Lee was most sensitive, to push a strong column directly west upon his line of communications, and to keep the rest of his army in position to support it. The feeling of grievance which he had towards General Halleck had not for a moment influenced his action or impeded his zealous activity; but the feeling remained; and on the 27th, just before leaving Poolesville to make a personal inspection of the post of Harper's Ferry, he telegraphed to the general-in-chief, somewhat in the old familiar tone of McClellan before a battle, that his whole force of enlisted men for duty would not exceed 105,000, adding that he stated these facts so that more might not be expected of him than he had material to do with.

CH. VIII.

June, 1863.

W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 59.

He had previously sent General Butterfield, his chief of staff, to Washington and Baltimore in the hope of organizing a strong movable corps to reënforce him on his crossing. At Washington General Halleck had assured him that there was not a man who could be spared from the defense of the city, and at Baltimore General Schenck, with all the good-will possible, could only raise a force of 2100. His scouts and spies were continually bringing him information of the strength of Lee's army, and, as usual in such cases, their estimates were much exaggerated. There was no soldier in our army of stouter heart than Hooker, and he seemed in this campaign to have recovered all that keenness of insight and steadiness of judgment which was obscured for a while at Chancellorsville. Nevertheless it is clear that a feeling of something like despondency attacked him after he

CH. VIII. had transported his army across the Potomac. He seemed to feel that too much was expected of him; that anything but the most brilliant successes would be viewed in the disparaging light of Chancellorsville; that the country demanded that he should not only protect the capital, but destroy the rebel army; and in view of the impression he had received as to Lee's superior numbers he began to think that such a task might not be possible with the force he had.[1]

In this frame of mind he wished to dispose absolutely of every man within his reach, and it seemed a personal affront to him if any troops he asked for were withheld from him. Before starting for Harper's Ferry he sent a dispatch to General Halleck, asking if there were any reason why Maryland Heights could not be abandoned after the public stores and property were removed; and, after going to that point, his conviction was confirmed that the large force there was utterly wasted for any practical purpose. His plan was to march the Twelfth Corps in that direction, to join to them the garrison of Maryland Heights, and with this considerable force to move upon Lee's rear; to destroy his bridges if there were any left; and to drive away his guard and intercept the opulent flow of stores, grain, horses, and cattle which Ewell was pouring down the Cumberland Valley into Virginia.

Hooker, Testimony, Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. I., p. 173.

[1] "It was expected of me by the country that I would not only whip the army of the enemy but prevent it from escaping. This I considered too much for the authorities to expect with the force I had. It may be very easy for one man to whip another of corresponding strength, but to do that and at the same time prevent the other from running away requires in my judgment a little superiority of one over the other."



GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE.

On the ground, he could see more clearly than ever that the troops there were useless; they guarded no ford of the Potomac; the place was not in itself defensible; its sole apparent purpose was to protect a railroad bridge; the engineer in charge, Colonel Reynolds, agreed with him that if it were ever of any use it was certainly useless now, when the rebel army had passed above it in force. As General Hooker afterwards said, "Even if it were the key to Maryland, of what value was the key after the door was smashed in?" He sat down to write an order for the abandonment of the post when to his deep disappointment he received a dispatch from General Halleck, saying, "Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them. I cannot approve their abandonment except in case of absolute necessity." General Hooker immediately replied reiterating his conviction that the troops were wasted there; that even if the works were abandoned no enemy would ever take possession of them; that under present circumstances the force left there was merely a bait for the rebels should they return. But no such reply as this, no mere expression of his opinion could satisfy the deep feeling of resentment and disappointment with which he received General Halleck's dispatch. He wrote and sent, at the same moment, another telegram saying that he was unable with the means at his disposal to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington, and to fight an enemy in his front of more than his numbers; he therefore requested to be at once relieved from the position he occupied.

Halleck to Hooker, June 27, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 59.

Hooker to Halleck. Ibid., p. 60.

Ibid.

CH. VIII.

It will always be impossible to say whether General Hooker intended to be taken at his word. We believe he never gave the slightest intimation that he intended to allow the Government the alternative of yielding to his wishes or accepting his resignation. But the situation was so critical and time was so precious that none could be lost in parley or delay. General James A. Hardie was at once dispatched to the headquarters of the army with a message relieving General Hooker, at his own request, and appointing in his place General George Gordon Meade, commanding the Fifth Corps.

Townsend, Orders, June 27, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part III., p. 369.

General Meade had served with distinction on almost every battlefield of the Army of the Potomac. He enjoyed the respect and esteem of all its officers and men, with perhaps the sole exception of his predecessor. For as, when Burnside was deposed, the person most ungrateful to his feelings was put in his place, so now by a strange caprice of fortune, Hooker himself was to drain the cup he had made so bitter for Burnside, and was to hand over the baton of command to his most conspicuous critic. Ever since the battle of Chancellorsville the relations between the two officers had been so unfriendly that when Hardie arrived at Meade's tent with an official envelope and a look of unusual solemnity, the latter thought it was an order of arrest for himself. Meade was a tall, thin, reserved man, very near-sighted, with the air of the student rather than of the sabreur. He had none of the genial gifts and graces which were in different ways possessed by all of those who had preceded him in command. But he was well known as an able and energetic soldier, of approved courage and calm

judgment in difficult circumstances; and it is an evidence of his own worth and of the splendid moral qualities of the great army he commanded, that this perilous change, made in a moment of supreme importance, was accepted both by him and his soldiery without an instant of confusion or hesitation. They went on in the line of duty without breaking step, without a tremor of the pulse. Hooker gave his congratulations in his usual hearty and chivalrous manner; he complimented Meade in general orders as "a brave and accomplished officer, who has nobly earned the confidence and esteem of this army on many a well-fought field." He took leave of his comrades in touching and generous words, and then rode away from the Army of the Potomac forever.[1]

Hooker, Orders, June 28, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part III., p. 373.

One cannot help a feeling of regret at this sudden termination of Hooker's command. He had never exhibited more vigor and ability, more insight and capacity, than in this fortnight which preceded his resignation. Every step of the way from Falmouth to Frederick he had shown the finest qualities of generalship; he had known when to move and when to halt, when to strike and when to refrain from striking. When he was relieved he was on his way

[1] He reported for orders from Baltimore, and receiving no reply made a visit to Washington, when he was placed under arrest for visiting the capital without leave — a proceeding entirely legal but most ungracious. Later he applied to the President to assign him to duty in a subordinate capacity with the Army of the Potomac. This the President was anxious to do, and Meade at first consented with apparent cordiality. Afterwards, however, he gave the President to understand that he did not wish the assignment made,— which, it must be admitted was natural enough,— and the President in some embarrassment was forced to make this known to Hooker; for whom he was able after a while to arrange a command in the West, where he gained new laurels in the battles about Chattanooga.

CH. VIII. to the very point where Lee considered his armor the weakest. If he had remained in command, with his clearness of vision and boldness of planning, joined with that impetuosity of attack which he showed on every occasion, except once in his life, it is easy to imagine what splendid results he might have accomplished for the cause he had so intensely at heart. But when, on the other hand, we reflect how feebly he concluded at Chancellorsville the work he had so magnificently begun, how suddenly and unaccountably the daring will, the brilliant intellect, of the 30th of April, became clouded with doubt and hesitation the next day, and passed into disastrous eclipse on the 3d of May, we cannot but admit that the President was right in taking alarm at the querulous tone of his dispatches from Poolesville and Harper's Ferry, and in concluding that a general who resigns his commission on the eve of battle should always have his resignation accepted, let the consequences be what they may.

CHAPTER IX

GETTYSBURG

GENERAL MEADE assumed command of the Army of the Potomac in an order which was equally free from humility and bluster. "It is with just diffidence," he said, "that I relieve in the command of this army an eminent and accomplished soldier whose name must ever appear conspicuous in the history of its achievements; but I rely upon the hearty support of my companions in arms to assist me in the discharge of the duties of the important trust which has been confided to me." To General Halleck he simply acknowledged the receipt of the order placing him in command. "As a soldier, I obey it," he said, "and to the utmost of my ability will execute it." He very briefly announced his general intention to be to "move toward the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy is checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, or if he turns towards Baltimore, to give him battle." He asked permission, not, as Hooker did, to abandon Harper's Ferry, but to withdraw a portion of its garrison, leaving enough to hold Maryland Heights against a *coup-de-main;* in this shape the request met with more favorable consideration from the general-in-

1863.

June 28, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part III., p. 374.

Meade to Halleck, June 28, 1863. Ibid., p. 61.



POSITIONS JUNE 29, 1863.


HARRISBURG
Columbia
Wrightsville
York
Hanover Junction
Jefferson
Mechanicsburg
Dover
Dillsburg
Kingston
Carlisle
Mt. Holly
East Berlin
Hanover
Littlestown
Heidlersburg
Gettysburg
Cashtown
Greenwood
Fairfield
Emmitsburg
Taneytown
Manchester
Union Mills
Westminster
Pipe Creek
Johnsville
Reisterstown
Liberry
Mt. Airy
Hood's Mill
Sykesville
Cooksville
Frederick
Middletown
Oakville
Shippensburg
Newland
Chambersburg
Marion
Greencastle
Mercersburg
Hagerstown
Williamsport
Falling Waters
Boonsborough
Sharpsburg
Shepherdstown
Harper's Ferry
Martinsburg
Hancock
McConnellsburg
PENNSYLVANIA
MARYLAND
WEST VIRGINIA
BALTIMORE
Relay
Elkridge
Ellicott's Mills
Woodstock
Point of Rocks
Berlin
Petersville
Jefferson
Knoxville
Sandy Hook
Potomac R.
Antietam Cr.
Conococheague Cr.
Monocacy R.
Patapsco R.
Gunpowder R.
Susquehanna R.
Juniata R.
Cumberland Valley R.R.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
Northern Central R.R.
Western Maryland R.R.
Pennsylvania R.R.
Chesapeake & Ohio Canal
Ohio R.R.
Potomac R.
Cumberland
Pittsburg
Philadelphia
Baltimore
Washington
Harrisburg
Gettysburg
Hanover
Frederick
Hagerstown
Chambersburg
Carlisle
York
Columbia
Lancaster
Reading
Wilmington
Delaware
Maryland
Virginia
West Virginia
Pennsylvania
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Kentucky
Tennessee
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Alabama
Mississippi
Louisiana
Texas
Arkansas
Missouri
Illinois
Indiana
Michigan
Wisconsin
Iowa
Minnesota
Kansas
Nebraska
Colorado
Utah
Nevada
California
Oregon
Washington
Idaho
Montana
Wyoming
North Dakota
South Dakota
New Mexico
Arizona
Oklahoma
Indian Territory
Alaska
Hawaii
Cuba
Mexico
Canada
Atlantic Ocean
Pacific Ocean
Gulf of Mexico
Hudson Bay
Great Lakes
Mississippi River
Missouri River
Rocky Mountains
Appalachian Mountains
Sierra Nevada
Cascade Range
Coast Range
Yellowstone National Park
Grand Canyon
Niagara Falls
Mount Rainier
Mount Shasta
Mount Whitney
Death Valley
Salton Sea
Great Salt Lake
Yellowstone Lake
Crater Lake
Lake Tahoe
Lake Michigan
Lake Superior
Lake Huron
Lake Erie
Lake Ontario
Lake Champlain
Lake George
Lake Winnipesaukee
Lake Memphremagog
Lake Okeechobee
Lake Pontchartrain
Lake Maracaibo
Lake Titicaca
Lake Nicaragua
Lake Managua
Lake Chapala
Lake Texcoco
Lake Xochimilco
Lake Patzcuaro
Lake Chalco
Lake Tezcu

CHAP. IX. chief, and he left the disposition to be made of the garrison to Meade's discretion. The new general made no change in the administration of his army; he retained, for the time being, General Hooker's staff; he asked that three meritorious young captains of cavalry, Farnsworth, Custer, and Merritt, all recommended by General Pleasonton, and two of them doomed to the death of soldiers in the flower of their youth, should be made brigadier-generals — which was at once done. The authorities at Washington placed all their resources freely in his hands. He had nothing to do but go forward and find and fight the enemy. He had, on his part, no desire to

June, 1863. do anything else. On the 29th he placed his army in motion for the North, with a front stretching across thirty miles of country, his cavalry guarding his flanks and rear. His intention remained the same as that of the day before: if Lee moved for Baltimore, to get between his main army and that place; if he should attempt to cross the Susquehanna, Meade relied upon General Couch, with his force, to hold him until the Army of the Potomac could fall upon his rear. With this general plan he moved steadily northward as rapidly as possible, his corps spread out like a fan upon the diverging roads, keeping them well in hand, so that they might rapidly concentrate, whenever necessary, to meet an attack of the enemy or to fall upon any detached portion of his force which they might encounter.

June, 1863. It was not until the evening of the 28th, while preparing to march upon Harrisburg, that General Lee became aware that the Army of the Potomac had crossed into Maryland. By detaching his cav-

alry in every direction he had deprived himself of his usual means of information. Stuart was far to the east on a useless chase. Imboden in the west had been busily engaged in breaking up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and damaging, as far as possible, the Chesapeake Canal, and now, although ordered to join the army by way of McConnellsburg, was still entirely out of reach. It was only through a scout that the Confederate General learned that the Federal army was advancing northward, and that the head of the column was menacing his communications with the Potomac. Even this news, when it reached him, was more than twenty-four hours old, and when he resolved to concentrate his army on the east side of the mountains for the purpose of diverting the supposed westward Federal movement, that movement had been already abandoned, and Meade was moving with the greatest rapidity in the very direction which Lee desired to have him take. CHAP. IX.

While Longstreet and Hill, in pursuance of Lee's orders, were marching east through the mountains to Gettysburg, while Early was hastening back from York to join Ewell, and the latter was leading his corps from Carlisle to the general rendezvous, General Meade was pushing his entire army in a direction almost perpendicular to the Confederate line of march. Each general, while manœuvring with boldness and energy, was determined, when the time for actual battle should come, to accept only a tactical defensive attitude. Lee had given a positive promise to his corps commanders that he would not attack the Army of the Potomac, nor accept its gage of battle unless under favorable

CHAP. IX. conditions. General Meade, after his victory, frankly stated that it was his desire to receive the attack of the enemy and fight a defensive rather than an offensive battle, being satisfied that such a course offered the better chance of success. But, in spite of these prudent intentions upon both sides, these two formidable armies were approaching each other at their utmost speed all through the day of the 30th of June, driven by the irresistible laws of human action — or, let us reverently say, by the hand of Providence — as unconscious of their point of meeting as two great thunder-clouds, big with incalculable lightnings, lashed across the skies by tempestuous winds.

Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. I., p. 439.

1863.

On the evening of the 30th, Meade's army, still kept well in hand, had advanced until his left wing, the First Corps, had crossed the Pennsylvania line, resting at Marsh Creek a few miles south of Gettysburg; the extreme right, the Sixth Corps, was at Manchester in Maryland, over thirty miles away; the Eleventh Corps was at Emmitsburg, where the Third arrived in the night, the Second at Uniontown, the Fifth at Union Mills, and the Twelfth at Littlestown.

General Meade was by this time convinced that the enemy was aware of his movement; that he had loosed his hold upon the Susquehanna; and was drawing in all his detachments to the main body for a movement in force upon some other point; he did not know precisely when or where the blow would fall, but he determined that if possible he would receive the onslaught of the enemy on ground chosen by himself, where he might fight a defensive battle with every attainable advantage.

Meade therefore sent out to all his corps commanders on the night of the 30th of June [after midnight, for the order is dated on the 1st of July], a circular informing them that Harrisburg was relieved, and that the prospect of an invasion of Pennsylvania beyond the Susquehanna was at an end; he accordingly announced his intention to withdraw the army from its present position, and to form a line of battle with the left resting in the neighborhood of Middleburg and the right at Manchester, the general direction being along Pipe Creek. He followed this with specific directions as to the course to be taken by each one of the corps. This choice of Pipe Creek as a line for defensive battle had been made after careful surveys by members of the engineer corps. The army was in such position on the morning of the 1st that this concentration could have been easily and rapidly made. The objection to it was obvious; the soldiers who were marching towards the enemy in high spirits and eager to meet him, could not but suffer a certain loss of morale in this sudden change to a retrograde movement; but the advantages of the line he had selected were, in the general's opinion, a sufficient compensation.

CHAP. IX.

July, 1863.

The wisdom of this purpose of General Meade's will doubtless be a subject of curious discussion among military men for many years to come. If the order had been given a few hours earlier, or if the army of Lee, marching through the defiles of the mountain, had been more expeditious, the waters of the peaceful rivulet, which Meade had selected for his line of battle, would have reflected that evening the blaze of thousands of camp-fires,

CHAP. IX. and the hills upon its border would have been lifted with the dawn of the next day into the most luminous blaze of fame. But this baleful glory was not reserved for Pipe Creek. The little town of Gettysburg, which, while that order of Meade's was written, lay sleeping in quiet obscurity among the hills of Pennsylvania, was destined to the terrors and the honors of the greatest battlefield of the New World.

Thus while Meade was sending his advance to occupy Gettysburg, it was with no thought of fighting there; it seemed to him merely a point from which to observe and occupy the enemy's advance and to mask his own movement to what seemed to him a better line in the rear. To Lee, although he did not expect to find his enemy there, the place was of far more importance. It was not only almost equidistant from Chambersburg, Carlisle, and York, and for that reason the most convenient point for the concentration of his scattered army, but it was the center of all the important roads of the region, which radiated from it on every side like the spokes from a hub. The possession of it was necessary to give him freedom of decision and of action in advancing to the East, or retreating to the West or South.

Gettysburg lies in a peaceful pastoral region, the county-seat of Adams County. Ten miles on the west the blue wall of the South Mountain range closes the view, while the entire landscape is wrinkled by parallel lines of lower ranges of hills. A little more than a mile west of the town two of these ridges are separated by a fertile valley, through which a brook meanders called Willoughby's Run.

It is crossed by the diverging lines of the Chambersburg and Hagerstown roads, the former inclining to the north, the latter to the south. The range of wooded hills between the brook and the town, running almost unbroken for several miles north and south, is called Oak Hill to the north of these roads, and Seminary Ridge to the south, the latter name being given from a Lutheran seminary which occupies a gentle acclivity between the roads not far from the point where they meet and enter the town. Due south of Gettysburg, on a hill between the Baltimore and Taneytown roads, is a cemetery where the forefathers of the hamlet sleep; the range begins in a rocky cliff called Culp's Hill, which rising above the winding stream of Rock Creek, east of the town, runs north and west, presenting a bold front to the town for a thousand yards, and is prolonged in a southerly direction for about three miles, ending abruptly in a bold conical rock, called Round Top, which dominates the country for leagues around; on the northern slope of this tower-like hill is a smaller spur of the same character called Little Round Top. The range runs parallel to Seminary Ridge, which lies a mile and a half to the west; between them is a highly cultivated valley filled with grain-fields and orchards, dotted with thrifty Pennsylvanian farm-houses and barns. In the midst of this valley there is a lower intermediate ridge, along which runs the road to Emmitsburg. No soldier could look at this range of hills without recognizing its remarkable advantages for a great defensive battle; it was a cyclopean fortress, framed for its purpose before the birth of man. At its northern extremity, the curve to the east and

CHAP. IX. south, crowned by the salient of Culp's Hill, guarded that flank; the Round Tops formed a redoubtable bastion on the south, and between them the hill was battlemented with a chaos of boulders. The Taneytown road wound just below the crest, and the Baltimore road, at the foot of the eastern slope, afforded a perfect service of transportation for the defense; and in front, the gentle slope and the cultivated fields furnished, as Hooker would have said, "elbow-room" for fighting, such as neither army had as yet ever beheld.

Of course not all these advantages could be at once perceived by a cavalier riding by in the dust of a column on the march. But enough was seen to inspire to heroic effort, and nerve to heroic death, the peerless soldier who dashed up the Emmitsburg road in hot haste on the morning of the
1863. first of July. General John F. Reynolds — the noblest sacrifice offered up on that ensanguined field — was in command of the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps, the left grand division of Meade's army. He had been ordered to Gettysburg to observe the enemy and to mask the retrograde movement to Pipe Creek. His advance, the First Corps, was four miles south of there; the others at Emmitsburg and Taneytown, twice and three times as far. They all had their orders for the movement to the right and rear. But hearing from Buford early in the morning that the enemy was in his front in considerable force, Reynolds ordered the First Corps forward with all possible speed, sent for the other two to join him, and rode ahead with his own pickets, impelled not only by his soldierly spirit, but also by the feelings of a patriotic

Pennsylvanian repelling an invasion of his native State. CHAP. IX.

Arriving at the seminary, west of the town, he met General Buford, and was immediately informed of the situation of affairs. Buford had taken possession of Gettysburg the day before, throwing his pickets well out along the Chambersburg road. There they had encountered the advance of Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's division and Hill's corps; Pettigrew, not suspecting the presence of an enemy, was coming into Gettysburg with the prosaic purpose of plundering the shoe-stores, the foot-gear of his men having gone to pieces in the sharp marching of the last fortnight; meeting Buford, he retired, without making any resistance, to Cashtown. Buford, knowing that this respite was only momentary, prepared to withstand the advance which was sure to come, and did come the next morning. Alone, with his two brigades of cavalry, he valiantly held the line of Willoughby's Run, until Reynolds came to the rescue with Wadsworth's division, the rest of the First Corps under General Doubleday, who galloped on in front of his own advance, coming up soon afterwards. Reynolds found Buford anxiously surveying the field from the belfry of the Lutheran seminary, and only a moment's conference between these two thorough soldiers was needed to determine the morning's work. The enemy was there. The place for the great battle was just behind them; their duty was to hold back the oncoming wave of Lee's forces until Meade could concentrate the Army of the Potomac to meet it. In a case so clear, the letter of his July 1, 1863.

CHAP. IX. orders mattered little to a man like Reynolds. His duty was under his eyes, clearer and more sacred than anything written upon paper could be. He was the lifelong friend and comrade of Meade; they had commanded brigades together in McCall's division, and had risen step by step to be first and second in command of the Army of the Potomac; he felt sure Meade would approve his action, and resolved to make his fight there. He was as ready to sacrifice his life as his orders.

The enemy were approaching in great force on the western side of Willoughby's Run, consisting of Heth's division of four brigades, and Reynolds at once made his preparations to meet them. There was a bit of woods just east of Willoughby's Run midway between the two roads, and both sides rushed to seize it. Reynolds had just sent an order to Doubleday, "Hold on to the Hagerstown road, and I will take care of this one" — the Chambersburg road, on which he had posted Cutler's brigade; he was watching Solomon Meredith's "Iron brigade" enter the woods on one side and James J. Archer's Confederates going in on the other when he was
July 1, 1863. shot dead by a bullet through the brain. Doubleday, who had been placed temporarily in command of the First Corps, now took charge of the field, and the fighting began in earnest. At first it was favorable to the Union arms. Wadsworth on the right captured Archer and a considerable portion of his brigade. On the left the attacking force was caught in a railroad cut beside the Chambersburg road, and a large number were killed and taken. Wadsworth's division held the field until about eleven o'clock, when the rest of the First Corps

GENERAL JOHN F. REYNOLDS.



POSITIONS AT 3:30 AND ABOUT 4 P. M. JULY 1, 1863.

CHAP. IX. came up with a good supply of artillery. The Confederates, largely reënforced, were still pressing them severely when General Howard arrived with the Eleventh Corps and, by virtue of his rank, assumed direction of the engagement, Major-General Schurz commanding the Eleventh Corps, and Doubleday remaining in command of the First.

Howard immediately deployed his entire force to the west and north of the town, his left assisting Doubleday to hold the two roads on the west and his right preparing to meet the attack of Ewell, who was now in sight on the Carlisle road. But his line was too extended; he attempted to cover too much; while the Eleventh Corps was hotly engaged along its entire front, Early came up on the right and attacked with a vigor there was no resisting; the gallant General Francis C. Barlow fell severely wounded, his division, which held the right, gave way; the damage could not be repaired, as the enemy had the superiority both of position and of numbers. Howard's troops were driven into Gettysburg, and the First Corps, thus left unsupported, were compelled to retire also, which they did slowly and with unbroken spirit; the enemy took advantage of the confusion of the retreat through the town, and, pressing closely upon the disordered Union right, they did great damage and made large captures. Before this, however, General Howard had occupied the hill on which the cemetery stood with Steinwehr's division, and as the retreating troops poured eastward from the town on the Baltimore and Taneytown roads, they were at once taken in charge and posted in advantageous positions: the First Corps was placed on

the left, and the Eleventh on the right. Between half-past three and four o'clock,[1] while order was rapidly being established among these broken corps, General Hancock arrived on the field and, by Meade's orders, assumed command. His presence immediately exerted a remarkable calming and encouraging effect. All accounts agree as to the extraordinary influence wielded by Hancock upon the battlefield, an influence not wholly attributable to prestige or to great intellectual power. The vague phrase "personal magnetism" is the one most frequently chosen by observers to express it. He was then in the flower of his youth, a man of singularly handsome presence, tall and stalwart, with the eye and profile of an eagle, a strong voice, and a manner expressive throughout of soldierly resolution and ardor. His arrival alone, at that critical moment, was like the reënforcement of an army corps. CHAP. IX.

It was a happy thought of General Meade to send Hancock forward in advance of his corps. As late as noon on the 1st, Meade had no thought of a great battle beginning that day. He wrote to Halleck at twelve o'clock, "the news proves my advance has answered its purpose. I shall not advance any, but prepare to receive an attack, in case Lee makes one. A battlefield is being selected to the rear, on which the army can be rapidly concentrated, on Pipe Creek, between Middleburg and Manchester, covering my depot at Westminster. If I am not attacked, and I can from reliable intelligence have reason to believe I can attack with reasonable degree of success, I will do so; but at present, hav- July, 1863.

[1] Hancock says 3:30; Howard says 4 or 4:30.

CHAP. IX.

ing relieved the pressure on the Susquehanna, I am now looking to the protection of Washington and fighting my army to the best advantage." But an hour later he added to this dispatch: "The enemy are advancing in force on Gettysburg, and I expect the battle will begin to-day." The battle had, as we have seen, already begun, Reynolds had made the precious sacrifice of his own life, and General Howard had sent back to headquarters an impressive account of the evil course of affairs and an urgent request for immediate assistance. General Meade's action upon this intelligence was prompt and decided; he did not for an instant hesitate as to the course he should pursue; he had been but three days in command of his army, yet in the midst of these trying circumstances he rose readily to the full height of his responsibility. His own orders issued that morning for the withdrawal to the chosen line of battle in the rear became at once as obsolete, in his own mind, as if they had been issued by Julius Cæsar; he instantly sent Hancock to the front, and at six o'clock in the afternoon, before receiving the reports from his lieutenants at Gettysburg, he telegraphed to Washington that his whole army was in motion towards that place; that although he was not certain of the exact position of all the enemy's force he hoped to defeat Hill and Ewell if Longstreet should not have joined them the next day, and that at all events he saw no other course than to hazard a general battle.

Meade to Halleck, July 1, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII. Part I., pp. 70, 71.

W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 72.

Hancock occupied the northern crotchet of the cemetery range with what troops were available; Wadsworth's division was placed on the extreme right at Culp's Hill, the Eleventh Corps guarding

the heights in front of Gettysburg and the Second Corps extending as far as it would reach to the left, where it was supported by Sickles's dusty and travel-stained veterans, who had come in haste from Emmitsburg. He then gave up the command to Slocum, who had just arrived, and who ranked every one present, and mounting his horse galloped back to Meade at Taneytown, prepared to urge in the strongest possible language the advantages of Gettysburg as the field for battle. But he found that no such persuasion was necessary and that Meade had already resolved to accept the field which the ordainment of events presented to him. The whole army, inspired by the same martial impulse, was marching to the scene of conflict with or without orders. Sickles was at Emmitsburg when he received the dispatch from Howard informing him of the desperate contest in which the advance was engaged. His position was such as to give him the keenest anxiety; he had been on his march to Gettysburg when he received the order withdrawing the army to Pipe Creek, and while preparing to obey that summons there came this new and pressing appeal from Howard. Meade was ten miles away; Sickles resolved to waste not another minute in asking more definite instructions, but forced his column of wearied, and many of them barefooted, soldiers at their utmost speed to Gettysburg. He arrived there while Hancock was making his hurried preparations for the defense of the hill, and by his orders the Third Corps was posted on the left of the ridge. All night, by every road, the troops came streaming in; part of the Third Corps and all of the Twelfth had arrived

CHAP. IX.

Sickles, Testimony, Report Committee on Conduct of the War. Part I., p. 296.

July 1, 1863.

CHAP. IX. before nightfall, and from sunset till morning the rest were marching to their places under the light of the full moon. Meade himself came upon the July 2, 1863. field at one o'clock in the morning, a pale, tired-looking, hollow-eyed man, worn with toil and lack of sleep, with little of the appearance of a conventional hero about him, but stout in heart and clear in mind.

General Lee had arrived upon the battlefield on the afternoon of the 1st in time to witness the final success of his troops. He ascended a commanding point upon Seminary Ridge and carefully studied the position assumed by the Army of the Potomac. Its strength was at once apparent to him, and he was evidently impressed by the steady attitude of the Union troops, and concluded not to order a general attack that evening. He sent a suggestion to General Ewell to carry Cemetery Hill, if he thought such a movement was practicable, but he was warned against bringing on a general engagement until the arrival of the rest of his force. Ewell took advantage of the discretion allowed him and awaited the arrival of General Edward Johnson, so that all the latter part of the afternoon was left to Howard and Hancock, and after them to Slocum, to make their preparations for the coming conflict undisturbed.

This was undoubtedly one of the most serious errors committed by General Lee in his campaign; his force was at the moment superior to that of the Federals; they were, besides, flushed with a great success which had been easily won, and his chances of carrying Cemetery Hill were greater at four o'clock on Wednesday than at any

time afterwards; but, so far as can be judged from his excessively brief and dry report of this campaign, it is altogether probable that up to that moment Lee had not made up his mind to attack the Army of the Potomac at all. He himself says: "It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base unless attacked by the enemy"; and the only reason he gives for following up the good fortune of the 1st of July was the difficulty of withdrawing his large trains through the mountains. The reason was not a valid one, as was shown by the ease with which he withdrew his trains after his defeat; the simple truth was, he imagined he saw a great victory in his grasp, and the mighty temptation was too much for his usual calm judgment. He was not forced by any purely military reason to attack the army posted on Cemetery Hill. It was entirely in his power, following the advice of Longstreet, the ablest general in his army, to move by the right flank upon the Emmitsburg road, and marching upon Frederick to manœuvre Meade out of his position. This move would certainly have succeeded; for General Meade, so late as three o'clock on the 2d, telegraphed to Halleck: "If I find it hazardous to [attack] or am satisfied the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back to my supplies at Westminster." It is, perhaps, too much to expect of any general, in the position in which Lee found himself, after a partial victory on the 1st, to follow such prudent counsel. The appetite whetted by the taste of blood demanded more immediate gratification. A victory at Gettysburg offered so splendid

Lee, Report, July 31, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part II., p. 308.

July, 1863.

W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 72.

CHAP. IX.

a vista of both use and glory that he was willing to stake everything upon it. "In view of the valuable results," he says, "that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade it was thought advisable to renew the attack."

W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part II., p. 308.

It was General Meade's intention to forestall the attack of his adversary by assaulting the Confederate lines at an early hour in the morning. He ordered Slocum to prepare with his own corps and the Fifth to make a vigorous attack upon Ewell near the extreme left of his line; but General Slocum and General Warren, Chief of Engineers, having reconnoitered the position and having reported against an attack, General Meade abandoned that intention and concluded to wait for the arrival of the Sixth Corps, and then to move the Fifth to the left, and if the enemy still delayed action to attack the Confederate right.[1]

July, 1863.

On the morning of the 2d Meade disposed his host in the following order: The Twelfth Corps,

[1] There is a voluminous and painful controversy on record between General Meade and General Butterfield, his chief-of-staff at Gettysburg. General Butterfield asserts with the utmost positiveness that Meade intended to retreat on the 2d of July, and that he, as chief-of-staff, had made out a programme for the withdrawal of the troops from Gettysburg, in accordance with Meade's orders. General Meade, with the greatest solemnity and definiteness, contradicts this statement. The issue of veracity seems to us only apparent. Both officers were able, earnest, and brave soldiers. General Meade probably requested General Butterfield, in view of the doubtful results of the battle which was imminent, to be prepared with a plan of orderly retreat, in case the battle went against him, and General Butterfield doubtless assumed that this order was given by General Meade, in expectation of a retreat. Those officers of the army who have taken part in this controversy are divided, according to their respective intimate relations with General Hooker and General Meade. It is probable that disinterested students of the history of those days will prefer to take neither side of the dispute.

under Slocum, held the extreme right on Culp's Hill, and Howard, with the Eleventh, still held the Cemetery, Wadsworth's division being placed between them; the crest of the Cemetery Ridge was occupied by the Second Corps, under Hancock, with Sickles commanding the Third Corps on his left; the Fifth Corps formed the reserve on the right; the Sixth, which, under Sedgwick, was marching in all haste to the field, did not arrive till afternoon. About a mile distant from the Union lines Lee's army swept in a wide curve from Benner's Hill, on the east of Gettysburg, to the high ground in front of the Round Tops; Ewell held the Confederate left, Hill the center, and Longstreet's troops, which were last to arrive, were posted on the extreme right.

CHAP. IX. July 2, 1863.

It was intended by General Meade that Sickles should prolong the line of Hancock to the left. Orders to this effect were given in general terms and without any inspection of the ground; so that when Sickles came on the morning of the 2d to establish his line of battle he found himself in low and, to his eye, untenable ground, which was commanded by the Emmitsburg road running along the ridge some three-quarters of a mile in his front, the ground between being much broken and furnishing cover at every point for an enemy's advance. He represented these facts to Meade and asked for more definite orders, which Meade at the time was too busy to give him, but sent General Henry J. Hunt, his chief of artillery, to look at the ground. General Hunt agreed with General Sickles that he would better his position by advancing his line towards the

CHAP. IX. Emmitsburg road,[1] which he at once proceeded to do. He advanced his two divisions to the higher ground in front of him, placing General Humphreys to the right and Birney to the left, the lines of the two divisions forming an angle at a point near the Emmitsburg road called the Peach Orchard, Humphreys's right being a considerable distance in front of Hancock's left, and Birney's left resting at the base of Little Round Top. It was a dangerous position, and entirely untenable if the Third Corps were to be left to itself, but with the assistance of reënforcements from the Fifth Corps on the left and from Hancock on the right General Sickles thought it could be held.[2] After the troops were in position General Meade came upon the ground, rather tardily, and as soon as he saw the state of affairs he disapproved the action of General Sickles. But it was then too late to change the disposition which had been made, for even while the two generals were discussing the matter the enemy's artillery opened from the woods near the Peach Orchard, and a furious assault began from Hood's division upon the refused line of Sickles's corps running from the Peach Orchard to Round Top.

[1] General Sickles made this statement in his evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War.—Report, 1865, Vol. I., p. 298. General Hunt says that while he considered the position a good line to occupy, in itself, he declined advising positively, on the ground that he did not know General Meade's intentions for the whole field.— See also "Battles and Leaders." Vol. III., p. 302.

[2] A passage from General Lee's report shows that he attached high value to the possession of the ridge which General Sickles thought it necessary to occupy. "In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought our artillery could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge."— W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part II., p. 308.

It had been General Lee's intention that Longstreet, with what force he could get together, should attack at an early hour of the morning; but Longstreet, inspired by wiser counsels than those of his chief, saw more clearly than Lee all the difficulties of the enterprise, and spent a part of the morning in trying to persuade him to adopt the better plan of manœuvring by the right flank. Failing to convince him, he still pleaded for time, that the rest of his corps might join him before the attack. The second division, under McLaws, arrived in the middle of the day; he would gladly have waited until the third, under Pickett, should have joined him also; but Lee, after a careful personal reconnaissance of the position occupied by the National left, at last gave Longstreet a positive order to attack upon that flank. It was after four o'clock when Hood's division was thrown with the greatest violence upon the refused line of General Sickles. CHAP. IX. July 2, 1863.

A desperate and sanguinary conflict raged along that line. For nearly two hours Birney's division bore the brunt of the fight; they received and inflicted great damage, both armies fighting with equal and desperate courage. General Sickles was borne from the field, his leg having been shot away, shortly after six o'clock, and Birney succeeded, temporarily, to the command of the corps. Meantime McLaws had attacked Humphreys on the Emmitsburg road, to the north of the Peach Orchard, and, when the salient angle was broken, Humphreys was finally forced to retire to Cemetery Ridge. He accomplished this movement coolly and successfully; he communicated his own indomitable spirit to his men, and conducted the retreat,

1863.


Positions July 2d,
ABOUT 3:30 P. M.
Union.
Confederate.
SCALE OF ONE MILE
GETTYSBURG
SEMINARY RIDGE
CEMETERY HILL
PENDER
HILL
WEIKERT
STEWART
WALKER
JONES
LAIMER
SMITH
GRAHAM
NICHOLS
WILLARD
WADSWORTH
AMES
NELSON
GAMBLE
COOPER
IVERSON
RAMSEUR
DANIELS
McINTOSH
GARNETT
MACON
GRIFFIN
RICE
DAVIS
BROCKENBROUGH
PETTIGREW
ARCHER
LEE
ARTIL
THA

POSITIONS JULY 2, 1863, ABOUT 3:30 P. M.

CHAP. IX. under a withering fire, so slowly and steadily that he was able to halt what was left of his division in the exact place assigned them. Reënforcements from the Second Corps, on the right, and from the Fifth, which had come in on the left, protected the withdrawal of the troops from the advanced position and repulsed the pursuing enemy with great slaughter.

There was a moment in the afternoon when the safety of the Union line was seriously compromised. The important position of Little Round Top was almost entirely undefended, and a portion of Hood's division, stealing up through the ravine of Plum Run, had almost succeeded in capturing it, when their advance was noticed by General Warren, Chief of Engineers, who happened, luckily, to be on that part of the field at the moment. There was no one on the hill but a few signal officers, who, seeing the enemy approaching, were folding their flags to leave the station. Warren commanded them to make a show of still waving their flags, and hurried away to find some available force; the first troops he met were Barnes's division of the Fifth Corps marching to reënforce Sickles. Warren, with a vehemence which could not be denied, seized upon a brigade of this division, commanded by Colonel Strong Vincent, which he hurried to the summit of the hill, while Charles E. Hazlitt's battery, which was fortunately in the neighborhood, was pulled and dragged with all haste up the beetling crag.

They were not an instant too soon; the two columns met on the hill top, and a savage hand-to-hand fight ensued, which was continued and kept up by

reënforcements on either side. The Confederates were at last driven from the crest down the precipitous slope, and the position, and with it the safety of the Union left, was secured. This was done at a terrible sacrifice. General Stephen H. Weed was killed; Hazlitt, stooping to receive his last words, fell dead across his breast; Vincent, who was the first to reach the summit, was one of the first to fall; young Colonel Patrick H. O'Rorke, just beginning a career to which his talents and his scholarship gave the most brilliant promise, was shot dead at the head of his regiment, the One Hundred and Fortieth New York. All along the Union left wing the slaughter of general and field officers was very great; besides Sickles, Charles K. Graham was wounded and captured, Samuel K. Zook and Edward E. Cross were killed; several regiments lost all their field officers, and were brought to the rear by captains. But the final successes of the field were with the Union arms; the last charge on the left was made by General Samuel W. Crawford, who securely held the ground on the right of Little Round Top; both hills, which crowned the southern extremity of the ridge, were strongly garrisoned; Humphreys's braves had the satisfaction of advancing in the twilight and re-taking the guns they had lost in their retreat, and before nightfall the whole line from Round Top to Cemetery Hill was firmly established. CHAP. IX.

It was General Lee's desire that Ewell should assault the north side of Cemetery Hill while the contest on the Confederate right was going on, and that Hill should observe the Union center and take advantage of any opportunity to attack.

1863.


Positions July 2d,
About 7:15 P. M. till after dark.
Confederate.
Union.
SCALE OF ONE MILE
GORDON
NELSON
CARTER
ONEAL
RODES
GETTYSBURG
RAMSEUR
DANIELS
PENDER
HILL
EWELL
EARLY
GRAHAM
RAINES
LATIMER
NICOLLS
JONES
WADSWORTH
IVERSON
SCALES
McGOWAN
THOMAS
JOHNSON
SMITH
GREEN

1863.

POSITIONS JULY 2, ABOUT 7:15 P. M., TILL AFTER DARK.

CHAP. IX. Ewell, attempting to carry out this plan, assaulted the Eleventh Corps with considerable energy and with such success that General Howard was compelled to call upon Hancock for assistance; he sent a brigade under Colonel Samuel S. Carroll, which rapidly drove the assaulting force from the hill. But later in the day, when the extreme right of the Federal line had been almost disgarnished by the withdrawal of troops to reënforce the left, General Johnson, commanding the old Stonewall division, made an energetic attack from the direction of Rock Creek and succeeded in occupying the intrenchments which had been left by Geary's division. He held this important point all night.

After the day's fighting was over General Meade called a council of war, and consulted his generals in regard to the question of fighting the battle out where they stood, or of taking up a new position; there was only one voice in the council: every general there was in favor of deciding the contest on that spot, and Meade promptly adopted their judgment as his own.

W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 73.

On the other side the same inevitable decision was reached. Although General Lee has been much criticized for continuing the battle on the third day, it is not easy to see how he could have done otherwise. It is true, he had not accomplished all he hoped for in the operations of the 2d of July; but his partial successes were such as to render it impossible for him to withdraw. At the cost of terrible bloodshed he had gained the Emmitsburg road on his right and had established himself in the Federal intrenchments on his left; his center had hardly been engaged, and Pickett's

1863.

strong division was to reënforce him during the day. His army was in fine spirits; he could not, even if he had been inclined, resist the martial impulse which was sweeping them on to what they expected would prove the great and crowning victory of the war. The only thing which was there to trouble hope and joy was the grave countenance and the disapproving words of his ablest general; but he put aside the remonstrances of Longstreet with his lofty good humor, and ordered him to make ready to assault the Federal left center. CHAP. IX.

The morning of the 3d of July brought a heavy responsibility to General Meade, which he accepted, if not with the high hope and buoyancy of his opponent, with equal coolness and resolution. It was not in his power to await the enemy's attack; the force which had lodged itself upon his right flank could not be permitted to remain there; it was dangerously near the Baltimore road and must be dislodged at any risk or cost; he ordered it assaulted therefore at the earliest dawn. He was not at all certain of the issue of the day, but he prepared for either fate with prudence and courage. In the midst of the roar of the guns which were opening upon Johnson's intruders in the intrenchments on Culp's Hill, he telegraphed to General Wm. H. French at Frederick that, in case the enemy should be beaten that day and fall back towards the Potomac, he wished him to reoccupy Harper's Ferry and to do all he could to annoy and harass the retreat. "If the result of to-day's operations," he said, "should be our discomfiture and withdrawal, you are to look to Washington and throw your force 1863.

Butterfield to French, July 3, 1863, 7 A. M. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part III., p. 501.

CHAP. IX. there for its protection." The ground of Culp's Hill was exceedingly broken and difficult, and an obstinate and desultory fight raged there for several hours. But Johnson was at last driven from his position, and Geary's men marched once more into their intrenchments, which had been in possession of the enemy overnight.

The little battle of Culp's Hill, although it lasted a good while, occupied but a small portion of either army, and after it was finished a singular silence fell upon the field. The day was clear and hot; the lassitude of midsummer seemed for several hours to have succeeded the furious activity of the last two days. There was something disquieting to General Meade in the intense stillness which at noon prevailed in the enemy's camp. There were constant indications, however, of a movement to the Confederate right, masked as far as possible by the woods and by the crest of Seminary Ridge. General Lee had been employing the entire forenoon in preparations for his attack; and, after a thorough consultation and careful survey of the entire field, he again resolved to try to carry the crest of Cemetery Hill, and intrusted the work once more to the able though unwilling hands of Longstreet. There was a striking analogy between Burnside's assault of Fredericksburg and the one which Lee
1863. was to deliver on this 3d of July. In both cases a strong position, powerfully defended, was to be attacked by brave and disciplined troops under corps commanders who did not believe the attack could succeed. The troops chosen for this final onslaught upon the Union line, were on the right, the division of General Pickett, composed of the Vir-

ginia chivalry, the flower of the Confederate army, supported by Wilcox's division; and, on the left, Pettigrew's and Trimble's divisions that, like Wilcox's, belonged to the command of A. P. Hill. CHAP. IX.

While the Union troops were waiting with intense expectation, the midday silence was broken by the report of two guns fired at a short interval, and then, all at once, from every point on the heights opposite, the simultaneous discharge of 130 pieces of artillery filled the air with smoke and flame and the wide circuit of the surrounding hills with continuous volleying thunders. Never in the experience of any of those seasoned soldiers on either height was heard anything comparable. Hancock and Gibbon, Webb and Warren, to whom the thunder of the captains and the shouting had become every-day experiences, all agree in saying that they never heard or imagined anything so terrific. But the Union artillery was not slow in responding; there was not enough room in the Union lines to bring so great a number of guns into action as those with which the Confederates had crowned the wide sweep of the opposing hills; but General Hunt had managed to get some seventy guns into position and they replied with great spirit to the furious cannonade from Seminary Ridge and the Emmitsburg road. This titanic artillery duel, in which two hundred guns were engaged, lasted about an hour. At the end of that time, General Hunt ordered his batteries gradually to cease firing; he desired to give his guns time to cool, and to reserve his ammunition for the infantry attack which it was now evident was coming.

July 3, 1863.

Hunt, Testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. I., p. 451.

CHAP. IX.

General Lee, who expected important results from this extraordinary cannonade, thought he had silenced the Federal artillery, and the explosion of several caissons confirmed him in this belief. It is remarkable that so little damage was done by this prodigious fire. The shifty veterans of the Army of the Potomac had taken advantage of every hillock and every boulder to protect themselves; the artillery suffered somewhat, but whenever a battery was disabled its place was immediately supplied from the reserve. A certain number of faint hearts melted away from the line into the Baltimore road; but at the end of an hour of such a fire as the world has rarely seen, the Union lines were as strong as at the beginning. It may be said that they were even stronger, for, while they were not in the least shaken, they had drunk of the delight of battle and waited with firm nerves and eager eyes for the coming assault.

The fury of his own bombardment had not inspired Longstreet with any new confidence; he still believed the plan of his general-in-chief to be rash and well-nigh hopeless. He gave an order to Colonel E. P. Alexander, his chief of artillery, to watch the effect of the cannonading and give, on his own judgment, the signal of attack when the Federal line should appear to be broken. Alexander did not relish the responsibility; before and during the artillery duel he sent messages to Longstreet, which opened the door for a change in the orders. At last, as his ammunition got short, and the Union fire slackened, he let Pickett know that if the charge was to be made, then was the time to advance. Pickett sought Longstreet personally,

Longstreet, Report. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part II., p. 360.

and demanded his orders. Longstreet, drawn one way by the commands of his chief and the other by his own convictions, seemed unable, in his anguish of mind, to utter the fatal words required of him. Pickett at last said, "Very well, I shall go forward," to which Longstreet answered only with an affirmative nod. CHAP. IX.

The Union soldiers on Cemetery Ridge now had the opportunity to enjoy a wonderful spectacle. No sight so beautiful in a soldier's eyes, so full of the pomp and circumstance of glorious war, had ever before been seen upon this continent, as when Pickett led forth his troops from behind the ridge, where they had lain concealed, and formed them in column for attack. There was nothing like it possible in the swamps of the Chickahominy, or the tangled thickets of the Rappahannock, or on the wooded shores of the Rapidan. There no enemy was visible half a musket-shot away; but here, at a distance of nearly a mile across a cultivated valley, part of which was covered with waving grain and part smooth in stubble fields, the whole irradiated with the unclouded beams of the July sun, an army formed itself in line of battle under the eyes of an appreciative adversary. It came on across the valley in the form of a wedge, of which Pickett's own division about 5000 strong formed the finely tempered point; on the left was Heth's division, commanded by Pettigrew, swelled by a part of Trimble's division; on the right the column of Wilcox moved forward in support; altogether some 17,000 men. They came forward with the steadiness of troops on parade; the direction they took at first, if retained, would have July 3, 1863.

1863.


Positions July 3d,
3:15 to 5:30 P. M.
Union.
Confederate.
SCALE OF ONE MILE
GETTYSBURG
CEMETERY
CEMETERY HILL
CULP'S HILL
CEMETERY RIDGE
SEMINARY RIDGE
PENDER
RODES
HAYS
GORDON
COLLEGE
CHAMBERSBURG PIKE
HARRISBURG ROAD
MAGAFFIN
JONES
McINTOSH
PEGRAM
WARREN
WEIKERT
CLARK
OHIO
CARROLL
STEUART
KEMPER
GREENE
RICKETTS
WADSWORTH
DOUBLEDAY
CAMERON
WILCOX
McGILVERY
AVERY
ROUSE
ANDREWS

POSITIONS JULY 3, 1863, 3:15 TO 5:30 P. M.

CHAP. IX. brought them upon the First Corps; but, before they had advanced half-way across the valley, they began to bear off to the left and directly upon Hancock's front.

The Federal artillery, which they had supposed to be silenced, now opened upon them from right and left with terrible effect. George J. Stannard's Vermont brigade, occupying a little grove in advance of the Union line, poured a destructive fire into Pickett's right flank, causing it to double in somewhat upon the center. Alexander Hays, on Hancock's right, met the advancing column of Pettigrew with such fury and vigor of attack that a large part of it was captured, a still greater number gave way and fled to the rear, and those that were left alive moved to their right and joined the assaulting force of Pickett. Diminishing at every step, this devoted column moved on, and at last struck a point where Webb's slender brigade held the Union line. A short and terrible contest here took place. Two small regiments of Webb's held a stone fence a few rods in advance of the main line. As the Confederates leaped over this slight barrier, these regiments moved to the rear; the enemy, encouraged by this seeming success, came on with yells of triumph, imagining that the Union line was broken; but the apparent fugitives stopped among their guns, and encouraged by the example of their young general, fought with desperate energy, while from right and left, in a confused mass of unorganized valor, regiments and brigades rushed from their own places to join Webb and Hays in their heroic defense of the crest. If properly drawn up in line of battle, the mass of troops that

gathered to the rescue at this point would have been four lines deep. But control was for an instant lost; the men could not be restrained, the colonels could not make their voices heard in the roar and tumult of battle; men fought as individuals. Such a chaos could only last for a few moments. The extreme point reached by the assaulting column was a little clump of woods where Lieutenant Alonzo H. Cushing, a young artillery officer (brother of Commander Cushing, who destroyed the *Albemarle*), stood by his gun; though desperately hurt, with his last strength he fired a final shot, and in the instant of death saluted his general with a gay farewell. General Lewis A. Armistead, who was foremost in the assault, rushed forward waving his hat upon his sword-point, and fell mortally wounded near Cushing's battery. This was the last leap of the advancing tide; from this moment it ebbed away. Pickett, with the few officers left him, gave the superfluous order to retire; for the fight was over, and already the plain was covered with fugitives flowing back, not so much over the track of their advance, as towards the Confederate center. The Union soldiers springing forward captured a great many prisoners and gathered in a wide harvest of battle-flags.

CHAP. IX. July 3, 1863.

Meanwhile Wilcox had advanced his supporting column obliquely upon Pickett's right, until he found himself making an isolated attack between Little Round Top and the main battlefield. Stannard, who had wrought such havoc upon Pickett's right flank, now wheeled and tried the same tactics, with equal effect, upon Wilcox's left; the batteries on the spur of Little Round Top also rained death

CHAP. IX. upon him, and the troops in his front received him with a sharp musketry fire; there was nothing to do but to turn and save himself with what speed
July 3, 1863. he could. The briefest and proportionately the bloodiest of the three days of battle at Gettysburg was at an end.

Two cavalry fights had taken place during the day; Kilpatrick at eight o'clock received orders to move to the right and rear of Longstreet and attack with his division and the Regular brigade. His advance served to occupy the attention of Longstreet's forces in front of the Round Tops, during the assault on Cemetery Ridge. At half-past five Kilpatrick with more bravery than judgment ordered a charge which resulted in the death of the gallant and promising young general, Elon J. Farnsworth, and the loss of many of his men. J. E. B. Stuart, on Lee's extreme left, took up a position which menaced Meade's line of retreat on the Baltimore road, and was there attacked by the force of D. McM. Gregg and George A. Custer. A general cavalry battle ensued, in which charges and counter-charges were made, but with little advantage to either side; Stuart at last gave way, and the Federal cavalry held the field.

Meade to Halleck, July 3, 1863, 8:35 P. M. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 74.

It is clear that General Meade did not immediately comprehend the magnitude of his victory. In the dispatch which he wrote in the evening to General Halleck he greatly understated the extent of his success, speaking of the victory merely as a "handsome repulse" of the enemy. So desperate had been the contest, so intense the strain of anxiety for three days, that there was not left enough of energetic impulse to press his great advantage. General Crawford, it is true, was sent

forward on the left to reconnoiter the battlefield of the 2d of July; he came upon a brigade of Hood's division, capturing several hundred prisoners and many thousand stands of arms. The enemy fled across a little brook, an affluent of Plum Run, and was not further pursued. Hancock, while he was borne severely wounded from the field, dictated from his stretcher a note to Meade, begging him to pursue the broken enemy; but, in the deep fatigue and lassitude of a great deliverance, the general-in-chief preferred not to risk the important results already gained by any perilous enterprise. He had as yet no adequate idea of the injury he had inflicted upon the enemy, and his own losses had been enormous. Of the men upon whom he most leaned, his trusted comrades through two years of battle, Reynolds was dead, Sickles disabled, Hancock, Gibbon, Doubleday, Warren, Webb, and many others were wounded, and incapable of holding up his hands in the battles which a keen pursuit would have brought upon him.[1]

[1] A large preponderance of the testimony given by the generals engaged in the battle of Gettysburg before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, goes to show that General Meade should have pushed his advantage after Gettysburg with more energy than he displayed. Generals A. P. Howe, Sickles, Graham, Doubleday, Birney, Wadsworth, and Hunt all thought great damage could have been inflicted upon the enemy by an immediate countercharge. After Pickett's failure on the 3d, Pleasonton begged Meade, when they stood together on Round Top, to order a general advance of his whole army in pursuit of the enemy, but the general preferred to order him, with his cavalry, to find out whether they were really falling back, which, of course, occupied so much time as to amount to a negative decision. Hancock is most unqualified in his opinion that an advance should have been made. "There were," he says, "only two divisions of the enemy on our extreme left opposite Round Top, and there was a gap in their line of one mile that their assault had left, and I believe if our whole line had advanced with spirit it is not unlikely that we would have taken all their artillery at that point." Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. I., p. 408.

1863.



DISPOSITIONS FOR THE CAVALRY BATTLE.

The left-hand margin of this map coincides (excepting the scale) with the upper part of the right hand margin of the map on pages 264 and 265.

General Lee had one moment of supreme exultation and triumph on this memorable afternoon; it was when he saw the blue flag of Virginia, borne by Pickett's troops, waving on the crest of Cemetery Ridge among the Union guns. His gratification lasted only an instant, for, a moment later, he saw the Virginia battle-flags dropping thickly

General Warren, while joining in the same opinion, gives a glimpse of the feeling which, perhaps, was the controlling motive that prevented the advance. "We were very much shattered in that respect [of important officers killed and wounded], and there was a tone among most of the prominent officers that we had quite saved the country for the time, and that we had done enough; that we might jeopard all that we had won by trying to do too much."

The following opinions of Confederate officers, confirmatory of this view, are given by General Doubleday in his valuable work, "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg." Longstreet says: "When Pickett's charge failed I expected that of course the enemy would throw himself against our shattered ranks and try to crush us. I sent my staff-officers to the rear to assist in rallying the troops, and hurried to our line of batteries as the only support that I could give them. . . For unaccountable reasons the enemy did not pursue his advantage." Longstreet holds the same view in his article in "Battles and Leaders," Vol. III., p. 347, though Swinton ["Army of the Potomac," p. 364] represents him as expressing the opinion that he could have repelled an attack. Colonel Alexander, chief of Longstreet's artillery, says: "I have always believed that the enemy here lost the greatest opportunity they ever had of routing Lee's army by a prompt offensive." He then refers to the advantages of the Federal position, and says: "Is it necessary now to add any statement as to the superiority of the Federal force, or the exhausted and shattered condition of the Confederates for the space of at least a mile in their very center, to show that a great opportunity was thrown away? I think that General Lee himself was quite apprehensive the enemy would *riposte*, and that it was that apprehension which brought him alone up to my guns, where he could observe all the indications." General Trimble says: "By all the rules of warfare the Federal troops should, as I expected they would, have marched against our shattered column, and sought to cover our army with an overwhelming defeat." Colonel Simms, who commanded a Georgia brigade which was put to flight by General Crawford late on the 3d, writes to the latter: "There was much confusion in our army, so far as my observation extended, and I think we would have made but feeble resistance if you had pressed on on the evening of the 3d." For Warren's Testimony, *vide* Report Committee on Conduct of the War.

July, 1863.

CHAP. IX. to the ground and his most trusted troops flowing back towards him like a broken wave. He hastened at his utmost speed to meet this returning column, and did all in his power to calm and encourage his beaten soldiers. Again, like Burnside at Fredericksburg, he took all the blame and all the responsibility upon himself. He rode towards the Peach Orchard, where Colonel Alexander still commanded the artillery, and there, with Longstreet, concerted what hasty means of defense were in their power to meet the attack which they thought, of course, would follow; but as the hours passed by, and the long summer day faded into twilight, and no attack was made, General Lee concluded to mass his entire army on Seminary Ridge and prepare for defense or retreat in the morning.

1863. The next day was the Fourth of July, to be made memorable for the second time to all generations of Americans, mingling the associations of Gettysburg and Vicksburg with those of Philadelphia in the last century. The reconnaissances sent out by General Meade, to his left and to his right, found the enemy still in position in front of the Round Tops; but from Benner's Hill and from the town of Gettysburg everything had disappeared; most of the enemy's wounded and the unburied dead were lying on the deserted field of battle. In the course of the day a request for a truce and exchange of prisoners was received from General Lee, which General Meade, under the circumstances, very properly declined. The day passed away in the Union army in the care of the wounded and the last offices to the dead: even yet General Meade was not aware of the

W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part III., p. 514.



GENERAL GEORGE E. PICKETT.

magnitude of his victory. He issued, it is true, a brave and inspiriting order of the day, announcing that the enemy was "utterly baffled and defeated," and saying, "Our task is not yet accomplished, and the commanding general looks to the army for greater efforts to drive from our soil every vestige of the presence of the invader"; but at noon he telegraphed General Halleck, saying merely that the enemy had thrown back his left, that we had occupied Gettysburg, and that he should require some time to get up supplies and rest his army. A violent rain-storm came on during the day, which formed another reason for delay. At night he called together his corps commanders in council of war; he put to them the question whether to remain at Gettysburg or to take immediate measures to attack the enemy or cut off his retreat; the majority were in favor of remaining where they were, keeping a close watch upon the movements of the enemy.

CHAP. IX.

Meade, Orders, July 4, 1863, 4:15 P. M. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part III., p. 519.

Ibid., Part I., p. 78.

Butterfield, Testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. I., p. 427.

On the morning of the 5th, the Confederates were discovered to be in full retreat. General Lee, as we have seen, gave as a reason for attacking the Federal army in position the difficulty of moving his trains through the mountains; but after his defeat he found no difficulty in moving those trains encumbered still further by thousands of wounded and prisoners. Through the night and the storm he retired by the Fairfield and Cashtown roads. Meade acted with sufficient promptness on receiving this news; he resolved to put his army in march on the enemy's flank by way of Middletown and the South Mountain passes, while he sent General Sedgwick with a considerable force in direct pursuit.

July, 1863.

CHAP. IX. Sedgwick came upon Lee's rear-guard at Fairfield Pass, and found him in a position so strong that it was unadvisable to attack him; he reported this to Meade, and joined the rest of the army in its march southward.

The news of this victory was received at Washington with great rejoicing, and the Government ordered every man whom it could reach to reënforce General Meade at Frederick. The President accompanied his generous words of praise and congratulation to the general with strict injunctions to give Lee no rest or respite. On the 7th he sent the inspiring news of the surrender of Vicksburg, and told Meade if he could "complete his work so gloriously prosecuted thus far, by the literal or substantial destruction of Lee's army," the rebellion would be over; on the same day he informed him that he had been appointed a brigadier-general in the regular army of the United States. Almost every hour Meade received from the War Department some words of stimulus or encouragement. Halleck wrote: "You have given the enemy a stunning blow at Gettysburg; follow it up and give him another before he can reach the Potomac." All through the 7th and 8th of July these pressing dispatches continued; General Meade seemed to grow weary of them at last, and began on the afternoon of the 8th to insist upon the difficulties of the enterprise so pressingly commended to him. "I expect," he says, "to find the enemy in a strong position well covered with artillery, and I do not desire to imitate his example at Gettysburg and assault a position where the chances were so greatly against success. I wish in advance to

July, 1863.

W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 83.

Halleck to Meade, July 7, 1863. Ibid., p. 82.

Ibid.

moderate the expectations of those who in ignorance of the difficulties to be encountered may expect too much." In this strain the correspondence continued for the next three days, the Government urging General Meade forward with as much pressure as was consistent with proper courtesy and consideration for a meritorious officer who had just rendered an inestimable service, and the general expressing his intention to do all he could, and his sense of the difficulties in the way.

Meade to Halleck, July 8, 1863, 2 P. M. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 84.

In the mean time General Lee had arrived at the Potomac and taken up his position on the line from Williamsport to Falling Waters; he found his pontoon bridge partly destroyed by General French and the river so swollen by the rains as to be unfordable. In this critical condition he did all that was in his power; he set to work to reconstruct his bridge, and while waiting for the river to fall, he strongly intrenched himself against attack. General Meade arrived in his front on the 10th, and for two days, with the utmost caution, advanced inch by inch until the two armies were less than a mile apart. On the 12th he announced his intention to attack the enemy the next day "unless something intervenes to prevent it, for the reason that delay will strengthen the enemy and will not increase my force." Unfortunately something did intervene; it was a council of war. On the night of the 12th he called his corps commanders together, and a large majority unqualifiedly opposed the projected attack. Meade himself favored it, but he was supported only by General Wadsworth who, as a civilian general, did not impose his opinion with much authority upon the council, and by General Howard,

July, 1863.

Ibid., p. 91.

Meade to Halleck, July 13, 1863. Ibid., p. 91.

CHAP. IX.



POSITIONS JULY 13, 1863.

Warren, Testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. I., p. 381.

whose bad luck at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg had deprived him of much of his influence. In the face of this opposition Meade felt himself too new in command of the army to disregard it entirely; he therefore resolved to pass the next day in a thorough series of reconnaissances, and if he could find a weak place in the enemy's line to assault it; he announced this decision in a dispatch to the War Department and received in reply a vehement message signed by Halleck but evidently inspired by the President himself. "You are strong enough to attack and defeat the enemy before he can effect a crossing. Act upon your own judgment and make

your generals execute your orders. Call no council of war.[1] It is proverbial that councils of war never fight. . . Do not let the enemy escape." W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 92.

The next morning, July 14, Meade's earliest reconnaissances proved how just had been the fears of the Government. Lee's lines were found deserted; he had crossed, in the night, a part of his force by the bridge which he had repaired at Falling Waters and a part at Williamsport, where the river had fallen enough during the last twenty-four hours to be fordable. The President, on receipt of this news, sent General Meade a dispatch expressing his great dissatisfaction at the result, which General Meade felt so keenly that he immediately requested to be relieved from command of the army. The President replied through Halleck that the dispatch was not intended as a censure

1863.

July 14, 1863.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 93.

[1] This council of war should never have been called. Of the corps commanders and the men of brain and temperament who fought the battle of Gettysburg, Reynolds was dead, Hancock and Sickles were wounded, Warren, Pleasonton, Hunt, and Humphreys, who were all in favor of the attack, had no votes in the council, so that Meade was overborne by mere numbers. The true opinion of the leading officers of the army would be represented as follows: in favor of attack, Meade, Hancock, Sickles, Howard, Wadsworth, Warren, Pleasonton, Humphreys, Hunt; against, Sedgwick, Sykes, Hays, French, and Slocum. The matter was unfortunately decided by the votes of the last five. General Wadsworth in conversation soon after said, "The weight of authority in the council of war was decidedly against fighting. French, Sedgwick, and Slocum strenuously opposed a fight, Meade was in favor of it, Pleasonton was very eager for it, I said what I could. Those opposed seemed to think that if we did not attack the enemy would, and even Meade thought he was not ready for action; he had no idea that the enemy intended to get away at once. Howard had little to say on the subject. Meade was in favor of attacking in three columns, each of 20,000 men." Wadsworth further said in the same conversation that he thought there were a good many officers of the regular army who had not yet entirely lost their West Point idea of Southern superiority.—J. H., Diary. See also Report Committee on Conduct of the War.

CHAP. IX. but as a stimulus to action, and declined to accept his resignation. The cavalry started at once in pursuit and succeeded in capturing a brigade of infantry and some guns and flags at Falling Waters.

July 14, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVII., Part I., pp. 93, 94.

July, 1863. The 12th and 13th had been passed by the President in intense anxiety, and when, on the 14th, he heard of Lee's escape he suffered one of the deepest and bitterest disappointments of the war. "We had them within our grasp," he said; "we had only to stretch forth our hands and they were ours, and nothing I could say or do could make the army move." He had been most unfavorably impressed by a phrase in Meade's general order after the victory in which he spoke of "driving the invader from our soil." He said upon reading it, "This is a dreadful reminiscence of McClellan; it is the same spirit that moved him to claim a great victory because 'Pennsylvania and Maryland were safe.' Will our generals never get that idea out of their heads? The whole country is our soil." He regretted that he had not himself gone to the army and personally issued the order for an attack.

J. H., Diary.

The President's disappointment lasted through the week. He said at one time, "Our army held the war in the hollow of their hand and they would not close it"; and again, "We had gone through all the labor of tilling and planting an enormous crop, and when it was ripe we did not harvest it. Still," he added with his habitual instinctive justice, "I am very grateful to Meade for the great service he did at Gettysburg"; and, at the end of the week, having received a letter from General

Howard justifying Meade's entire action at Williamsport, the President answered him expressing his deep mortification at the escape of Lee, rendered deeper by the high hopes inspired by the brilliant conduct of our troops at Gettysburg; he referred to his own long-cherished and often expressed conviction that if the enemy ever crossed the Potomac he might be destroyed; he said that Meade and his army had expended their skill and toil and blood up to the ripe harvest and then allowed it to go to waste; but he added that, after the lapse of several days, he now felt profoundly grateful to Meade and his army for what they had done without indulging in any criticisms for what they had not done, and General Meade had his full confidence as a brave and skillful officer and a true man.[1] CHAP. IX. J. H., Diary, July 21, 1863.

While the President's disappointment and irritation were at their keenest, he wrote a letter to General Meade which he never signed or sent. It was not an unusual proceeding with him to put upon paper in this way his expressions of dissatisfaction and then to lay them away, rather than wound a deserving public servant by even merited censure. The letter is given as the clearest statement which could be made of the failure to reap the full harvest of the Gettysburg victory:

[1] The battle of Gettysburg was one of the most destructive in modern history. The Comte de Paris says, "The losses on both sides were almost equal, and enormous considering the number of combatants engaged." According to the revised tables the Union army lost 3072 killed, 14,497 wounded, 5434 captured or missing, in all 23,033; the Confederates had 2592 killed, 12,709 wounded, and 5150 missing; in all 20,451 men. The troops engaged on the actual field of battle numbered about 78,000 men under Lee and 92,000 or 94,000 under Meade.

CHAP. IX. I have just seen your dispatch to General Halleck, asking to be relieved of your command because of a supposed censure of mine. I am very, very grateful to you for the magnificent success you gave the cause of the country at Gettysburg; and I am sorry now to be the author of the slightest pain to you. But I was in such deep distress myself that I could not restrain some expression of it. I have been oppressed nearly ever since the battles at Gettysburg by what appeared to be evidences that yourself and General Couch and General Smith were not seeking a collision with the enemy, but were trying to get him across the river without another battle. What these evidences were, if you please, I hope to tell you at some time when we shall both feel better. The case, summarily stated, is this: You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated, and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure without attacking him. And Couch and Smith — the latter left Carlisle in time, upon all ordinary calculation, to have aided you in the last battle at Gettysburg, but he did not arrive. At the end of more than ten days, I believe twelve, under constant urging, he reached Hagerstown from Carlisle, which is not an inch over fifty-five miles, if so much, and Couch's movement was very little different.

Again, my dear general, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last Monday, how can you possibly do so south of the river, when you can take with you very few more than two-thirds of

the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect, and I do not expect [that] you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed immeasurably because of it.

I beg you will not consider this a prosecution or persecution of yourself. As you had learned that I was dissatisfied, I have thought it best to kindly tell you why.

Lincoln to Meade, July 14, 1863. Autograph MS.

CHAPTER X

VICKSBURG

CHAP. X. THE town of Vicksburg stands on a plateau some two hundred feet above the river level, which has been cut and carved by the rains of centuries so as to present a chaos of ravines and ridges running in every direction. The hills are composed of a peculiarly tough and fine-grained clay, and the ravines, cut out of them by the running streams, retain their form for many years, only gradually widening under the climate and weather. Except where the streams that form them are very large, the ravines are extremely narrow at the bottom. They are so steep that it is impossible for a full-armed soldier to climb them. The only way in which this net-work of hills and chasms can be traversed is by roads running along the crests of the ridges. All these crests were fully commanded by the Confederate works; and it was this which made the siege of Vicksburg so tedious and toilsome an enterprise.

When Grant arrived before the intrenchments,
1863. on the evening of May 18th, he thought it possible that the defeats of the last week had so demoralized and discouraged the defenders of the place that a quick rush of his victorious troops

might carry the works by a *coup-de-main*. He therefore ordered a general attack on the afternoon of the 19th. Sherman's corps got up to the works, but, as McClernand's and McPherson's were at a greater distance, they were unable to afford Sherman the necessary support, and the attack failed, with no advantage to the Union forces except a nearer approach to the enemy's works, and the gaining of better ground for a future attempt.

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May, 1863.

General Grant did not wait long for his second trial. The reasons which he gave in his report for the second assault have been generally accepted by military critics as sound, in spite of the failure of the enterprise. He believed the assault could be made successful; secondly, he knew that Johnston was at Canton, and was being rapidly reënforced; he was anxious, therefore, to take the place before Johnston could fall upon his rear, and, having done this, he would himself have been able to turn upon Johnston and drive him from the State before the season was too late for campaigning; and, finally, he says: "The troops themselves were impatient to possess Vicksburg, and would not have worked in the trenches with the same zeal, believing it unnecessary, that they did after their failure to carry the enemy's works." He therefore ordered, on the evening of the 21st, an assault all along the line at ten o'clock the next morning, and caused all the corps commanders to set their watches by his so that the assault might be made at the same instant. This was done according to orders, and with equal bravery and energy in all three of the corps, and with equal

Grant, Report, July 6, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 55.

May, 1863.

Grant to Halleck, May 22, and July 6, 1863. Ibid., pp. 37, 55.

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From General Badeau's "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant." D. Appleton & Co., N. Y.

CHAP. X. lack of success. Sherman's, McPherson's, and McClernand's soldiers all rushed with the same valor for the narrow roads through which, alone, the assault could be made; each planted their flags upon the outer walls of the enemy's works; all were met with an energetic defense and repulsed with heavy loss.

A bitter controversy arose after the battle between General McClernand on the one side and General Grant and his friends on the other, in regard to an unfortunate incident by which the Union losses were greatly increased. Grant watched the attack from a hill on the Jackson road, which commanded a view of all the roads on which the assault was made. He saw the forward rush; the blaze of fire from the enemy's parapet; the planting of the Union colors on the outward slope; the check of his soldiers and their pause in the ditches. He was satisfied that the attack had failed, and, starting to communicate with Sherman, in regard to the next step to be taken, he received a dispatch from Gen-

11:15 A. M. eral McClernand saying he was hard pressed, and asking for reënforcements. He continued his ride to Sherman's position, and on reaching there received a second dispatch from McClernand, saying

W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 172. that he had part possession of two forts, and that the Stars and Stripes were floating over them. Neither Grant nor Sherman placed full credence in this enthusiastic dispatch, but both agreed that it was impossible to neglect so important a message at such a time. Sherman said the note was official

Sherman, "Memoirs." Vol. I., p. 327. and must be credited, and offered to renew the assault with new troops. At McPherson's headquarters, whither he instantly hastened, General

Grant received a third dispatch from McClernand of the same import, and at last ordered the attack to be renewed. The devoted soldiers sprang once more to the assault with the finest courage and energy, but it was useless; they were everywhere repulsed again, and the renewed attempt only added heavily to the list of the day's casualties. General McClernand always insisted that his dispatches were correct, and that he would have taken the town if he had been properly supported, but the facts seem to be that only Sergeant Joseph E. Griffith of the Twenty-second Iowa, with a squad of men, got into the enemy's works, and they were all killed but the valorous sergeant himself, who came out safely, bringing some prisoners with him.

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McClernand, Report, June 17, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 154.

This was General McClernand's last feat of arms.[1] Unwilling to trust his exploits of the 22d of May to any less intelligent or friendly chronicler than himself, he wrote, on the 30th of May, and published to his troops, and not to his troops alone but to his fellow-citizens in the North, a congratulatory order, in which he recounted, in the style of Napoleon in Italy, the labors and the triumphs of the Thirteenth Army Corps, giving especial prominence to the affair of the 22d. If he had confined himself to the doughty deeds of his own soldiers, it might have passed unnoticed, but he unfortunately sought to gild his own achievements by slighting those of his comrades; and to place his own desert in a brighter light he even insinuated that the general-

May, 1863.

[1] On September 25, 1863, General McClernand wrote an elaborate defense of his conduct, which may be found in the War Records, Vol. XXIV., Part I., pp. 169, 186.

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in-chief had not properly supported him.[1] When this order, published in a St. Louis paper, came back to the camp it occasioned such effervescence as may easily be imagined in the corps of Sherman and McPherson. Both these generals joined immediately in a protest to General Grant against their censorious colleague, and Grant, fully sympathizing in their resentment, immediately relieved General McClernand from the command of the Thirteenth Army Corps, assigning in his place, subject to the President's approval, that able and modest soldier, E. O. C. Ord. In announcing this action to General Halleck, Grant said that he had tolerated General McClernand long after he thought the good of the service demanded his removal, which, he added, now that it had taken place, had "given general satisfaction; the Thirteenth Army Corps sharing, perhaps, equally in the feeling with other corps of the army."

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 364.

May 22, 1863.

After this severe repulse, which cost the Union army more than three thousand men with no compensating advantages whatever, Grant gave up all thought of taking the place by storm, and resolved upon a regular siege. In the peculiarities of topography to which we have already referred, this

1 "How and why the general assault failed it would be useless now to explain. The Thirteenth Army Corps, acknowledging the good intentions of all, would scorn indulgence in weak regrets and idle criminations. According justice to all, it would only defend itself. If, while the enemy was massing to crush it, assistance was asked for by a diversion at other points, or by reënforcement, it only asked what in one case Major-General Grant had specifically and peremptorily ordered, namely, simultaneous and persistent attack all along our lines, until the enemy's outer works should be carried, and what in the other, by massing a strong force in time upon a weakened point, would have probably insured success." — W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 161.



GENERAL E. KIRBY SMITH.

siege differs from any other in history. Vicksburg was, properly speaking, not a fortress, but an intrenched camp stretching for miles along the heights of the Mississippi and defended by innumerable gullies and ravines almost impassable to troops. Grant's forces at the beginning were altogether insufficient for the complete investment of such a camp; at the outset of the campaign his forces numbered about 43,000, though at the close his army had been increased to 75,000 men. In his official report Pemberton says that when he moved into the defenses he had 28,000 effectives. The parole lists after the surrender accounted for 29,491 men, which included the non-effectives. Not being able to garnish the entire semicircle of investment with troops Grant contented himself, at the beginning, with holding and strongly occupying the northern half of it; Sherman's corps holding the bank of the Mississippi and the heights to the east of it; McPherson coming next, and McClernand upon his left. General Jacob G. Lauman arrived two days after the assault, and was placed in position on McClernand's left to guard the Hall's Ferry and the Warrenton roads which enter Vicksburg from the south. Brigadier-General John McArthur, with three brigades, had already joined McPherson's corps and strengthened his line, and on the 11th of June, the division of General Herron arrived from the other side of the river, and completed the investment by taking up a strong position on the river south of the town. Lauman, moving to the right, formed a close connection with Hovey, thus hermetically closing all the avenues of approach to Vicksburg. Now, for the first time in his ca-

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Grant to Halleck, May 29, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 40.

rear, Grant, wishing by an overwhelming force to insure the capture of the town and to defend himself against the threatened attack of Johnston, asked for reënforcements which, even before his request was received, were promptly and ungrudgingly sent him as fast as they were needed or could be used;[1] so that he was able, on the 8th of June, to say in a dispatch to Washington, "Vicksburg is closely invested. I have a spare force of about thirty thousand men with which to repel anything from the rear."

Grant to Halleck, June 8, 1863. Ibid., p. 41.

May, 1863.

The troops, having been satisfied by the slaughter of the 22d of the impossibility of storming the works in their front and of the absolute necessity of hard work to capture them, labored for six weeks with cheerful and uncomplaining fortitude in the drudgery of the siege. The army was most imperfectly provided with all the material considered essential for the prosecution of a work of this sort, and the ingenuity of the American soldier found constant exercise in the invention of devices to supply these deficiencies. They wattled their gabions with crushed cane which abounded in the ravines and hollows; they took empty barrels from the commissary department which, bound about with fascines of cane, made

[1] "General Halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked, forwarded reënforcements with all possible dispatch."—Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. I., p. 535.

Sooy Smith's division of the Sixteenth Corps arrived June 11, Nathan Kimball's had already arrived on the 3d, and both were sent to Haines's Bluff under command of General C. C. Washburn. The Ninth Army Corps, under General J. G. Parke, came in on the 14th and was also stationed at Haines's Bluff to be ready for an apprehended movement of Johnston. "At the close of the siege," says Greene,—"The Mississippi," p. 188,—"there were 17,000 men from Hurlbut's corps present at Vicksburg."

excellent sap-rollers. They had no cohorn mortars, and so improvised them by shrinking iron bands on cylinders of hard wood and boring them for shells. The negro refugees from the surrounding counties came in and worked with cheerful and efficient industry under the novel stimulus of reg ular wages. The peculiar nature of the ground was the occasion of all sorts of eccentric siege inventions. When it became necessary to cross one of the gullies commanded by the enemy's fire, they would build in the night strong parapets of logs, manning them with picked riflemen under which the working parties were perfectly protected the next day; for the first shot from the rebel works would be answered by a deadly reply from the log parapets. The engineer's report refers in one instance to a reconnaissance of a rebel ditch obtained by mounting a mirror upon a sap-roller. As the siege went on from day to day, and the hostile armies came nearer and nearer together, they were constantly within sound of each other's voices, and friendly conversations continually took place between soldiers who would have destroyed each other in a moment with their rifles, if they had come within sight.[1]

For siege operations of this enormous extent the force of engineers in the army was, of course, alto-

1 "On one occasion, in front of Ord's corps, our pickets, in being posted, became intermixed with the enemy's, and after some discussion the opposing picket officers arranged their picket-lines by mutual compromise, these lines in places not being more than ten yards apart. As the enemy could have stopped our work by remaining in his lines and firing an occasional volley, the advantage of this arrangement, novel in the art of war, was entirely on our side and was not interfered with." — Engineers Prime and Comstock, Report. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part II., p. 175.

CHAP. X. gether inadequate. Grant, Sherman, and McPherson multiplied themselves all along the line. Every graduate of West Point in the army was assigned to energetic duty, and the cleverest and most capable collegians from the volunteer regiments were detailed, and given an opportunity to show what their Euclid and Legendre had done for them.

While holding the enemy in front in this grip of iron Grant was equally vigilant in regard to the enemy in his rear. After his reënforcements arrived he felt strong enough to remove Sherman from his duty on the heights above Vicksburg, and to place him in command of a large army to observe Johnston. He gave him Generals Parke, Washburn, James M. Tuttle, McArthur, and Osterhaus, who massed a force of about thirty thousand men; and a strong division of McPherson's was also held in constant readiness to join him. Sherman occupied the country from Haines's Bluff on the left to a bridge over the Black River on the right, a space of eight miles. Foraging expeditions sent out previously had made a waste of the entire region between the two rivers, gathering large supplies for the Union army, and spoiling the country to the point of starvation, to prevent General Johnston from drawing provisions from it.

Two incidents of the siege from which important results were expected on the one side and on the other, but which had in the end no effect upon the march of events, deserve perhaps a word of notice.

1863. Shortly after the assault of the 22d of May an attempt was made to enfilade the enemy's batteries upon Fort Hill, by which it was thought that an important position on the Confederate left might

be carried. It was therefore attacked from the river with that readiness which Porter always showed when his assistance was needed by the army, on the morning of the 27th of May; but nothing came of it, except the destruction of the gunboat *Cincinnati*, which was sunk in half an hour by the plunging fire from the guns of Fort Hill. After this, no further direct attack was made by the navy, which, however, continued to lend valuable assistance by the bombardment of the town.

The other incident was a diversion, on the west side of the river at Milliken's Bend, by a division under General John G. Walker sent from Arkansas by General Kirby Smith. Milliken's Bend had been left undefended except by a small garrison consisting chiefly of colored troops from Louisiana. The garrison was assailed with great energy by the Confederates, and the attack at first seemed to promise a complete success; but the garrison, after having been driven out of their works to the shelter of a levee by the river side, there rallied and, with the assistance of the gunboats *Choctaw* and *Lexington* which, as usual, were ready when needed, the assault was checked, and finally repulsed. A brigade of the Fifteenth Corps was sent across the river next day, and this, together with the marine brigade under Alfred W. Ellett, drove Walker along the Shreveport railroad to Monroe. This raid, which, it was hoped, might have opened the gates of the Western frontier to Pemberton's army, came to nothing, and even if they had succeeded in taking and holding Milliken's Bend, such occupation would probably not have been of long continuance, and the attempt to evacuate

CHAP. X. Vicksburg under the fire of Porter's guns would have been nothing less than desperate.

While Grant was pushing his saps and mines inch by inch up to the Confederate works, Johnston was doing his best to bring together an army at Canton sufficient to raise the siege of Vicksburg. He soon found himself at the head of a not inconsiderable force. During the first days of the siege he was joined by the brigades of Generals Gist, M. D. Ector, and Evander McNair. Loring's division, ragged and travel-stained from its long wanderings, reached him four days after the battle of Champion's Hill, and S. B. Maxey came in from the Port Hudson army some days later. By the 4th of June he received the additional reënforcements of a brigade under N. G. Evans, a division under General Breckinridge, and a cavalry division, commanded by W. H. Jackson, amounting to 2800 men; a force, according to the Confederate War Department, of 32,000, but which General Johnston, after the habit of Confederate generals, diminishes to 24,000. Although he says in his report it was "not one-third [the force] of the enemy," it really was, in those first days of June, not very much inferior to the victorious army of Grant, and if it could have been joined with the army of Pemberton before Grant's reënforcements arrived, Johnston would have found himself at the head of a force largely in excess of the Union army. Johnston complains bitterly, in his report and in his "Narrative," of his deficiency in every arm of the service; but it cannot be denied that, during the whole month of June, his army was as deficient in leadership as in anything else.

Johnston, Report, Nov. 1, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 242.

Ibid.

1863.

Luck, as well as some other things, was against him.

He sent a dispatch to General Franklin Gardner directing the evacuation of Port Hudson, but before it reached him the investment of that post was complete. In answer to Pemberton's repeated requests in the latter days of May for some demonstration which should relieve him, he answered on the 29th that he was too weak to save Vicksburg; that he could do nothing more than attempt to save the garrison, and invited suggestions from Pemberton as to the manner of accomplishing this. During the whole month of June the correspondence between them continued on the same lines, Pemberton representing from day to day his increasing needs and Johnston giving what scant encouragement he could. At last Pemberton, on the 21st of June, suggested that Johnston should march upon Grant north of the Jackson railroad, driving in his pickets at night and at daylight next morning engage him heavily with skirmishers, occupying him during the entire day; that on that night he would attempt to escape by the Warrenton road by Hankinson's Ferry, at which point Johnston should previously send a brigade of cavalry and two field batteries to cover the crossing. The messenger who brought this dispatch told Johnston that it was Pemberton's opinion that the attempt could not be made with less than 40,000 men. Johnston saw, in this verbal message, an excuse for postponing the desperate enterprise proposed to him, and answered on the following day that there was hope of coöperation with General Taylor from the west bank of the river; that he would himself try to make a diversion in Pemberton's favor in a day or two; that he feared his force was too small; and he

CHAP. X.

May, 1863.

W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 279.

CHAP. X. gave Pemberton the cold comfort of suggesting that he had better communicate with General Taylor and try to cross the river at the last moment. But by this time Pemberton's hopes had
June, 1863. so faded that he wrote on the same day (the 22d) suggesting that Johnston should propose terms of surrender to General Grant, saying that he might hold out for fifteen days longer, but that the enemy's works were within twenty-five feet of his redan; that his men had been thirty-four days and nights in the trenches without relief, and the enemy within conversation distance. "We are living," he adds, "on very reduced rations"; and this gloomy dispatch, Johnston says, was the last received from Pemberton, though others were written. He answered, saying that if the worst should come
Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 196. Pemberton should himself make overtures of surrender to Grant, as such a step on Johnston's part "would be an impolitic confession of weakness."

During all these months a busy and most unsatisfactory correspondence was going on between the Confederate Government at Richmond and Gen-
1863. eral Johnston. On the 24th of May Jefferson Davis expressed to him the not very reasonable hope that he should soon be able to break the investment, make a junction, and carry in munitions. Johnston replied, referring to his inferiority in troops to General Grant, and the controversy as to his numbers continued for several days.[1] In a dispatch of the

[1] Jefferson Davis says: "On the 1st of June General Johnston telegraphed to me that the troops at his disposal available against Grant amounted to 24,100, not including Jackson's cavalry command and a few hundred irregular cavalry. Mr. Seddon, Secretary of War, replied to him, stating the force to be 32,000." — "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government." Vol. II., p. 412.

5th of June Mr. Seddon, the Secretary of War, regrets his inability to promise more troops, "as we have drained resources even to the danger of several points." Johnston says five days later: "I have not at my [disposal] half the number of troops necessary." At the same time he does not choose to take the responsibility of withdrawing troops from Bragg. "Nor is it for me," he says, "to judge which it is best to hold, Mississippi or Tennessee — that is for the Government to determine. Without some great blunder of the enemy we cannot hold both. . . I consider saving Vicksburg hopeless."[1]

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W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 224. June 10, 1863.

June 15.

W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 227.

Mr. Seddon replied in grief and alarm: "Vicksburg must not be lost without a desperate struggle. The interest and honor of the Confederacy forbid it. I rely on you still to avert the loss. If better resources do not offer you must hazard attack." To this General Johnston replied in a dispatch which shows how depressed was the tone of his spirits and how impossible it was for him to see anything but the strength of the enemy and his own weakness. "Grant's position," he says, "naturally very strong, is intrenched and protected by powerful artillery and the roads obstructed. . . The Big Black covers him from attack and would cut off retreat if defeated. . . The defeat of this

Ibid.

June 19.

[1] The Governor of Mississippi and four other prominent Southerners sent Mr. Davis a dispatch from Jackson, on the 18th of June, saying that it would require not less than 30,000 additional troops to relieve Vicksburg, and placing before the Confederate authorities the same merciless dilemma which General Johnston was continually presenting them — that the withdrawal of these troops might possibly involve the loss of Tennessee, but that the failure to send them would involve the loss of the Mississippi Valley. They add: "We respectfully submit that Vicksburg and the country adjoining upon it should be held at every sacrifice."

CHAP. X.

Johnston to Seddon, June 19, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 227.

little army would at once open Mississippi and Alabama to Grant." He repeats that he has no hope of doing more than to extricate the garrison. Mr. Seddon, two days later, in a tone of vehement persuasion, urged General Johnston to action. With courteous and even flattering language he invited him to follow the most desperate course the occasion might demand. "Rely upon it, the eyes and hopes of the whole Confederacy are upon you, with the full confidence that you will act, and with the sentiment that it were better to fail nobly daring than through prudence even to be inactive. I look to attack in last resort, but rely on your resources of generalship to suggest less desperate modes of relief." Mr. Seddon, in his deep distress, went on to suggest, in turn, an attack upon Banks, something to be done in coöperation with Kirby Smith, or finally the setting on foot of siege operations with artillery against Grant from the dry swamps on the north side of the Yazoo below Haines's Bluff.

Seddon to Johnston, June 21, 1863. Ibid., p. 228.

Johnston to Seddon, June 24, 1863. Ibid., p. 229.

Johnston, "Narrative," p. 202.

Johnston, unmoved by these persuasions and passionate appeals, explained, on the 24th, the utter impossibility of following any of these suggestions; but, unable to withstand the pressure behind him, he at last made ready to move upon Grant's line. He is careful to make it clear that he did not undertake this expedition in the "wild spirit that dictated the dispatches from the War Department." He did not expect to save Vicksburg by raising the siege. His utmost hopes, he said, were, in case the chances of success seemed to justify it, to attack the beleaguering line, and to rescue the army.

With this intention he devoted the 2d, 3d, and

4th of July to an elaborate series of reconnaissances, which showed him that the besieging army was covered by a line of field-works extending from the railroad bridge to the Yazoo; that all the roads leading to it had been obstructed, and that strong bodies of Federal troops observed and guarded the river. He therefore determined, he says, to move by the way of Edwards's Station to the south road on the morning of the 5th, and he dispatched a note to General Pemberton telling him that a relieving force was about to attempt a diversion to enable him to cut his way out of the place, and that he hoped to attack the enemy for this object on the 7th. But even before the letter was written the fate of Pemberton and his army had been decided; and, instead of moving upon Vicksburg, Johnston was making the best of his way to Jackson on the 7th of July. In any case General Johnston's attack would have been too late, for it was the 6th of July that Grant had fixed as the day of his final assault upon Vicksburg.

Johnston, Report. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., pp. 244, 245.

Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 203.

July, 1863.

The heads of sap had reached the enemy's lines at several points. Grant had fired one heavy mine on the Jackson road on the 25th of June, exploding almost a ton of powder. Vast masses of earth were thrown into the air, a part of the enemy's parapet was hurled bodily into the Union lines, several Confederate soldiers being thrown in, still living, with the flying mass.[1] An attempt was

[1] "I remember one colored man who had been underground at work when the explosion took place who was thrown to our side. He was not much hurt, but terribly frightened. Some one asked him how high he had gone up. 'Don't know, massa, but t'ink 'bout tree mile,' was his reply. General Logan . . . took this colored man to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege."—Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. I., p. 552.

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made to hold the crater thus formed, but it was commanded by an inner line, and after severe loss from hand-grenades the Union troops were compelled to abandon it. Another mine was begun with the intention of firing it when the final assault was made, but the Confederate miners being hard at work very near it, it was thought injudicious to wait and, on the 1st of July, the mine was loaded and fired, again destroying a redan of the enemy, crushing his galleries, and disabling about twenty-five men. The Union troops were deterred by the experience of the 25th of June from attempting to occupy this crater. The approaches were now in several places within a few feet of the enemy's works; every advance of a single yard resulted in a hand-to-hand contest between the troops of the two armies. No further progress could be made by digging alone. The enemy's works were everywhere weakened. At as many as ten different points Grant was able to put heads of regiments under cover within from five to one hundred yards of the enemy's line. There was little more to be done. No further delay could avail. Vicksburg was a ripe fruit only waiting to be plucked, and Grant had fixed the hour of plucking three days ahead.

1863.

Engineers Prime and Comstock, Report. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part II., p. 173.

Within the city the state of affairs had come to a point where much longer resistance was impossible. Absolute famine had not yet made its appearance, but the stock of provisions was dwindling fast, and prices had risen portentously. They were estimated, it is true, in Confederate money, but as the people had no other measure of value, even these fictitious prices give some idea of the general

distress. Flour was $1000 a barrel; meal $140 a bushel. It was difficult to get a gallon of molasses for ten dollars. The oxen killed by the shells of the bombardment were picked up by butchers and the meat sold for two and three dollars a pound. The pack-mules which, early in the siege, had been driven outside the rebel works to forage for themselves, were now enticed inside or caught by parties in the night, and furnished the subsistence of thousands of troops and citizens. The unhappy people of Vicksburg passed their nights and a great part of their days in caves excavated in the hillsides. These troglodyte habitations became an article of commerce, selling for forty or fifty dollars each. There was still a large army within the walls and they were not yet destitute of military stores. CHAP. X.

The most serious deficiency was that which began to declare itself in the morale of the troops. The Confederates seemed to have lost confidence in their leaders and all hope of a favorable issue of the siege. Conversation between the pickets of the opposing forces became general, and was encouraged by Grant, as the advantage was all upon his side. Late in the siege the rebel pickets communicated a rumor current in the city, that the place was to be evacuated by night; that the garrison was to be transferred across the Mississippi, and that houses were being torn down all over the city for the purpose of constructing boats to effect this passage. They also said that there was a disposition among the troops to mutiny if they were called on to cut their way out. Among General Pemberton's papers communications have been

CHAP. X. found, from private soldiers, warning him of the ominous tone of discontent in his army. Held by the relentless embrace of a host he now considered invincible, and despairing at last of any relief from the outside, Pemberton, on the 1st of July, requested his division commanders to give him their opinion, in writing, as to the ability of their troops "to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation." Forney, Smith, and Bowen at once replied, advising capitulation; Stevenson's opinion was little more encouraging. Pemberton then called them together, and the council unanimously resolved upon capitulation. General Bowen was sent with a flag of truce to Grant, on the morning of the 3d, proposing the appointment of commissioners to arrange terms of surrender. As the matter was resolved upon, Pemberton thought best to lose no time, and as he was afterwards severely blamed for giving to the Union arms the glory of a great victory upon the national anniversary, he replied that he had selected that day for the surrender, hoping for better terms through this gratification of the national pride.[1] To Bowen's embassy Grant replied that the only terms he would admit were those of "unconditional surrender";

W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part III., p. 983.

1863.

W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 281.

Ibid., pp. 281, 282.

Pemberton to Grant, July 3, 1863. Ibid., p. 283.

[1] General Grant does not give credit to the reasons assigned by Pemberton for choosing the 4th as the date of his surrender. "I have no doubt," he says, "that Pemberton commenced his correspondence on the 3d with a twofold purpose; first, to avoid an assault which he knew would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on the great national holiday. . . Holding out for better terms, as he did, he defeated his aim in the latter particular. . . His first letter asking terms was received about ten o'clock A. M., July 3d. It then could hardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect a surrender." — Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. I., pp. 564, 565.

July, 1863.

Bowen, being a friend of Grant's and an old neighbor in Missouri, asked for a personal interview; this Grant declined, but consented to meet Pemberton in front of the lines at three o'clock. CHAP. X.

In the afternoon, under a tree standing alone upon the hillside a few hundred yards from the rebel lines, the commanders of the two armies met, Pemberton being accompanied by General Bowen and Colonel L. M. Montgomery, and Grant by Ord and McPherson, Logan and A. J. Smith. It was a picture full of vivid and exciting interest to the troops of the two armies, who swarmed upon the parapets of the opposing lines in eager expectation and perfect security, in places where their exposure a few hours before would have been certain death. A strange and almost oppressive silence, unbroken by a single shot from the earthworks or the fleet, brooded over the scene, wrapt in the warm languor of a sultry summer evening. The two generals saluted each other, and Pemberton asked what terms of capitulation he was to expect. Grant repeated what he had said in the morning. Pemberton haughtily replied, "Then the conference may as well terminate"; and in this futile manner the meeting was on the point of breaking up, when General Bowen suggested that a conference between two of the subordinates might lead to some result. Grant neither assented nor objected to this, and Smith and Bowen retired a little way, leaving Pemberton and Grant in conversation. A few minutes later the two subordinates returned, and Bowen suggested that the Confederates should march out of Vicksburg with the honors of war. Grant promptly and smilingly rejected the propo- July 3, 1863.

CHAP. X. sition. Without coming to any conclusion the generals separated, Grant promising to send his ultimatum before ten o'clock at night; the truce to last as long as the correspondence should be in progress. Grant returned to his camp, and sent

July 3, 1863. to Pemberton the following letter:

> In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at 8 A. M. to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them. Thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, while officers are present authorized to sign the roll of prisoners.

W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 60.

Late at night Pemberton replied, accepting these terms in the main, "but in justice both to the honor and spirit" of his troops, manifested in the defense of Vicksburg, he proposed by way of amendment to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under his command, by marching out with his colors and arms, and stacking them in front of his present lines, after which Grant should take possession. He asked also that officers should retain their side-

Ibid., pp. 60, 61.



GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON.

arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens should be respected. Shortly after midnight Grant sent his final answer, acceding only partly to Pemberton's proposed amendment. "It will be necessary," Grant said, "to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the completion of the rolls of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. Again I can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. While I do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. The property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each. If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at ten o'clock A. M., and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it. Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by 9 A. M., I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified from firing upon your men." These terms were accepted by Pemberton. CHAP. X.

Grant to Pemberton, July 4, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 61.

The last shot had been fired on the heights of Vicksburg. At ten o'clock on the morning of the 4th of July the Union soldiers, standing upon the parapets of their works, witnessed with deep 1863.

CHAP. X.

emotion the army of the Confederates issuing from their sally ports, stacking their arms in front of the works which they had defended so long and so gallantly, and retiring again within their lines as prisoners of war. They were so near together that every word spoken on one side could easily be heard on the other, and it is not the least of the glories gained by the Army of the Tennessee in this wonderful campaign that not a cheer went up from the Union ranks, not a single word that could offend their beaten foes. Logan's command, which was nearest to the works, had the merited honor of marching first into Vicksburg. The soldiers of the two armies immediately began to fraternize, and the Northern boys shared the contents of their well-filled haversacks with their hungry brethren of the South. In the higher ranks this fraternization was not so prompt. General Grant was received by Pemberton and his staff, at headquarters, with sulky coldness. No one, at first, offered him a seat; when he asked for a drink of water he was told where he might find it himself; and during the interview between the two generals, which lasted half an hour, Grant remained standing while officers, girded with the swords which his magnanimity had allowed them to retain, sat sullenly about him. General Pemberton asked for supplies to feed his troops. Grant asked him how many rations would be required, and, to his amazement, Pemberton replied thirty-two thousand, for from these words the conqueror gained the first intelligence of the magnitude of his triumph. With his habit of minimizing the number of his enemy he had thought, up to this moment, that he had captured

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant," Vol. I., p. 387.

less than twenty thousand men. He rode down to the wharf and exchanged congratulations with Porter, who had rendered him such manful assistance through evil and good report during the last year, and then went back through the cheering lines of his troops to his old quarters in the camp beyond Vicksburg. CHAP. X.

The paroling of the troops was rapidly accomplished, and they marched away on the 11th of July, Pemberton vainly imploring the assistance of Grant to keep them in their ranks; the disposition to desert was so general that he feared he could not bring his army intact to its destination. This was, of course, refused. General Grant always afterwards, in his reports and in his memoirs, showed an unwonted anxiety to defend his action in thus paroling Pemberton's army. Immediately on receiving the news of the great victory General Halleck had suggested to him that this action might be construed into an absolute release, and the men be put at once into the ranks of the enemy, such having been the action of the Confederates elsewhere. Grant's defense of this proceeding was that he saved thereby several days in the capture and left the troops and the transports ready for other service. But it must be counted, on the whole, an error of judgment; for even before Pemberton, with his unarmed host, had marched away from Vicksburg, Jefferson Davis had telegraphed to him that all the general officers had been exchanged and were released from their parole, and two months later the Confederate agent of exchange notified the United States agent that all the effective troops paroled at Vicksburg 1863.

CHAP. X. were declared exchanged and ordered to duty. In spite of the protests on the part of the National authorities this lawless proceeding was carried through, and Grant confronted, a few months later, on the heights of Chattanooga, some of the soldiers to whom he had allowed such generous terms on the bluffs of Vicksburg. The confusion arising from this lasted till the end of the war, and it was due to General Grant's belief that the Confederate authorities had acted in bad faith in this matter that he maintained so rigid an attitude in regard to the exchange of prisoners during the last year of the war. On the other hand, during the march of the paroled Confederates to Demopolis, the place where they were to await their exchange, some of the results which General Grant looked forward to became apparent. Grant having refused Pemberton the means of maintaining order among his demoralized troops, the gravest indications of a mutinous spirit appeared as soon as they left Vicksburg, and continually increased as they moved along the hot and dusty roads. They insulted their officers, and at one time loudly called upon Pemberton to "come and be hanged"; all along their route they scattered the germs of discouragement and discontent.

But the victory was too great, too important, and too beneficent for criticism. Seldom in the history of the world have results so vast been attained with equal expenditure. Grant had captured 29,491 men, 172 cannon, 60,000 muskets, generally new arms which had recently run the blockade, and which were at once adopted by the regiments of our army in exchange for their own inferior

pieces, battered with use, and associated with many victories. General Pemberton's returns for March showed 61,495 actually present, and of these all that remained saved from death, wounds, or capture, on the 4th of July, were those who had escaped with Loring from Champion's Hill, and 11,000 or 12,000 more who were in the force which Sherman was chasing before him towards Jackson. The Confederate cause had lost not much less than fifty thousand supporters in this destructive campaign, and with them the control of that great artery of the West, the Mississippi River. The Confederacy was cut in two at a cost to the Union of 9362 men. There were still two years of labor, and toil, and bloodshed before the end came, but the war reached its crisis and the fate of the rebellion was no longer doubtful from that hour, in the afternoon of the 3d of July, when Grant and Pemberton sat in stern and joyless conversation beneath the oak tree on the hillside of Vicksburg, and Pickett's veterans were reeling back, baffled and broken by the guns of Meade at Gettysburg.[1]

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1863.

1 "We had lost the opportunity to cut his communications while he was making his long march over the rugged country between Bruinsburg and the vicinity of Vicksburg. Pemberton had by wise prevision endeavored to secure supplies sufficient for the duration of an ordinary siege, and, on the importance which he knew the Administration attached to the holding of Vicksburg, he relied for the coöperation of a relieving army to break any investment which might be made. Disappointed in the hope which I had entertained that the invading army would be unable to draw its supplies from Bruinsburg or Grand Gulf, and be driven back before crossing the Big Black, it now only remained to increase as far as possible the relieving army, and depend upon it to break the investment. The ability of the Federals to send reënforcements was so much greater than ours that the necessity for prompt action was fully realized; therefore, when General Johnston, on May 9, was ordered to proceed to Mississippi he was directed to take from the Army of the Tennessee three thousand good

CHAP. X.

troops, and informed that he would find reënforcements from General Beauregard. On May 12 a dispatch was sent to him at Jackson, stating: 'In addition to the 5000 men originally ordered from Charleston (Beauregard) about 4000 more will follow. I fear more cannot be spared to you.' On May 22 I sent the following dispatch to General Bragg at Tullahoma, Tennessee: 'The vital issue of holding the Mississippi at Vicksburg is dependent on the success of General Johnston in an attack on the investing force. The intelligence from there is discouraging. Can you aid him?'

"To this he replied on the 23d of May, 1863:

"'Sent 3500 with the general, three batteries of artillery, and 2000 cavalry since; will dispatch 6000 more immediately.'" — "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," by Jefferson Davis. Vol. II., p. 411.

CHAPTER XI

PORT HUDSON

THE great work of freeing the Mississippi was not complete when the flags of truce fluttered from the works of Vicksburg. Two hundred miles below, the Confederate flag still waved defiantly from the stronghold of Port Hudson. A brief review of the state of things in the Department of the Gulf is necessary to explain the circumstances under which this last river fortress fell. General Banks had been dispatched to the Department of the Gulf in the autumn of 1862. He carried with him from New York a strong force of troops — not much less than 20,000 men — and instructions to advance up the Mississippi with the forces he took and those he should find in Louisiana, to act in coöperation with General Grant to clear the river; after which he was to establish a line of land communications from New Orleans to Vicksburg, and then to plant himself in the Red River country in such a manner as to protect Louisiana and Arkansas, and form a basis for future operations against Texas; a subject which, in view of our relations with Mexico, greatly occupied, at that time, the mind of the President. Before he sailed he made so large a requisition for supplies of all sorts

NOV., 1862.

CHAP. XI. as to strike the President with dismay. He sent it back to the general with this sermon of kindly severity:

"Early last week you left me in high hope, with your assurance that you would be off with your expedition at the end of that week, or early in this. It is now the end of this, and I have just been overwhelmed and confounded with the sight of a requisition made by you which, I am assured, cannot be filled and got off within an hour short of two months. I inclose you a copy of the requisition, in some hope that it is not genuine — that you have never seen it. My dear general, this expanding and piling up of *impedimenta* has been, so far, almost our ruin, and will be our final ruin if it is not abandoned. If you had the articles of this requisition upon the wharf, with the necessary animals to make them of any use, and forage for the animals, you could not get vessels together in two weeks to carry the whole, to say nothing of your twenty thousand men; and, having the vessels, you could not put the cargoes aboard in two weeks more. And, after all, where you are going you have no use for them. When you parted with me you had no such ideas in your mind. I know you had not, or you could not have expected to be off so soon as you said. You must get back to something like the plan you had then, or your expedition is a failure before you start. You must be off before Congress meets. You would be better off anywhere, and especially where you are going, for not having a thousand wagons doing nothing but hauling forage to feed the animals that draw them, and taking at least two thousand

men to care for the wagons and animals who otherwise might be two thousand good soldiers. Now, dear general, do not think this is an ill-natured letter; it is the very reverse. The simple publication of this requisition would ruin you."

Lincoln to Banks, Nov. 22, 1862. Autograph MS.

General Banks wasted no time after his arrival at New Orleans, which was about the middle of December. Before disembarking his troops, he sent 10,000 of them, under General Cuvier Grover, to take possession of Baton Rouge, as Grover did not consider himself strong enough at the moment to take Port Hudson, which was twenty-five miles further up the river. The next movement Banks made was not so judicious: harassed by the entreaties of General Andrew J. Hamilton, the military governor of Texas, and a rather disreputable lot of local politicians whom Hamilton kept about him, he sent a small detachment to take possession of Galveston on the Texan coast, which, as soon as it landed, was captured by an overwhelming force of Confederates under J. B. Magruder, the gunboat *Harriet Lane* being taken at the same time and her gallant commander, J. M. Wainwright, killed. This happened on January 1st; an inauspicious opening for the New Year. Later in the same month General Banks set on foot an expedition to move up the Bayou Têche, and, in connection with another force, which was to leave the Mississippi River at Plaquemines, to take the post at Butte-à-la-Rose. But the Bayou Plaquemines was found to be absolutely impassable, and the expedition was finally abandoned, at the request of Admiral Farragut, who was proposing to run past the Port Hudson batteries, for the purpose of patroling the river

Banks to Halleck, Jan. 7, 1863. W. R. Vol. XV., pp. 200, 201.

W. R. Vol. XXVI., Part I., pp. 6, 7.

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CHAP. XI. between that point and Vicksburg, and who asked General Banks to make a demonstration by land to assist him. This he did, moving in the rear of Port Hudson on the 14th, and occupying the attention of the enemy by slight skirmishing, while Farragut, with the *Hartford* and *Albatross*, successfully passed the batteries on the river, the rest of his fleet, however, having failed to follow him. Banks, not having the force to make a serious attack on the Confederate works, brought his men back to Baton Rouge, and himself returned to New Orleans. He was criticized in the report of the general-in-chief for not having invested Port Hudson at that time; but General Halleck was manifestly in error in his censure, as the rebel forces at Port Hudson were then at their maximum; the official returns for that month showing a total of 20,000 men, with 16,000 ready for duty.

Banks, Report, April 6, 1865. W. R. Vol. XXVI., Part I., p. 9.

Mar. 14, 1863.

The Confederate forces in Louisiana were, at that time, commanded by General Richard Taylor. They had a post called Fort Bisland at Berwick, at the western terminus of the railroad connecting New Orleans and Brashear City; they had full command of the country from that point to Alexandria, where a strong work called Fort De Russey commanded the Red River. It was to break up the rebel force upon this line that Banks had projected the movement in the winter, and he now made preparations, as promptly as possible, considering the difficulties under which he labored from deficiency of transportation, to resume that interrupted enterprise. He started on the 11th of April with about 17,000 men, and, after a sharp skirmish, his

1863.

troops captured Fort Bisland; the Confederates retreating northward to Opelousas. Banks followed in keen pursuit, and took Opelousas on the 20th of April; Butte-à-la-Rose was captured at the same time by the gunboats, and Banks, moving northward, arrived on the 9th of May at Alexandria, driving the Confederates northwestward to Shreveport. Farragut's vessels, strongly reënforced by Porter, joined the troops at Alexandria, and a very large extent of Eastern Louisiana was thus practically restored to the possession of the Union. Banks had acted with promptness and vigor, and, with a loss of only about 600 men, he had captured 2000 prisoners and twenty-two guns, and had taken or destroyed great quantities of property of value to the enemy.

Banks, Report, April 6, 1865. W. R. Vol. XXVI., Part I., pp. 10, 11.

This enterprise, however successful and judicious as it is now seen to be, did not meet the approval of the general-in-chief, whose mind was fixed upon the purpose of a junction between Grant and Banks, to act successively against Port Hudson and Vicksburg. General Banks and General Grant, during the months of March and April, were continually in correspondence, with the purpose of effecting this object, but, with the utmost good-will on both sides, it was found to be impracticable. In the first place, the difficulties of communication between the two generals were enormous. Their letters were weeks in reaching each other, and every movement proposed in one became obsolete long before the answer was received. From this cause a serious misunderstanding arose between Halleck, Grant, and Banks, for which neither of the three can be properly

CHAP. XI. 1863. blamed. Grant made a conditional promise of reënforcements to Banks in a letter of the 23d of March; but Banks received it on the 21st of April, after the situation was materially changed. Banks wrote to Grant on the 10th of April, telling him when he could join him, and with what force; but this letter came to the hands of Grant only after the victory of Port Gibson had opened to Grant the way to Jackson. While Grant was concentrating his forces at Grand Gulf, he sent a dispatch to Banks, engaging to send him an army corps to Bayou Sara by the 25th, to coöperate with him on Port Hudson, and asking if, after the reduction of Port Hudson, Banks could assist him at Vicksburg. A month passed before the dispatch reached Banks, and, being repeated to him from New Orleans without giving date, he naturally understood the 25th to mean the 25th of May, and so answered that he would be there "probably by the 25th, certainly by the 1st," meaning the 1st of June. But as we have seen, before this answer reached the hands of Grant, he was far on his way towards the capital of Mississippi, all thought of waiting for Banks's assistance having long ago passed from his mind. He responded instantly, however, explaining why he had not waited for Banks, and urged Banks either to join him or send all the force he could spare to coöperate in the great struggle. This dispatch was promptly delivered, reaching Banks at Alexandria on the 12th of May. He answered, regretting the impossibility of joining Grant, for the perfectly valid reason that he had neither water nor land transportation to make the movement. He gave General Grant, in this

letter,[1] a full and accurate account of his situation, and announced to him his intention of investing Port Hudson, which was unquestionably the wisest thing he could do.[2]

May 12, 1863. W. R. Vol. XV., pp. 317, 318.

Banks put his troops at once in motion across the Atchafalaya on the 19th of May, marched down the bank of the Mississippi to a point opposite Bayou Sara, where they were slowly and toilsomely ferried across the river, and then moved swiftly to Port Hudson, arriving there on the 24th of May, and meeting C. C. Augur's division, which had been directed to join him from Baton Rouge. The junction was effected successfully after a slight skirmish with the enemy, whom Augur promptly repulsed. The works of Port Hudson were very strong; too strong, as it appeared in the end, to justify an assault from a force so little superior, as was Banks's, to that of the enemy. But the same consideration which impelled General Grant twice to assault the works of Vicksburg induced Banks to take the same action. He assaulted on the 25th, immediately after his arrival, and again upon the 14th of June; the result of these two attacks was precisely the same as in the

[1] In one of Banks's letters occurs a phrase which shows the difficulty of communication between these two generals, who were only two hundred miles apart: "We shall endeavor to establish communication with Admiral Farragut near Bayou Sara, but the opening of the levee opposite Port Hudson may make it impossible. If so, we will communicate with you freely by way of New York, as to our progress. I shall be very glad if you will communicate with us in the same manner."

Banks to Grant, April 10, 1863. W. R. Vol. XV., p. 296.

[2] "To avoid mistake, I directed Brigadier-General William Dwight to report our condition to General Grant in person and solicit his counsel. General Dwight returned with the advice that I attack Port Hudson without delay, and that he would give me five thousand men, but that I should not wait for them."—Banks, Report, April 6, 1865. W. R. Vol. XXVI., Part I., p. 12.


PORT HUDSON
MISSISSI
AUGUR'S DIV.
GROVER'S DIV.
PAINE'S DIV.
WEITZEL'S DIV.
STEELE'S
DWELL'S
SHERMAN'S
BUTLER'S
DIV.
BRECASTWORK
RAILROAD
BATTERY
BAYOU SARA ROAD
OPENINGS IN CANE BRAKES
HEAD QRS JUNE 14



SIEGE OF PORT HUDSON, LA.

EXPLANATION

BATTERY	1	1 30pdr Parrott	BATTERY	8	2 3in Rifled, NORRIS	BATTERY	16	1 3in Rifled, BAINS	BATTERY	24	2 20pdr Parrotts, HARTLEY
"	2	2 12pdr Howitzers, PHELPS	"	9	2 12pdr " , COX	"	17	4 8in Siege Howitzers, ROSE	"	"	3 24pdr Guns, HINKLE
"	8	4 Siege Mortars, TAYLOR	"	10	Naval Batt. 9in Dahlgren, TERRY	"	18	4 Siege Mortars, HILL	"	"	2 9in Dahlgren, LT SWAN
"	4	1 30pdr Parrott, HARROWER	"	11	6 20pdr Parrotts, MACK	"	19	6 3in Rifled, HEBARD	"	"	1 8in Howitzer, LT GLOVER
"	5	4 6in Rifled, HALEY	"	12	6 12pdr Napoleon, DURYEA	"	20	4 20pdr Parrotts, ROY	"	"	2 12pdr Napoleon, GLOSSON
"	6	6 12pdr Napoleon, DURYEA	"	"	1 20pdr Parrott, "	"	21	4 12pdr Napoleon, BRADLEY	"	"	2 10pdr Parrotts, APPLETON
"	7	2 30pdr Parrotts, McLAFLIN	"	13	3 24pdr , HADDEN	"	22	8in Siege Howitzers, BOUGH	"	"	3 30pdr " , GRIMSBY
"	8	4 12pdr Napoleon, CARRUTH	"	14	6 6pdr Sawyer, HOLCOMB	"	23	1 10in Siege Mortar, MOTT	"	"	2 10in Siege Mortars, HAMLIN
"	"	4 12pdr " BAINBRIDGE	"	15	2 20pdr Parrotts, HAMRICK				"	25	Trench Cavalier
			"	"	2 24pdr " , HARPER						

NOTE—CONFEDERATE WORKS ARE INDICATED BY ROMAN NUMBERS

J. WELLS

CHAP. XI.

case of Grant; no benefit was derived from them, except a slight advance in position, which, however, did not compensate for the terrible loss of life involved. The curious parallelism between the cases of the two commanders is continued also to the extent of their losses: about four thousand men were lost in the assaults at Vicksburg, and nearly the same number at Port Hudson. Siege operations were then resumed, the investment rendered absolutely complete, and the garrison in Port Hudson held with a steadily tightening grasp until the end.

Banks was not left to complete the capture of the place at his leisure. He had not only the care of the enemy inside the works upon his mind, but he was painfully drawn in two other directions at once. General Halleck was writing dispatch after dispatch[1] commanding him with the most cutting emphasis to go to the assistance of Grant. General W. H. Emory, whom he had left in charge at New Orleans, was sending the most importunate appeals to him to return to that city, or all would be lost. Even while the Confederate troops were marching out of the works at Vicksburg, Emory wrote: "I respectfully suggest that unless Port Hudson be already taken, you can only save this city by sending me reënforcements immediately and at any cost. It is a choice between Port Hudson and New Orleans." But, disregarding the importunities from both quarters — both imperfectly advised of the real state of affairs — Banks pursued the judicious

Emory to Banks, July 4, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVI., Part I., p. 51.

[1] "I have sent dispatch after dispatch to General Banks to join you. Why he does not, I cannot understand. His separate operation upon Port Hudson is in direct violation of his instructions. If possible, send him this dispatch." — Halleck to Grant, June 2, 1863. W. R., Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 40.



GENERAL NATHANIEL P. BANKS.

course of standing by the work in hand. The danger to which General Emory referred was by no means imaginary. New Orleans was more severely menaced than at any other time during the war. CHAP. XI.

General Taylor, after the unsuccessful attack upon Milliken's Bend, had returned to Alexandria and organized a considerable force, variously estimated at from 3000 to 5000 men. With this he had moved, in two detachments, upon Berwick Bay. He sent Colonel J. P. Major, with a force of cavalry, by way of Plaquemines, to attack Brashear City in the rear, while, with Generals Alfred Mouton and Thomas Green, he moved his main force down the Têche, and the two forces came together on the 24th, exactly at the time ordered. Taylor captured the place, taking several hundred invalid and convalescent prisoners and a large amount of valuable stores. He then sent General Green, assisted by Major's cavalry, to Donaldsonville, midway between New Orleans and Port Hudson, while he pushed another party to within twenty-five miles of New Orleans, creating little less than a panic in the city, which justified General Emory's dispatch to Banks. On the 28th Green attacked Donaldsonville, which was protected by a small earthwork and garrisoned by only 225 men of the Twenty-eighth Maine regiment, under Major J. D. Bullen. The assaulting force was about ten times that of the defenders. They attacked a little after midnight, and met with a severe repulse at the hands of the gallant little garrison and the gunboats in the Mississippi. They withdrew several miles down the river, and there erected batteries which, if they could have been made permanent, would have placed Banks's army and the city of New Orleans

June, 1863.

W. R. Vol. XXVI., Part I., p. 210.

Banks, Report.

CHAP. XI. in a most critical position. But the tremendous events which were taking place along the river rendered the well-laid plan of Taylor of little avail. When the great news of Vicksburg arrived in the Union camp around Port Hudson, it was greeted with the thunder of artillery and the joyous shouts of the Northern soldiers. The Confederate pickets, who had already established the same social relations, modified by rifle practice, which had been so long in force at Vicksburg, inquired the cause of this rejoicing, and General Gardner became thus informed of the uselessness of further resistance.

1863. He surrendered the place on the 9th of July. Weitzel and Grover were at once sent down to Donaldsonville, and, after a sharp engagement, in which neither side gained any special advantage, the Confederates withdrew to Brashear City, whither they were not very vigorously pursued. Banks retook the place on the 22d of July, and Taylor moved northward along the line of the Têche, where he passed the winter.

The fruits of Banks's victory were about six thousand prisoners actually paroled. If we add to this the 500 sick and wounded in the hospitals and nearly 800 lost during the siege, it will be seen that the campaign of Port Hudson added 6340 men to the grand aggregate taken from the Confederacy in this summer's work. They lost fifty-one pieces of artillery and over five thousand small arms.[1]

It seemed as if the stars in their courses were fighting to make everything, East and West, gild

W. R. Vol. XXVI., Part I., p. 17.

[1] General Banks says in his official report that his army captured in this campaign 10,584 prisoners; a force, he says, equal to his own at the time of the surrender.

with new luster the anniversary of American independence. One of the most brilliant of the minor victories of the war was gained at Helena, Arkansas, on the west bank of the Mississippi, on the 4th of July. General Holmes had asked and received permission to take that place, in the middle of June, and had mustered for the purpose an army of nearly ten thousand men. The garrison of Helena consisted of a division of the Thirteenth Corps and a brigade of cavalry numbering in all four thousand men, commanded by Major-General B. M. Prentiss. Holmes felt so sure of victory that he doubtless selected the 4th of July for his attack in a mere spirit of bravado. He assaulted at daylight with converging columns, two of which made considerable impression upon the outworks, but never reached the town. The defense of the Union troops was singularly skillful and energetic, and after a few hours of fighting, Holmes, finding himself utterly defeated, retired at half-past ten. The little army of Prentiss was, of course, too small to pursue. The last Confederate attempt to hold the Mississippi River thus ended in a complete and most humiliating repulse.

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Sherman, who had been ordered by Grant to hold himself in readiness to set out in search of Johnston, the moment Vicksburg fell, had obeyed the order with such efficiency that, although the city surrendered two days before the proposed assault, Sherman was ready to start within an hour from the time when the Confederates stacked their arms. He took with him a splendid army, consisting of the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, and Ninth Corps; holding the center with his own, with Ord on the

CHAP. XI. right and Parke on the left. In this order they marched rapidly on the track of Johnston, over roads thick with dust and in weather of tropical heat. There was very little water to be had along the route, and Johnston had taken pains to spoil even that scanty supply, wherever possible, by driving cattle, hogs, and sheep into the ponds, and shooting them there. But these were light afflictions to Sherman's hardy veterans, and they arrived on the morning of the 9th, in robust health and high spirits, before the field works in front of Jackson. Here General Johnston awaited them in the full hope and confidence that they would be compelled to attack him for want of water, and safely established behind his earthworks, he counted upon inflicting a severe repulse upon them. But when two days had passed, and instead of a dash upon his fortifications he found that Sherman had quietly extended his flanks to the Pearl River above and below the town, and was preparing intrenchments for his formidable artillery, Johnston's heart failed him, and he telegraphed to Jefferson Davis that it would be impossible, for want of supplies, to stand a siege, and that therefore unless the enemy attacked him he must abandon the place. Hot skirmishing began on the 12th, with continually increasing fire of artillery. General Lauman, with misdirected zeal, went too near the Confederate works and was severely handled — both in front and in rear, we may say, for at General Ord's request he was relieved from his command; a punishment rather too prompt and severe for a single error of judgment on the part of an officer of great courage and

Sherman, "Memoirs." Vol. I., p. 331.

July, 1863.

Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 207.

merit. An attempt was next made by General Johnston to cut off Sherman's artillery train, which his scouts had reported as approaching by the Jackson road. But this failing, and Johnston having heard that the train was near the Federal camp, he decided to evacuate the place, and accomplished it with that singular skill and address which never failed him on such occasions. He crossed the river upon bridges inside of his lines without exciting the least suspicion on the part of his accomplished adversary, and Sherman, for the second time, entered the capital of Mississippi, from which Johnston had retired in perfect safety and was now miles away. He was followed a little distance, but Sherman, concluding that pursuit in that torrid weather would be fatal to his army, returned to Vicksburg and went into camp. CHAP. XI.

The great work was done. The army of the Tennessee and its commanders received the enthusiastic plaudits of a grateful country. Grant was made a major-general in the regular army, Sherman and McPherson were promoted to be brigadiers in the regular service; there was no cloud upon their satisfaction over a great duty well performed; as General Halleck said in his dispatch of congratulation, they could feel that they had "deserved the gratitude of your country, and it will be the boast of your children that their fathers were of the heroic army which reopened the Mississippi River." W. R. Vol. XXIV., Part I., p. 63.

Up to this time no general in the field had shown less thought than Grant of his personal future, or of those prospects which are so frequently presented to the imagination of successful military

CHAP. XI. leaders; but it is recorded that he said many years afterwards in one of those characteristic phrases of simple directness peculiar to him, "After the capture of Vicksburg I regarded it as probable that it would fall to my lot to command the army and to end the war."

One of the minor crosses which successful soldiers are called upon to bear is the imputation that the plans of their triumphant campaigns were suggested by subordinates or dictated by superiors. But in the case of General Grant, fortunate in this as in everything else, the door was forever closed against such an imputation by the swift and generous testimony of his superiors and his most intimate subordinate; Sherman lost no time in saying that the plan of the Vicksburg campaign was Grant's, and Grant's alone;[1] General Halleck gave him this unqualified and ungrudging praise: "In boldness of plan, rapidity of execution, and brilliancy of results these operations will compare most favorably with those of Napoleon about Ulm"; while from the President came the following letter, which we believe no other ruler that ever lived would have had the magnanimity to write:

Halleck to Grant, Aug. 1, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVI., Part I., p. 63.

"MY DEAR GENERAL: I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimable service you have done the country. I wish to say a word further. When you first reached the vicinity

[1] "The campaign of Vicksburg in its conception and execution belonged exclusively to General Grant, not only in the great whole, but in the thousands of its details. I still retain many of his letters and notes, all in his own handwriting, prescribing the routes of march for divisions and detachments, specifying even the amount of food and tools to be carried along." — William T. Sherman, "Memoirs." Vol. I., p. 334.

of Vicksburg, I thought you should do what you finally did — march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below; and I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition and the like could succeed. When you got below and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks, and when you turned northward, east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that you were right and I was wrong." CHAP. XI. Lincoln to Grant, July 13, 1863.

There remained but one act to close the mighty drama of the struggle for the great river of the West, which for two years had shaken its bluffs with the thunder of artillery and had reddened its turbid waters with the blood of brothers. This was accomplished on the 16th of July, when the steamboat *Imperial* quietly landed at the wharf in New Orleans, arriving direct from Saint Louis, laden with a commercial cargo, having passed over the whole course of that great thoroughfare of commerce undisturbed by a hostile shot or challenge from bluff or levee on either shore. 1863.

CHAPTER XII

VALLANDIGHAM

CHAP. XII.

W. R. Vol. XXIII., Part I., p. 11.

GENERAL BURNSIDE took command of the Department of the Ohio (March 25, 1863) with a zeal against the insurgents only heightened by his defeat at Fredericksburg. He found his department infested with a peculiarly bitter opposition to the Government and to the prosecution of the war, amounting, in his opinion, to positive aid and comfort to the enemy; and he determined to use all the powers confided to him to put an end to these manifestations, which he considered treasonable; and in the execution of this purpose he gave great latitude to the exercise of his authority. He was of a zealous and impulsive character, and weighed too little the consequences of his acts where his feelings were strongly enlisted. He

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issued, on the 13th of April, an order, which obtained wide celebrity under the name of General Order No. 38, announcing that "all persons found within our lines, who commit acts for the benefit of the enemies of our country, will be tried as spies or traitors, and, if convicted, will suffer death." He enumerated, as among the acts which came within the view of this order, the writing and carrying of secret letters; passing the lines for

treasonable purposes; recruiting for the Confederate service; harboring, concealing, or feeding public enemies within our lines; and, rising beyond this reasonable category of offenses, he declared that "the habit of declaring sympathy for the enemy will not be allowed in this department. Persons committing such offenses will be at once arrested, with a view to being tried as above stated, or sent beyond our lines into the lines of their friends." And in conclusion he added a clause which may be made to embrace, in its ample sweep, any demonstration not to the taste of the general in command: "It must be distinctly understood that treason, expressed or implied, will not be tolerated in this department."

Burnside, Order, April 13, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIII., Part II., p. 237.

This order at once excited a most furious denunciation on the part of those who, either on account of their acts or their secret sympathies, felt themselves threatened by it, and many even of those opponents of the Administration who were entirely loyal to the Union[1] criticized the order as illegal in itself and liable to lead to dangerous abuses. The most energetic and eloquent of General Burnside's assailants was Clement L. Vallandigham, who had been for several years a Member of Congress from Ohio, whose intemperate denunciation of the Government had caused him the loss of his seat,[2] and

[1] One of Burnside's own staff-officers, Colonel J. M. Cutts, wrote to the President July 30: "Order 38 has kindled the fires of hatred and contention. Burnside is foolishly and unwisely excited, and if continued in command will disgrace himself, you, and the country, as he did at Fredericksburg." MS.

[2] At the first threat of civil war Vallandigham made haste to profess himself opposed to any forcible execution of the laws. He declared the States of the Union the only judges of the sufficiency and justice of secession, and promised he would never vote one dollar of money whereby one drop of American blood

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whose defeat had only heightened the acerbity of his opposition to the war. General Order No. 38 furnished him a most inspiring text for assailing the Government, and he availed himself of it in Democratic meetings throughout the State. A rumor of his violent speeches came to the ears of the military authorities in Cincinnati, and an officer was sent, in citizens' clothes, to attend a

May 1, 1863.

meeting which was held at Mount Vernon, Ohio,

should be shed in civil war; and in February preceding the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln he proposed to amend the Constitution by dividing the Union into four sections, giving each section a veto on the passage of any law or the election of Presidents or Vice-Presidents, and allowing to each State the right of secession on certain specified terms. Having thus early taken his stand, he retained his position with more consistency than was shown by any other member of his party. After his defeat by General R. C. Schenck, in his canvass for re-election to Congress, he renewed his attacks upon the Government and its war policy with exaggerated vehemence.

"Globe," Feb. 7, 1861, pp. 794, 795.

In a speech delivered in the House of Representatives on the 14th of January, 1863, he boasted that he was of that number who had opposed abolitionism or the political development of the antislavery sentiment of the North and West from the beginning. He called it the development of the spirit of intermeddling, whose children are strife and murder. He said: "On the 14th of April I believed that coercion would bring on war, and war disunion. More than that, I believed, what you all in your hearts believe to-day, that the South could never be conquered—never. And not that only, but I was satisfied . . . that the secret but real purpose of the war was to abolish slavery in the States, . . . and with it . . . the change of our present democratical form of government into an imperial despotism. . . I did not support the war; and to-day I bless God that not the smell of so much as one drop of its blood is upon my garments. . . Our Southern brethren were to be whipped back into love and fellowship at the point of the bayonet. Oh, monstrous delusion! . . . Sir, history will record that, after nearly six thousand years of folly and wickedness in every form and administration of government, theocratic, democratic, monarchic, oligarchic, despotic, and mixed, it was reserved to American statesmanship, in the nineteenth century of the Christian era, to try the grand experiment, on a scale the most costly and gigantic in its proportions, of creating love by force and developing fraternal affection by war; and history will record, too, on the same page, the utter, disastrous, and most bloody failure of the experiment." — Appendix, "Globe," Jan. 14, 1863, pp. 53, 54.

where Mr. Vallandigham and other prominent Democrats were the orators of the day. The meeting was an enthusiastic one, full of zeal against the Government and of sympathy with the South. CHAP. XII.

Mr. Vallandigham, feeling his audience thoroughly in harmony with him, spoke with unusual fluency and bitterness, greatly enjoying the applause of his hearers, and unconscious of the presence of the unsympathizing recorder, who leaned against the platform a few feet away, and took down some of his most malignant periods. He said it was the design of those in power to usurp a despotism; that it was not their intention to effect a restoration of the Union; that the Government had rejected every overture of peace from the South and every proposition of mediation from Europe; that the war was for the liberation of the blacks and the enslavement of the whites; that General Order No. 38 was a base usurpation of arbitrary power; that he despised it, and spat upon it, and trampled it under his feet. Speaking of the conscription act, he said the people were not deserving to be free men who would submit to such encroachment on their liberties. He called the President "King Lincoln," and advised the people to come up together at the ballot-box and hurl the tyrant from his throne. The audience and the speaker were evidently in entire agreement. The crowd wore in great numbers the distinctive badges of "Copperheads" and "Butternuts"; and amid cheers which Vallandigham's speech elicited, the witness heard a shout that "Jeff Davis was a gentleman, which was more than Lincoln was." May 1, 1863.

The officer returned to Cincinnati, and made his

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report. Three days later, on the evening of the 4th of May, a special train went up to Dayton, with a company of the 115th Ohio, to arrest Mr. Vallandigham. Reaching Dayton, they went at once to his house, where they arrived shortly before daylight, and demanded admittance. The orator appeared at an upper window, and, being informed of their business, refused to allow them to enter. He began shouting in a loud voice; pistols were fired from the house; the signals were taken up in the town, and, according to some preconcerted arrangement, the fire-bells began to toll. There was evidently no time to be lost. The soldiers forced their way into the house; Vallandigham was compelled to dress himself in haste, and was hurried to the cars, and the special train pulled out of the station before any considerable crowd could assemble. Arriving at Cincinnati, Vallandigham was consigned to the military prison, and kept in close confinement. During the day he contrived, however, to issue an address to the Democracy of Ohio, saying: "I am here in a military bastile for no other offense than my political opinions, and the defense of them, and of the rights of the people, and of your constitutional liberties. . . I am a Democrat — for the Constitution, for law, for the Union, for liberty — this is my only 'crime.' . . Meanwhile, Democrats of Ohio, of the Northwest, of the United States, be firm, be true to your principles, to the Constitution, to the Union, and all will yet be well. . . To you, to the whole people, to Time, I again appeal."

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1863, p. 474.

While he was issuing these fervid words his friends in Dayton were making their demonstration

in another fashion. The town was filled with excitement all day. Crowds gathered on the streets, discussing and denouncing the arrest. Great numbers of wagons loaded with rural friends and adherents of the agitator came in from the country; and, the excitement increasing as night came on, a crowd of several hundred men moved, hooting and yelling, to the office of the Republican newspaper. Some one threw a brick at the building, then a volley of pistol-shots was fired, and the excitement of the crowd wreaked itself on the unoffending building, which was first sacked, and then destroyed by fire. Later in the night a company of troops arrived from Cincinnati, and before midnight the crowd was dispersed, and order was restored. CHAP. XII.

Mr. Vallandigham was promptly tried by a military commission, convened May 6 by General Burnside, consisting of officers of his staff and of the Ohio and Kentucky volunteers. Mr. Vallandigham made no individual objection to the court, but protested that they had no authority to try him; that he was in neither the land nor naval forces of the United States, nor in the militia, and was therefore amenable only to the civil courts. This protest was, of course, disregarded, and his trial went on. It was proved that he made the speech of which we have already given an abstract. He called as witness in his defense S. S. Cox, who was also one of the orators of the occasion, and who testified that the speech of Mr. Vallandigham, though couched in strong language, was in no respect treasonable. When the evidence was all in, the accused entered a protest against the entire pro- 1863.

CHAP. XII. ceeding, repeating the terms of his original protest, and adding that his alleged offense itself was not known to the Constitution nor to any law thereof. "It is," he said, "words spoken to the people of Ohio, in an open and public political meeting, lawfully and peacefully assembled under the Constitution and upon full notice. It is words of criticism of the public policy of the public servants of the people, by which policy it was alleged that the welfare of the country was not promoted. It was an appeal to the people to change that policy, not by force, but by free elections and the ballot-box. It is not pretended that I counseled disobedience to the Constitution or resistance to laws and lawful authority. I never have. Beyond this protest, I have nothing further to submit."

"Annual Cyclopædia,' 1863, p. 480.

There were no speeches either in prosecution or in defense. When the court was cleared it remained in deliberation for three hours, and returned a decision that the accused was guilty of the charge of "publicly expressing, in violation of General Order No. 38, from Headquarters Department of the Ohio, his sympathy for those in arms against the Government of the United States, declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the Government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion." They therefore sentenced him to be placed in close confinement in some fortress of the United States, to be designated by the commanding officer of the department, there to be kept during the continuance of the war. General Burnside approved the finding and the sentence, and designated Fort Warren, Boston Harbor, as the

Ibid. p. 484.

place of confinement in accordance with the sentence. CHAP. XII.

But before the finding of the commission was made public, George E. Pugh, as counsel for Vallandigham, applied to Judge Leavitt of the United States Circuit Court, sitting in Cincinnati, for a writ of habeas corpus. On the 11th of May 1863. the case was heard, and extended arguments were made by Mr. Pugh in favor of the motion, and by A. F. Perry, who appeared on behalf of General Burnside, against it. But the most noticeable feature of the trial was a written address from General Burnside himself, presented to the district attorney, in which he explained and defended his action. He began by saying that he was prohibited by law and by his duty from criticizing the policy of the Government; that such abstention from injurious criticism was binding on every one in the service. He then went on to say:

> If it is my duty and the duty of the troops to avoid saying anything that would weaken the army by preventing a single recruit from joining the ranks, by bringing the laws of Congress into disrepute, or by causing dissatisfaction in the ranks, it is equally the duty of every citizen in the Department to avoid the same evil. . . If I were to find a man from the enemy's country distributing, in my camps, speeches of their public men that tended to demoralize the troops, or to destroy their confidence in the constituted authorities of the Government, I would have him tried and hung, if found guilty, and all the rules of modern warfare would sustain me. Why should such speeches from our own public men be allowed?

"Trial of Hon. C. L. Vallandigham," etc., p. 41.

He even went so far as to disapprove the use of party names and party epithets, saying: "The simple names of 'patriot' and 'traitor,' are comprehensive enough."

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> If the people do not approve that policy they can change the constitutional authorities of that Government, at the proper time and by the proper method. Let them freely discuss the policy in a proper tone; but my duty requires me to stop license and intemperate discussion, which tend to weaken the authority of the Government and army: whilst the latter is in the presence of the enemy it is cowardly so to weaken it. . . There is no fear of the people losing their liberties; we all know that to be the cry of demagogues, and none but the ignorant will listen to it.

"Trial of Hon. C. L. Vallandigham," etc., pp. 42, 43.

Judge Humphrey H. Leavitt denied the motion for habeas corpus in a long decision, in which he thoroughly reviewed the legal points involved in the case. The essential point of his decision was this: General Burnside, by order of the President, had been appointed to the military supervision of the Department of the Ohio, including, among other States, the State of Ohio. The precise extent of his authority was not known to the court, but it might properly be assumed that the President had clothed him with all the powers necessary to the efficient discharge of his duties. It is not claimed that in time of war the President is above the Constitution. He derives his power, on the contrary, expressly from the provision of that instrument that he shall be Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy. The Constitution does not specify the powers he may rightfully exercise in this character, nor are they defined by legislation. No one denies, however, that the President, in his character, is invested with very high powers, which he has exercised, as Commander-in-Chief, from time to time during the present rebellion. His acts in this capacity must be limited to such as are deemed

GENERAL ROBERT C. SCHENCK.

essential to the protection and preservation of the Government and the Constitution. And in deciding what he may rightfully do under this power, where there is no express legislative declaration, the President is guided solely by his own judgment, and is amenable only for an abuse of his authority by impeachment. The occasion which calls for the exercise of this power exists only from the necessity of the case; and when the necessity exists there is a clear justification of the act. The judge concludes that if this view of the power of the President is correct, it implies the right to arrest persons who, by their mischievous acts of disloyalty, impede or endanger the military operations of the Government. He continued:

> And if the necessity exists, I see no reason why the power does not attach to the officer or general in command of a military department. The only reason why the appointment is made is, that the President cannot discharge the duties in person; he, therefore, constitutes an agent to represent him, clothed with the necessary power for the efficient supervision of the military interests of the Government throughout the department. . . In the exercise of his discretion he [General Burnside] issued the order (No. 38) which has been brought to the notice of the court.

"Trial of Hon. C. L. Vallandigham," etc., pp. 267, 268.

Judge Leavitt would not comment on that order, but only referred to it because General Burnside had stated his motives for issuing it, and also because it was for its supposed violation that he ordered the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham. He had done this under his responsibility as the commanding general of the department, and in accordance with what he supposed to be the power vested in him by the appointment of the President. It was

CHAP. XII. virtually an act of the Executive Department under the power vested in the President by the Constitution, and the court therefore refused to annul or reverse it.

The arrest, trial, and sentence of Vallandigham took the President somewhat by surprise, and it was only after these proceedings were consummated that he had an opportunity seriously to consider the case. If he had been consulted before any proceedings were initiated there is reason to believe he would not have permitted them;[1] but finding himself in the presence of an accomplished fact, the question now given him to consider was, whether he should approve the sentence of the court, or, by annulling it, weaken the authority of the general commanding the district, and greatly encourage the active and dangerous secession element in the West. He concluded to accept the act of Burnside as within his discretion as military commander; but, as the imprisonment of Vallandigham in the North would have been a constant source of irritation and political discussion, the President concluded to modify his sentence to one which could be immediately and finally executed, and the execution of which would excite far less sympathy with the prisoner, and, in fact, seriously damage his prestige and authority among his followers.

[1] General Burnside, feeling, after the trial, that his act had subjected the Administration to violent attack, thought proper to signify to the President that his resignation was at his service if desired, to which the President answered: "When I shall wish to supersede you I will let you know. All the Cabinet regretted the necessity of arresting, for instance, Vallandigham, some perhaps doubting there was a real necessity for it; but, being done, all were for seeing you through with it." — Lincoln to General Burnside, May 29, 1863. MS.

The method of punishment which he chose was doubtless suggested by a paragraph in Burnside's Order No. 38, which had mentioned, as a form of punishment for the declaration of sympathy with the enemy, deportation "beyond our lines into the lines of their friends." He therefore commuted the sentence of Vallandigham, and directed that he be sent within the Confederate lines.[1] This was done about a fortnight after the court martial. Mr. Vallandigham was sent to Tennessee, and, on the 25th of May, was escorted by a small cavalry force to the Confederate lines near Murfreesboro. After a short parley with the rebel videttes, who made no objection to receiving the prisoner, he was delivered into the hands of a single private soldier of an Alabama regiment, Mr. Vallandigham making a formal protest to the effect that he was within the Confederate lines by force and against his will, and that he surrendered as a prisoner of war.

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The arrest and sentence of this distinguished Democrat produced a profound sensation throughout the country. It occasioned general rejoicing in the South. The Government in Richmond saw in it a promise of counter-revolution in the North, and some of the Confederate generals built upon it the rosiest hopes for future campaigns. General

[1] The order under which Vallandigham was sent south was dated the 19th of May and transmitted by telegraph from Washington to General Burnside:

"The President directs that, without delay, you send C. L. Vallandigham, under secure guard, to the headquarters of General Rosecrans, to be put by him beyond our military lines, and in case of his return within our lines, he be arrested and kept in close custody for the term specified in his sentence."— McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 162.

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CHAP. XII. Beauregard, writing to a friend in Mobile, said the Yankees, by sending Vallandigham into Bragg's lines, had indicated a point of attack. He suggested that, Hooker being disposed of for the next six months at least, Lee should act on the defensive, and send Bragg thirty thousand men to take the offensive at once. Let Bragg — or some better soldier who is sufficiently shadowed forth in parenthesis — "destroy or capture (as it is done in Europe) Rosecrans's army; then march into Kentucky; raise thirty thousand men more there and in Tennessee; then get into Ohio and call upon the friends of Vallandigham to rise for his defense and support; then call upon Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri to throw off the yoke of the accursed Yankee nation; then" — his plan growing more and more magnificent as it took grandeur and color under his pen — call "upon the whole Northwest to join in the movement, form a Confederacy of their own, and join us by a treaty of alliance, defensive and offensive. What would then become of the Northeast?" demanded the doughty Creole. "How long would it take us to bring it back to its senses?"

Beauregard to Villere, May 26, 1863. W. R. Vol. XIV., p. 955.

The feeling in the North, if less exuberant in its expression, was equally serious. No act of the Government has been so strongly criticized, and none having relation to the rights of an individual created a feeling so deep and so widespread. No further legal steps were taken in the case, except an application which was made by Vallandigham's counsel for a writ of certiorari to bring up the proceedings of the military commission for review in the Supreme Court of the

United States. This motion was denied, on the evident ground that no such writ could be issued by the Supreme Court to any such military commission, as the court had no jurisdiction over the proceedings of such a tribunal. But in the Democratic newspapers, in public meetings, in a multitude of leading articles and pamphlets, the question was discussed with the greatest earnestness, and even violence, the orators and politicians of the Democratic party regarding the incident as the most valuable bit of political capital which had fallen to them during the year. Even some of the most loyal newspapers of the North joined in the general attack, saying that, by the statutes, Vallandigham was a prisoner of state, and that the Secretary of War was bound to report him as such to the circuit judge of the district in which his supposed offenses were committed, to be regularly tried by the civil tribunal. But the principal criticism was, of course, confined to the ranks of the opposition. Their newspapers and public men vied with one another in a chorus of condemnation. To a meeting, held in Albany on the 16th of May, Governor Seymour wrote: CHAP. XII. 1863.

> It is an act which has brought dishonor upon our country; it is full of danger to our persons and to our homes; it bears upon its front a conscious violation of law and of justice. . . The transaction involved a series of offenses against our most sacred rights. It interfered with the freedom of speech; it violated our rights to be secure in our homes against unreasonable searches and seizures; it pronounced sentence without a trial, save one which was a mockery — which insulted as well as wronged. . . If this proceeding is approved by the Government, and sanctioned by the people, it is not merely a

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step towards revolution — it is revolution; it will not only lead to military despotism — it establishes military despotism. . . If it is upheld, our liberties are overthrown. . . The action of the Administration will determine, in the minds of more than one-half of the people of the loyal States, whether this war is waged to put down rebellion at the South, or to destroy free institutions at the North. We look for its decision with most solemn solicitude.

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1863, p. 689.

The meeting to which Governor Seymour sent this passionate address passed a series of resolutions insisting upon their loyalty and the services they had rendered the country, but demanding that the "Administration shall be true to the Constitution, shall recognize and maintain the rights of the States and the liberties of the citizen, shall everywhere, outside of the lines of necessary military occupation and the scenes of insurrection, exert all its powers to maintain the supremacy of the civil over military law"; and in view of these principles they denounced "the recent assumption of a military commander to seize and try a citizen of Ohio, Clement L. Vallandigham, for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting in criticism of the course of the Administration, and in condemnation of the military orders of that general." The resolutions further set forth that such an assumption of military power strikes a fatal blow at the supremacy of law. They enumerated the provisions of the Constitution defining the crime of treason, and the defenses to which those accused of that crime are entitled, and said "that these safeguards of the rights of the citizen against the pretensions of arbitrary power were intended more especially for his

protection in times of civil commotion." They further resolved: CHAP. XII.

> That in the election of Governor Seymour the people of this State, by an emphatic majority, declared their condemnation of the system of arbitrary arrests, and their determination to stand by the Constitution. . . And that, regarding the blow struck at a citizen of Ohio as aimed at the rights of every citizen of the North, we denounce it as against the spirit of our laws and Constitution, and most earnestly call upon the President of the United States to reverse the action of the military tribunal which has passed a cruel and unusual punishment upon the party arrested, prohibited in terms by the Constitution, and to restore him to the liberty of which he has been deprived.

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1863, p. 800.

A copy of these resolutions was sent to the President, and received his most careful consideration. He answered on the 12th of June, in a letter which demands the close perusal of every student of our history. He accepted in the beginning, and thanked the meeting for the resolutions expressing the purpose of sustaining the cause of the Union despite the folly and wickedness of any administration. He referred to the safeguards of the Constitution for the defense of persons accused of treason, and contended that these provisions of the Constitution had no application to the case in hand. The arrests complained of were not made for the technical crime of treason. He then proceeded, in language so terse and vigorous that it is difficult to abridge a paragraph without positive mutilation, to describe the circumstances under which this rebellion began, and the hopes of the insurgents, which were founded upon the inveterate respect of the American people for the forms of law. He wrote:

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June 12, 1863.

Prior to my installation here it had been inculcated that any State had a lawful right to secede from the National Union, and that it would be expedient to exercise the right whenever the devotees of the doctrine should fail to elect a President to their own liking. I was elected contrary to their liking; and, accordingly, so far as it was legally possible, they had taken seven States out of the Union, had seized many of the United States forts, and had fired upon the United States flag, all before I was inaugurated, and, of course, before I had done any official act whatever. The rebellion thus begun soon ran into the present civil war; and, in certain respects, it began on very unequal terms between the parties. The insurgents had been preparing for it for more than thirty years, while the Government had taken no steps to resist them. The former had carefully considered all the means which could be turned to their account. It undoubtedly was a well-pondered reliance with them that, in their own unrestricted efforts to destroy Union, Constitution, and law all together, the Government would, in a great degree, be restrained by the same Constitution and law from arresting their progress. Their sympathizers pervaded all departments of the Government and nearly all communities of the people. From this material, under cover of "liberty of speech," "liberty of the press," and "habeas corpus," they hoped to keep on foot amongst us a most efficient corps of spies, informers, suppliers, and aiders and abettors of their cause in a thousand ways. They knew that in times such as they were inaugurating, by the Constitution itself, the "habeas corpus" might be suspended; but they also knew they had friends who would make a question as to who was to suspend it; meanwhile, their spies and others might remain at large to help on their cause. Or if, as has happened, the Executive should suspend the writ, without ruinous waste of time, instances of arresting innocent persons might occur, as are always likely to occur in such cases, and then a clamor could be raised in regard to this, which might be at least of some service to the insurgent cause. It needed no very keen perception to discover this part of the enemy's programme, so soon as, by open hostilities, their machinery was fairly put in motion.

Yet, thoroughly imbued with a reverence for the guaranteed rights of individuals, I was slow to adopt the strong measures which by degrees I have been forced to regard as being within the exceptions of the Constitution, and as indispensable to the public safety. Nothing is better known to history than that courts of justice are utterly incompetent to such cases. Civil courts are organized chiefly for trials of individuals or, at most, a few individuals acting in concert, and this in quiet times and on charges of crimes well defined in the law. Even in times of peace bands of horse thieves and robbers frequently grow too numerous and powerful for the ordinary courts of justice. But what comparison in numbers have such bands ever borne to the insurgent sympathizers, even in many of the loyal States? Again, a jury too frequently has at least one member more ready to hang the panel than to hang the traitor. And yet again, he who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he who kills a Union soldier in battle. Yet this dissuasion or inducement may be so conducted as to be no defined crime of which any civil court would take cognizance.

He then applied to the case in hand the clear provision of the Constitution that, "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless, when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it," and went on to say:

This is precisely our present case — a case of rebellion wherein the public safety does require the suspension. Indeed, arrests by process of courts and arrests in cases of rebellion do not proceed altogether upon the same basis. The former is directed at the small percentage of ordinary and continuous perpetration of crime, while the latter is directed at sudden and extensive uprisings against the Government, which, at most, will succeed or fail in no great length of time. In the latter case arrests are made, not so much for what has been done as for what probably would be done. The latter is more for the preventive and less for the vindictive than the former.

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In such cases the purposes of men are much more easily understood than in cases of ordinary crime. The man who stands by and says nothing when the peril of his Government is discussed cannot be misunderstood. If not hindered, he is sure to help the enemy; much more if he talks ambiguously — talks for his country with "buts" and "ifs" and "ands." Of how little value the constitutional provisions I have quoted will be rendered, if arrests shall never be made until defined crimes shall have been committed, may be illustrated by a few notable examples. General John C. Breckinridge, General Robert E. Lee, General Joseph E. Johnston, General John B. Magruder, General William B. Preston, General Simon B. Buckner, and Commodore Franklin Buchanan, now occupying the very highest places in the rebel war service, were all within the power of the Government since the rebellion began, and were nearly as well known to be traitors then as now. Unquestionably, if we had seized and held them, the insurgent cause would be much weaker. But no one of them had then committed any crime defined in the law. Every one of them, if arrested, would have been discharged on habeas corpus were the writ allowed to operate. In view of these and similar cases, I think the time not unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than too many.

Referring to the charge made in the resolutions that Mr. Vallandigham was arrested for no other reason than words addressed to public meetings in criticism of the course of the Administration, Mr. Lincoln said:

If this assertion is the truth and the whole truth, — if there was no other reason for the arrest, — then I concede that the arrest was wrong. But . . . he [Mr. Vallandigham] was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects of the Administration, or the personal interests of the commanding general, but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence and vigor of which the life of the nation depends. He was warring

upon the military, and this gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. CHAP. XII.

If it could be shown that his arrest was made on mistake of fact, the President would be glad to correct it. But he said:

Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting, and there working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked Administration of a contemptible Government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that in such a case to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional, but, withal, a great mercy.

He then stated clearly his belief that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires them, which would not be constitutional when, in absence of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does not require them. He continued:

The Constitution itself makes the distinction, and I can no more be persuaded that the Government can constitutionally take no strong measures in time of rebellion because it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man because it can be shown to not be good food for a well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting that the American people will, by means of military arrests during the rebellion, lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by jury, and habeas

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corpus, throughout the indefinite peaceful future, which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics, during temporary illness, as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life.

The President parried the political thrust in the resolutions by reminding the gentlemen of Albany that, although they address him as "Democrats," not all Democrats are of their way of thinking:

He on whose discretionary judgment Mr. Vallandigham was arrested and tried is a Democrat, having no old party affinity with me; and the judge who rejected the constitutional view expressed in these resolutions, by refusing to discharge Mr. Vallandigham on habeas corpus, is a Democrat of better days than these, having received his judicial mantle at the hands of President Jackson. And still more, of all those Democrats who are nobly exposing their lives and shedding their blood on the battlefield, I have learned that many approve the course taken with Mr. Vallandigham, while I have not heard of a single one condemning it.

The President fortified his argument by an incident of pertinent history especially adapted to touch the sympathies of Democrats—the arbitrary arrests made by General Jackson at New Orleans; his defiance of the writ of habeas corpus, and his imprisonment of the judge who had issued it. Near the close of this strong and adroit defense of the action of Burnside the President made a remarkable admission in these words:

And yet let me say that in my own discretion I do not know whether I would have ordered the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham. While I cannot shift the responsibility from myself, I hold that, as a general rule, the commander in the field is the better judge of the necessity in any particular case. . . It gave me pain when I learned that

Mr. Vallandigham had been arrested — that is, I was pained that there should have seemed to be a necessity for arresting him — and it will afford me great pleasure to discharge him so soon as I can, by any means, believe the public safety will not suffer by it. I further say that as the war progresses it appears to me opinion and action, which were in great confusion at first take shape and fall into more regular channels, so that the necessity for strong dealing with them gradually decreases. I have every reason to desire that it should cease altogether, and far from the least is my regard for the opinions and wishes of those who, like the meeting at Albany, declare their purpose to sustain the Government in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the rebellion. Still I must continue to do so much as may seem to be required by the public safety.

Lincoln to Erastus Corning and others, June 12, 1863.

There are few of the President's state papers which produced a stronger impression upon the public mind than this. Its tone of candor and courtesy, which did not conceal his stern and resolute purpose; his clear statement of the needs of the country; his terse argument of his authority under the Constitution to suspend the writ of habeas corpus when, in case of rebellion, the public safety required it; his contrast of the venial crime of the simple-minded soldier boy, which was punished by death, with the deeper guilt of the wily agitator, who claimed immunity through the Constitution he was endeavoring to destroy; the strong, yet humorous, common sense of his doubt whether a permanent taste for emetics could be contracted during a fit of sickness — met with an immediate and eager appreciation among the citizens of the country, and rendered this letter remarkable in the long series of Mr. Lincoln's political writings. It is needless to say that it did not meet with equal

CHAP. XII. approbation in all quarters. It was received by the politicians of New York, to whom it was addressed, with the gravest displeasure. They answered in an angry yet forcible paper, claiming that the original act of tyranny by which Mr. Vallandigham was arrested had been aggravated by the claim of despotic power which they assumed to find in the President's letter. They wrote with so much heat and feeling that they hardly paused to measure their epithets; otherwise they would scarcely have been guilty of the impertinence of speaking to the President of his "pretensions to more than legal authority," and of criticizing his crystal-clear statement as the "misty and cloudy forms of expression" in which those pretensions were set forth. But it is not worth while to rescue either of these letters from the oblivion which soon overtook them. In the words of Mr. Lincoln, on another occasion, the world little noted nor long remembered them. Their first letter had no function nor result but to call into being the President's admirable reply, and the second was little more than a cry under punishment.

In the State of Ohio the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham had precipitated an issue which was in its solution greatly to the advantage of the cause of
1863. the Union. When, on the 11th of June, the Democratic Convention of the State met at Columbus, it was found to be completely under the control of those opposed to the war, and the excitement consequent upon Vallandigham's arrest and banishment designated him as the only serious candidate for the office of governor. Nominating him by acclamation was the readiest and most practical

way of signifying their disapproval of the proceedings of the Government. They passed a series of resolutions affirming their devotion to the Union, denouncing the arrest and banishment of Vallandigham as a forcible violation of the Constitution and a direct insult offered to the sovereignty of the people of Ohio, saying that the Democratic party was fully competent to decide whether Mr. Vallandigham was a fit man to be nominated for Governor, and that the attempt to deprive them of that right by his arrest and banishment was an unmerited imputation upon their intelligence and loyalty. They therefore called upon the President to restore Mr. Vallandigham to his home in Ohio.

The committee appointed to present these resolutions accompanied them with a long letter, signed by the most prominent Democrats of Ohio, arguing, upon lines similar to those followed in the letter from the Albany Democrats, that the action of the Government towards Vallandigham was illegal and unconstitutional; that it had created widespread and alarming disaffection among the people of the State; that it was not an offense against any law to contend that the war could not be used as a means of restoring the Union, or that a war directed against slavery would inevitably result in the final destruction of both the Constitution and the Union. They took up the President's letter to the Albany committee, and insisted that Mr. Vallandigham was not warring upon the military; they disagreed entirely with the President on the subject of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus; they represented the President as claiming that the Constitution is dif-

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ferent in time of insurrection or invasion from what it is in time of peace or public security, and that he had the right to engraft limitations or exceptions upon these constitutional guarantees whenever, in his judgment, the public safety required it. Having attributed to him these absurd pretensions, they proceeded solemnly to deny them, and ask:

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1863, p. 805.

If an indefinable kind of constructive treason is to be introduced and engrafted upon the Constitution unknown to the laws of the land and subject to the will of the President, whenever an insurrection or invasion shall occur in any part of this vast country, what safety or security will be left for the liberties of the people?

The President sent a reply to this letter, briefer than the one he had devoted to Albany, and not so full in its discussion of the constitutional question at issue. For his views in this regard he referred the Ohio committee to his Albany letter. He simply repudiated the opinions and intentions which the Ohio committee had gratuitously imputed to him. But he assumed the full responsibility for the exercise of the enormous powers which he believed the Constitution, under the circumstances, conferred upon him.

June 29, 1863.

You ask, in substance, whether I really claim that I may override all the guaranteed rights of individuals on the plea of conserving the public safety — when I may choose to say the public safety requires it. This question, divested of the phraseology calculated to represent me as struggling for an arbitrary personal prerogative, is either simply a question who shall decide, or an affirmation that nobody shall decide, what the public safety does require in cases of rebellion or invasion. The Constitution contemplates the question as likely to occur for decision, but it does not expressly declare who is to decide it. By necessary implication, when rebellion

or invasion comes, the decision is to be made, from time to time, and I think the man whom, for the time, the people have, under the Constitution, made the Commander-in-Chief of their army and navy is the man who holds the power, and bears the responsibility of making it. If he uses the power justly, the same people will probably justify him; if he abuses it, he is in their hands to be dealt with by all the modes they have reserved to themselves in the Constitution.

He disclaimed, in courteous language, any purpose of insult to Ohio in Mr. Vallandigham's case; and, referring to the peremptory request of the committee that Vallandigham should be released from his sentence, and to the further claim of the committee that the Democracy of Ohio are loyal to the Union, he proposed, on what he considered very easy conditions, to comply with their request. He offered them the following propositions:

1. That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the object and tendency of which is to destroy the National Union, and that, in your opinion, an army and navy are constitutional means for suppressing that rebellion.

2. That no one of you will do anything which, in his own judgment, will tend to hinder the increase or favor the decrease or lessen the efficiency of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress that rebellion; and

3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, paid, fed, clad, and otherwise well provided for and supported.

Lincoln to Committee from the Ohio State Democratic Convention, June 29, 1863.

If the committee, or a majority of them, would write their names upon the back of the President's letter, thus committing themselves to these propositions and to nothing else, he would then publish

CHAP. XII. the letter and the names, which publication would be, within itself, a revocation of Vallandigham's sentence. This would leave Mr. Vallandigham himself absolutely unpledged; the President's object being to gain for the cause of the Union so large a moral reënforcement from this clear definition of the attitude of the other gentlemen as to compensate for any damage that Mr. Vallandigham could possibly do on his return. The President concluded this letter with the same frankness that he used in that to Albany. "Still," he said, "in regard to Mr. Vallandigham and all others, I must hereafter, as heretofore, do so much as the public service may seem to require." This overture of the President was promptly rejected by the committee. They treated it as an evasion of the questions involved in the case, and as implying not only an imputation upon their own sincerity and fidelity as citizens of the United States, but also as a concession of the legality of Mr. Vallandigham's arrest and banishment.

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1863, p. 807.

Evidently nothing could come from negotiations between parties whose points of view were so far apart as those of the President and the Democratic leaders in New York and Ohio. The case must be resolved by the people of the State whose sovereignty it was said had been violated, and the issue was made in the clearest possible manner by the nomination of Mr. Vallandigham for Governor of Ohio. The convention which nominated him determined to leave no doubt of their position, not only denouncing the action of General Burnside and the President, but expressing their deep humiliation and regret at the failure of Governor

Tod of Ohio to protect the citizens of the State in the enjoyment and exercise of their constitutional rights. The Union party, meeting at Columbus, nominated for governor John Brough, a war Democrat, and adopted a brief platform of unqualified devotion to the Union, in favor of a most vigorous prosecution of the war, and the laying aside of personal preferences and prejudices, and pledging hearty support to the President. Upon this issue, clearly announced and unflinchingly adhered to, the canvass proceeded to its close. Before it ended, Mr. Vallandigham himself intervened once more — not in person, indeed, but by letters from Canada. On entering the rebel lines he had gone at once to Richmond, where he was kindly and courteously received by the Confederate authorities, although both on his side and on theirs the forms appropriate to the fiction that he was a prisoner of war were carefully observed.[1] After a conference with the leading men of the Confederate Government, he went southward and arrived on

[1] John B. Jones, a clerk in the rebel war office, made on the 22d of June, 1863, the following entry in his diary: "To-day I saw the memorandum of Mr. Ould, of the conversation held with Mr. Vallandigham, for file in the archives. He says if we *can only hold out* this year that the peace party of the North would sweep the Lincoln dynasty out of political existence. He seems to have thought that our cause was sinking, and feared we would submit, which would, of course, be ruinous to his party! But he advises strongly against any invasion of Pennsylvania, for that would unite all parties at the North, and so strengthen Lincoln's hands that he would be able to crush all opposition and trample upon the constitutional rights of the people. Mr. V. said nothing to indicate that either he or the party had any other idea than that the Union would be reconstructed under Democratic rule. The President [Davis] indorsed with his own pen on this document that in regard to invasion of the North experience proved the contrary of what Mr. V. asserted." — Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary." Vol. I., pp. 357, 358.

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the 22d of June at Bermuda in a vessel called the *Lady Davis*, which had run the blockade at Wilmington. He made only a brief stay in Bermuda, and then took passage for Halifax, Nova Scotia, where he arrived on the 5th of July. From the Canadian side of Niagara Falls he issued an address to the people of Ohio, which began with this clever and striking exordium:

Moore, "Rebellion Record." Vol. VII., Documents, pp. 438, 439.

> Arrested and confined for three weeks in the United States a prisoner of state; banished thence to the Confederate States, and there held as an alien enemy and prisoner of war, though on parole, fairly and honorably dealt with, and given leave to depart — an act possible only by running the blockade at the hazard of being fired upon by ships flying the flag of my own country, I found myself first a freeman when on British soil. And to-day, under protection of the British flag, I am here to enjoy and, in part, to exercise the privileges and rights which usurpers insolently deny me at home. . . Six weeks ago, when just going into banishment because an audacious but most cowardly despotism caused it, I addressed you as a fellow-citizen. To-day, and from the very place then selected by me, but after wearisome and most perilous journeyings for more than four thousand miles by land and upon sea, still in exile, though almost within sight of my native State, I greet you as your representative.

He thanked and congratulated the Democrats of Ohio upon the nominations they had made. He indorsed their platform, which he called "elegant in style, admirable in sentiment." He claimed that his arrest was the issue before the country. "The President," he said, "accepts the issue. . . In time of war there is but one will supreme — his will; but one law — military necessity, and he the sole judge." He was convinced that the war could never be prosecuted to a successful termination; he added:

If this civil war is to terminate only by the subjugation or submission of the Southern force in arms, the infant of to-day will not see the end of it. . . Traveling a thousand miles or more, through nearly one-half of the Confederate States, and sojourning for a time at widely different points, I met not one man, woman, or child who was not resolved to perish rather than yield to the pressure of arms, even in the most desperate extremity.

Moore, "Rebellion Record." Vol. VII., Documents, p. 439.

He announced, therefore, that he returned with his opinion in favor of peace not only unchanged, but confirmed and strengthened. But nothing availed. Mr. Vallandigham was defeated by the unprecedented majority of 101,000 votes, 62,000 of which were cast in the State and 39,000 by the soldiers in the field, to whom a State statute had given the privilege of voting. In view of this overwhelming defeat, Mr. Vallandigham thought it prudent to remain during the winter beyond the jurisdiction of the United States. He was in constant correspondence, however, with his associates and adherents,[1] and demonstrations

[1] At Niagara, Vallandigham had come into communication with one W. C. Jewett, a person who passed his time writing letters to the newspapers and to public men in favor of putting an end to the war by foreign mediation. After the Ohio election had convinced Vallandigham that little was to be expected in the way of peace from the efforts of the Democratic party, he wrote Jewett a letter strongly favoring an immediate acceptance of the mediation of France in the controversy between the States. He said: "The South and the North are both indebted to the great powers of Europe for having so long withheld recognition from the Confederate States. The South has proved her ability to maintain herself by her own strength and resources, without foreign aid, moral or material; and the North and West — the whole country, indeed — these great powers have served incalculably, by holding back a solemn proclamation to the world that the Union of these States was finally and formally dissolved. They have left to us every motive and every chance for reunion. . . Foreign recognition now of the Confederate States could avail little to delay or prevent final reunion."—W. C. Jewett, Letter to "Liverpool Mercury," November 4.

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were made from time to time against the Government for its treatment of him. On the 29th of February, 1864, Mr. Pendleton of Ohio offered a resolution in the House of Representatives that the arrest and banishment of Mr. Vallandigham were "acts of mere arbitrary power in palpable violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States," which was rejected by a strict party vote, forty-seven Democrats voting in favor of it, and seventy-six Union Members voting against it, only two Democrats voting with the majority.

"Globe," Feb. 29, 1863.

Vallandigham's course in opposition to the war had been so exasperating to the Union sentiment of the country, his speeches had been so full of vehement malice, that even those who thought his original arrest an unjustifiable stretch of military power felt no sympathy with the object of it, and were inclined to acquiesce in the President's disposition of the case. The situation was not without a humorous element also, to which the American mind is always hospitable. The spectacle of this furious agitator, condemned by court martial to a long imprisonment, and then handed over by the contemptuous mercy of the President to the care and keeping of his friends beyond the Union lines; his frantic protests that the Confederates were not his friends, but that he was their most formidable and dreaded enemy; the friendly receptions and attentions he met with in the South and among the sympathizing British officials in the West Indies and the Northern provinces; his nomination by the Democratic Convention of his State, which was forced immediately to apply to the President to give them back their candidate — affected the

popular mind as an event rather ridiculous than serious, and the constitutional question involved received probably less attention than it deserved. His letters from Canada aroused little or no sympathy, and when, in June, 1864, he returned to the United States, the President declined to take any notice of his presence. CHAP. XII.

His dramatic re-appearance came unexpectedly upon Mr. Lincoln, as his arrest had done. He had seriously thought of annulling the sentence of exile, but had been too much occupied with other matters to do it. When he heard of Vallandigham's arrival in the country, he wrote a joint letter to Governor Brough, and General Heintzelman, who had succeeded Burnside in command of the department, directing them to "consult together freely, watch Vallandigham and others closely, and upon discovering any palpable injury or imminent danger to the military proceeding from him, them, or any of them, arrest all implicated; otherwise do not arrest without further order. Meanwhile report the signs to me from time to time." But, after writing the letter, he concluded not to send it. He said, in conversation, the only question to decide was whether he could afford to disregard the contempt of authority and breach of discipline shown in Vallandigham's action; otherwise it could not but result in benefit to the Union cause to have so violent and indiscreet a man go to Chicago as a firebrand to his own party. Fernando Wood had urged him to allow Vallandigham to return, saying that in that case there would be two Democratic candidates for the Presidency. "These war Democrats," said Mr. Wood, "are scoundrelly hypocrites; they want to oppose you and favor the

MS. June 20, 1864.

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war at once, which is nonsense. There are but two sides in this fight — yours and mine, war and peace. You will succeed while the war lasts, I expect; but we shall succeed when the war is over. I intend to keep my record clear for the future."

J. H., Diary.

Emboldened by impunity, Vallandigham began at political meetings a new series of speeches more violent in tone than those which had caused his arrest. But as the effect of them was clearly beneficial to the Union cause, no means were taken to silence him. He defied the Government and the army; he made vague threats that in case he was arrested the persons and property of those instigating such a proceeding should be held as hostages. He was not molested, and in August was allowed to take a prominent part in the National Democratic Convention at Chicago, where he rendered valuable service to the Union party[1] as chairman of the Committee on Resolutions, and offered the motion that the nomination of General McClellan should be made unanimous.

McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 176.

[1] The Illinois Democrats were greatly troubled by Vallandigham's apparition. Congressman William R. Morrison said to J. H., June 18: "How much did you fellows give Fernandy Wood for importing him?"— J. H., Diary.

CHAPTER XIII

THE DEFEAT OF THE PEACE PARTY AT THE POLLS

THE reverses sustained by the Union arms during the summer and autumn of 1862 had their direct effect in the field of politics. Every unsuccessful movement, and especially every defeat of the National forces, increased the strength and audacity of the opposition to the Government and the war. There were, it is true, hundreds of thousands of Democratic soldiers in the ranks fighting to uphold the Union; and as a result of this — because men's sentiments are far more influenced by their actions than their actions are inspired by their sentiments — they were generally induced to take the Republican view of public affairs, and by degrees to unite themselves with the Republican party. But they seemed to exert no influence whatever upon their friends and relations at home. The Democratic party remained as solid in its organization, as powerful in its resistance to the Government, as ever. The great liberating measure of the President, the proclamation of September, had its influence also in exasperating and consolidating the opposition. This act, which not only renders his name immortal, but glorifies the age in which he

CH. XIII. lived, contributed to the defeat of his party in some of the more important States of the Union. In the autumn of 1862 the Democrats carried New York, electing Horatio Seymour governor over that patriotic and accomplished gentleman, General James S. Wadsworth; the adjoining State of New Jersey was also carried by them. There were heavy losses of Congressmen in the great States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana; and even in the President's own State of Illinois the opposition inflicted upon him a peculiarly painful defeat, electing nine of his opponents and only four of his friends.

1862. The Union sentiment was still sufficiently powerful throughout the North to elect an easy working majority in the House of Representatives, and the Republican predominance in the Senate was, of course, untouched; so that so far as legislation was concerned there was no danger that the Government would be embarrassed by an opposition majority. But the losses it met with in the elections were none the less serious and discouraging. A war disapproved by a free people cannot long be carried on by the will of the Government, and, if the ratio of losses indicated by the elections of 1862 had continued another year, the permanency of the republic would have been gravely compromised. But the intelligence of the American people gradually acknowledged the wisdom and accepted the leadership of the President, and moved forward to the advanced platform upon which Mr. Lincoln had placed himself. The right of suffrage given by the State Legislatures to the soldiers in the field reenforced the voting strength of the Republicans

at home, and the ballot and the bullet worked harmoniously together. CH. XIII.

Nevertheless, in the autumn of 1862, Mr. Lincoln was exposed to the bitterest assaults and criticisms from every faction in the country. His conservative supporters reproached him with having yielded to the wishes of the radicals; the radicals denounced him for being hampered, if not corrupted, by the influence of the conservatives. On one side he was assailed by a clamor for peace, on the other by vehement and injurious demands for a more vigorous prosecution of the war. He stood unmoved by these attacks, converging upon him from every quarter, and rarely took the trouble to defend himself against them. Coming from every side the pressure neutralized itself, like that of the atmosphere. To one friend who assailed him with peculiar candor, he made a reply which may answer as a sufficient defense to all the radical attacks which were so rife at the time.

I have just received and read your letter of the 20th. The purport of it is that we lost the late elections, and the Administration is failing because the war is unsuccessful, and that I must not flatter myself that I am not justly to blame for it. I certainly know that if the war fails, the Administration fails, and that I will be blamed for it, whether I deserve it or not. And I ought to be blamed if I could do better. You think I could do better; therefore you blame me already. I think I could not do better; therefore I blame you for blaming me. I understand you now to be willing to accept the help of men who are not Republicans, provided they have "heart in it."—Agreed. I want no others. But who is to be the judge of hearts, or of "heart in it"? If I must discard my own judgment, and take yours, I must also take that of others; and by the time I should reject all I should be

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advised to reject, I should have none left, Republicans or others — not even yourself. For be assured, my dear sir, there are men who have "heart in it" that think you are performing your part as poorly as you think I am performing mine. I certainly have been dissatisfied with the slowness of Buell and McClellan; but before I relieved them I had great fears I should not find successors to them who would do better; and I am sorry to add that I have seen little since to relieve those fears. I do not clearly see the prospect of any more rapid movements. I fear we shall at last find out that the difficulty is in our case rather than in particular generals. I wish to disparage no one — certainly not those who sympathize with me; but I must say I need success more than I need sympathy, and that I have not seen the so much greater evidence of getting success from my sympathizers than from those who are denounced as the contrary. It does seem to me that in the field the two classes have been very much alike in what they have done and what they have failed to do. In sealing their faith with their blood, Baker, and Lyon, and Bohlen, and Richardson, Republicans, did all that men could do; but did they any more than Kearny, and Stevens, and Reno, and Mansfield, none of whom were Republicans, and some at least of whom have been bitterly and repeatedly denounced to me as secession sympathizers? I will not perform the ungrateful task of comparing cases of failure. In answer to your question, Has it not been publicly stated in the newspapers, and apparently proved as a fact, that from the commencement of the war the enemy was continually supplied with information by some of the confidential subordinates of as important an officer as Adjutant-General Thomas? I must say "No," as far as my knowledge extends. And I add that if you can give any tangible evidence upon the subject, I will thank you to come to this city and do so.

Lincoln to Schurz, Nov. 24, 1862. MS.

The movements for peace which were made at this period on both sides of the line were feeble and without result. Henry S. Foote of Tennessee introduced a resolution in the Confederate House of Representatives to the effect "that the signal suc-

cess with which Divine Providence has so continually blessed our arms for several months past would fully justify the Confederate Government in dispatching a commissioner or commissioners to the Government at Washington City, empowered to propose the terms of a just and honorable peace." Hines Holt of Georgia offered as a substitute a resolution setting forth that the people of the Confederate States have been always anxious for peace, and that "whenever the Government of the United States shall manifest a like anxiety it should be the duty of the President of the Confederate States to appoint commissioners to treat upon the subject." But both resolution and substitute were laid on the table by a large majority. In the Senate of the United States Garrett Davis offered a resolution recommending to the States to choose delegates to a Convention to be held at Louisville, Kentucky, to take into consideration the condition of the United States and the proper means for a restoration of the Union; this was laid upon the table. Mr. Vallandigham also offered resolutions for peace in the House of Representatives; but neither in the North nor in the South was there at that time a party sufficiently powerful to bring any measures for peace to the point of legislation, though on both sides there was a strong current of agitation for the termination of the war, which, being regarded and treated as treasonable, was easily held in check.

McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 303.

"Globe," Dec. 2, 1862, p. 4.

From time to time there were unauthorized attempts of individuals, inspired by restlessness or a love of notoriety, to set on foot amateur negotiations for peace. One of the most active and per-

CH. XIII. sistent of the peace politicians of the North was Fernando Wood of New York. He held a unique position in his party. While strongly sympathizing with the secessionists, and openly affiliating with them in public, he nevertheless tried to keep up a sort of furtive confidential relation with the leading members of the Government. He frequently visited the White House, the State Department, and the Treasury Department, but emulated the discretion of Nicodemus as to the hour of his visits. No rebuffs daunted him; he apparently cared nothing for the evident distrust with which his overtures were received. He kept them up as long as the war lasted, probably in the hope that the time might come for him to play a conspicuous and important part in the final negotiations for peace. He used every occasion to ingratiate himself with the President. He wrote, congratulating him on the change in the War Department in the beginning of 1862, as indicating the President's "ability to
MS. govern, and also his executive power and will." Later in the same year he wrote complaining that the radical abolitionists of New York represented him as hostile to the Administration and as in sympathy with the States in rebellion against the Government. He denied these charges, and begged the President to "rely upon his support in his
MS. efforts to maintain the integrity of the Union."

In September, after making a speech furiously denouncing the Government for its arbitrary arrests, he wrote a confidential note to the President, making the usual explanation that he had been incorrectly reported: "All I said applied to those arrests that had been made through error or mis-

representation, and exclusively as to the truly loyal." In November, after a similar tirade, he wrote to Mr. Seward, with a striking lack of originality, making the same plea of an incorrect report. "I did not," he said, "utter the treasonable sentiments reported." Having in this way, as he thought, established himself in the confidence of the President, he wrote him a letter on the 8th of December, 1862, pretending that he had "reliable and truthful authority" to say that the Southern States would send Representatives to the next Congress, provided that a full and general amnesty should permit them to do so, no guaranty or terms being asked for other than the amnesty referred to.

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As an humble but loyal citizen deeply impressed with the great necessity of restoring the Union of these States, I ask your immediate attention to this subject. The magnitude of the interests at stake warrants some executive action predicated upon this information, if it be only to ascertain whether it be grounded upon even probable foundation. If it shall prove groundless no harm shall have been done, provided the inquiry be made, as it can be, without compromising the Government or injury to the glorious cause in which it is now engaged. If, however, it shall prove well founded, there is no estimate too high to place upon its national value.

The immediate object of his letter became evident in the following paragraph:

Now, therefore, Mr. President, I suggest that gentlemen whose former social and political relations with the leaders of the Southern revolt [*sic*] may be allowed to hold unofficial correspondence with them on this subject — the correspondence to be submitted to you. It may be thus ascertained what, if any, credence may be given to these statements, and also whether a peaceful solution of the present struggle may not be attainable.

Wood to Lincoln, Dec. 8, 1862. Corrected by MS.

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The President answered on the 12th of December. Referring to the first paragraph above quoted, he said:

> I strongly suspect your information will prove to be groundless; nevertheless, I thank you for communicating it to me. Understanding the phrase in the paragraph above quoted, "The Southern States would send representatives to the next Congress," to be substantially the same as that "the people of the Southern States would cease resistance, and would re-inaugurate, submit to, and maintain the national authority within the limits of such States, under the Constitution of the United States," I say that in such case the war would cease on the part of the United States, and that if, within a reasonable time, "a full and general amnesty" were necessary to such end, it would not be withheld. I do not think it would be proper now for me to communicate this formally or informally to the people of the Southern States. My belief is that they already know it; and when they choose, if ever, they can communicate with me unequivocally. Nor do I think it proper now to suspend military operations to try any experiment of negotiation. I should nevertheless receive with great pleasure the exact information you now have, and also such other as you may in any way obtain. Such information might be more valuable before the 1st of January than afterwards.

Lincoln to Wood, Dec. 12, 1862. MS.

These last words refer, of course, to the impending proclamation of emancipation. Between the date of Mr. Lincoln's letter and Mr. Wood's reply came the frightful carnage at Fredericksburg, which emboldened him to say that the President's reply had filled him with profound regret.

"It declines what I had conceived to be an innocent effort to ascertain the foundation for information in my possession of a desire in the South to return to the Union. It thus appears to be an indication on your part [*sic*] to continue a policy which, in

my judgment, is not only unwise, but, in the opinion of many, is in conflict with the constitutional authority vested in the Federal Government." CH. XIII.

He protested earnestly against this policy, and felt encouraged to renew the suggestions of his letter of the 8th.

"I feel that military operations so bloody and exhausting as ours must sooner or later be suspended. The day of suspension must come. The only question is whether it shall be before the whole American people, North and South, shall be involved in general ruin, or whether it shall be whilst there is remaining sufficient of the recuperative element of life by which to restore our once happy, prosperous, and peaceful American Union." Wood to Lincoln, Dec. 17, 1862. MS. To this letter the President made no reply.

Other volunteers from time to time tendered their services in the same field. Duff Green, a Virginia politician, wrote to the President from Richmond as early as the 20th of January, asking permission to visit Washington. He said that if he could see Mr. Lincoln and converse with him on the subject he could do much to pave the way for an early termination of the war. Receiving no encouragement from Washington, he asked the same permission from Richmond, but this request came to nothing. In the summer of 1863, however, an effort for peace negotiations was made, which came with such high sanction and involved personages of such individual and political importance that it requires particular mention.

About the middle of June Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Southern Confederacy, became convinced that the time was auspicious for 1863.

CH. XIII. initiating negotiations for peace. He thought he saw reasons for great encouragement in the attitude of the North; the great gains of the Democratic party in the last autumnal elections, the pamphlet of Judge Benjamin R. Curtis attacking the measures of the Administration, a public meeting in favor of peace, held without disturbance in the city of New York, in which violent speeches were made by Fernando Wood and others, and the nomination for Governor of Ohio of Vallandigham are all mentioned by him as facts going to show that the people of the North were wearying of the war. On this insufficient evidence he wrote to Jefferson Davis proposing that he should go to Washington, ostensibly to negotiate some questions involving the exchange of prisoners, but saying that he was not without hopes that indirectly he "could now turn attention to a general adjustment, upon such basis as might ultimately be acceptable to both parties, and stop the further effusion of blood in a contest so irrational, unchristian, and so inconsistent with all recognized American principles." He assured Mr. Davis that he entertained but one idea of the basis of final adjustment — the recognition of the sovereignty of the States, and the right of each in its sovereign capacity to determine its own destiny. He did not believe the Federal Government was yet ripe for such acknowledgment, but he did believe that the time had come for a proper presentation of the question to the authorities at Washington. "While, therefore," he says, "a mission might be dispatched on a minor point, the greater one could possibly, with prudence, discretion, and skill, be opened to view and brought in discussion, in a way that

Stephens, "War Between the States." Vol. II., pp. 557, 558.

June 12, 1863.

Ibid., p. 559.

would lead eventually to successful results. This would depend upon many circumstances," he adds complacently, "but no little upon the character and efficiency of the agent. . . So feeling, I have been prompted to address you these lines."

Stephens, "War Between the States," Vol. II., p. 560.

Upon the receipt of this letter Mr. Davis sent a telegram requesting his Vice-President to go immediately to Richmond. He arrived there on the 22d of June; but, in the ten days which had elapsed since his letter was written, he found that changes of the utmost importance had taken place in the military situation. On the one hand the Confederate authorities had despaired of the condition of Pemberton at Vicksburg, and expected that any day might bring them tidings of his surrender, but on the other hand they were anticipating with sanguine enthusiasm the most magnificent results from Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania. Mr. Stephens, in the work which he wrote at his leisure after the war was ended, represents that in these changed conditions he was inclined to give up his mission, thinking that no good could result from it, as the movement of Lee into Pennsylvania would greatly excite the war spirit and strengthen the war party — a view of the case in which Mr. Davis positively declined to agree. He thought Mr. Lincoln would be more likely to receive a commissioner for peace if General Lee's army was actually threatening Washington than if it was lying quietly south of the Rappahannock. The Confederate Cabinet being called together, they agreed with Mr. Davis; they thought the Federal Government might be best approached while under the threat of the guns of Lee, and before they should receive fresh hope

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and encouragement from the surrender of Pemberton, which was now considered inevitable.

Stephens, "War Between the States." Vol. II., pp. 563–566.

An arrangement was made for Stephens to proceed by land on the route taken by Lee's army, and to communicate with the Washington authorities from his headquarters; but excessive rains and the badness of the roads caused a change of route, and the invalid Vice-President was therefore saved a most distressing journey, from which he would have come "bootless home and weather-beaten back." Mr. Mallory, the Secretary of the Confederate Navy, gave him a small steamer, and accompanied by Robert Ould as his secretary, he steamed away to Fort Monroe. In any case his mission would probably have been fruitless, but he states only the truth when he claims that he arrived at an unlucky moment. He communicated with Admiral Lee in Hampton Roads on the Fourth of July, just after Lee's march to the North had ended in disastrous failure at Gettysburg. He sent the admiral a letter stating that he was "bearer of a communication in writing from Jefferson Davis, Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval forces of the Confederate States, to Abraham Lincoln, Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval forces of the United States," and that he desired to proceed directly to Washington in his own steamer, the *Torpedo*.

Lee to Welles, July 4, 1863. MS.

The titles by which Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Davis were designated in this note had been the subject of anxious consultation in Richmond. Stephens's commission from the Confederate President gave Mr. Lincoln the title above quoted to avoid the necessity of claiming the style of President for Mr. Davis; but in case Mr. Lincoln should stand upon

his dignity and refuse the letter addressed to him as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, Mr. Davis had prepared for Mr. Stephens a duplicate letter addressed to Mr. Lincoln as President and signed by Mr. Davis in the same style; if to this letter objections were made, on the ground that Mr. Davis was not recognized to be President of the Confederacy, Mr. Stephens's mission was then to be at an end, "as such conference," Mr. Davis said, "is admissible only on a footing of perfect equality." But all this care, foresight, and punctilio went for nothing. As soon as Mr. Lincoln received the telegram in which Admiral Lee announced to the Secretary of the Navy the arrival of Mr. Stephens, he immediately wrote on the back of the dispatch a note to be sent by Mr. Welles to Admiral Lee, in which, without paying any attention whatever to the style of Mr. Stephens's application, he went directly to the heart of the matter. This draft of an order ran as follows:

Davis to Stephens, July 2, 1863. Stephens, "War Between the States." Vol. II., p. 780.

You will not permit Mr. Stephens to proceed to Washington or to pass the blockade. He does not make known the subjects to which the communication in writing from Mr. Davis relates, which he bears and seeks to deliver in person to the President, and upon which he desires to confer. Those subjects can only be military, or not military, or partly both. Whatever may be military will be readily received if offered through the well understood military channel. Of course nothing else will be received by the President when offered, as in this case, in terms assuming the independence of the so-called Confederate States, and anything will be received, and carefully considered by him, when offered by any influential person, or persons, in terms not assuming the independence of the so-called Confederate States.

Lincoln, Autograph MS.

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This note he afterwards evidently considered as entering too much into detail, and he therefore caused the Secretary of the Navy to send this brief reply to Admiral Lee:

> The request of A. H. Stephens is inadmissible. The customary agents and channels are adequate for all needful communication and conference between the United States forces and the insurgents.

Mr. Stephens, when he came afterwards to relate the history of this abortive mission, frankly admitted that his ulterior purpose was not so much to act upon Mr. Lincoln and the then ruling authorities at Washington as through them, when the correspondence should be published, upon the great mass of the people in the Northern States, who were becoming, he thought, so sensitively alive to the great danger of their own liberties. He wanted, he said, "to deeply impress the growing constitutional party at the North with a full realization of the true nature and ultimate tendencies of the war"; to show them "that the surest way to maintain their liberties was to allow us the separate enjoyment of ours."

Stephens, "War Between the States," Vol. II., pp. 561, 562.

Though this hope was baffled by the rebuff which Mr. Stephens received at Fort Monroe, which prevented him from laying before his sympathizing Northern friends his view of their endangered liberties and the best means of preserving them, it may be doubted whether the partisans of peace at the North lost anything by this incident. Certainly, throughout the whole summer of 1863, they fought their losing battle with a courage and a determination equal to that which their sympathizers were displaying in the South. But the very energy and

malice with which they carried on the contest roused the loyal people of the North to still greater efforts and increased the dimensions of their ultimate triumph. The election in New Hampshire, the first which took place in the spring of 1863, while it brought victory to the Republicans, still gave painful evidence of the bitter hostility of the Democratic party to the prosecution of the war. Senator Daniel Clark, writing to Mr. Lincoln, said:

"Scarcely a Democrat supported the Administration. Almost every one who had heretofore avowed himself for the Union and the country turned in for peace and party. Yet we have beaten them. They have retired from the field. The two houses in convention will choose a Republican governor, and Frank Pierce in retirement will not have beaten Abraham Lincoln in office."

Clark to Lincoln, March 13, 1863. MS.

There were after this, during the summer and early autumn, moments of depression and discouragement in which it seemed that the malignant energy displayed by the opposition could not be without disastrous effect, and as the day of election drew near in the "October States" both sides felt justified in renewing their utmost efforts. In Pennsylvania the contest presented features of special interest. Andrew G. Curtin, who, as Governor of the State, had given not only efficient but enthusiastic support to the war, was opposed by Judge George W. Woodward, who, as one of the Democratic justices of the Supreme Court of the State, had just aimed a blow at the prosecution of the war which would have been fatal if followed up and sustained by other courts. He had declared the enrollment law unconstitutional, and upon

CH. XIII. the record thus made had been nominated for governor.

The friends of Mr. Curtin relied on the war spirit to carry their candidate through, and towards the close of the campaign they claimed,
1863. most injudiciously, that General McClellan, whose popularity was still great among the Democrats of Pennsylvania, was in favor of the election of Curtin, with whom he had always sustained friendly personal relations. Just on the eve of election this matter came to the attention of McClellan. Desiring to keep his political standing with his party intact, he sought an interview with Judge Woodward, and published a letter declaring that, "having had a full conversation with the judge, he found that their views agreed, and that he regarded his election as Governor of Pennsylvania called for by the interests of the nation."[1] But even this dilatory reënforcement of the peace party was not enough to save their canvass; the Republicans of the State were as thoroughly alive to the emergency as their opponents, and the vote polled was greater by many thousands than had ever been cast before. Governor Curtin was reëlected by a majority of over fifteen thousand, and Chief-Justice Lowrie, who with Woodward had aimed from the bench the most mischievous blow ever dealt at the enrollment bill, was defeated for reëlection by Daniel Agnew, and the court, thus reconstituted, reversed its previous judgment.

[1] This letter of McClellan was a severe disappointment to Curtin, who had regarded him as his friend. A friend (now Sir John Puleston, M. P.) who was with Curtin when the newspaper containing McClellan's letter was received said, "'*Et tu, Brute!*' was not a circumstance to it." — J. H., Diary.

In Ohio the contest was marked with equal bitterness and enthusiasm. The Democrats, working against hope but with undaunted persistency for their banished candidate, Vallandigham, were buried under the portentous majority of one hundred thousand votes. This overwhelming triumph of the Union party in the October States made success certain in the general election of the next month. The tide had turned, and the current now swept steadily onward in one way. The State of New York, which had been shaken to its center by the frightful crimes and excitement incident to the draft riots, now witnessed a great popular political reaction; and, reversing the majority of ten thousand given to Seymour in 1862, the Republican State ticket was elected by thirty thousand, and the Legislature also passed into the hands of the Unionists. The success of the year, which — as it involved the most important practical results — was dearest to the heart of the President, was that attained in Maryland. The second passage of rebel armies over her territory seemed at last to have purged the secession sentiment from that State, and four Unionists out of her five districts were elected to Congress, and an emancipation State ticket was carried by twenty thousand majority. CH. XIII. 1863.

Throughout the West the Union sentiment asserted itself with irresistible strength. An attempt marked with singular boldness and energy had been made during the year by the leaders of the peace party to gain control of the great States of the Northwest, which for a time seemed to them so promising that the rebel emissaries in Canada,

CH. XIII. being informed of it, gave encouragement to their principals in Richmond to hope for the formation of a Northwestern Confederacy in opposition to the National Government. Meetings were continually held, secret societies were everywhere active, and every effort was made in public and in private to form a basis of organized hostility against the Government. The details of this important and dangerous movement are not worth recording; its culmination may be regarded as having taken place at Springfield, Illinois, on the 17th
1863. of June. A mass meeting, enormous in numbers and wild with enthusiasm, under the presidency of Senator Richardson, listened during all a summer's day to the most furious and vehement oratory, and at last passed resolutions demanding nothing less than submission to the South. They resolved "that a further offensive prosecution of this war tends to subvert the Constitution and the Government, and entails upon this nation all the disastrous consequences of misrule and anarchy"; that they were "in favor of peace upon a basis of restoration of the Union"; for the accomplishment of which they proposed "a national Convention to settle upon terms of peace, which should have in view the restoration of the Union as it was, and the securing by constitutional amendment of such rights of the several States, and people thereof, as honor and justice demand."

This bold challenge was accepted by the Republicans with equal determination and superior means. The guns of Vicksburg and of Gettysburg might have been regarded as sufficient answer to the resolutions of the Springfield mass meeting; but the

Copperheads[1] of that State only clamored the louder for peace after these great victories, and the political canvass went on with tenfold vehemence in the tacit truce of arms that followed the battles of July. The Republicans prepared for the beginning of September the greatest mass meeting of the campaign; and to give especial significance to the occasion, it was to take place at the home of Lincoln, on the very spot where defiant treason had trumpeted to the world its challenge in June.

It was the ardent wish of the Illinois Republicans that Mr. Lincoln might be with them on this important day. James C. Conkling, Chairman of the Committee of Arrangements, wrote, urging him to come in person. He said:

> There is a bad element in this State, as well as others, and every public demonstration in favor of law and order and constitutional government will have a favorable influence. The importance of our meeting, therefore, at the capital of a State which has sent so many soldiers into the army, and which exercises such a controlling power in the West, cannot be overestimated.

Conkling to Lincoln, Aug. 21, 1863. MS.

For a moment the President cherished the hope of going to Springfield, and once more in his life renewing the sensation, so dear to politicians, of personal contact with great and enthusiastic masses, and of making one more speech to shouting thou-

[1] The "peace Democrats" of the North were variously nicknamed "Butternuts" and "Copperheads." The former name referred to the domestic dye which gave color to the uniforms of the Confederate soldiers, and the latter was the name of the most venomous snake in the West. In each case the nickname was assumed and borne with bravado by the younger Democrats, who, in some instances, wore butternuts as breastpins, and in others, with a clever return upon their opponents, cut the copper head of the Goddess of Liberty from the old-fashioned red cent and, with a pin fastened to its back, wore it as their cognizance.

CH. XIII. sands of his fellow-citizens. The temptation, however, only lasted for a moment; and instead of going, he wrote a letter which was read amid the hushed attention of an immense auditory, and passed in a moment into the small number of American political classics. The meeting was an extraordinary one in numbers and in hot tumultuous feeling; it was addressed by the greatest orators of the Republican party; speaking went on continuously at many stands from morning until twilight. The speeches were marked by the most advanced and unflinching Republican doctrine; the proclamation of emancipation, the arming of negroes, received universal adhesion; and, of course, every reference to Mr. Lincoln's name was received with thunders of applause; but with all these features of the highest interest and importance, the meeting can only live in the memories of men as the occasion of the letter

Aug. 26, 1863. which Mr. Lincoln wrote to its chairman. He said:

> Your letter, inviting me to attend a mass meeting of unconditional Union men, to be held at the capital of Illinois on the 3d day of September, has been received. It would be very agreeable to me to thus meet my old friends at my own home, but I cannot just now be absent from here so long as a visit there would require.
>
> The meeting is to be of all those who maintain unconditional devotion to the Union, and I am sure my old political friends will thank me for tendering, as I do, the nation's gratitude to those other noble men whom no partisan malice or partisan hope can make false to the nation's life.
>
> There are those who are dissatisfied with me. To such I would say: You desire peace, and you blame me that we do not have it. But how can we attain it? There are but three conceivable ways. First, to suppress the rebellion by force of arms. This I am trying to do. Are you for it? If you are, so far we are agreed. If you are not

for it, a second way is to give up the Union. I am against this. Are you for it? If you are, you should say so plainly. If you are not for force, nor yet for dissolution, there only remains some imaginable compromise.

I do not believe any compromise embracing the maintenance of the Union is now possible. All I learn leads to a directly opposite belief. The strength of the rebellion is its military — its army. That army dominates all the country and all the people within its range. Any offer of terms made by any man or men within that range, in opposition to that army, is simply nothing for the present, because such man or men have no power whatever to enforce their side of a compromise if one were made with them.

To illustrate: Suppose refugees from the South and peace men of the North get together in Convention and frame and proclaim a compromise embracing a restoration of the Union, in what way can that compromise be used to keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania? Meade's army can keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania, and I think can ultimately drive it out of existence. But no paper compromise to which the controllers of Lee's army are not agreed can at all affect that army. In an effort at such compromise we should waste time which the enemy would improve to our disadvantage, and that would be all.

A compromise, to be effective, must be made either with those who control the rebel army, or with the people first liberated from the domination of that army by the success of our own army. Now, allow me to assure you that no word or intimation from that rebel army, or from any of the men controlling it, in relation to any peace compromise, has ever come to my knowledge or belief. All charges and insinuations to the contrary are deceptive and groundless. And I promise you that if any such proposition shall hereafter come, it shall not be rejected and kept a secret from you. I freely acknowledge myself the servant of the people according to the bond of service,— the United States Constitution,— and that as such I am responsible to them.

But, to be plain, you are dissatisfied with me about the negro. Quite likely there is a difference of opinion be-

CH. XIII. tween you and myself upon that subject. I certainly wish that all men could be free, while I suppose you do not. Yet I have neither adopted nor proposed any measure which is not consistent with even your view, provided you are for the Union. I suggested compensated emancipation, to which you replied you wished not to be taxed to buy negroes. But I had not asked you to be taxed to buy negroes, except in such way as to save you from greater taxation to save the Union exclusively by other means.

You dislike the Emancipation Proclamation, and perhaps would have it retracted. You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I think the Constitution invests its Commander-in-Chief with the law of war in time of war. The most that can be said — if so much — is that slaves are property. Is there, has there ever been, any question that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it helps us or hurts the enemy? Armies, the world over, destroy enemies' property when they cannot use it, and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded as barbarous or cruel. Among the exceptions are the massacre of vanquished foes and noncombatants, male and female.

But the proclamation, as law, either is valid or is not valid. If it is not valid it needs no retraction. If it is valid it cannot be retracted, any more than the dead can be brought to life. Some of you profess to think its retraction would operate favorably for the Union. Why better after the retraction than before the issue? There was more than a year and a half of trial to suppress the rebellion before the proclamation issued; the last one hundred days of which passed under an explicit notice that it was coming, unless averted by those in revolt returning to their allegiance. The war has certainly progressed as favorably for us since the issue of the proclamation as before.

I know, as fully as one can know the opinions of others, that some of the commanders of our armies in the field, who have given us our most important successes, believe the emancipation policy and the use of the colored troops

constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion, and that at least one of these important successes could not have been achieved when it was but for the aid of black soldiers. Among the commanders holding these views are some who have never had any affinity with what is called Abolitionism or with Republican party politics, but who hold them purely as military opinions. I submit these opinions as being entitled to some weight against the objections often urged that emancipation and arming the blacks are unwise as military measures, and were not adopted as such in good faith.

You say you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem willing to fight for you — but no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively to save the Union. I issued the proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all resistance to the Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will be an apt time then for you to declare you will not fight to free negroes. I thought that in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the enemy in his resistance to you. Do you think differently? I thought that whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do in saving the Union. Does it appear otherwise to you? But negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do anything for us if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even the promise of freedom. And the promise, being made, must be kept.

The signs look better. The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea. Thanks to the great Northwest for it. Nor yet wholly to them. Three hundred miles up they met New England, Empire, Keystone, and Jersey, hewing their way right and left. The sunny South, too, in more colors than one, also lent a hand. On the spot, their part of the history was jotted down in black and white. The job was a great national one, and let none be banned who bore an honorable part in it. And while those who have cleared the great river may well be proud, even that is not all. It is hard to say that anything has been more bravely and well done than at Antietam, Mur-

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freesboro, Gettysburg, and on many fields of lesser note. Nor must Uncle Sam's web-feet be forgotten. At all the watery margins they have been present. Not only on the deep sea, the broad bay, and the rapid river, but also up the narrow, muddy bayou; and wherever the ground was a little damp, they have been and made their tracks. Thanks to all. For the great Republic — for the principle it lives by and keeps alive — for man's vast future — thanks to all.

Peace does not appear so distant as it did. I hope it will come soon, and come to stay; and so come as to be worth the keeping in all future time. It will then have been proved that among free men there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet, and that they who take such appeal are sure to lose their case and pay the cost. And then there will be some black men who can remember that with silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised bayonet they have helped mankind on to this great consummation; while I fear there will be some white ones unable to forget that with malignant heart and deceitful speech they strove to hinder it.

Lincoln to James C. Conkling, Aug. 26, 1863.

Still, let us not be over sanguine of a speedy, final triumph. Let us be quite sober. Let us diligently apply the means, never doubting that a just God, in his own good time, will give us the rightful result.

Among all the state papers of Mr. Lincoln from his nomination to his death this letter is unique. It may be called his last stump-speech, the only one made during his Presidency. We find in it all the qualities that made him in Illinois the incomparable political leader of his party for a generation. There is the same close, unerring logic, the same innate perception of political conduct, the same wit and sarcasm, the same touch of picturesque eloquence, which abounded in his earlier and more careless oratory, but all wonderfully heightened, strengthened, and chastened by a sense



HENRY WILSON.

of immense responsibility. In this letter, which the chairman took only ten minutes to read, he said more than all the orators at all the stands. It was, like most of his speeches, addressed principally to his opponents, and in this short space he appealed successively to their reason, to their sympathies, and to their fears. By a succession of unanswerable syllogisms he showed them how untenable was their position. He appealed to their generosity, to their sense of duty, to their patriotism, even to their love of glory, and in the end he held out to them with dignified austerity the prospect of shame and self-reproach which lay before them if they continued their hostility to the sacred cause of humanity and nationality. The style of this letter is as remarkable as its matter; each sentence, like a trained athlete, is divested of every superfluous word and syllable, yet nowhere is there a word lacking, any more than a word too much. Modest as he was, he knew the value of his own work, and when a friend called to ask him if he was going to Springfield he replied, "No, I shall send them a letter instead; and it will be a rather good letter."[1] CH. XIII.

[1] Nothing he ever uttered had a more instantaneous success. Mr. Sumner immediately wrote to him: "Thanks for your true and noble letter. It is a historical document. The case is admirably stated, so that all but the wicked must confess its force. It cannot be answered." Henry Wilson wrote him: "God Almighty bless you for your noble, patriotic, and Christian letter. It will be on the lips and in the hearts of hundreds of thousands this day." Among the letters which the President most appreciated was one from the venerable Josiah Quincy, then ninety-one years of age, who wrote: "Old age has its privileges, which I hope this letter will not exceed; but I cannot refrain from expressing to you my gratification and my gratitude for your letter to the Illinois Convention — happy, timely, conclusive, and effective. What you say concerning emancipation, your proclamation, and your course of proceeding in relation to it was due to truth MS. MS.

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The Springfield Convention, taking up the gauntlet thrown down by the disloyal mass-meeting of June, resolved "that we will lay aside all party questions and forget all party prejudices and devote ourselves unreservedly to the support of our Government, until the rebellion shall be finally and forever crushed"; they resolved that "whatever else may die, the Union shall live to perpetuate civil liberty; whatever else may perish, the Government shall survive in all its constitutional integrity; whatever else may be destroyed, the nation shall be preserved in its territorial unity; and to this end we pledge anew our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor."

"History of Sangamon County," p. 315.

In this spirit the campaign was fought through to its victorious close, and on the night of the 3d of November the President, sitting in the War Department, had the pleasure of learning from all the clicking wires about him that the cause of nationality and freedom was triumphant from one end of the Union to the other; that the people had come up fully abreast of him on the question of emancipation, and that the nation was now substantially united in the resolute purpose to prosecute the war to its legitimate conclusion. These

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and to your own character, shamefully assailed as it has been. The development is an imperishable monument of wisdom and virtue." After discussing the question of emancipation, he continued: "I write under the impression that the victory of the United States in this war is inevitable; compromise is impossible. Peace on any other basis would be the establishment of two nations, each hating the other, both military, both necessarily warlike, their territories interlocked with a tendency of never-ceasing hostility. Can we leave to posterity a more cruel inheritance, or one more hopeless of happiness and prosperity?" Mr. Lincoln answered this letter in a tone expressive of his reverence for the age and illustrious character of the writer.

MS.

victories at the polls made sure the good results of this summer of battles; the Administration felt itself confirmed anew and strengthened for the work before it. To those members of the Administration who had formerly acted with the Democratic party there was a certain sense of humiliation and disappointment. Mr. Stanton said, "The disheartening thing in the affair was that there seemed to be no patriotic principle left in the Democratic party, the whole organization voting solidly against the country." Mr. Seward, on the contrary, came back from Auburn, where he had gone home to vote, in high content. He considered the political attitude of New York absolutely safe in the present and future. He thought "the crowd that follows power had come over to the Republicans; the Democrats had lost their leaders when Toombs and Davis and Breckinridge forsook them and went South; the inferior Northern Democrats who succeeded to the leadership had proved their incompetency; the best and most energetic portion of the rank and file of the party were now voting shoulder to shoulder with the Republicans. No party," he said, "can survive an opposition to a war. The Revolutionary heroes were political oracles till 1812, and afterwards the 'soldiers of the late war' succeeded to their honors. But we are hereafter a nation of soldiers. These people will be trying to forget years hence that they ever opposed this war. I had to carry affidavits to prove I had nothing to do with the Hartford Convention. Now the party that gained eminence by the folly of the Federalists in opposing the war have the chalice commended to their own

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J. H., Diary, Nov. 3, 1864.

CH. XIII. lips. I told the Democratic leaders," he said, with his habitual subacid good nature, "how they might have saved themselves and carried the next Presidential election by being more loyal and earnest in support of the Administration than the Republican party. The Lord knows that would not have been hard."

J. H., Diary., Nov. 8, 1864.

Although in this memorable contest the Republicans presented a united front to the common enemy, within their own organization there were those bitter differences of opinion which always arise among men of strong convictions. The President's anteroom was thronged with earnest men who desired to warn him in person against the machinations of other men equally earnest, and his mail was encumbered by letters from every part of the country, and every shade of faction, filled with similar denunciations and warnings. The pure and able Senator Dixon of Connecticut wrote: "The heresies of Sumner are doing immense harm in a variety of ways. If his doctrine prevails this country will be ruined. I do hope you and Mr. Seward will stand firm."

MS.

From the other wing of the party came the most passionate denunciations of Seward and those who were associated with him in the popular mind; and after the election Senator Zachariah Chandler of Michigan, one of the most powerful of the Republicans who had by this time assumed to themselves the title of Radicals, having seen in the newspapers a paragraph that Mr. Thurlow Weed and Governor Morgan had been in consultation with the President in regard to his message, wrote a vehement letter to the President, telling him there was a "pa-

triotic organization in all the free and border States, containing to-day over one million of voters, every man of whom is your friend upon the Radical measures of your Administration; but there is not a Seward, Weed, or Blair man among them all. How are these men," he asked, "to be of service to you in any way? They are a millstone about your neck. You drop them and they are politically ended forever. . . . Conservatives and traitors are buried together. For God's sake don't exhume their remains in your message. They will smell worse than Lazarus did after he had been buried three days." There was no man slower than Mr. Lincoln to take personal offense at even the most indiscreet advice or censure; but he answered this letter of Mr. Chandler in a tone of unusual dignity and severity. "I have seen," he said, "Governor Morgan and Thurlow Weed separately, but not together, within the last ten days; but neither of them mentioned the forthcoming message or said anything, so far as I can remember, which brought the thought of the message to my mind. I am very glad the elections this autumn have gone favorably and that I have not by native depravity or under evil influences done anything bad enough to prevent the good result. I hope to 'stand firm' enough to not go backward, and yet not go forward fast enough to wreck the country's cause."

Chandler to Lincoln, Nov. 15, 1863. MS.

Lincoln to Chandler, Nov. 20, 1863. MS.

In the month of October Mr. Hood, the postmaster at Chattanooga, wrote to the President a letter setting forth the particulars of a scheme which Emerson Etheridge, Clerk of the House of Representatives, had entered into to give control of the next House to the opposition. Etheridge was a

CH. XIII. Member of Congress from Tennessee before the war, and his sincere attachment to the Union in the face of much obloquy and persecution at home had endeared him to the Republicans in Congress and caused him to be given the post of Clerk of the House; but in the course of two years of war he had become separated from his former political affiliations and now sympathized with the opposition. Mr. Hood, who wrote apparently with great regret as a personal friend of Etheridge, claimed to have become aware of Etheridge's intention to leave off the rolls of the House the names of all Members whose certificates did not bear on their face the statement that they had been elected "according to the laws of the State or of the United States." He based this action upon the provisions of a law which had been hurriedly passed during the last day of the Thirty-seventh Congress. At the same time it was understood that he had intimated to the Democratic Members what his action would be, so as to allow them to provide themselves with certificates in the form required.

The President, on the receipt of this news, put himself confidentially in communication with leading Republicans in all the loyal States, requesting them, without publicity, to have prepared duplicate certificates meeting the objection which it was thought Etheridge would raise to the ordinary ones. This was in most cases attended to, but not in all, so that when the Members began to arrive in Washington a few days before the day fixed for the opening of Congress a general impression of the contemplated action of Etheridge had transpired, and there was some uneasiness in regard to the

issue. The President had done what he could to meet the legal requirements of the case; but, that having been done, he was not inclined to rely exclusively upon moral force. In view of the threatened outrage he sent for some of the leading Congressmen and told them the main thing was to be sure that all the Union Members should be present. "Then," he said, "if Mr. Etheridge undertakes revolutionary proceedings, let him be carried out on a chip, and let our men organize the House." This practical solution of the trouble had occurred to others, and the Rev. Owen Lovejoy, disregarding for a moment the etiquette of his sacred calling, announced that he was quite ready himself to take charge of Etheridge, and was confident of his muscular superiority to the Tennesseean.

J. G. N., Personal Memoranda. MS.

There was not so much uncertainty in regard to the issue as to prevent an animated contest among the Republicans for the caucus nomination for the Speakership. The prominent candidates were Schuyler Colfax of Indiana and Elihu B. Washburne of Illinois. Samuel S. Cox of Ohio was the principal candidate for the barren honor of the caucus nomination among the Democrats; though for some time before the meeting of Congress there was a good deal of not very practical talk in regard to the nomination of General Frank P. Blair of Missouri as a compromise candidate to be supported by the Democrats and by a few of the so-called Conservative Republicans. General Blair, while one of the earliest and ablest Republicans of the border States, one who had distinguished himself equally in politics and in the field in the cause

CH. XIII. of freedom and of progress, had, through the vehemence of the factional fight which had so long been raging in Missouri, been gradually forced, partly by the denunciations of his enemies and partly by his own combative instincts, into an attitude almost of hostility to the Republican party of the nation. Mr. Lincoln saw this with great regret. He had a high personal regard for Blair, and deplored the predicament into which his passionate temper and the assaults of his enemies were gradually crowding him. In the autumn of 1863 the Postmaster-General, in conversation with the President, said that his brother Frank would be guided by the President's wishes as to whether he should continue with his command in the field or take the seat in Congress to which he had been elected from Missouri. The President answered in a letter,

1863. dated 2d of November, saying:

> Some days ago I understood you to say that your brother, General Frank Blair, desires to be guided by my wishes as to whether he will occupy his seat in Congress or remain in the field. My wish, then, is compounded of what I believe will be best for the country and best for him; and it is that he will come here, put his military commission in my hands, take his seat, go into caucus with our friends, abide the nominations, help elect the nominees, and thus aid to organize a House of Representatives which will really support the Government in the war. If the result shall be the election of himself as Speaker, let him serve in that position; if not, let him retake his commission and return to the army. For the country this will heal a dangerous schism; for him it will relieve from a dangerous position. By a misunderstanding, as I think, he is in danger of being permanently separated from those with whom only he can ever have a real sympathy — the sincere opponents of slavery. It will be a mistake if he shall allow the provocations offered

him by insincere time-servers to drive him out of the house of his own building. He is young yet. He has abundant talent — quite enough to occupy all his time without devoting any to temper. He is rising in military skill and usefulness. His recent appointment to the command of a corps, by one so competent to judge as General Sherman, proves this. In that line he can serve both the country and himself more profitably than he could as a Member of Congress on the floor. The foregoing is what I would say if Frank Blair were my brother instead of yours. CH. XIII. Lincoln to Montgomery Blair, Nov. 2, 1863. MS.

In pursuance of this letter Blair came to Washington, though before Congress assembled his candidacy for the Speakership had passed out of sight. He took his seat, served for some months, and went back to the army in command of a corps, as the President had promised. This relinquishment of and restoration to a high command in the army occasioned much feeling and a violent attack upon the President on the part of the Radical Republicans, which continued even after he had submitted in a message to Congress the entire correspondence, which reflected nothing but credit upon all parties.

The canvass for Speaker closed on Saturday night, the 5th of December, Washburne withdrawing from the field and Colfax being nominated by acclamation. All the next day there was great excitement at the hotels frequented by politicians, in regard to Etheridge's proposed course of action, which was now no longer a secret to any one. The comments he everywhere heard upon his conduct had its effect upon his nerves, and he began to talk in a complaining and apologetic tone, saying he was simply obeying the law and there was no rea- 1863.

CH. XIII. Dec. 7, 1863.

son why Republicans should regard him vindictively. The next day, when the House opened, while he did not flinch from the position he had occupied, he did nothing arbitrary or revolutionary. He left off the roll the names of all those Members whose certificates were not, in his opinion, in due form, but readily entertained a motion to restore them. This met with a hot protest from some of the pro-slavery Members, but a vote was taken showing a majority of twenty for the Government. Mr. Washburne nominated Mr. Colfax, and he was elected by the same majority in a total vote of 181, the Democratic vote being scattered among many Members, Mr. Cox receiving more than any other.

As soon as Congress came together Fernando Wood renewed his furtive overtures with the Government for the appointment of peace commissioners from what he called his wing of the Democratic party, making no secret of his belief that he himself was the most appropriate choice which could be made for such a function. He urged the President to publish some sort of amnesty for the Northern sympathizers with the rebellion which would include Mr. Vallandigham and permit him to return to the country. He promised that in that case there should be two Democratic candidates in the field at the next Presidential election. The President declined his proposition, but he would not take no for an answer. He called again on the morning of the 14th of December and the President refused to see him, merely sending word by a servant that he had nothing further to say to him. Later in the day

J. G. N., Personal Memoranda. MS.

Mr. Wood offered, in the House of Representatives, a resolution requesting the President to appoint commissioners, "to open negotiations with the authorities at Richmond to the end that this bloody, destructive, and inhuman war shall cease, and the Union be restored upon terms of equity, fraternity, and equality under the Constitution." "Globe," Dec. 14, 1863, p. 21.

This resolution was laid upon the table by a party vote, and Green Clay Smith of Kentucky offered resolutions opposing "any . . . proposition for peace from any quarter so long as there shall be found a rebel in arms against the Government; and we ignore," the resolutions continued, "all party names, lines, and issues, and recognize but two parties in this war — patriots and traitors." Second: "That we hold it to be the duty of Congress to pass all necessary bills to supply men and money, and the duty of the people to render every aid in their power to the constituted authorities of the Government in the crushing out of the rebellion and in bringing the leaders thereof to condign punishment." The third resolution tendered the thanks of Congress to the soldiers in the field. The first resolution was passed by a party vote of ninety-three to sixty-five; the second and third were passed unanimously, with the exception of B. G. Harris of Maryland. Several times during the session this battle of resolutions was renewed, but always with the same result; the Democratic party constantly favoring negotiations for peace while as constantly declaring their devotion to the Union, and the Republicans repudiating every suggestion of negotiation or compromise so long as the enemies of the republic bore arms against it. "Globe," Dec. 17, 1863, pp. 46, 47.

CHAPTER XIV

MAXIMILIAN

CHAP. XIV. AT the beginning of the year 1863 the French had made but little headway in their conquest of Mexico. They had an army of less than thirty thousand men distributed from Vera Cruz to Orizaba and scattered about in other more or less important posts. The Mexicans had a force considerably larger than this. The greater part of their army was concentrated at Puebla, with all the points between that city and the capital strongly held and a large reserve under Alvarez in the State of Guerrero. It was not until near the end of
1863. February that General Forey felt strong enough to advance from Orizaba upon the capital. He had learned caution from his former misadventure, and now advanced in heavy force and with great circumspection, sending before him proclamations of the most pacific intentions. The national troops gathered to meet him with the best array that a distracted country could furnish, and by the middle of March the siege of Puebla was fairly begun. It took a month of fighting before the French had penetrated into the city, and even then their advance was disputed by the Mexicans from street to street, and almost from house to house, with the

most desperate valor, and as late as the 25th of April the French received their severest repulse in the assault which they made upon the fortified convent of St. Inez. But on the 8th of May General Comonfort, who commanded the coöperating force outside of the city, was totally defeated by General Bazaine near the village of St. Lorenzo, and driven away towards Mexico, leaving Forey free to reduce Puebla at his leisure. CHAP. XIV. 1863.

The city fell on the 19th of May, after a laborious and costly siege of two months, the French capturing some fifteen thousand men, of whom twenty-three were generals. The Mexicans could not recover from this double defeat in time to oppose the triumphant march of the invaders. With Comonfort's army totally defeated and Ortega's captured or disbanded, there was no possibility of interposing an effectual resistance to the advance on the city of Mexico, and on the 10th of June Forey entered the capital amidst demonstrations of delight from the French population and the reactionary church party, which might well have deceived him in regard to the sentiments of the majority of the people. He issued a manifesto announcing that his mission had but two objects, one being the glory of the French arms, and the other the establishment in Mexico of a government which should practice justice, probity, and good faith in its foreign relations and liberty at home; "but liberty," he gave it to be understood, "walking in the path of order, with respect for religion, property, and family."

He at once organized, with the assistance of M. de Saligny, his diplomatic colleague, a provisional

CHAP. XIV. government. He appointed a superior council of thirty-five, which in turn elected a triumvirate, consisting of General Almonte, the Archbishop of Mexico, and General Salas, which formed the executive power. An assembly of notables was then
1863. called together, which convened on the 10th of July, and at once, with a unanimity rarely encountered off the stage, declared for an imperial government and selected as emperor the Archduke Maximilian of Austria. The next month an imposing deputation, at the head of which was Señor Gutierrez de Estrada, sailed for Europe charged to tender the crown of Mexico to Prince Maximilian, and, in case of his refusal, to any one whom the Emperor of France should designate.

General Forey had done his work with only too much promptness and zeal. The demonstrations of joy and enthusiasm in favor of a new government which he reported to the Emperor had been too exclusively confined to the immediate neighborhood of his headquarters, and the Emperor of France could not but anticipate the derision of Europe at a revolution so fundamental accomplished in so few days and in the shadow of so few bayonets. The junta, nominated by a French soldier, had appointed an executive power which, in turn, had called together an assembly of two hundred notables, who had with absurd unanimity founded without an hour's debate a new government and a new dynasty. The Emperor, who had a passion for plebiscites, felt that this brusque handiwork of his soldiers needed the sanction of something which should at least appear like a popular vote, and he therefore instructed his general in Mexico, by a

dispatch written on the same day the crown-bearing deputation sailed for Europe, that he accepted this action of the assembly of notables merely as a "symptom of favorable augury"; he regarded their vote as having no validity in itself, but simply as a recommendation to the real voters. "It is now," he said, "the part of the provisional government to collect these suffrages of the people in such a manner that no doubt shall hang over this expression of the will of the people of the country." CHAP. XIV.

The deputation arrived at the castle of Miramar, near Trieste, on the 3d of October, and, although every semblance of authority had been stripped from them by the Emperor's dispatch, they still went through the form of offering to the Archduke their visionary empire. Señor Gutierrez de Estrada, in a speech full of southern eloquence and extravagance, represented to Prince Maximilian the spontaneous and enthusiastic character of the call which came to him as the unanimous choice of the people of Mexico, and, with that intimate knowledge of the designs of Providence always assumed by the extremists of all parties, he warned him that in refusing the crown of Mexico he would be contravening the will of Heaven, which had endowed him with the rarest and richest qualities for the express purpose of saving and regenerating Mexico. They then presented him, inclosed in the handle of a scepter of solid gold, the parchment upon which was engrossed the vote of the notables. 1863.

The Prince, who had received his orders from Paris, could not accept at once the glittering honors thus offered him. He declared that he must, in complete accordance with the views of the Emperor

CHAP. XIV. Napoleon, insist that a monarchy could not be established on a legitimate and firm basis without a spontaneous expression of the wishes of the whole nation. He must also ask for guarantees which would be indispensable to secure Mexico against the dangers which threatened her integrity and independence. Should these conditions be fulfilled, and his brother the Emperor of Austria approve, he would then be ready to accept the crown. With this answer the delegation was forced to be content, and returned to try to carry into effect the difficult conditions proposed by the Emperor of France.

All through the summer and autumn General Forey, and after him General Bazaine, continued their operations against the scattered and still struggling armies of Mexico. In November the French forces moved towards the north; General Comonfort was killed by banditti and General Uraga became general-in-chief. The Mexicans were not strong enough to risk at any time a general engagement, but endeavored to harass and impede as far as possible the march of the French. But the invaders constantly gained ground; so that on the 1st of January, 1864, they occupied most of the country from Mexico to San Luis Potosi on the north and Guadalajara on the west, and on the east the country between Vera Cruz and the capital was entirely in their hands. It was not a large portion of the territory of the republic counted in square miles, but it was of great importance, comprising, as it did, some of the richest and most populous States and cities of Mexico.

1863.

The course of events in Mexico was vigilantly

watched by President Lincoln and the Secretary of State. On the 9th of August, at a time when General Grant, flushed with his triumph at Vicksburg, proposed an expedition to Mobile, the President in a confidential letter to him said: "This would appear tempting to me also, were it not that in view of recent events in Mexico I am greatly impressed with the importance of reëstablishing the national authority in Western Texas as soon as possible. I am not making an order, however; that I leave, for the present at least, to the general-in-chief." Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward observed with equal care the progress of events on our Western frontier and in European courts. They did not consider themselves obliged, either by the traditions of American policy or by the necessities of the case, to do more than keep steadily before the eyes of European governments the adverse opinion of the United States in relation to the French invasion; but they did not fail to perform this duty with the utmost candor and firmness. In a long dispatch of the 26th of September, Mr. Seward gave a thorough explanation of the views of the President, which could have left no doubt on the mind of Napoleon III. as to what he might ultimately expect in case of a prolonged war or a permanent occupation of Mexico. He refers to the non-intervention which the American Government has practiced in every phase of the war, but at the same time insists upon the fact, which, he says, is known full well to the American Government, "that the inherent normal opinion of Mexico favors a government there republican in form and domestic in its organization, in preference

CHAP. XIV.

Lincoln to Grant, Aug. 9, 1863. MS.

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CHAP. XIV. 1863. to any monarchical institutions to be imposed from abroad." He speaks of the interdependence of all the American republics upon each other, and says that the safety of the United States "and the cheerful destiny to which they aspire are intimately dependent upon the continuance of free republican institutions throughout America." These opinions were worthy of the serious consideration of the Emperor of France in determining how he should conduct and close what might prove a successful war in Mexico. If France should, upon due consideration, determine to adopt a policy in Mexico adverse to the American opinions and sentiments referred to, that policy would probably scatter seeds which would be fruitful of jealousies which might ultimately ripen into collision between France and the United States and other American republics. He mentions, in illustration of this, various rumors, already current, in regard to the purposes of France in reference to Texas and the Mississippi River, and to coalitions between the Regency established in Mexico and the insurgent cabal at Richmond. "The President," said Mr. Seward, "apprehends none of these things. He does not allow himself to be disturbed by suspicions so unjust to France and so unjustifiable in themselves; but he knows, also, that such suspicions will be entertained more or less extensively by this country, and magnified in other countries equally unfriendly to France and to America; and he knows also that it is out of such suspicions that the fatal web of national animosity is most frequently woven." He assumes that the Emperor's intentions are as friendly as those of the President,

and bases upon that assumption this sincere and earnest conversation. He closed by saying, "We ourselves, however, are not unobservant of the progress of events at home and abroad; and in no case are we likely to neglect such provision for our own safety as every sovereign state must always be prepared to fall back upon when nations with which they have lived in friendship cease to respect their moral and treaty obligations." CHAP. XIV.

Seward to Dayton, Sept. 26, 1863.

These views were laid before the French Minister for Foreign Affairs by Mr. Dayton. M. Drouyn de l'Huys said that the dangers of the Government of the Archduke would come principally from the United States, and the sooner we showed ourselves satisfied, and manifested a willingness to enter into peaceful relations with that Government, the sooner would theirs be ready to leave Mexico and the new Government to take care of itself, which France would, in any event, do as soon as it could; but that it would not lead or tempt the Archduke into difficulty, and then desert him before his Government was settled; a promise which, within a few years, was to figure strangely among the broken covenants of the Second Empire. Mr. Dayton intimated to him in reply that he could scarcely suppose that France, under the circumstances, would expect the United States to make haste to acknowledge a new monarchy in Mexico; but he promised to report the views of the Minister to the Government at home.

Dayton to Seward, Oct. 9, 1863.

By return of mail Mr. Seward again set forth the sentiments of the President in a dispatch of singular moderation and firmness. He referred to the determination of the President to err on the side of

CHAP. XIV. strict neutrality, if he erred at all, in the war that is carried on between two nations with which the United States are maintaining relations of amity and friendship; and also to the intimation of M. Drouyn de l'Huys that an early acknowledgment of the proposed empire by the United States would assist to relieve France from her troublesome complications; and then went on to say, "the French Government has not been left uninformed that, in the opinion of the United States, the permanent establishment of a foreign and monarchical government in Mexico will be found neither easy nor desirable." He reiterated the purpose of the United States not to interfere with the free choice of the people of Mexico in the establishment or enjoyment of such institutions as they may prefer, but said: "It is also proper that M. Drouyn de l'Huys should be informed that the United States continue to regard Mexico as the theater of a war which has not yet ended in the subversion of the Government long existing there, and with which the United States remain in the relation of peace and sincere friendship; and that for this reason the United States are not now at liberty to consider the question of recognizing a government which, in the further chances of war, may come into its place."

Seward to Dayton, Oct. 23, 1863.

It is probable that no one, now or in future, will question the wisdom or the equity of the attitude assumed and consistently maintained by the President and the Secretary of State in regard to the invasion of Mexico; but in the midst of the stormy passions of that period they were subjected to severe criticisms and attack on the part of those who insisted that the moderation with which they

held their ground in all their discussions with the French Government amounted to a practical abandonment of what was loosely called the Monroe Doctrine. It was the opinion of many that the Government was recreant to its duty in not protesting against any European aggression upon an American republic, and opposing such aggression even to the point of war. This was carrying the doctrine of President Monroe to a point far beyond the intentions of any of the early statesmen of the republic. CHAP. XIV.

The text of the famous passage in President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, which is almost a repetition of the words employed by John Quincy Adams in a dispatch to Mr. Rush, the American Minister in London, and in a conversation with the Russian Minister in Washington, five months before, is as follows: "The occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." And further, in the same message, the President said: "We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and these powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety"; and referring to the American governments which had declared and maintained their independence, he added: "We could not view any interposition

July 17, 1823.

CHAP. XIV.

for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States."

George F. Tucker, "The Monroe Doctrine," p. 22.

Two years later, when Mr. Adams, the true author of the Monroe Doctrine,— if any one can claim the authorship of a doctrine universally held by Americans, then and since,— had succeeded Mr. Monroe in the Presidency, Henry Clay, his Secretary of State, in a dispatch to the American Minister in Mexico, gave the idea a little further extension by adding to the text given above a second clause to the effect that the United States, while they did not desire to interfere in Europe with the political system of the Holy Alliance, would regard as dangerous to their peace and safety any attempt on the part of the allied European powers to extend their system to any part of America, neither continent having the right to enforce upon the other the establishment of its peculiar system. At the close of the same year Mr. Adams, in a message suggesting the propriety of having the United States represented at the Congress of Panama, said: "An agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting, that each will guard by its own means against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders, may be found advisable. This was," he adds, "more than two years since, announced by my predecessor to the world, as a principle resulting from the emancipation of both the American continents."

March 25, 1825.

Dec. 26, 1825.

It was therefore in accordance, not only with the dictates of a wise expediency, but also in harmony

with the established traditions of the Government, that the President contented himself with a firm repetition of the views and principles held by the United States in relation to foreign invasion, and abstained from protests which would have been futile and ridiculous. In his message of December, 1863, at the opening of Congress, he entered into no discussion of the subject. This occasioned a great disappointment among some of the more ardent spirits in Congress, and on the 11th of January Mr. McDougall of California introduced into the Senate a resolution declaring that "the occupation of a portion of the territory of the republic of Mexico by the armed forces of the Government of France is an act unfriendly to the republic of the United States of America"; that it was the duty of the American Government to demand of France to withdraw its armed force from the Mexican territory within a reasonable time, and that failing this, "on or before the 15th day of March next it will become the duty of the Congress of the United States of America to declare war against the Government of France." Just one year before this, Mr. McDougall had introduced a set of resolutions of like purport, which had been laid on the table on motion of Senator Sumner. A similar fate awaited these belligerent propositions. They were referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, then, as before, under the judicious chairmanship of Mr. Sumner, and were not again reported to the Senate.

CHAP. XIV.

1864.

McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 349.

But the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives had a chairman of very different temper from Mr. Sumner, Henry Winter

CHAP. XIV. Davis, who was equally distinguished for his eloquence and his ardor, his tenacity of opinion and his impatience of contradiction. Under his energetic leadership the Committee of the House reported the following resolution, which was passed by an affirmative vote of 109, not a voice being raised against it. "Resolved, That the Congress of the United States are unwilling by silence to leave the nations of the world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now transpiring in the republic of Mexico; and that they therefore think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchical government, erected on the ruins of any republican government in America, under the auspices of any European power." On arriving at the Senate this resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, where, in company with the more fiery utterances of Mr. McDougall, it slept unreported until the close of the session.

"Globe," April 4, 1864, p. 1408.

The Minister of France in Washington lost no time in asking for an explanation of this vote, and, on the 7th of April, Mr. Seward, in a dispatch to Mr. Dayton, said, "It is hardly necessary, after what I have heretofore written with perfect candor for the information of France, to say that this resolution truly interprets the unanimous sentiment of the people of the United States in regard to Mexico." He then goes on to say that the question of recognition of a monarchy in Mexico is an Executive one; and the decision of it constitutionally belongs, not to the House of Representatives, nor even to Congress, but to the President of the

United States; that the joint resolution which had passed the House, before it could receive a legislative character, must pass the Senate and receive the approval of the President; that while the President received the declaration of the House of Representatives with the profound respect to which it was entitled, he directed Mr. Dayton to inform the Government of France that he did not at present contemplate any departure from the policy which this Government had hitherto pursued in regard to the war between France and Mexico; "that the proceeding of the House of Representatives was adopted upon suggestions arising within itself and not upon any communication of the Executive department, and that the French Government would be seasonably apprised of any change of policy upon this subject which the President might at any future time think it proper to adopt." CHAP. XIV.

Dayton to Seward, April 22, 1864.

But before this dispatch reached Paris, Mr. Dayton, visiting M. Drouyn de l'Huys, was greeted by him with the abrupt inquiry, "Do you bring us peace or war?" Mr. Dayton, not having received Mr. Seward's dispatch on the subject, was unable to answer, except in general terms that there was nothing in the resolutions of the House at variance with the views constantly expressed in the official dispatches of the Secretary of State. M. Drouyn de l'Huys evidently regarded the proceedings as entailing serious consequences; and Mr. Dayton reported that it was the occasion of great exultation and activity among the secessionists in Paris.

When, a few days later, Mr. Dayton received Mr. Seward's dispatch of the 7th of April, and read

Ibid., May 2, 1864.

CHAP. XIV. it to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was able to report that the sensitiveness manifested by the Government on the receipt of the news of the passage of the resolution had, to a great extent, subsided. The "Moniteur" announced that the Emperor's Government had received satisfactory explanations as to the sense and bearing of the resolution; that the Senate had laid it on the table; and then added the gratuitous statement that in any case the Executive power would not have given its sanction to it. When this publication arrived in Washington the "sensitiveness," which had subsided in Paris, woke up anew in the House of Representatives. On motion of Mr. Davis the House requested the President to communicate any explanation which he might have made to the Government of France, in reply to which he sent the entire correspondence, of which we have given an abstract. The matter led to an angry debate and to the adoption of a report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, written by Mr. Davis, in which he vehemently criticized the action of the President and the Secretary of State; but he did not succeed in convincing any considerable portion of the public that the course of the Government had been any more lacking in dignity than in prudence.

In the condition of affairs which prevailed throughout Mexico, no plebiscitum was possible. In most of the States of the republic the Indian population had never heard of the Archduke Maximilian, and everywhere outside of the French lines his adherents were found only in monasteries and sacristies; so that, after a year of waiting, the Emperor of France was compelled to give up his

favorite expedient, and intimated to the Archduke that they must be content with whatever sanction the Regency in Mexico could contrive. Señor Gutierrez de Estrada therefore appeared once more at Miramar, on the 10th of April, 1864, and, with the same fluent rhetoric and ready emotion, informed the Archduke that he had been called to the throne by the practically unanimous voice of the notables, the municipal authorities, and the great corporations. CHAP. XIV.

Prince Maximilian, who had employed his leisure in the study of Spanish, replied to the deputation in that language, saying that the signs of adhesion to his cause in Mexico seemed to him sufficiently unanimous; that he was satisfied with the guarantees of independence and stability already secured; that the Emperor of Austria had given his consent; and that, relying upon the friendship and good-will of the Emperor of the French, he therefore accepted the crown at the hands of the Mexican nation. He said, "She has placed her confidence in a descendant of that House of Hapsburg which, three centuries ago, planted a Christian monarchy upon her soil. This confidence touches me, and I will not betray it." He promised to retain the absolute authority given him only so long as it might be necessary to introduce settled order into Mexico. He would start at once for his new country, only pausing on his way to visit Rome to receive from the hands of the Holy Father those benedictions so precious to all sovereigns, and which were doubly important to him as called upon to found a new empire. The Mexican imperial flag was at once displayed from the turrets of Miramar, and

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1864, p. 519.

CHAP. XIV. amid the roar of artillery from the castle and the town, the deputation knelt and did homage to the new Emperor. On the same day a convention between France and Mexico was signed at the castle, by which the new Government bound itself to the payment of 270,000,000 francs for the expenses of the French expedition, 12,000,000 more to satisfy the claims of French subjects in Mexico, and a further annual sum of 25,000,000 in specie. Thus with his kingdom in pawn to his powerful protector, bankrupt in advance, loaded down with a debt which he could not reasonably have hoped ever to repay, the ill-starred prince embarked upon his brief career of disaster, which was to be closed by an early and cruel death.

While the Archduke was waiting for his crown at Miramar, he authorized the Confederate envoys in Europe to be informed of his strong sympathy with their cause and his wishes for friendly relations with the Confederacy. He sent a message to Mr. Slidell that he considered the success of the South identical with that of the new Mexican empire, in fact so inseparable that an acknowledgment of the Confederate States of America by the governments of England and France ought to take place before his acceptance of the Mexican crown became unconditional. Mr. Slidell was naturally astonished at such a communication coming to him unsought, and at first imagined that the person, Mr. De Haviland, who brought the message, might be "a Yankee emissary"; but on making his suspicions known to Gutierrez de Estrada the latter confirmed Haviland's assertions as to his relations to the Archduke, and said that he himself had in-

Slidell to Benjamin, Dec. 3, 1863. MS. Confederate Archives.

troduced him; and Slidell's agent in the Foreign Office afterwards confirmed what had been said of the value the Archduke attached to the recognition of the Confederacy. He said he had seen the paper in which the Archduke set forth the different measures which he considered essential to the establishment of his Government, and that the recognition of the Confederacy headed the list. CHAP. XIV.

It was, therefore, with the liveliest anticipations that Mr. Slidell awaited the visit of the Archduke Maximilian to Paris in the month of March; but it is probable that the Austrian prince had received from the Tuileries a caution against any commitment towards the Confederacy; for, although he remained in Paris a week, and although Mr. Slidell sought an interview with him immediately on his arrival, the prince went away without giving an audience to the Southern commissioner. This was a bitter disappointment to Mr. Slidell, and he tried to console himself with an absurd fable which he picked up at some salon in Paris, that Mercier had informed the Archduke that he had been authorized by Lincoln to promise recognition to his Government by that of Washington, on the condition, however, that no negotiations should be entered into with the Confederate States. "The Archduke," continues Mr. Slidell, "is weak and credulous enough to think that he can keep on good terms with the Yankees, while he can at any time in case of need command the support of the Confederacy." Mr. Slidell sent to the Archduke, through one of the prominent Mexicans who surrounded him, an intimation that he was making a great mistake as to his hopes of avoiding difficulties with the

Slidell to Benjamin, March 16, 1864. MS. Confederate Archives.

CHAP. XIV. North, and his reliance upon the South to aid him in meeting them should they occur; that without the active friendship of the South he would be entirely powerless to resist Northern aggression; that the motive of the Confederates in desiring to negotiate with Mexico was not the expectation of deriving any advantage from an alliance *per se*, but from the consequences that would probably flow from it in another quarter.

Mr. Slidell did not indulge in any illusion as to the Mexican expedition itself. "It is impossible," he said, "to exaggerate the unpopularity of the Mexican expedition among all classes and parties in France; it is the only subject upon which public opinion seems to be unanimous. I have yet to meet the first man who approves of it, and several persons very near the Emperor have spoken to me of it in decided terms of condemnation. The Emperor is fully aware of this feeling, and is, I believe, very desirous to get rid of the embarrassment as soon as he decently can; the Archduke may be obliged to rely on his own resources at a much earlier day than he expects. In this opinion I may perhaps do the Emperor injustice, but I cannot otherwise account for the evidently increased desire to avoid giving umbrage to the Lincoln Government." Nothing more lucid or sagacious than these words was ever sent to the Confederate Government at Richmond; and it would have been well for the Archduke if he could have heard and heeded them.

MS. Confederate Archives.

1864. On the 2d of May, Mr. Slidell wrote again to Richmond, repeating his story that Mercier pretended to be the bearer of assurances from Lincoln

to Maximilian that the empire would be recognized by the United States;[1] and he reports also that he hears "from well-informed quarters that Maximilian, on his arrival in Mexico, will address a circular letter to the various governments with which he wishes to establish relations, that of Washington included, and ignoring the Confederacy. I have taken care," he says, "to advise leading Mexicans that such a course could not but be offensive to my Government, and might lead to results which would hereafter be regretted." He took particular care to impress upon the mind of one of Maximilian's officers, who was to sail with him in the *Novara*, the necessity of the support of the Confederacy to protect the new Government against the aggressions of the North. But when the imperial party sailed from Civita Vecchia there was little left of the high hopes with which the Rebel Commissioners had anticipated that event.

Slidell to Benjamin, May 2, 1864. MS. Confederate Archives.

Maximilian arrived in the City of Mexico on the 12th of July, and made his triumphant entry into the capital with all the splendor of ceremonial which was within the reach of the French army and the Mexican Church. But the enthusiasm of the occasion was confined exclusively to the foreign soldiers and the native priests. The people looked coldly on, enjoying the unwonted and brilliant show but exhibiting no hearty welcome to their new

[1] Mr. Jefferson Davis on reading this dispatch made the following note in pencil: "Lord Lyons and Count Mercier are fulfilling my expectations. The action of the convention which nominated Mr. Lincoln and his acceptance on the avowal of purpose made, should be conclusive even to minds as oblique as those who [*sic*] have so misrepresented and defrauded us."—MS. Confederate Archives, in possession of the authors.

CHAP. XIV. sovereign. His first acts exhibited at once his goodness of heart, his purity of intentions, and his utter incapacity to understand or control the turbulent elements with which he was called upon to deal. He invited Juarez and his leading adherents to hold a conference with him in the City of Mexico, and offered them the most tempting positions in his gift as a price of their adhesion to the empire. He received in return a letter from the Mexican President, couched in dignified and moderate language, but filled with an unflinching spirit of hostility and defiance, both to Maximilian and to Napoleon III., whom he considered his principal, which when published did much to encourage the adherents of the national cause.

The Archduke then established several commissions to organize the administration. They did their work in a feeble and vacillating way, and, shortly after his arrival, Maximilian found himself in an attitude of hostility to the Church party, at whose invitation he had come to Mexico. Even before his arrival there had been a breach of friendly relations between the Church and the French authorities. The clerical party expected, as a matter of course, that, upon the arrival of the French in the capital, their church property would be restored to them; but General Bazaine found this course impossible, not only on account of the exigencies of the public treasury, but also because many French citizens, the holders of ecclesiastical property, would have been ruined by its restitution. He therefore allowed proceedings in the courts in relation to such property to take their regular course, and when the Archbishop of Mexico pro-

tested against this action, his two colleagues in the triumvirate, Almonte and Salas, at the suggestion of the French commander, dismissed him from the Regency. He protested loudly against this action, and, in company with the great ecclesiastical dignitaries of the country, issued a manifesto denouncing the acts of the French military authority, and of the Regency under it, as no less tyrannical and unjust to the Church than the proceedings of the Juarez Government, which had driven the Church party to seek for foreign intervention. CHAP. XIV.

The Archduke found himself confronted upon his arrival by this ominous state of things; and hampered by his dependence upon the Emperor Napoleon, he was unable to take sides with the Church party, to whom alone he could look for sincere and loyal support in Mexico. Even the Pope, upon whose benediction and fatherly sanction he had built such hope for the stability of his empire, turned against him, and in a letter of the 18th of October, most affectionate in form, but severe in substance, informed him of the sorrow which his apparent recreancy to the Church had occasioned at Rome, and of the hard conditions upon which alone he might expect the support and commendation of the Papacy. "The Catholic religion must, above all things, continue to be the glory and the mainstay of the Mexican nation to the exclusion of every other dissenting worship; the bishops must be perfectly free in the exercise of their pastoral ministry; the religious orders should be reëstablished or reorganized conformably with the instructions and the powers which we have given; the patrimony of the church and the rights which attach to it must

CHAP. XIV. be maintained and protected; no person may obtain the faculty of teaching and publishing false and subversive tenets; instruction, whether public or private, must be directed and watched over by the ecclesiastical authority; and, in short, the chains must be broken which up to the present time have held the church in a state of dependence and subject to the arbitrary rule of the civil government."

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1864, p. 526.

These conditions were impossible of fulfilment. Maximilian could not restore the vast possessions of the Church. He could not establish or maintain an absolute censorship of the press and of public and private instruction; and thus every day widened the breach between himself and the Church party. It was equally impossible for him to meet the financial exigencies of the situation. It had appeared to him at Miramar that with $18,000,000, his estimated income, including all that was left to him from the proceeds of his first loan, he might satisfy the most pressing wants of his administration; with $4,000,000 for the public debt, $4,000,000 for the Mexican army, $5,000,000 for the French army, and with $5,000,000 more for public works and the government of the interior, he could get along for the time being. But he soon found it necessary to rearrange his budget. Instead of the $18,000,000 of expenses for which he had provided he was confronted by an estimate twice as large: $6,000,000 were needed for the debt, $14,000,000 for the army, $10,000,000 and more for the public works and the government of the interior. He was driven to seek another loan in Europe, which was issued at a ruinous rate, complicated with the system of lotteries which produced

Speech of M. Thiers. July 9, 1867.

but little money for the bankrupt empire of Mexico and seriously discredited the tottering empire of France.

It was only in the military department of his government that something like order prevailed. The disciplined army of Bazaine met with but little resistance wherever it marched except from the diseases incident to the unaccustomed climate and the harassment of irregular bands of guerrillas. Many of the leading generals of the republic betrayed their trust. Vidaurri deserted from Monterey; Uraga, general-in-chief of the army, went over to Maximilian: the Government of Juarez fled from place to place, until at last he sought refuge in the State of Chihuahua with an army reduced to a mere body-guard of two thousand men, still opposing an indomitable front to the invader and refusing to listen either to the temptations held out by Maximilian or to the persuasions of faint-hearted friends who urged him to put an end to his own troubles and the distraction of the country by submission to the empire.

So long as the new empire was supported by the arms and by the prestige of France it presented to the world a certain appearance of strength. The President of the republic and the Cabinet kept up a show of resistance in a remote frontier State; and the southern portion of the republic, where Alvarez held Guerrero and the adjoining States with his faithful army of Pinto Indians, was never overrun by the invader. But the court of Maximilian in Mexico appeared as strong as any of the governments with which foreigners had had to deal for

CHAP. XIV. many years, and one by one the European powers recognized the new empire and entered into diplomatic relations with it. The United States retained its attitude of reserve towards the imperial court and of outspoken friendship towards the harassed republican government. Mr. Seward lost no opportunity of making known to the diplomatic body in Washington, and through our minister in Paris to the Emperor himself, that the Government of the United States regarded the empire as a temporary and exotic government in Mexico, and constantly reiterated his firm and friendly warning to France to bring its invasion of Mexico to a close at the earliest possible day.

At the end of 1864 and the beginning of the following year a rumor reached the United States that ex-Senator Wm. M. Gwin, foreseeing the failure of the rebellion, was preparing an extensive scheme of emigration to Mexico, which was to serve as a refuge for the defeated Confederates and doubtless also as a point of departure for future schemes of hostility against the Government of the United States. There seems to have been some foundation for this rumor, although the details of the scheme were contradicted by the imperial governments of Mexico and France; and after the war closed several irreconcilable Southern generals and politicians, among them Price, Magruder, and Harris, sought the protection of Maximilian, and tried to carry out a scheme similar to that attributed to Gwin. The great mass of the Southern people being tired of wars and wanderings, this seductive scheme of colonization came to nothing.

When the Republican National Convention of 1864, which renominated Lincoln, met in Baltimore, a resolution was adopted, with long-continued applause, approving the position taken by the Government "that the people of the United States can never regard with indifference the attempt of any European power to overthrow by force or to supplant by fraud the institutions of any republican government on the Western Continent, and that they will view with extreme jealousy, as menacing to the peace and independence of their own country, the efforts of any such power to obtain new footholds for monarchical governments, sustained by foreign military force in near proximity to the United States." This was a wider and more energetic extension of the Monroe Doctrine than had ever before been put forward in so authoritative a form by any body representing the majority of the people of the United States. It was adopted by Mr. Lincoln in his letter accepting the nomination to the Presidency, though with his usual candor and caution he added that "the position of the Government in relation to the action of France in Mexico, as assumed through the State Department and approved and indorsed by the Convention among the measures and acts of the executive, will be faithfully maintained so long as the state of facts shall leave that position pertinent and applicable." But neither then nor at any other time was the Government of France left in ignorance of the fact that the presence of their troops in Mexico was most unwelcome to the people of the United States, and that their continuance there was likely at any moment to result in disastrous complications.

Republican National Platform, June, 1864.

Lincoln to Committee, June 27, 1864. MS.

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During the next winter there were two resolutions introduced in the Confederate Congress at Richmond which, although they were not adopted, showed that a small minority at least of the rebel Congressmen were opposed to the intervention of foreign powers in Mexico, and imagined that there might be a possibility of *rapprochement* between the Confederate Government and that of the Union on a basis of united action against the French invasion. John P. Murray of Tennessee, on the 7th of November, brought in a resolution to the effect that "we have no sympathy with the efforts to establish a monarchy in Mexico, and that we will not, directly or indirectly, aid in the establishment of a monarchy on the continent of America"; and in the following January D. C. De Jarnette of Virginia introduced resolutions with a preamble setting forth that there were reasons to believe that ulterior designs were entertained by the imperial governments of Mexico and France against California and the Pacific States, which "we do not regard as parties to the war now waged against us, as they have furnished neither men nor money for its prosecution"; and resolving "that the time may not be distant when we will be prepared to unite on the basis of the independence of the Confederate States with those most interested in the vindication of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine for their mediation, to the exclusion of all seeming violations of those principles on the continent of North America." Mr. De Jarnette, with foolish frankness, allowed his impression to appear, first, that the Pacific States might be detached from the Union for the purpose of attacking the empire in

McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 617.

Ibid., p. 618.

Mexico in concert with the South; and, secondly, that England and France would be so frightened by the policy indicated in his resolutions that they would give to the Confederacy "all it wanted, and more than it had hoped for." CHAP. XIV.

So long as Mr. Lincoln lived the Government of the United States continued its attitude of firm disapproval of French invasion; and after his death, when the fall of the rebellion had set free the armies of the Union, and had made the continued existence of Maximilian's empire in Mexico impossible, Mr. Seward, at the head of the State Department, still carried on with the same unswerving skill, dignity, and forbearance the policy inaugurated in the lifetime of Mr. Lincoln, until the Emperor of France, recognizing at last the failure of his scheme of a Latin empire in America, withdrew the troops which alone had sustained during those three years the power of Maximilian, at the cost of many thousands of lives and $200,000,000; and the unfortunate Archduke, with a courage and self-devotion worthy of a better fate, offered up his life amid the ruins of his short-lived empire. After the departure of the French troops he retired to Queretaro, where he was immediately besieged by the Republican army. In the middle of May the place was taken, and a month later Maximilian and his two generals, Miramon and Mejia, were shot, in accordance with the sentence of a court martial. June 19, 1867.

CHAPTER XV

FORT WAGNER

CHAP. XV. THE fact that the rebellion had its first violent outbreak at Fort Sumter indicated that place as among the first objects of attack by the national arms; but, as we have seen, two years elapsed before any serious attempt was made to retake the fort, and, when made, in April, 1863, it resulted in failure. After Du Pont's attack the Confederates enjoyed two months of undisturbed leisure for the construction and strengthening of their works, though all this time the matter of a new essay at the reduction of Sumter occupied more than its proper share of the attention of the Government. The forces in the Department of the South were not sufficient to undertake a siege of Charleston by land, and the exigencies of the more important campaigns going forward in Virginia, Tennessee, and Mississippi prevented their being reënforced. It was resolved, therefore, to restrict operations to the harbor and the islands immediately adjoining, and Admiral John A. Dahlgren—after the death of Admiral Foote, who had been designated for the purpose—and General Q. A. Gillmore were charged with the command of the military and naval forces engaged. The one was the most eminent officer of

ordnance in the service, and the other, though young, was already not only a famous engineer, but also distinguished for his intelligence and enterprise in the command of troops. The President was sure of the zeal and devotion of both, and of their cordial disposition to work together harmoniously for the best results. CHAP. XV.

They indulged in no illusions as to the probable extent of their success in the undertaking before them. General Gillmore gave his opinion in advance that Fort Sumter could be reached and reduced, or its offensive power entirely destroyed, by the land and naval forces then serving in the Department of the South, provided there was hearty and energetic coöperation between them, and the naval officer in command was one who had confidence in the monitors; but that, with the small force available, about eleven thousand men, the army could not initiate any movement of importance inland, which would involve their leaving their advantageous position on the Sea Islands, flanked by marshes on one side and the navy on the other. Admiral Dahlgren had similar views. He was ready to coöperate at all times with the army in any measures deemed advisable, but never regarded it as possible that the navy alone could reduce the circle of forts around the harbor, and take permanent possession of Charleston. He assumed command on the 6th of July. Gillmore had already been on the ground some three weeks, and had nearly completed his preparations for a descent upon Morris Island, when Dahlgren arrived. The admiral, without a moment's delay, entered into the plans of the general, and within forty- 1863.

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eight hours collected his scattered monitors, and steamed away to the harbor of Charleston.

Morris Island is a low strip of sandy beach, which lies to the south of Charleston and, with Sullivan's Island to the north, guards the entrance to the harbor, the two stretching out to sea like the open jaws of an alligator. They are each about three and a half miles long, separated from the mainland on the north, and from the high ground of James Island on the south, by miry and impracticable marshes stretching a distance of two or three miles. Their inner ends are a little less than four miles from the Charleston wharves, with Fort Sumter lying midway. Gillmore resolved to make his attack from Folly Island, which lies on the coast directly south of Morris, which it greatly resembles in conformation, and from which it is separated by Light House Inlet. It was occupied by a brigade under General Israel Vogdes, who had fortified the southern end of it, controlling the waters of Stono harbor and the approaches of James Island. There was a heavy growth of underbrush at both ends of the island; taking advantage of this, Vogdes, under Gillmore's direction, constructed ten powerful batteries near its northern extremity, completely masked from the enemy's view; their purpose being to operate against the enemy's guns near the landing place, to protect the debarkation of the troops, and to cover their retreat in case of necessity. Most of this work was done at night, and all of it as silently as possible; during the last days the rebels were busily engaged in wrecking a stranded blockade-runner within pistol-shot of these batteries, and never discovered them.

Gillmore, Report. W. R. Vol. XXVIII., Part I., pp. 4, 5.

Alfred H. Terry's division of 4000 and George C. Strong's brigade of 2500 were quietly brought together on Folly Island, and on the afternoon of the 8th of July the former force was sent up the Stono to make a demonstration against James Island, while Strong's brigade was ordered to descend upon Morris Island at daybreak of the 9th. Colonel T. W. Higginson of the First South Carolina Volunteers, colored, was ordered at the same time to cut the railroad between Charleston and Savannah; a duty in which General Gillmore says he "signally failed." The others punctually performed the tasks assigned them. Terry's feint against Stono was so imposing as to be taken for the real attack, by Beauregard, who hastily gathered together a considerable force to resist him, and paid little attention to the serious movement on the beach. There were still, however, enough men left on Morris, all in fact who could be handled to advantage; but they were taken by surprise. Attacked in front by Strong's brigade who crossed the Inlet at daybreak, and on their left flank by Dahlgren, who swept the narrow island with his guns, they were speedily driven out of all their batteries south of Wagner, and abandoned to Gillmore three-fourths of the island with eleven pieces of heavy ordnance. The next day he ordered Strong's brigade to assault Fort Wagner; an attempt which failed, with slight loss on each side. On the 16th Terry was attacked by a superior force on James Island, and although he repulsed the enemy with the assistance of the gunboats which accompanied him, he was recalled to Folly Island, the purpose of his demonstration having been accomplished.

Gillmore, Report. W. R. Vol. XXVIII., Part I., p. 8.

CHAP. XV. 1863. Although General Gillmore had as yet no adequate conception of the enormous strength of Fort Wagner, the assault and repulse of the 11th of July convinced him that it could not be carried offhand. He therefore determined, on consultation with Admiral Dahlgren, to establish counter-batteries against it, hoping with the combined fire of these and the gunboats to dismount the guns of the work and so shake its defense as to carry it by a determined assault. The preparations were made with great energy, and by the morning of the 18th, exactly one week after the first assault, General Gillmore was ready for the second. It was an ill-advised and unfortunate enterprise, doomed to disaster from the nature of the case. With all his skill and coolness, and his profound knowledge of engineering, Gillmore was still young and daring, and naturally inclined to think less than they deserved of obstacles in front of him. He admits in his report that he was not aware of the tremendous strength of the sand-work he was attacking; his information in regard to it was contradictory and meager. Its formidable armament, its full and disciplined garrison, its capacious bomb-proof, which could shelter the entire force in complete safety, were as yet unknown. Worse than all this, the maps of the Coast Survey, upon which our army and navy relied implicitly, had been rendered obsolete as to Morris Island by the stealthy encroachments of the sea, which had almost gnawed the sand-spit in two at the point just south of the fort, leaving only about a hundred feet of dry land instead of the three hundred indicated by the maps; and even this narrow causeway was subject to the

Gillmore, Report. W. R. Vol. XXVIII., Part I., p. 13.

Ibid.

W. R. Vol. XXVIII., Part I., p. 13.

washing of the waves in spring tide and heavy weather. Along this path of death an attacking force must march, exposed to the fire of a fort stretching all the way across the island from the sea-shore to Vincent's Creek, presenting a front of three times the development which could be given to the head of a column of approach, the terrible ratio reaching as high as ten to one as the sandy isthmus narrowed under the walls of Wagner.

July 18, 1863.

The batteries opened fire upon Fort Wagner from land and sea about noon, and in a short time its defenders were driven from the parapets to the bomb-proofs, the fire of its guns appearing to be completely silenced. "The flag-monitor lay only three hundred yards from the sea-face of the work," says Dahlgren; "not a gun was fired from it; not a head was visible to my glass, as I stood with other officers outside watching for the first symptom of renewed resistance." Cart-loads of sand were hurled into the air by every broadside; in the course of the afternoon the whole work seemed to be beaten out of shape. Late in the afternoon Gillmore formed his storming party, to move at twilight; this time was chosen that the column might not be distinctly seen by the enemy's batteries on the opposite islands. General Strong's brigade took the lead, followed by Colonel H. S. Putnam's; in advance was the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts, colored, led by Colonel Robert G. Shaw, one of the bravest and gentlest soldiers whom the North had sent to the war. "As the head of the column debouched," says General Gillmore, "from the first parallel, the guns in Wagner, Gregg, and Sumter, and also those on James and Sullivan's

Letter to Committee on Conduct of the War, June 20, 1864.

Gillmore, Report, "Engineer and Artillery Operations against Charleston," p. 41.

CHAP. XV. Islands, opened upon it rapidly and simultaneously, and when it approached so near the work that the fire from the navy and from our own mortars, and the gun batteries on our extreme left had to be suspended for fear of hitting our own men, then a compact and most destructive musketry fire was instantly poured upon the advancing column from the parapet by the garrison of the work, which up to that moment had remained within the safe protection of the bomb-proof shelter, and now emerged therefrom to meet the exigencies of the assault."

From a front ten times as large as the head of the assaulting column this storm of death rained upon the devoted troops; night had closed suddenly in, unrelieved even by the light of stars, for the sky was black with thunder-clouds. The colored regiment in the advance, led by the flower of Massachusetts loyalty, did all that could be asked of them; they melted away rapidly in the darkness, but still pushed forward, dashing through the water of the ditch and climbing the parapet of the fort. There their heroic young colonel fell, shot dead among his foremost men, and the decimated regiment streamed back to the rear, carrying some confusion into the ranks of those following them. Strong's men rallied gallantly, and, supported by Putnam's brigade, they gained the southeast bastion and held it for several hours. But, ignorant of the interior arrangements of the work, they could make no further progress, and were being gradually killed at the enemy's leisure when, about midnight, they abandoned the hopeless contest, and such of them as were able made their way back

to their camps. The loss had been extraordinarily severe. Besides Colonel Shaw, General Strong and Colonels John L. Chatfield and Putnam were killed or mortally wounded; General Truman Seymour, who had immediate charge of the assault, was severely wounded; and many other valuable officers were killed.

In General Strong and Colonel Putnam the army lost two of its most promising and brilliant leaders, equally eminent in character and attainments. The death of Colonel Shaw was widely lamented, not only because of his personal worth, but because he had become in a certain sense the representative of the best strain of New England anti-slavery sentiment. The Confederates recognized this representative character by their treatment of his corpse, replying to a request of his friends for his remains, that they "had buried him under a layer of his niggers."[1]

[1] The following letter from Colonel Shaw's father to the President gives a striking instance of that devoted loyalty which in the brave young soldier was a legitimate inheritance.

Francis George Shaw wrote to the President, July 31, 1863: "My only son, Colonel Robert George Shaw, of the 54th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers (colored troops), was killed on the parapet of Fort Wagner, in South Carolina, and now lies buried in its ditch among his brave and devoted followers. I feel that I have the right in his name to intreat you that immediate measures be taken to extend the protection of the United States over his surviving officers and men, some of whom are now prisoners, and over all others belonging to the colored regiments in the service, when they fall into the hands of the enemy. And this not only as an act of humanity, but as required by justice and sound policy. Our colored soldiers have proved their devotion and valor in the field; they deserve that their rights and the responsibilities of the Government towards them shall be proclaimed to the world and shall be maintained against all enemies. If our son's services and death shall contribute in any degree towards securing to our colored troops that equal justice which is a holy right of every loyal defender of our beloved country, we shall esteem our great loss a blessing."

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General Gillmore, though powerfully affected by the waste and ruin of this unsuccessful assault, began instantly to accomplish the work assigned him in another and a better way. He had lost 1500 men in his gallant rush upon Wagner, and had inflicted comparatively no damage upon the enemy. The heavy cannonade from land and sea had done nothing more than mar the symmetry of the thick walls of fine, white quartz sand; a few hours' work by night could repair all the injuries inflicted by many tons of metal during the day. The impregnable bomb-proof could shelter the full garrison; one thousand men mounting the parapet at a given moment could hold an army of twenty times their number at bay, advancing along the narrowing path of sand. There was nothing to be done but to press the siege by gradual approaches; and even this course was surrounded by most formidable difficulties. The scanty isthmus, twenty-five yards at its narrowest part, and subject to frequent overflow by the tides, was swept not only by the fire of Wagner in front, but by that of Battery Gregg on Cumming's Point, at the northern extremity of the island, by numerous heavily armed batteries on James Island, and by the destructive plunging fire of Fort Sumter delivered over the heads of Wagner and Gregg. The first preoccupation of General Gillmore was the "elimination of Fort Sumter from the contest." Even while his thinned battalions were retreating from their assault on the 18th of July, he gave orders for the formation of a strong defensive line, capable of resisting any possible sortie, which was afterwards called the First Parallel.

1863. Gillmore, Report. W. R. Vol. XXVIII., Part I., p. 17.



GENERAL QUINCY A. GILLMORE.

On the night of the 23d he established his second parallel by the flying sap, six hundred yards in advance of the first, stretching his line diagonally across the island on a ridge of sand, resting his left on Vincent's Creek, which was guarded by a floating boom, and extending his right by a barricade to low-water mark, terminating in a strong crib-work, on which was established a powerful and novel arrangement of guns, known as the "surf battery." At every advance he planted breaching batteries against Fort Sumter; this part of the work being under the charge of Major T. B. Brooks, a volunteer officer, one of the most notable instances, of which there were so many, of extraordinary military capacity suddenly developed in young men whose training had hitherto been exclusively in civil pursuits. Admiral Dahlgren gave his earnest coöperation in this work; one of the most important of the breaching batteries was armed and manned from the fleet, under the command of Captain Foxhall Parker.

W. R. Vol. XXVIII., Part I., p. 18.

Under the incessant fire of the enemy's batteries from front and flank, these operations went on; not satisfied with occupying every foot of the sand-spit, Gillmore resolved to establish a battery, bearing both upon Sumter and the city of Charleston, in the deep mire of the morass separating Morris from James Island. This apparently impossible task was successfully carried out; nothing was left to chance; every step of the work was founded upon careful experiment and scientific induction. On a bed of soft black mud, sixteen feet deep, in a swamp overgrown with reeds and grasses, traversed by winding bayous, and subject

CHAP. XV. to daily overflow by the sea-waves, a battery was built and immediately christened by the soldiers the "Swamp Angel." We will give General Gillmore's description of this unique structure: "The 'Marsh Battery' consisted of a sand-bag parapet with a return or epaulement of the same material at each end; the whole supported by a broad grillage, composed of round timbers in two layers, crossing each other at right angles, and resting directly on the surface of the marsh. In this grillage, in rear of the parapet, there was a rectangular opening through both layers of logs, exactly of the proper size to receive the platform of the gun, and surrounded by closely fitting sheathing piles. These piles reached from the upper surface of the grillage entirely through the stratum of mud into the solid substratum of sand. Within this rectangular space, thus closely confined laterally by the piles, layers of marsh grass, canvas, and sand were placed directly on the mud, to the aggregate depth of several inches, the sand being on top. On the sand rested a compact sub-platform of planks. On these planks the gun-platform was placed. The epaulment and the gun were therefore so far independent of each other, that the subsidence or displacement of the one would not necessarily involve that of the other."

Gillmore, Report, "Engineer and Artillery Operations against Charleston," p. 52.

1863. On the 9th of August Major Brooks established the third parallel with the flying sap, an advance of over three hundred yards, and at this time the fire from the semi-circle of Confederate forts and from the sharpshooters in Wagner became so incessant and so galling that General Gillmore concluded that for the success of his siege operations against

Wagner it would be necessary to breach Fort Sumter and put an end to the annoyance of its fire. He was not without hope, also, that after he had demolished Sumter he might invest the island so as to insure the fall of Wagner and Gregg. He was compelled to wait a few days on account of the inferior quality of his powder, but having been generously supplied by the navy he began on the 17th of August, in concert with Admiral Dahlgren, a furious and sustained bombardment of Fort Sumter. Every battery had its work assigned it; the distances from the batteries to the fort ranged from 3500 to 4300 yards; for seven days the storm of metal cast over that expanse of beach and water rained upon the fort, until, on the 24th, Gillmore was able to report to the general-in-chief its "practical demolition." "The barbette fire of the work was entirely destroyed. A few unserviceable pieces, still remaining on their carriages, were dismounted a week later. The casemates of the channel fronts were more or less thoroughly searched by our fire, and we had trustworthy information that but one serviceable gun remained in the work, and that pointed up the harbor towards the city. The fort was reduced to the condition of a mere infantry outpost."

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Gillmore, Report, "Engineer and Artillery Operations," p. 62.

While this demolition of Sumter was going on, the siege work against Wagner, which had been checked for a while, was again pushed forward. On the night of the 21st the fourth parallel was opened, and five days later a ridge in front of it was carried by a bayonet charge, and a fifth parallel established within two hundred and forty yards of the fort. Nothing now intervened between the

CHAP. XV. besiegers and besieged but a flat ridge of sand twenty-five yards wide, washed over by the seas in high weather. This was found to be thickly planted with torpedoes, and captured Confederates said
1863. the glacis of the fort was also full of them. In the midst of these hidden perils the sappers worked on, and a single night brought them to within one hundred yards of Wagner. Here they were brought to a standstill. "The converging fire from Wagner alone almost enveloped the head of our sap, delivered as it was from a line subtending an angle of nearly ninety degrees, while the flank fire from the James Island batteries increased in power and accuracy every hour. To push forward the sap in the narrow strip of shallow sifting sand by day was impossible, while the brightness of the prevailing harvest moon rendered the operation almost as hazardous by night."

Gillmore, Report, "Engineer and Artillery Operations," p. 69.

A feeling of doubt and discouragement began to prevail, when Gillmore resolved upon a final and vigorous movement which ended the siege. He moved all his light mortars to the front and placed them in battery, brought his sharpshooters forward, trained his breeching batteries on the fort, arranged powerful calcium lights to aid his own men and blind the eyes of the enemy, and secured the ever-ready coöperation of the navy in a final bombardment of the rebel work. At daybreak on the 5th of September the whole armament opened fire, and for forty-two hours the soldiers were regaled with a spectacle of unequaled magnificence. The mortars threw their shells over the sappers' heads into the fort; thirteen of the monstrous Parrotts, 100, 200, and 300 pounders, sent their howling missiles at the

Ibid., p. 70.

angle of the bomb-proofs; the *New Ironsides*, under Captain Rowan, cast the ricocheting shells from her eight-gun broadsides over the hissing waters to climb the parapets and explode within the fort. By night the Union men worked with perfect security in the shadow, while the calcium lights showed them every inch of the enemy's works. CHAP. XV.

There was no withstanding such a fire as this; the Confederates fled to their bomb-proof. Gillmore's sappers pushed rapidly onward; they were out of danger from the moment they had got so near to Wagner that the James Island batteries ceased to fire for fear of hitting their friends. A feeling of exultation took possession of them; the diggers off duty mounted their parapets and coolly surveyed the works of the enemy, a few feet away, which gave no sign of life. On the night of the 6th the sappers pushed past the south face of the fort, masking its guns, and removed the pikes planted at the foot of the counter-scarp of the sea-front. The way was now open, and Gillmore ordered an assault on the morning of the 7th; but shortly after midnight the enemy left the fort and silently evacuated the island. Some seventy prisoners were caught in the darkness on the water. Eighteen pieces of heavy ordnance were found in Wagner, seven in Battery Gregg. Gillmore was surprised at the strength of the fort; it exceeded all that spies or deserters had reported. After the terrible bombardment it was virtually intact. Sept., 1863.

These operations were not carried on without a vigorous correspondence with General Beauregard; no one could entertain relations with that sprightly general either as enemy or as friend except at the

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cost of voluminous letter-writing. On the 4th of July he considered it his "duty" to deliver an extended lecture to General Gillmore in regard to the misdeeds of his predecessor; he gave a graphic account of General Hunter's administration, his raids on the mainland, his pillage of plantations and seizure of slaves; he held up the noble example of Napoleon, who refused the aid of Russian serfs against their government; and demanded a reply from Gillmore as to whether he proposed to continue the "barbarian" practices of which he complained. General Gillmore replied, with judicious brevity, that while he and his Government would scrupulously endeavor to conduct the war upon principles established by usage among civilized nations, he should expect from the commanding general opposed to him full compliance with the same rules in their unrestricted application to all the forces under his command. It is hardly possible that General Beauregard did not understand the meaning of this note; but he answered on July 22, pretending ignorance, and calling for more specific charges; a demand with which Gillmore complied succinctly, but definitely enough, on the 5th of August, saying that he considered the expressions in his former letter as pertinent and proper at the time they were written, and that they had been more fully justified by subsequent events. He then quoted the agreement entered into for parole and exchange of wounded prisoners, and referred to the violation of this agreement by the Confederates. "You declined," he said, "to return the wounded officers and men belonging to my colored regiments, and your subordinate in charge of the

Beauregard to Gillmore, July 4, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVIII., Part II., pp. 11–13.

Gillmore to Beauregard, July 20, 1863. Ibid., p. 21.

W. R. Vol. XXVIII., Part II., p. 38.

exchange asserted that that question had been left for after-consideration." He could only regard this action as a palpable breach of faith. CHAP. XV.

Later in the month of August, in the midst of the terrific cannonade upon Sumter, another interchange of warlike missives took place between the commanders. The Marsh Battery — the famous "Swamp Angel," whose construction has been already described — having been completed on the 21st of August, General Gillmore sent to the Confederate general a letter demanding the evacuation of Morris Island and Fort Sumter, and informing him that in case of refusal he should open fire, four hours after delivery of the letter, upon the city of Charleston from batteries already established in range of the heart of the city. This letter by inadvertence was sent unsigned, and was at once returned, and then signed and sent back. After waiting fourteen hours, instead of four, the Swamp Angel opened fire, throwing a few shots into the sleeping city by way of warning and exhortation.

Aug. 21, 1863.

W. R. Vol. XXVIII., Part II., pp. 57, 58.

The next morning General Beauregard replied in words as furious, if not so sonorous, as the tones of the Marsh Battery. He sermonized Gillmore as to his duties under the rules of "nations not barbarous"; he reminded him that Wagner, Gregg, and Sumter were much nearer to him than Charleston, and seemed to think there was special depravity in firing on the city from a battery "quite five miles distant"; an act, indeed, of "inexcusable barbarity"; that the shots fired were "the most destructive missiles ever used in war"; growing sarcastic, he asked why he did not demand the surrender of all the forts; and, finally, he "solemnly warned"

CHAP. XV. his adversary that if he fired again on the city without giving a reasonable time to remove non-combatants he would employ "stringent means of retaliation." Gillmore replied at once, paying no attention to the excited rhetoric of Beauregard, simply calling his attention "to the well-established principle that the commander of a place attacked, but not invested, having its avenues of escape open and practicable, has no right to expect any notice of an intended bombardment other than that which is given by the threatening attitude of his adversary." Charleston had already had forty days' notice of her danger; the attack on her defenses had been that long steadily in progress; the object of that attack had been at no time doubtful. If the life of a single non-combatant were exposed to peril by bombardment, the responsibility rested with those who had failed to apprise them of their danger, or to provide for their safety, and who had refused to accept the terms upon which the bombardment might have been postponed. General Gillmore said it was his belief that most of the women and children had long been removed from the city; on Beauregard's assurance, however, that the city was still full of them, he would suspend the fire upon it until eleven o'clock on the night of the 23d, thus giving forty-eight hours for the removal of non-combatants from the time his first communication was received. At the expiration of this respite the Swamp Angel again opened, throwing her eight-inch shells over five miles of marsh and beach and bay into the heart of the frightened city. The non-combatants poured in a continuous stream out of the town; but little damage was

W. R. Vol. XXVIII., Part II., pp. 58, 59.

Ibid., p. 60.

Aug., 1863.

done. The famous battery, built with such skill and care, had but a brief history; its great Parrott gun burst at the thirty-sixth discharge, and was never replaced, though two sea-coast mortars were afterwards mounted in the battery, to operate against James Island.

On the night of the 8th of September an attempt was made by a detachment from the fleet to carry Fort Sumter by a *coup-de-main*. This plan had occurred to General Gillmore at the same time, but the force he had detailed for that purpose was detained by low tide in the creek, and did not get off until the sailors and marines had attacked and had been repulsed with severe loss in the darkness. After this the army busied itself for several weeks in reconstructing the captured forts on Morris Island and turning their guns against the Confederate works in the harbor. On the 26th of October the heavy rifle-guns were opened once more against Sumter, and two monitors from the fleet joined in the bombardment, which in the course of a few days cut down the southeast face of the work so as to expose the channel fronts to a reverse fire; the debris soon formed a continuous and practicable ramp from the top of the breach to the water's edge. Fort Sumter was now a ruin, sheltering an infantry outpost, but encircled by the other forts in the harbor, which had been greatly strengthened during the summer and autumn. It continued to be held by the Confederates until Sherman marched North from Savannah in the spring of 1865.

Gillmore, Report, Feb. 28, 1864. W. R. Vol. XXVIII., Part I., p. 30.

General Gillmore had not troops enough to make a land attack upon Charleston, and Admiral Dahl-

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Dahlgren, Letter to the Committee on Conduct of the War, June 20, 1864.

gren did not think it possible with his "seven battered monitors" to move upon the formidable series of works which lined the harbor on every side. He convened a council of his commanders of ironclads,—men of tried courage and intelligence,—who decided unanimously that Forts Moultrie and Johnson could not be reduced by the navy without the coöperation of the troops, and by a vote

1863.

of six to four that the attempt to penetrate to Charleston with the monitors would be attended with extreme risk without adequate results. The bombardment of Wagner, and later the attack by the ironclads on Moultrie, had shown that the damage inflicted by the severest fire on such sand-works was incommensurate with the great expense and risk. "The ironclads," says Dahlgren, "might steam in and make a promenade of the harbor, suffering much damage and inflicting little, then

Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. III.

retire. To remain in would only be a useless expenditure of valuable vessels, which could not soon be replaced." The only result, therefore, of the year's campaign was the completion of the blockade of Charleston by the possession of Morris Island, which gave a shorter line to the fleet, and by the demolition of Fort Sumter, which allowed more freedom of action to the squadron in the lower bay.

The mutual criticisms of the opposing commanders in this campaign are curious; each thinks the other at fault. General Gillmore contends

"Engineer and Artillery Operations."

that Fort Wagner, though formidable in construction was wrongly placed; that after the primary error of abandoning Cole's Island, which gave up Folly and made possible the movement against

Morris, the great mistake of the enemy was in not fortifying the southern end of the island, and in placing Fort Wagner so near to Sumter that he was compelled to "witness the humiliating spectacle of the destruction of his principal work on an interior line over the heads of the defenders of an exterior one." The special defense of Wagner, Gillmore thinks, was faulty in two particulars; it was too passive; not a single night sortie was made; and, second, there was little use of curved fire, though the two mortars they had seriously delayed the advance of the national sappers. General Beauregard, on the other hand, condemns Gillmore's plan of campaign as a whole. "James Island," he says, "was the avenue of approach I dreaded the most to see selected. . . It was in reality the entrance-gate to the avenue which would have almost assuredly led into the heart of Charleston. The enemy preferred breaking in through the 'window,' and I certainly had no cause to regret his having done so." But General Gillmore insists that his force was too small to justify an attack by way of James Island, which was too wide for his small force to operate on, and where he would have been met by superior numbers of the enemy. On Morris Island, however, where the space was narrow, his force was ample; both parties there had all the troops there was room for; the advantage was on the side which was superior in artillery, afloat and ashore, in engineering devices, and in a steadily maintained initiative. Moreover, he especially wished to demolish Fort Sumter, and took the best means to that end.

W. R. Vol. XXVIII., Part I., p. 36.

Beauregard, Defense of Charleston, in "North American Review," June, 1886.

CHAPTER XVI

PRISONERS OF WAR

THE treatment, on both sides, of prisoners of war is a subject which any one of ordinary sensibility would gladly avoid; but it is too important to pass over in silence. We shall deal with it briefly. We cannot persuade ourselves to repeat in these pages the stories of horrible suffering which may be found in the narratives of the survivors of the prison pens; but it would not be just to omit all mention of one of the most dreadful results of the war. By even a slight reference to the unspeakable woes inflicted upon tens of thousands of human beings by a state of civil war, we may hope to bring home to the minds of readers of a later generation some sense of what such a conflict means. It is not to arraign the people of the South that this chapter is written; we know them to be in general of the same blood, the same feelings, as those of the North. If during several years they subjected their kindred whom the fortunes of battle threw into their hands to horrors which it is no figure of speech to call infernal, it is not they who are to blame, but the circumstances which rebellion brought upon the people of the whole country.

The entire subject of the exchange and treatment of prisoners is fully set forth in a volume of twelve hundred pages, issued by the Fortieth Congress in 1869. It embodies the result of a year's labor of a committee of Congress, in the course of which the members were so shocked and inflamed by the contemplation of the frightful stories of suffering which were told them that their own language takes on the tone of the half-frantic victims of Andersonville. The reader who desires to look thoroughly into this revolting subject is referred to this book, and to the sworn testimony of the witnesses in the trial of Wirz, the keeper of the Andersonville prison. The first volume of the "Southern Historical Society Papers" is mainly devoted to the Confederate view of the case. We merely refer to these documents as giving the two sides of the question from strongly partisan points of view. The most candid and accurate statement of the treatment of the question of exchanges is to be found in General E. R. S. Canby's report to the Fortieth Congress, which gives all the correspondence between the two governments. As to the treatment of Union prisoners, after long deliberation, we have resolved not to quote from any Northern source. In the pages of the works above mentioned, and in the personal narratives of Union officers and soldiers, such as Davidson, Goss, Isham, and hundreds of others, the reader may find the hideous story told in detail. We restrict ourselves here, as to the question of exchange, to the official correspondence of the two governments, and as to the treatment of prisoners, to the reports and sworn statements of Confederate officers.

CHAP. XVI. One of the earliest embarrassments of the Government was the question how insurgents captured with arms in their hands should be treated. No one rightly estimated the extent or the duration which the insurrection was to assume. If it were to be speedily brought to a close a cartel for the exchange of prisoners was altogether undesirable; if it were to continue any length of time such an exchange would of course become necessary, but it must be effected with care and circumspection, lest in the process the insurrectionary government should extort some quasi-recognition of its legality. The matter ought not perhaps to have presented any insurmountable difficulty; the law of nations clearly enough provides for all such incidents of civil war. A nation loses none of its rights by following the dictates of humanity. As Dr. Theodore D. Woolsey says: "The same rules of war are required in such a war as in any other — the same ways of fighting, the same treatment of prisoners, of combatants or of non-combatants, and of private property by the army where it passes. . . In general, the relations of the parties *ought* to be nearly those of ordinary war, which humanity demands, and *will* be, because otherwise the law of retaliation will be applied." But in the early days of the war the state was so encompassed by dangers at home and abroad that the simplest actions seemed of doubtful propriety. The Government had not only to guard against a vigilant opposition at home, ready to seize upon any pretext for attack, but it had also to be constantly in an attitude of defense against European powers, which would have taken advantage of anything in the

conduct of the United States Government that would justify the recognition of the Confederacy. Recognition once granted, intervention would not have been far distant.

When the United States troops in Texas were surrendered by Twiggs they were granted terms of ostentatious liberality. "They are our friends," the Texan commissioners wrote; "they have heretofore afforded our people all the protection in their power, and we owe to them every consideration." They were to be allowed to leave the State unmolested, carrying their arms with them. But before they got away the collision at Fort Sumter took place, and they were seized and disarmed, some paroled and some imprisoned. A part of them were released, but others were held in defiance of the terms of Twiggs's surrender for over two years. After the war began no treatment seemed harsh enough for these friends and protectors of the frontiers. Various citizens wrote to Jefferson Davis, suggesting that they be put to hard labor on the railroads; that they be starved unless the United States would feed them; that they be put upon a diet of bread and water; that their left legs should be broken and they be turned loose; that those among them who were foreigners should be killed. These suggestions were referred by Mr. Davis to his Secretary of War.

Canby, Report, "Treatment of Prisoners," p. 288.

Ibid., p. 289.

During the year 1861 no general policy for the exchange of prisoners was adopted. In the temper both parties were in, no formal cartel was possible; the Confederates demanded the treatment of a recognized government, which the United States was not prepared to grant. Yet exchanges were made from time to time by generals in the

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field, at the bidding of immediate necessity, and without touching the larger questions. At the opening of the year 1862 the Washington authorities, desiring to release the prisoners of the first battle of Bull Run, made an effort to effect an exchange; but the Confederate demands seemed inadmissible. These were, in effect, that seamen taken in rebel privateers should be exchanged on equal terms with seamen in the merchant service; that United States regulars should not be exchanged for Southern volunteers; and that no proposition for the exchange of Southern privateers should be considered without "an absolute, unconditional abandonment of the pretext that they are pirates," their release from confinement as felons, and their treatment as other prisoners of war. The President had already resolved to adopt the course here suggested in regard to rebel privateers. The certainty of bloody reprisals upon Union officers in Richmond had induced the President to give up all thought of exceptional treatment of privateers, even before the end of 1861. Four men of the crew of the privateer *Jefferson Davis* had been convicted of piracy and sentenced to death; others were awaiting trial. The law seemed sufficiently clear; but even if Mr. Lincoln had been able to withhold a pardon from brave men engaged in what they considered their duty, he could never have thus sentenced to death an equal number of Union officers, in rigorous confinement, marked out for shameful execution.[1]

J. P. Benjamin to General Huger, Jan. 23, 1862.

[1] See "Letter to Hon. Ira Harris," by Judge Charles P. Daly, on this subject, written, as he informs us, at the request of the President to prepare the public mind for the action he had determined to take in relation to privateers and prisoners of war.

GENERAL JOHN E. WOOL.

But before any formal action was taken in relation to exchange the President made an effort to alleviate the condition of our prisoners in the South by appointing the Reverend Bishop Ames and the Hon. Hamilton Fish commissioners to visit them and minister to their wants. A large sum of money was given them for this purpose; and they were also instructed to make a list of all prisoners, giving "such particulars as might be interesting and proper for their families to know, or useful to this Government for the purpose of effecting their exchange or release"; they were authorized to assure the Richmond authorities that prisoners held by the United States might receive like visitation and relief. All this was notified to the Confederate Government by General Wool, commanding at Fort Monroe. In reply they ignored the purpose of the commission entirely, and appointed James A. Seddon and C. M. Conrad to meet them at Fort Monroe and negotiate an exchange of prisoners. Mr. Fish and Bishop Ames, being thus repulsed in their humane and charitable mission, went back to Washington, returned the money with which they had been intrusted, and resigned their office. The President, willing to sacrifice not only his own sense of dignity but something of national right to relieve a large amount of suffering, yielded every point of the Confederate demands and ordered arrangements to be made for a general exchange.

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Canby's Report, p. 290.

General Wool and General Howell Cobb therefore met on the 23d of February to settle the details of the business. But the consummation so ardently desired by the friends of the prisoners was again

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CHAP. XVI. postponed through the persistence with which the Confederate agent clung to certain phrases, by which he hoped to gain some recognition from the United States of the territorial integrity of the Confederacy. He insisted that the cartel should contain a provision for delivering prisoners of either side at "the frontier" of their own country, respectively. As the Confederates claimed, at one time or another, all the slave States, this phrase might have been taken to mean the Ohio River or the Southern boundary of Iowa. It was objected to by the President, and General Wool was ordered to make no arrangement except for actual exchanges. A few exchanges were made, but the question of the hostages held against the privateersmen remained for a long time unsettled.

The United States placed the men captured at sea and convicted as pirates on the list of prisoners, and tendered them for exchange by a letter from Gen-
1862. eral Wool on the 13th of February. On the 18th Mr. Benjamin, Confederate Secretary of War, accepted this assurance as entirely satisfactory, said the hostages had been placed on the footing of other prisoners, and would be at once sent home on parole. But on the failure of Generals Wool and Cobb to agree on a general cartel these officers were, in defiance of this agreement, which had nothing to do with the cartel, once more remanded to their distressing position as hostages, and every attempt made by the United States for their release only riveted their fetters more strongly. The Confederates never positively refused to give them up; but repeated promises to exchange them were broken. The privateersmen were sent to Fort

Monroe, placed on a flag-of-truce boat, conveyed to City Point, and kept there five days, under promise of exchange for the hostages. But the Confederate authorities could not bring themselves to part with such valuable property. The privateersmen were brought back, and the hostages continued to languish in prison for several months longer. At last, on the 22d of July, 1862, after infinite correspondence, a cartel was agreed upon between General Dix and General D. H. Hill, under which the exchange of prisoners was begun. CHAP. XVI.

But the course of exchange never ran smooth. There was seldom a pretext lacking to interrupt its practical working. Robert Ould, who was placed in charge of the prisoners soon after the cartel was agreed upon, was a man of unsuitable temper and character for such a delicate and responsible duty. He was not content with carrying out with extravagant zeal the orders of his superiors, but was continually seeking cause of dispute with the Federal agents of exchange. With such a disposition existing both in Richmond and at the office of exchange, it is not surprising that frequent wranglings arose. It would be tedious to recount these controversies in detail; a few may be mentioned in passing. The Confederates insisted that it was a breach of faith for officers liberated on parole to be sent to our Northwestern frontier against the Indians — a claim to which there could be no foundation, unless the savages who were then massacring the women and children of the frontier were to be regarded as the allies of the Confederacy. This claim the President, while anxious to avoid the slightest imputation of bad faith, refused to allow. Arrests of

CHAP. XVI. citizens for treasonable practices by the United States Government was another ground of complaint and of threats to repudiate the cartel; so was the levy of military contributions by Pope and his army. All cases of grievances were promptly considered and, if possible, redressed; the President never allowed any consideration of etiquette to stand in the way of the release of prisoners.

It was after the Proclamation of Emancipation that the most serious obstacle to the exchange of prisoners arose.[1] The Government at Richmond had refused from the beginning to regard negro troops as soldiers. Mr. Seddon, then their Secretary of War, in a letter to General Beauregard, dated November 30, 1862, instructed him that slaves in flagrant rebellion were subject to death; that they could not be recognized as soldiers, even so far as to be tried and shot by court martial; summary execution must therefore be inflicted upon them; but, to guard against abuses, this power of death should be lodged in the general commanding the immediate locality of the capture. The object of these hellish instructions was evidently to prevent any record of the murder of negro soldiers being made. On the 24th of December, 1862, Jefferson Davis issued his proclamation declaring General Butler a felon, and ordering him to be hanged without trial as soon as captured, and also directing that no commissioned officer of the United States taken captive should be released on parole until Butler was caught and hanged; declaring all

Canby's Report, p. 305.

[1] See Chapter XXI., Vol. VI. of this work, with reference to the action of the Confederate Government in regard to negro troops and to the question of retaliation.

commissioned officers in Butler's command "robbers and criminals deserving death," and ordering them, whenever captured, to be reserved for execution. This frantic proclamation, of course, put an end for a time to the exchange of officers on either side. In his message of the 12th of January, Mr. Davis proposed to deliver all Union officers thereafter captured to the civil authorities, to be punished as criminals inciting to servile insurrection; and on the 1st of May the Confederate Congress passed substantially the law he proposed. CHAP. XVI. 1863.

It will never be known to what extent the Confederate officers obeyed the horrible instructions of the rebel authorities. Whenever questions were asked by the United States agent of exchange, Mr. Ould took a simple and easy way out of the difficulty. He pretended to know nothing about it. He reported his action in this respect to his Government in a letter which deserves to be made known, as it preserves in a few lines the moral portrait of this serviceable person. "As yet, the Federals," he said, "do not appear to have found any well-authenticated case of the retention of the negro prisoners. They have made several special inquiries, but in each case there was no record of any such party, and I so responded. Having no special desire to find any such case, it is more than probable the same answer will be returned to every such inquiry." We find, however, in the rebel archives several documents which indicate the commission of revolting crimes upon captured colored soldiers. Canby's Report, p. 464.

On the 13th of June, 1863, General Kirby Smith, commanding the trans-Mississippi Depart-

CHAP. XVI. ment, wrote a letter to General Richard Taylor, who commanded in Louisiana, containing these words: "I have been unofficially informed that some of your troops have captured negroes in arms. I hope this may not be so, and that your subordinates who may have been in command of capturing parties may have recognized the propriety of giving no quarter to armed negroes and their officers. In this way we may be relieved from a disagreeable dilemma." In an official order, written the same day, he repeated this Draconic injunction, and added that if, unfortunately, any black soldiers should be taken alive, they should not be executed by the military, as that would provoke retaliation, but should be turned over to be dealt with by the civil authorities, to which course, he said, "no exception can be taken."

June 13, 1863.

Canby's Report, p. 641.

Hundreds of living men who were acquainted with Generals Smith and Taylor, who have sat at table with them, who have known them as men of sense and refinement, will find it difficult to appreciate the strange mental and moral conditions into which they must have wandered before they could put their hands to propositions so unconsciously fiendish. Unhappily, we are not allowed the comfort of believing that these crimson edicts went unfulfilled. We have the evidence that Confederate officers of high rank did not scruple to murder negro prisoners, and then lie about it to avoid retaliation. On the 8th of August General George L. Andrews, commanding at Port Hudson, having heard a rumor of the execution of certain colored soldiers near Jackson, interrogated the Confederate Colonel J. L. Logan in regard to it. Logan

denied the story, not squarely but evasively, saying that if done at all, it was without his knowledge or authority, threatening vengeance in case of any severity to his soldiers, and informing Andrews of his intention to place the Union prisoners in his hands in close confinement. The facts, which Andrews was at that time unable to ascertain, were far worse than he suspected. The reports of Colonels John Griffith and Frank Powers show that a squad of negroes in arms was captured at Jackson on the 3d of August. While bringing them into camp, "four of the negroes attempted to escape" (Colonel Powers reports); "I ordered the guard to shoot them down; in the confusion the other negroes attempted to escape likewise. I then ordered every one shot, and with my six-shooter assisted in the execution of the order. I believe few escaped, most of them being killed instantly." There is no tone of any regret or apology in this — both these officers are as complacent over their exploit as young hunters talking about a good bag of game. It is hard to enter into the minds of men to whom these things are possible, unless we reflect that an environment of slavery created peculiar ideas of humanity and morals.

"Treatment of Prisoners." Report 40th Congress, p. 645.

Mr. Lincoln was helpless in face of this state of things. He was incapable of ordering the bloody reprisals required by the *lex talionis*. He could not have caused such orders to be executed if they had been given. The public opinion of the North would not have permitted it. While Mr. Ould was spurring his Government to every extremity of cruelty, General E. A. Hitchcock wrote to the Secretary of War that his mind was full night and day of the

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awful subject of retaliation, and while he acquiesced in the threats the Government had made to protect the lives of its soldiers, he earnestly advised that they be not carried out. "If they choose in the South," he said, "to act as barbarians, we, as a civilized people, ought not to follow their example." The President was compelled to take the same view. He could not get accurate information as to the murder or enslavement of negroes; the Confederates denied every specific case; and he could not destroy an innocent man in cold blood for a crime his superiors had committed. He remained, therefore, at a grievous disadvantage, in face of the Richmond authorities, in regard to the question of prisoners, from the beginning to the end.

"Treatment of Prisoners," p. 318.

It was not possible, on the other hand, even for Mr. Davis to carry out the full rigor of his proclamation. Whatever his wishes might have been, he could not send every captured officer to the gallows. He did not publicly withdraw his threats, but from time to time the agents of the respective governments were permitted to carry on exchanges not only of enlisted men, but of officers. The Union agent tried hard to get a declaration that the proclamation was revoked, but this was sometimes angrily refused and sometimes courteously evaded by the Confederates.

There were other causes of dispute. The cartel provided that all prisoners of war on either side should be sent either to Aiken's Landing on the James River or to Vicksburg, to be paroled or exchanged, though the commanders of two opposing armies might agree on other points. No attention was paid to this rule by the rebel author-

ities, unless it suited them. They continually paroled prisoners on the field whom they were unable to take with them, soldiers captured in cavalry raids, citizens seized on their farms or in the streets, and insisted upon their equivalents in exchange. The Federal commissioner would protest; an angry interchange of notes would take place, and the matter would end by the Union commissioner yielding the point for the time being, and giving notice that it would not be allowed again; the whole performance would be repeated a few months later. The Union authorities, for instance, allowed full equivalents for the thirteen thousand men paroled and turned loose at Harper's Ferry, in order that the captors might take part in the battle of Antietam; and it did the same for the victims of Stuart's Maryland raid. On the other hand, the Confederates took advantage of the paroles given by Pemberton's army at the capitulation of Vicksburg, arbitrarily declared the prisoners exchanged, and sent them, a heavy reënforcement, to Bragg's army at Chattanooga.

Canby's Report, p. 314.

Ibid., p. 324. This is asserted by Grant, Thomas, and Halleck. Ould denies it.

In June, 1863, a serious question arose from the treatment to which Colonel A. D. Streight and his officers were subjected. They had been captured in a cavalry raid in Alabama and Georgia, and on the pretext that they were inciting slaves to insurrection, they had been excluded from the privilege of exchange, and had been put in close confinement as felons. In this case the Union authorities imprisoned John H. Morgan and his men in retaliation. Both Streight and Morgan eliminated the personal element from this controversy by escaping from jail. The Confederates continued to the end the

CHAP. XVI. practice of treating men of any political prominence with especial severity: Messrs. J. H. Browne and A. D. Richardson, civilians, were treated with great cruelty, and their exchange persistently refused, because they were connected with the "New-York Tribune"; Colonel Harry White was served with the same injustice because he was a Republican member of the Pennsylvania Senate and his absence made a tie in that body; Mr. Ould boasted that he refused a major-general for him. Ould prized his civilian prisoners and resisted all attempts at their release. In one instance, when the Richmond authorities had ordered the release of one Webster, an inoffensive citizen of Maryland, captured in a cavalry raid, Ould protested, saying he wished he had several hundred like him: "We must have a Northern pressure to assist us; that can only be obtained by holding on to every Northern Union man."

This reason is given by Mr. Ould in an article written since the war. The Philadelphia "Times'" Annals of the War, p. 56.

Canby's Report, p. 503.

The controversy between the officers of exchange continued through the year 1863, though the capture of General W. F. Lee, at the end of June, put a sudden stop to the threats of hanging Union officers. As to exchanges, Mr. Ould apparently had things very much his own way; he would put in lists of thousands of paroles of prisoners said to have been captured at indefinite times and places, which, after due protest and dispute, the United States Commissioner, in his anxiety to effect exchanges, would allow. In November the reports of the sufferings of Union prisoners in the South had grown so rife that the Secretary of War, after vainly endeavoring to bring about some amendment, or at least elicit some definite information, at last gave an order that Confederate prisoners

Hitchcock, Canby's Report, p. 332.

Ibid., p. 336.

Nov. 9, 1863.

should be subjected to the same treatment received by Union men in Southern prisons. This order was not executed, as General Hitchcock reported that it would result in an uprising against the guards at Camps Newton and Chase, and other slenderly guarded places. "Human nature," he said, "would not endure such treatment under an ordinary system of guards." The unhappy soldiers in Southern hands were so debilitated by insufficient food, so deterred by menaces of wholesale massacre, to be mentioned more particularly hereafter, that there was little danger of their rising against their keepers.

Canby's Report, p. 337.

Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton felt keenly the sufferings of these unfortunate soldiers, and every expedient, short of absolute surrender to Mr. Ould's demands, was resorted to in the autumn and winter of 1863, to effect their liberation. Ould stubbornly insisted upon an immediate exchange of all prisoners, the excess on either side to be paroled; and this, while Mr. Davis's proclamation declaring large classes of Federal officers and soldiers outlaws was still in force. Experience had shown that as soon as Ould effected an exchange on parole he would declare the paroled soldiers regularly exchanged, and they would be sent into the field; as there was a large excess of Confederates in Union hands, every exchange was a reënforcement of their armies. Besides this, the Southerners were so much better cared for in Northern prisons that they required far less time for recuperation than the released Union prisoners. Ould himself wrote, in a moment of cynical candor, to his own Government, "The arrangement I have made works

Report on Treatment of Prisoners of War. H. R., 40th Congress, p. 278.

CHAP. XVI. largely in our favor. We get rid of a set of miserable wretches and receive some of the best material I ever saw." While, therefore, the United States Government could not effect the release of all its suffering soldiers the commissioner did all he could by way of partial exchanges. Mr. Ould thriftily managed in all cases to get more than he returned, boasting of his success in this respect in his official reports. Late in November the Union commissioner, sick at heart at the stories brought up by released surgeons of the condition of their comrades, proposed the immediate exchange of twelve thousand on each side, which Ould refused. General Hitchcock, a man of the greatest delicacy and humanity, suggested that another might succeed where he with his best efforts had failed to relieve this vast sum of misery; upon this General Halleck offered General Lee full equivalents for all the Union prisoners in Richmond, leaving other questions for future settlement. General Lee declined the proposition on the 12th, and on the same day the Confederates sent back notice by a flag-of-truce boat that they would receive no more supplies for the relief of Union prisoners.

Canby's Report, pp. 533–542.

Dec. 7, 1863.

In December, 1863, General Butler was put in charge of the exchange of prisoners at Fort Monroe. Mr. Ould was promptly directed to give notice that, as General Butler was under outlawry by order of the Confederate Government, no communication could be held with him, but this puerile attitude was, after a while, tacitly abandoned, and on the 29th of March Ould asked Butler for a conference, and during the next month partial exchanges were resumed. Mr. Ould continued

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reënforcing the Southern armies by releasing exchanged prisoners from their paroles. At one time he declared exchanges when the balance in favor of the Union side was over 34,000 by General Hitchcock's showing, and over 16,000 by his own. Butler wanted the United States Government to follow this bad example, but they declined, preferring to stand the injury rather than begin a competition of bad faith. The War Department estimated that this action of the two Governments, in relation to prisoners, made a difference against the United States, in the campaign of 1864, of forty thousand men.

Canby's Report, p. 354.

Ibid., p. 356.

When General Grant came East, after his appointment to the chief command of all the armies, he introduced a somewhat sterner spirit into the negotiations for exchange. He ordered General Butler to give up no more prisoners, until equivalents for the Vicksburg and Port Hudson captures were received, and to insist upon a formal agreement of the Confederate Government to make no distinction between white and colored prisoners. These requirements were communicated to the Confederate commissioner, and caused a cessation of exchanges. In the face of this altered demeanor of the United States authorities, the Confederates became in turn the suitors for exchange. Unavowed motives were perhaps at work on both sides. General Grant had come to the conclusion that the system of exchange, as carried on, resulted in serious disadvantage to the fighting force of the Union army; while the Confederate authorities had doubtless been somewhat affected by the appalling reports made to them by their own officials of the frightful mortality among the Union prisoners,

Grant to Butler, April 17, 1864. Canby's Report, p. 540.

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threatening their entire extinction; and, besides, the steady advance of Sherman southward made the danger of their rescue every day more serious. The Confederates now began to press for exchange, and the Union authorities to grow more exacting as to conditions. The first intimation received from Mr. Ould that he was ready to exchange prisoners, man for man, was made on the 10th of August, 1864. General Butler replied in a caustic letter, reviewing the whole question in a combative spirit, and demanding a withdrawal of the Confederate menace of death to the negro troops and their officers.

Canby's Report, p. 359.

Commissioner Ould took this letter as a rejection of his offer, and stated in the Richmond papers that the United States had refused the Confederate tender of exchange. This was intended for political effect in the North — the Confederate authorities being much preoccupied at this time with the effort to defeat Mr. Lincoln's reëlection. Howell Cobb wrote to Mr. Seddon suggesting that the prisons be polled, and all soldiers opposed to Lincoln be sent home on parole. He enumerates the following advantages of such a course: "1. We get clear of feeding and guarding that many prisoners. 2. We give that many votes and influence against Lincoln's election. 3. We show the Yankee people that Lincoln is refusing to exchange for political purposes." The Secretary of War referred this ingenious scheme to Mr. Ould, who doubted its efficacy.

Sept. 9, 1864. Treatment of Prisoners, p. 558.

Little was done during the summer and early autumn except to arrange the exchange of some thousands of sick and disabled prisoners; but on the 6th of October, Mr. Ould having made a pro-

posal for the mutual forwarding of supplies to prisoners, the Government of the United States, which had frequently made the same suggestion in vain, now eagerly embraced it. General Grant was authorized also to reopen the subject of exchange. "It is the desire of the President," his instructions said, "that no efforts, consistent with national safety and honor, be spared to effect the prompt release of all soldiers and loyal persons in captivity to the rebels as prisoners of war, or on any other grounds." Yet in spite of the ardent desire of Mr. Lincoln to have the matter expedited, there was so much of technical obstruction and delay that it was the 28th of December before the questions at issue were settled, and the 5th of the next February before all arrangements were made and the final exchanges actually begun. CHAP. XVI. 1864. 1865.

As to the comparative treatment of prisoners by the respective sides there is no room for doubt. The two ponderous volumes of testimony to which allusion has been made contain unquestionable evidence of nameless suffering, which we cannot bring ourselves, at this day, even to summarize. In addition to these, there is the report of the Select Committee of the Thirty-eighth Congress, describing the shocking condition of released Union prisoners at Annapolis; and the more elaborate and careful report of the Commission of Inquiry, appointed by the United States Sanitary Commission, consisting of eminent physicians, jurists, and clergymen. Special students of the subject are referred to these documents; they disclose a state of facts not fit for general reading. The spirit of the time, the circumstances of the case which made

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Of course there are counter-charges from the other side; but there is a noticeable difference of tone in the accounts given by Union men of Southern prisons and those in which Confederate soldiers describe their treatment in the North; in the one there is a grim, gloomy earnestness, as of men who have been saturated with horrors which have permanently darkened their lives; in the other there is the note of humorous petulance, the style in which a young clerk abuses his boarding-house, or the tourist lashes out at the railway restaurant. Among the worst outrages of which they complain were the rough words they sometimes received from guards and the insolent looks of the negro soldiers. The Southerners were, of course, not happy at Johnson's Island or Fort Delaware; it is inconvenient to be restrained of one's liberty, and prison fare is not always plentiful or palatable. But all the reports agree that there was no systematic overcrowding, and the ration was wholesome and sufficient. At Fort Delaware every prisoner could bathe in the river as often as he chose; each prisoner had a bunk to himself; their health improved steadily from the beginning to the end of their imprisonment. Johnson's Island, in Sandusky Bay, is a pleasant spot, though the Confederates complained of the cold in winter. It em-

Report of Sanitary Commission, p. 19.

braced three hundred acres; the prison buildings were substantial and not uncomfortable; there was a spacious square for the exercise of the prisoners; there were never more than twenty-five hundred men there at once. At Andersonville the prison-pen measured thirty-five acres in all, many acres of which were swamp; and in that inclosure were crammed 35,000 men. At Point Lookout, one of the largest depots, there were about 9000 Confederate prisoners, and only 400 in hospital. Miss Dix reported the following *menu* for the sick: Beef tea, beef soup, rice, milk punch, milk, gruel, lemonade, stewed fruits, beefsteak, mutton, and vegetables. These things are not said with any motive of laudation. There was no reason why prisoners should not be treated kindly in Northern prisons; money and stores were plentiful; there would have been no excuse for privation. It would have been impossible for the Confederates to treat their prisoners equally well; the captives at Fort Delaware fared better than the clerks in the Departments at Richmond. There was a difference of motive also. The United States Government always looked forward to the time when their enemies would be citizens and friends; the hope of the Confederates was that they should be forever aliens.

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"Report of Sanitary Commission," p. 22.

Unfortunately, it cannot be said that Union prisoners at the South were treated as well as was possible. We will use, in proof of this, only the reluctant testimony of Southern officials.

In the summer of 1864, Lieutenant-Colonel D. T. Chandler was sent to Andersonville to inspect the prison there. From his report to the Confederate authorities we condense the following statement, in

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which his own words are generally used. The Federal prisoners were confined in a stockade, fifteen feet high, inclosing an area of 540 by 260 yards; a railing around the inside of the stockade, and about twenty feet from it, constituted the dead-line, beyond which prisoners were forbidden to pass on pain of death; the center was occupied by a noisome swamp covering three and a half acres; "reducing the available area to 23½ acres, which gives somewhat less than six square feet to each prisoner."[1] A small stream passing through the inclosure furnished the only water for washing accessible to the prisoners, and the troops of the guard encamped above the stockade rendered this water unfit for use. The soil on the edges of the stream being used as a sink was a loathsome marsh, breeding pestilence. There was no shelter for prisoners; they were exposed to all the rigor of the skies; they died of sunstroke at one time, of cold and exposure at others. The crowding and the famine developed frightful accesses of passion among them: the strong oppressed the weak; murders were not uncommon, until at last the prisoners themselves organized a Lynch court and hanged six of the homicides. There was no medical attendance provided within the stockade; medical officers appeared at the gates each day,

Lieut.-Col. Chandler to Col. Chilton, Aug. 5, 1864. Trial of Henry Wirz," p. 224.

[1] This is Colonel Chandler's estimate, which he defended on cross-examination. It is the lowest we have seen; another Confederate account gives between three and four square yards to each person; the Congressional Committee estimated that the available space was eighteen square feet to each man. Report H. R., p. 225, "Trial of Henry Wirz," p. 241. The discrepancy probably arises from the fact that Col. Chandler excluded in his calculation the ground which was unfit for occupancy, but which was nevertheless occupied. In either case crowding 35,000 men in the space described means simply suffocation.

but the crowd of agonized wretches was so great that only the strongest could be served. There were hospitals outside, but they afforded no room for a tithe of the sick. The dead who had died from unknown causes, and whom the medical officers had never seen, were daily carted out of the stockade by the score. They were tumbled into nameless graves; their fingers were chopped off with axes to remove their rings. Colonel Chandler was shocked at the sanitary condition of the place; the prisoners were dying like flies from scurvy and diarrhea; no effort, he said, was made to arrest the mortality by means of proper food; the ration consisted of a little bacon and unbolted cornmeal, many witnesses testifying that the grain and the cobs were ground up together. No soap or clothing was ever issued. The death rate increased with appalling rapidity; in March it was $3\frac{7}{10}$ per cent. a month, in July, $6\frac{3}{10}$. Colonel Chandler concluded his report with this terrible arraignment of General Winder. He recommended his removal "and the substitution in his place of some one who unites both energy and good judgment with some feeling of humanity and consideration for the welfare and comfort . . . of the vast number of unfortunates placed under his control; some one who at least will not advocate deliberately and in cold blood the propriety of leaving them in their present condition until their number has been sufficiently reduced by death to make the present arrangement suffice for their accommodation; who will not consider it a matter of self-laudation and boasting that he has never been inside the stockade, a place the horrors of which it is difficult to describe, and

CHAP. XVI.

Chandler to Chilton, Aug. 5, 1864. "Trial of Henry Wirz," p. 227.

which is a disgrace to civilization; the condition of which he might, by the exercise of a little energy and judgment, even with the limited means at his command, have considerably improved." We may safely leave the case with these words of honest indignation from a truthful and high-minded Confederate officer. Winder soon afterwards received a promotion, and was made commissary-general of Union prisoners.

Side by side with this report of a professional soldier, we will place a few extracts from the report of an eminent Southern surgeon, Dr. Joseph Jones, who inspected Andersonville in August, 1864, under the orders of the Confederate surgeon-general, not with any humane intention towards the prisoners, but purely in the interest of pathology.[1] It is written in a manner curiously calm and cold, and the good faith of the writer is made evident by his throwing upon the Government of the United States the blame for the miseries he so graphically describes. We are forced to omit the most revolting particulars of this singular document, but a few passages will serve to show a condition of things which would sound incredible if related of Zululand. The report sets forth that the large number of men confined within the stockade soon, under a defective system of police, covered the low ground with ordure, which, by occasional rising of the water in time of rain, was distributed over the inclosure, there being not force of current sufficient to carry it away. The refuse of the camp was thrown there; the action of the

[1] This report is printed in full in the "Trial of Henry Wirz," pp. 618–642.

sun excited rapid fermentation and a horrible stench; the stagnant water quivered with life.

Dr. Jones not only found the hospital overcrowded, but the stockade filled with sick who were receiving no care. There were great numbers walking about, suffering with severe and incurable diarrhea, dysentery, and scurvy. Men died by hundreds, and their deaths were entered in the books under the head *Morbi varii*, showing they had not even been seen by a surgeon. Dr. Jones found to his surprise few cases of malarial fever; he inferred "that the artificial atmosphere of the stockade, crowded densely with human beings, and loaded with animal exhalations, was unfavorable to the existence and action of malarial poison." The effects of scurvy were manifested on every hand, and in all its various stages, from the muddy, pale complexion, pale gums, feeble, languid muscular motions to the swollen features, livid, bleeding gums, loose teeth, œdematous limbs, spasmodically flexed extremities, spontaneous hemorrhages, and large, spreading ulcers covered with purplish, fungous growth. From the crowded condition, filthy habits, bad diet, and depressed condition of the prisoners, their systems had become so disordered that the smallest abrasion of the skin, from the rubbing of a shoe, or from the effects of the sun, or from the prick of a splinter, or from scratching, or a mosquito bite, took on rapid and frightful ulceration and gangrene. He attributes this morbid condition to the improper food furnished; asserts that it might easily be improved by giving the prisoners green corn and other vegetables, which were plentiful. He draws this hideous

"Trial of Henry Wirz," p. 637.

Ibid., p. 625.

CHAP. XVI. picture: "The haggard, distressed countenances of these miserable, complaining, dejected living skeletons, crying for medical aid and food, and cursing their Government for its refusal to exchange prisoners, and the ghastly corpses with their glazed eyeballs staring up into vacant space, with the flies swarming down their open and grinning mouths and over their ragged clothes infested with numerous lice, as they lay among the sick and dying!" To the want of proper police and hygienic regulations also he attributed the dreadful aggregate of nearly ten thousand deaths from February to September.

"Trial of Henry Wirz," p. 226.

1864.

There can be no accurate count of the mortality in rebel prisons. The report made by the War Department to the Fortieth Congress shows that about 188,000 Union soldiers were captured by the Confederates; that half of them were paroled, and half confined in prison; of this number 36,000 died in captivity. The Union armies, on the other hand, captured 476,000 Confederates; of these 227,000 were retained as prisoners, and 30,000 died. While the percentage of mortality in Northern prisons was thirteen in the hundred, that in rebel prisons was thirty-eight.

We will not continue the recital of those monotonous miseries which meet us in the history of Libby, of Salisbury, and of Belle Isle in the very sight of the Confederate Government at Richmond. There are other reports, like that of Colonel Chandler, of honorable Confederate officers outraged beyond endurance by the sufferings which seemed to them wantonly inflicted upon helpless prisoners. There is the evidence of Southern priests whose

hearts were torn by the agonies of Catholic soldiers, dying of want and privation in the murderous stockade. But this cumulation of anguish would be an ungrateful task. We will refer to only two more incidents, which show how the terror of immediate and violent death was occasionally added to the daily torments, to stifle every aspiration for freedom in the hearts of the miserable captives. At the time of Kilpatrick's abortive cavalry raid towards Richmond, it was feared the city might be taken and the prisoners rescued. We will not trust ourselves to tell in our own language the means adopted to prevent such a rescue. A joint committee of the Confederate Congress say of it in a report intended to vindicate their action in the treatment of prisoners, "A mine was prepared under the Libby prison; a sufficient quantity of gunpowder was put into it, and pains were taken to inform the prisoners that any attempt at escape made by them would be effectually defeated." In July, 1864, when Sherman's rapid march towards Atlanta had thoroughly alarmed the Confederates as to the safety of the prisoners they held, General Winder issued an order to the guards on duty at Andersonville, "on receiving notice that the enemy have approached within seven miles of this post to open fire upon the stockade with grape shot, without reference to the situation beyond these lines of defense. It is better," he added, "that the last Federal be exterminated than be permitted to burn and pillage the property of loyal citizens, as they will do, if allowed to make their escape from prison." Here is no pretense of necessity, nor of self-defense; General Winder

Printed in full in Pollard, "The Lost Cause," pp. 629–641.

July 27, 1864. "Treatment of Prisoners of War," p. 31.

CHAP. XVI. simply says it is better to slaughter thirty thousand helpless, starving men than run the risk of a Georgia farmer losing his hayrick. Justice is sometimes wrought in strange ways. This heartless jailer, who boasted to Colonel Chandler that he had never been inside the stockade, and that, if it was too crowded, he would kill enough to make it fit, was still near enough to his victims to breathe their tainted air. He contracted gangrene of the face and died not long after his promotion.

"Southern Historical Society Papers." Vol. I., p. 183.

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